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2018 DIGILAW 1411 (MAD)

S. Rajesh Kannan v. C. Johnshy

2018-04-11

J.NISHA BANU

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2009, passed by the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, in G.W.O.P.No.195 of 2009, in and by which, the appellant's claim seeking custody of the minor child came to be negatived. 2. The facts of the case are that the marriage between the appellant and the first respondent was solemnized on 17.04.2002 and out of the wedlock, a minor child, namely, R.J. Jennishkaan, born on 18.09.2003. Due to some misunderstanding, divorce petition came to be filed and on 24.10.2007, a decree for divorce came to be passed on mutual consent in H.M.O.P.No.18 of 2007. At the time of granting divorce, it was agreed by both the parties that the custody of the minor child to be with the first respondent. 3. Thereafter, the first respondent got married with the second respondent and out of this wedlock, she gave birth to a female child. It is the grievance of the appellant that the minor boy, R.J.Jennishkaan, was not sent to School after the second marriage and he was treated as a labourer. Moreover, the appellant was not permitted to meet his son. After some legal struggles, according to the appellant, he has filed the impugned petition seeking custody of the minor boy. 4. Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the documents placed on record. 5. Going by the facts of the case, it is seen that the respondents remained absent before the Court below. However, the Court below has passed a detailed order touching all the aspects and its legality has been questioned in the present appeal. Ex.P.4 is the agreement of divorce entered into between the appellant and the first respondent, wherein, it is clearly established that the appellant agreed for the custody of the minor child to be with the first respondent. It is necessary to reiterate that by mutual consent, divorce was granted. 6. It is seen that the appellant has averred that the minor boy has been treated as a labourer to the personal needs of the second respondent. However, no evidences have been adduced to that effect, except oral pleadings. It is the specific contention of the appellant that he was not allowed to see the minor boy. 6. It is seen that the appellant has averred that the minor boy has been treated as a labourer to the personal needs of the second respondent. However, no evidences have been adduced to that effect, except oral pleadings. It is the specific contention of the appellant that he was not allowed to see the minor boy. However, on a perusal of the records, it is seen that the appellant neither lodged a complaint nor filed a petition in this regard before any of the forum. In the absence of any such efforts of the appellant, this Court is not inclined to accede with the oral submission of the appellant. 7. On a perusal of documents, it is seen that before the Court below, the appellant has relied upon certain judgments and even in those judgments, it was held that what has to be seen is the welfare of the child, i.e., the welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration of the Courts. 8. The impugned order was passed in the year 2009 and at that time, the age of the minor boy was 6 years. Taking into consideration the age of the child, the learned Judge has held that removing the child from the custody of the mother/first respondent without knowing the willingness of the child would affect its welfare and therefore, negatived the appellant's claim. However, the learned Judge has granted visitation rights to the appellant on every Saturday and Sunday between 9 A.M., to 1 P.M. 9. We are in the year 2018 and now, the age of the child would be 15 years. In another three years, the child itself will become major and he will be able in a position to decide his needs. At this juncture, any interference by this Court would only disturb the welfare of the child and at this lengthy point of time, I do not find any valid reasons to interfere with the impugned order and therefore, this civil miscellaneous petition is liable to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.