ORDER : KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. 1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 to assail the order dated 19.2.2018, passed by Family Court, Alwar in Criminal Misc. Case No. 1/191/2016 titled Smt. Sapna & Anr. v. Manoj Kumar, whereby the trial court in an application filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973 by the aggrieved wife awarded interim maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month in favour of respondent wife and also Rs. 2,000/- per month as interim maintenance in favour of minor son of the petitioner. 2. Briefly stated, the petitioner Manoj Kumar and respondent Smt. Sapna on 19.11.2012 were married as per Hindu customs and rites at Alwar. At the time of marriage, father of respondent Smt. Sapna had given dowry beyond his capacity. On 25.8.2014, from the loins of petitioner and womb of respondent Sapna, a son was born, who was later named as Aarvi Singh. Due to matrimonial dispute and cruelty caused and because of demand of Car by the accused, respondent Smt. Sapna as per averments made in the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973 was compelled to leave the house of the petitioner. She returned to her parental house along with her son in November, 2014. On 25.7.2016, she filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973 praying for grant of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973 for herself and son. The petitioner filed reply to the application filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973 stating that the respondent wife has obtained qualification of M.A., B.Ed. and is working as Teacher in Lords International School, Alwar and is earning Rs. 10,000/-. 3. The trial court vide impugned order, after examining the contentions raised, awarded interim maintenance and held that no evidence has been led that the respondent aggrieved wife is working lady. The trial court also came to conclusion that even non-applicant has failed to prove that the petitioner is working and earning salary Rs. 15,000/- per month in a Mall. Thus, the trial court concluded as under:- "This court is of considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, when there is allegations of dowry demand and other mental torture in such a situation it cannot be said that the applicant are living separately without any valid reason. 15,000/- per month in a Mall. Thus, the trial court concluded as under:- "This court is of considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, when there is allegations of dowry demand and other mental torture in such a situation it cannot be said that the applicant are living separately without any valid reason. (Emphasis supplied) As such, without going into merit and demerit of the case and the allegations made by the parties against each other, I find it just and proper to pass an order of interim maintenance in favour of applicants. Treating the minimum wage obtained by the non-applicant as Rs. 9,000 per month, a sum of Rs. 2,000 to be given to the wife and Rs. 2,000 to be given to the minor child per month as interim maintenance from the date of application till the final disposal of the main application." 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner to assail the impugned order passed by the trial court has primarily raised plea that the respondent wife is not entitled to grant of maintenance, as she has withdrawn herself from the company of petitioner without any sufficient cause. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Section 125(4) Cr.P.C., 1973 to urge that the respondent wife without any sufficient reason has refused to live with the petitioner. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon Section 125(5) Cr.P.C., 1973 to contend that there is order in favour of the petitioner from the court of law from which it can be inferred that wife has refused to live with her husband. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this court to petition Annexure-3 filed by him under section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, filed for restitution of conjugal rights. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that upon filing petition Annexure-3, the court of Principal District Judge, Hissar, had passed decree under section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act by holding that the respondent wife has withdrawn from the company of the petitioner without any just reason. Concluding Para-6 of the judgment rendered by Principal District Judge, Family Court, Hissar, reads as under"- "6. There is no evidence in rebuttal available on record. Concluding Para-6 of the judgment rendered by Principal District Judge, Family Court, Hissar, reads as under"- "6. There is no evidence in rebuttal available on record. It is established from the un-rebutted evidence led by petitioner that the respondent is his legally wedded wife who has withdrawn from his society without just excuse. It may be very safely said that there is no legal ground why the prayer should not be granted and it is not hit by any of the disqualification mentioned in section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955." 6. A perusal of the above judgment of which Para-6 has been reproduced, reveals that the respondent aggrieved wife was proceeded ex-parte, hence, the judgment Annexure-4 is an ex-parte judgment. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Satish v. Smt. Yoglata & Anr. reported in 2009 (1) WLC 608 . Para-6 to 8 of the said judgments reads as under:- 6. I have gone through the judgment reported in 2003 (2) RCC 751 very carefully. In that case the decree of restitution of conjugal rights was passed ex-parte whereas in the present case the decree is not ex-parte. Therefore, 2003 (2) RCC 751 is clearly distinguishable. (Emphasis supplied) 7. The decree of restitution of conjugal rights passed in favour of the petitioner does not lose its legal value because the petitioner thereafter files an application under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 8. It is true that second revision is not maintainable but this court can and must interfere under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Here is a case where it is obligatory for this court to interfere to secure the ends of justice." 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has conveniently read Para-5 of the above judgment, ignoring Para-4 and Para-6, wherein the court noted two judgments where an ex-parte judgment and decree was not relied. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon another judgment rendered by co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in Chandra Kalla v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in 2013 (2) Cri.L.R. 1031, wherein it was held that decree of divorce has not been challenged on the ground of desertion. