JUDGMENT Hon’ble Salil Kumar Rai, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The dispute in the present writ petition as well as in the consolidation proceedings from which the present writ petition arises relates to Khata Nos. 38Ka, 38Kha and 120 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘disputed property’). 3. The facts of the case are that one Ram Din was the original tenure holder of the disputed property. Sheo Barat was the son of Ram Din. The aforesaid facts are admitted by the parties. The contention of the petitioner is that Chauthi i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner and respondent Nos. 3 to 5 was the only son of Sheo Barat. On the other hand, the contention of respondent No. 2 had been that Chauthi and respondent No. 2 were the sons of Sheo Barat who was also known as Ameer. During the consolidation proceedings, Case Nos. 6979 and 6987 under Section 9A-(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘Act, 1953’) were registered in the Court of Consolidation Officer on the issue whether Chauthi was the sole tenure holder of the disputed plots and the decision of the said issue depended on the answer to the question as to whether respondent No. 2 was also the son of Sheo Barat. It is admitted between the parties that Kabili was the wife of Sheo Barat and Kabili was the mother of both Chauthi and respondent No. 2. However, the contention of the petitioner as well as respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 before the consolidation authorities was that after the death of Sheo Barat, Kabili had started living with another person, named, Ameer and respondent No. 2 was born from the relationship between Kabili and Ameer and therefore was not the son of Sheo Barat. From a perusal of the records, it appears that before the consolidation authorities, respondent No. 2 had admitted that after the death of Sheo Barat, Kabili had started living with some other person but asserted that he i.e. respondent No. 2 was the son of Sheo Barat. In Case Nos. From a perusal of the records, it appears that before the consolidation authorities, respondent No. 2 had admitted that after the death of Sheo Barat, Kabili had started living with some other person but asserted that he i.e. respondent No. 2 was the son of Sheo Barat. In Case Nos. 6979 and 6987 registered before the Consolidation Officer, certain revenue records were filed by the petitioner in which Chauthi was recorded as the only son and heir of Sheo Barat while respondent No. 2 filed copies of the khatauni of 1359 Fasli relating to Khata No. 129 and Khatauni of 1362 Fasli relating to Khata No. 55 in which Chauthi and respondent No. 2 were recorded as co-tenure holders of certain plots being the sons and heirs of Sheo Barat. Before the Consolidation Officer, respondent No. 2 had also filed copies of the family registers which reflected that Chauthi and he belonged to the same family and respondent No. 2 was the son of Sheo Barat. Apart from the above, the petitioner had also filed the revenue records relating to 1356 and 1359 Fasli which showed that one Kali Charan was recorded as tenure holder of certain plots in the aforesaid revenue records alongwith one Ameer who was shown to be son of one Punarwasi. The aforesaid document was filed by the petitioner to controvert the allegation of respondent No. 2 that Sheo Barat and Ameer were the same person and to prove that Sheo Barat and Ameer were two different persons. 4. The Consolidation Officer, vide his judgment and order dated 2.12.1974, decided Case Nos. 6979 and 6987 against respondent No. 2 directing that the name of respondent No. 2 be deleted from the revenue records relating to the disputed property. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 2.12.1974, respondent No. 2 filed an appeal under Section 11 (1) of the Act, 1953 before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation which was numbered as Appeal No. 2563 and the said appeal was dismissed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation vide his judgment and order dated 27.4.1976. Consequently, respondent No. 2 filed a revision under Section 48 (1) of the Act, 1953 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation registering Revision No. 5261 of 1976 which has been allowed by the revisional Court vide its judgment and order dated 20.12.1979. Consequently, respondent No. 2 filed a revision under Section 48 (1) of the Act, 1953 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation registering Revision No. 5261 of 1976 which has been allowed by the revisional Court vide its judgment and order dated 20.12.1979. The judgment and order dated 20.12.1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation has been challenged in the present writ petition. 5. While challenging the order dated 20.12.1979, Sri Vishnu Singh, counsel for the petitioner, has argued that the under the Act, 1953, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation is the final Court of fact and while allowing Revision No. 5261 of 1976 through his impugned order dated 20.12.1979, the Deputy Director of Consolidation exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 48 (1) of the Act, 1953 by re-appreciating the evidence on record and by recording a finding contrary to the findings recorded by the sub-ordinate consolidation authorities. In support of his aforesaid submission, Sri Vishnu Singh, counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ram Dular v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and others, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 198, as well as the judgment of this Court in Shambhoo and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and another, 2014(10) ADJ 557 . It has been further argued by counsel for the petitioner that from the documents available on record and also from the oral testimony of Bhagauti, it was evident that Sheo Barat and Ameer were two different persons and respondent No. 2 was the son of Ameer and not the son of Sheo Barat and therefore the Consolidation Officer as well as the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, after considering the evidence on record, had rightly rejected the claim of respondent No. 2 on the disputed property and the findings of Deputy Director of Consolidation that respondent No. 2 was also the son of Sheo Barat was without any evidence and also contrary to the evidence on record. It has been contended by counsel