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon another judgment rendered by co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in Chandra Kalla v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in 2013 (2) Cri.L.R. 1031, wherein it was held that decree of divorce has not been challenged on the ground of desertion. Having held so, the court denied maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973 to Chandra Kalla petitioner in that case. 10. Reliance has also been placed on another judgment rendered by Single Judge of Delhi High Court in the case of Yashika Mehndiratta v. Amit Mehndiratta reported in 2014 (7) RCR (Cr.) 371, wherein it was held that where a wife has refused to join company of the husband, she is not entitled to grant of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973 Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:- "13. In the facts of the present case, the petitioner herself has admitted that she was always ready and willing to join the company of her husband and stay in the matrimonial home but was pressurised by her parents to live with them at her parental house and was not in a position to muster the courage to defy the wishes of her parents. With such admissions on the part of the petitioner, it has become quite evident that the Respondent - husband cannot be blamed at all for the separate living of his wife as he was always ready and willing to live with her." 11. As noted in the present case, the judgment Annexure-4 relied by the petitioner against the respondent wife is an ex-parte judgment. 12. What is effect if an ex-parte judgment is rendered against the aggrieved wife, is an issue which is no longer res integra. 13. A Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in the case of Ravi Kumar v. Santosh Kumari reported in 1997 (3) RCR(Criminal) 3, examined this issue and after taking entire case law into consideration, held as under:- "3. In this petition, the husband Ravi Kumar has challenged the judgment dated 17.9.1991 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur. This petition came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 10th January, 1994. In this petition, the husband Ravi Kumar has challenged the judgment dated 17.9.1991 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur. This petition came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 10th January, 1994. The learned Single Judge found that there was a conflict of authorities of different High Courts on the point as to whether the wife against whom decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed, is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. In view of this, the learned Single Judge directed that the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to decide this question. This is how this case has come up before this Bench to decide the following question of law : "Whether the wife against whom decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed, is entitled to claim maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?" 4. Mr. Chaudhary, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the learned Trial Court in his order dated 12th July, 1990, had given a clear finding that the respondent-wife had failed to prove any sufficient reason for residing separately from the petitioner-husband and in view of the provisions contained in Section 125(4) of the Code, the respondent was not entitled to receive maintenance allowance from the petitioner. He further submitted that during the pendency of the revision petition filed by the respondent-wife against the aforesaid order dated 12.7.1990, the petition filed by the husband under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur, vide his order dated 17.8.1991. He drew our attention to this judgment and submitted that from this judgment it was clear that on the basis of the pleadings in that case, one of the issues framed was : "Whether the respondent withdrew from the society of the petitioner without reasonable and sufficient cause ?" 5. After the parties led evidence on this issue, the learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that the respondent-wife was guilty of deserting the petitioner without any sufficient and reasonable cause. Consequently, he allowed the petition of the husband under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Mr. After the parties led evidence on this issue, the learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that the respondent-wife was guilty of deserting the petitioner without any sufficient and reasonable cause. Consequently, he allowed the petition of the husband under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Mr. Chaudhary, therefore, contended that since the respondent-wife herself was guilty for withdrawal from the society of the husband, she could not claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the following judgments: (1) Chander Kumar Sharma v. Smt. Shanvit Sharma 1989 (1) Ch. LR 486; (2) Joginder Singh v. Dilbir Kaur (1980) 82 PLR 665; (3) Piara Singh v. Satwant Kaur 1988 (2) RCR 389; (4) Jasbir Singh v. Amrit Kaur Walia 1991 (2) RCR 306; (5) Murlidhar Chintatnan Waghmare v. Smt. Pratibha Murlidhar Waghmare & Anr. 1986 Crl. LJ 1216. 6. Mr. Ahluwalia, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent, however submitted that the decree of restitution of conjugal rights against the wife ipso facto shall not debar the Magistrate to grant maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 He further submitted that the judgment of a Civil Court in exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction would be binding only in respect of matrimonial status between the parties and it will not be binding in respect of matters other than matrimonial status. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the following judgments : (1) K. Narayan Rao v. Bhagya Laxmi 1984 CrI. LJ 276. (2) Amin Chand v. Shakuntla Devi 1996 (1) RCR 143; (3) Babu Lal v. Sunita. 7. The learned Counsel further submitted that if a decree for conjugal rights was obtained subsequent to an order for maintenance, the decree would not ipso facto end the right of maintenance. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the following judgments : (1) Smt. Sheela Rani v. Durga Parshad; (2) Jhanwar Lal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1969 Raj. (3) Kundan Lal v. Shanti Devi. 8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the records. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, it will be appropriate to refer to Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 which read as under : "125. 8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the records. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, it will be appropriate to refer to Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 which read as under : "125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents-(1) if any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain- (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the First Class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct : Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in Clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. Explanation-For the purposes of this Chapter,- (a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875) is deemed not to have attained his majority; (b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband has not remarried. xxx xxx xxx (4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent." 9. From Sub-section (4) it is clear that the wife shall not be entitled to receive allowance from her husband under Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 if without any sufficient reason, she refused to live with her husband. From Sub-section (4) it is clear that the wife shall not be entitled to receive allowance from her husband under Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 