for the petitioner that for the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 20.12.1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is liable to be set-aside and the writ petition is liable to be allowed. It has been contended by counsel for the petitioner that for the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 20.12.1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is liable to be set-aside and the writ petition is liable to be allowed. Rebutting the contention of counsel for the petitioner, counsel for respondent No. 2 has argued that from the materials available on record, especially the family registers produced by respondent No. 2, it was proved that respondent No. 2 was also the son of Sheo Barat and the said fact was also proved from the revenue records of 1359 Fasli and 1362 Fasli filed by respondent No. 2 before the Consolidation Officer. It has been contended by counsel for respondent No. 2 that the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation had ignored the aforesaid documents and for the said reason, the findings of the sub-ordinate consolidation authorities were illegal and against the settled principles of law and, therefore, under Section 48 (1) of the Act 1953, the Deputy Director of Consolidation had the jurisdiction to intervene in the same and record a contrary finding on the basis of available material. It has been contended by counsel for respondent that for the said reasons, the order dated 20.12.1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is within his jurisdiction and there is no illegality in the same and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have considered the rival submissions of counsel for the parties. 7. A perusal of the order dated 2.12.1974 passed by the Consolidation Officer shows that revenue records of 1359 Fasli and 1362 Fasli as well as the family registers which showed that Chauthi and respondent No. 2 belonged to the same family and were the sons of Sheo Barat were not considered by the Consolidation Officer. In his judgment and order dated 27.4.1976, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation has rejected the family registers filed by respondent No. 2 on the ground that voters list and family registers are not proof of the paternity of any person. A perusal of the judgment and order dated 27.4.1976 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation also shows that in his aforesaid judgment, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation has not considered the entries in the revenue records of 1359 Fasli and 1362 Fasli. A perusal of the judgment and order dated 27.4.1976 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation also shows that in his aforesaid judgment, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation has not considered the entries in the revenue records of 1359 Fasli and 1362 Fasli. It is noticeable that the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, while recording a finding regarding the paternity of respondent No. 2 and that he was not the son of Sheo Barat, have relied on different revenue records which showed that the properties included in the said revenue records devolved only on Chauthi as the son of Sheo Barat but failed to consider the effect of the entries in the revenue records relating to 1359 Fasli and 1362 Fasli. 8. In his judgment dated 27.4.1976, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation while recording a finding regarding the paternity of respondent No. 2 has also relied on the oral testimony of Bhagauti wherein the witness had testified that Ameer and Punarwasi lived in the same house. Relying on the said testimony, the Settlement Officer drew the conclusion that Ameer was the son of Punarwasi and thus Ameer and Sheo Barat were two different persons, which according to Settlement Officer disproved the case of respondent No. 2. 9. In his impugned judgment and order dated 20.12.1979, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has taken note of the failure of the Consolidation Officer as well as the Settlement Officer of Consolidation in considering the entries in the revenue records relating to 1359 and 1362 Fasli relating to Khata Nos. 129 and 55 from which it could be deduced that respondent No. 2 and Chauthi were sons and heirs of Sheo Barat. In his impugned order dated 20.12.1979, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has also recorded the fact that the revenue records relating to 1356 Fasli, which showed Ameer as the son of Punarwasi, may have been relevant to decide the paternity of Ameer but were not relevant to decide the issue relating to paternity of respondent No. 2 unless it was shown that respondent No. 2, on the basis of entries in the revenue records relating to 1356 Fasli, had succeeded to the property of Ameer which, as the Deputy Director of Consolidation has recorded in his order dated 20.12.1979, was not proved by the petitioner. 10. 10. In his judgment and order dated 20.12.1979, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has taken note of the fact that the sub-ordinate Consolidation Officers had illegally failed to consider the aforesaid documents i.e. the family registers, which clearly proved that respondent No. 2 was also the son of Sheo Barat and for the said reason, the Deputy Director of Consolidation set-aside the judgment and orders dated 2.12.1974 and 27.4.1976 passed by the sub-ordinate consolidation authorities. 11. I do not find any illegality in the aforesaid approach of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It is evident that in their judgments dated 2.12.1974 and 27.4.1976, the Consolidation Officer as well as Settlement Officer of Consolidation had not considered the entries in the family register as well as in the revenue records of 1359 Fasli and 1362 Fasli while recording a finding regarding the paternity of respondent No. 2. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in his judgment and order dated 20.12.1979 rightly held that the entries in the family registers as well as different registers regarding the birth and death of persons are prepared according to the procedures prescribed in the relevant rules and are state records and the entries in the same shall be presumed to be true unless rebutted. It was held by this Court in Swami Prasad v. Prescribed Authority and others, 1979 RD 135, that entries in the family registers should ordinarily be accepted unless proved otherwise. The relevant extract from the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: “If the extract of the family register is a public document a presumption should have been raised about its being prepared in the ordinary course of business by the person concerned and the entry in the register should have ordinarily been accepted. 12. In the present case, the entries in the revenue records were not sufficient to rebut the presumption raised by the entries in the family registers. Further, the entries in different revenue records were inconsistent and no definite conclusion could be drawn from entries in the revenue records. While from the entries in some revenue records, it would be deduced that Chauthi was the only son of Sheo Barat, the entries in revenue records of 1359 and 1362 Fasli lead to the inference that both respondent No. 2 and Chauthi were the sons of Sheo Barat. While from the entries in some revenue records, it would be deduced that Chauthi was the only son of Sheo Barat, the entries in revenue records of 1359 and 1362 Fasli lead to the inference that both respondent No. 2 and Chauthi were the sons of Sheo Barat. The testimony of Bhagauti, referred by the Settlement Officer cannot be relied upon to decide the issue as in his testimony (annexed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition), the witness has admitted that he would not be able to accurately state the lineage of Chauthi and respondent No. 2. 13. A reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Dular (supra) alongwith judgment of the Supreme Court in Preetam Singh and others v. Assistant Director of Consolidation and others, 1996 (2) SCC 270 , leads to the conclusion that in case a legally admissible evidence has not been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by it was based on no evidence or any patent illegality or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity, which goes to the root of the matter, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, under Section 48 (1) of the Act, 1953 had the power to reverse the findings of the sub-ordinate consolidation authorities by re-appreciating the evidence on record and decide the case on merits. The relevant extract from the judgment of Ram Dular (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow: “It is clear that the Director had power to satisfy himself as to the legality of the proceedings or as to the correctness of the proceedings or correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by the authorities under the Act. But in considering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof it cannot assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for itself of those facts de novo. But in considering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof it cannot assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for itself of those facts de novo. It has to consider whether the legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by it is based on no evidence, any patent illegality or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity, which goes to the rest (sic root) of the matter, had been committed in recording the order or finding.” (Emphasis added) 14. The relevant extract from the judgment of Preetam Singh (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow: 6.”When the matter was in revision before the Assistant director (Consolidation), he had the entire matter before him and his jurisdiction was unfettered. While in seisin of the matter in his revisional jurisdiction, he was in complete control and in position to test the correctness of the order made by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) effecting remand. In other words, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Assistant Director (Consolidation) could examine the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer as to the abandonment of the land in dispute by those tenants who had been recorded at the crucial time in the Khasra of 1359 Fasli. That power as a superior Court the Assistant Director (Consolidation) had, even if the remand order of the Settlement Officer had not been specifically put to challenge in separate and independent proceedings. It is noteworthy that the Court of the Assistant Director (Consolidation) is a Court of revisional jurisdiction otherwise having suo moto power to correct any order of the subordinate officer. In this situation the Assistant Director (Consolidation) should not have felt fettered in doing complete justice between the parties when the entire matter was before him. The war of legalistics fought in the High Court was of no material benefit to the appellants. A decision on merit covering the entire controversy was due from the Assistant Director (Consolidation).” (Emphasis added) 15. The family register was a legally admissible evidence and the entries in the same lead to a presumption that respondent No. 2 was also the son of Sheo Barat. The said presumption could not be rebutted by the inconsistent entries in different revenue records. The family register was a legally admissible evidence and the entries in the same lead to a presumption that respondent No. 2 was also the son of Sheo Barat. The said presumption could not be rebutted by the inconsistent entries in different revenue records. The Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer acted illegally in not considering the entries in the family registers and by merely relying on the entries in certain revenue records while drawing the conclusion that respondent No. 2 was not the son of Sheo Barat. For reasons stated previously, the testimony of Bhagauti, on which the Settlement Officer has relied to support his findings, was not relevant and could not be relied upon to determine the paternity of respondent No. 2. The Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer has clearly acted against the settled principles of law in deciding against respondent No. 2. In view of the judgment in Preetam Singh (supra) read with Ram Dular (supra), the Deputy Director of Consolidation exercising his powers of Section 48 (1) of the Act, 1953 had the jurisdiction to reverse the findings of sub-ordinate consolidation authorities and decide the case on merit. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any illegality or jurisdictional error in the judgment dated 20.12.1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition is, hereby, dismissed.