if without any sufficient reason, she refused to live with her husband. Admittedly, proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 are summary proceedings. It is settled law that the judgment of a Civil Court in exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction would be binding between the parties in respect of matters pending before the Matrimonial Court under Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 only if in the proceedings before Civil Court, specific issues have been framed and the parties have been given opportunity to lead evidence and specific findings are recorded by the Civil Court. In this connection reference may be made to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Chander Kumar Sharma (supra) relevant portion of which is reproduced below: "In this view of the matter, final judgment of a competent Civil Court in exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction would be binding even in respect of matters other than dealing with legal character, and marital status between the parties regarding which specific issues have been framed, and the parties have been given opportunity to lead evidence and specific findings are recorded by the Civil Court. In that eventuality Criminal Courts cannot be permitted to re-open such findings which would be binding between the parties before the Criminal Courts query with regard to question No. 1 is answered accordingly." (Emphasis Supplied) 10. With respect, we also agree with the ratio of the Division Bench Judgment in the case of Chander Kumar Sharma (supra). We are, therefore, of the opinion that the wife against whom decree of restitution of conjugal rights had been passed would not be entitled to claim allowance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 if in the proceedings of restitution of conjugal rights, a specific issue has been framed on the point 'as to whether without any sufficient reason, the wife refused to live with the husband' and the parties have been given an opportunity to lead evidence and thereafter specific findings are recorded by the Civil Court. A fortiori, in case the husband has got an ex-parte decree of conjugal rights from the Civil Court, it shall not be binding on the Criminal Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 (Emphasis Supplied) We are further of the opinion that in case decree for conjugal rights is obtained by the husband subsequent to the order for maintenance passed by the Magistrate under Section 125, Cr.P.C,, 1973 then the decree ipso facto shall not end the right of maintenance and in that case the husband will have to approach the Court of the Magistrate under Sub-section (5) of Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 for cancelling the order granting maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 11. We may also make it clear that in case the wife against whom decree of restitution of conjugal rights in the manner indicated above has been passed, will get the right to claim maintenance from the date when she is granted divorce and she will be entitled to this maintenance till she re-marries. In this connection, reference may be made to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Vanamala v. Shri H.M. Ranganatha Bhatia. The relevant portion from this judgment is reproduced herein below : "On a plain reading of this section [Section 125(4)] it seems fairly clear that the expression "wife' in the said sub-section does not have the extended meaning of including a woman who has been divorced. This is for the obvious reason that unless there is a relationship of husband and wife there can be no question of a divorcee woman living in adultery or without sufficient reason refusing to live with her husband. After divorce where is the occasion for the woman to live with her husband ? Similarly there would be no question of the husband and wife living separately by mutual consent because after divorce there is no need for consent to live separately: In the context, therefore, Sub-section (4) of Section 125 does not apply to the case of a woman who has been divorced or who has obtained a decree for divorce." 12. Similarly there would be no question of the husband and wife living separately by mutual consent because after divorce there is no need for consent to live separately: In the context, therefore, Sub-section (4) of Section 125 does not apply to the case of a woman who has been divorced or who has obtained a decree for divorce." 12. We, therefore, answer the question of law referred to us as follows: (1) The wife against whom a decree of restitution of conjugal rights has been passed by the Civil Court, shall not be entitled to claim allowance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 if in the proceedings of restitution of conjugal rights before the Civil Court, a specific issue has been framed that whether without sufficient reason, the wife refuses to live with the husband, and the parties have been given an opportunity to lead evidence and thereafter specific findings are recorded by the Civil Court on this issue (Emphasis Supplied); (2) But in case the husband has got an ex-parte decree of restitution of conjugal rights from the Civil Court, such decree shall not be binding on the Criminal Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (Emphasis Supplied); (3) In case the decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been obtained by the husband subsequent to the order for maintenance passed by the Magistrate under Section 125, Cr.P.C., 1973 then the decree ipso facto, shall not disentitle the wife to her right of maintenance and in that case, the husband will have to approach the Court of the Magistrate under Sub-section (5) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for cancelling the order granting maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C;, 1973 and (4) The wife against whom decree of restitution of conjugal rights in the manner indicated in our first conclusion has been passed, will get the right to claim maintenance from the husband with effect from the date when she is granted divorce and she will continue getting this maintenance till she re-marries." 14. Since in the present case, petitioner had obtained ex-parte judgment and decree of restitution of conjugal rights and no opportunity was given to the wife to lead evidence, therefore, the finding given in judgment Annexure-4 is not a contested finding. Since in the present case, petitioner had obtained ex-parte judgment and decree of restitution of conjugal rights and no opportunity was given to the wife to lead evidence, therefore, the finding given in judgment Annexure-4 is not a contested finding. Hence, no reliance can be placed upon ex-parte judgment under section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, as it is specific case of respondent wife in petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973 that she was turned out of the matrimonial house. Therefore, relying upon the judgment rendered by Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ravi Kumar v. Santosh Kumari (supra), it is held that ex-parte judgment or decree under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be relied within the ambit of Section 125(5) Cr.P.C., 1973 to deny maintenance to respondent wife. 15. In view of observations made above, the present petition is dismissed.