JUDGMENT Sureshwar Thakur, J. - The petitioner is aggrieved by the award pronounced by the learned Arbitrator, whereunder, he proceeded to allow some of the claims reared before him, by the respondent herein, and, as also declined some claims reared before him, by the respondent. However, the respondent is not aggrieved, in the learned Arbitrator, declining some of the claims reared before him, by it. 2. The respondent was awarded contract, for providing, laying and compaction of 75 mm thick dense Bituminous Macadam, and, 40 mm thick asphalt concrete as per most specification including surface cleaning, and, providing of tack coat for above layers between KM 72.00 to KM 83.00 on Manali-Sarchu road in 38 BRTF Sector under Project Deepak-CA CE(P)DPK/13/06-07. The time of commencement of awarded work, was, prescribed therein to begin, from 12.08.2006, and, the prescribed time for completion of the awarded works, was, to end on 11th December, 2006, (a) and, the petitioner contends that the respondent/contractor failed to commence the work till 21.08.2007, (b) rather he commenced work on 22.08.2007, (c) and, during the year 2007, the respondent, was, able to complete only 40.42% awarded works, amounting to Rs. 1,68, 98,822.10 paisa. The petitioner also contends that the respondent/contractor again failed to commence awarded works till 3.7.2008. The in-diligence of the respondent to hence complete the awarded works, is, espoused, to, remain alive, despite various reminders or notices being served, upon, the respondent/contractor. Ultimately, the petitioner was constrained to cancel the apt awarded works. 3. The learned counsel appearing, for the petitioner, has contended with vigour before this Court, (i) that with time being the essence of the contract, and, with palpable omission(s), and, with personified indiligence, and, tardiness, of, pace of execution of awarded works, by respondent/contractor, (ii) when hence validly constrained, the petitioner, to cancel the awarded works, (iii) thereupon, it was unbefitting, for, the learned Arbitrator to rather allow, a, part of the contractor''s claim, and, his aforesaid misdemeanors, has rather rendered the award to militate against public policy, and, also the impugned award, is, hence ingrained with the vice of fraud, thereupon, he contends that the award, is, amenable for reversal by this Court. 4. 4. Contrarily, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has with much vigour, and, vehemence made contentions, before this Court, (a) that the impugned award is neither ingrained with any vices, of, fraud or misrepresentations nor it militates against public policy, (b) rather with the learned Arbitrator in drawing proceedings, his hence meteing compliance, with, the canons of audi alteram partem, thereupon, the award merits validation, than reversal. (c) He further contends that the apt constructions, meted, by the learned Arbitrator, upon, the relevant clauses of the relevant contract, being holistic objective construction(s) thereof, (d) and, with the Hon''ble Apex Court in a case titled as M/s. Sudarshan Trading Co. vs. Govt. of Kerala, reported in AIR 1989 SC 890 , in relevant paragraphs No. 29 and 31 thereof, paras whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- "29. The next question on this aspect which requires consideration is that only in a speaking award the court can look into the reasoning of the award. It is not open to the court to probe the mental process of the arbitrator and speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. See the observations of this Court in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. vs. C. Rajasekhar Rao, (1987) 4 SCC 93 . In the instant case the arbitrator has merely set out the claims and given the history of the claims and then awarded certain amount. He has not spoken his mind indicating why he was done what he has done; he has narrated only now he came to make the award. In absence of any reasons for making the award, it is not open to the court to interfere with the award. Furthermore, in any event, reasonableness of the reasons given by the arbitrator, cannot be challenged. Appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is never a matter which the court questions and considers. If the parties have selected their own forum, the deciding forum must be conceded the power of appraisement of the evidence. The arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as the quantity of evidence and it will not be for the court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence before the arbitrator. See the observations of this Court in Municipal Corpn. The arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as the quantity of evidence and it will not be for the court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence before the arbitrator. See the observations of this Court in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi vs. M/s. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar & Anr., (1987) 4 SCC 497 . 31. An award may be remitted or set aside on the ground that the arbitrator in making it, had exceeded his jurisdiction and evidence of matters not appearing on the face of it, will be admitted in order to establish whether the jurisdiction had been exceeded or not, because the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined outside award--whatever might be said about it in the award or by the arbitrator. See in this connection, the observations of Russell on The Law of Arbitration, 20th Edn. 427. Also see the observations of Christopher Brown Ltd. vs. Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer etc., (1954) 1 QB 8 at p. 10 and Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd vs. National Bank of Pakistan, (1978) 2 Lloyd''s Rep 223 . It has to be reiterated that an arbitrator acting beyond his jurisdiction--is a different ground from the error apparent on the face of the award. In Halsbury''s Laws of England (4th Edn. Vol. 2 para 622) one of the misconducts enumerated, is the decision by the arbitrator on a matter which is not included in the agreement or reference. But in such a case one has to determine the distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and an error in excess of the jurisdiction. See the observations in Anisminic Ltd. vs. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 AC 147 and Regina vs. Noseda, Field, Knight & Fitzpatrick, (1958) 1 WLR 793 . But, in the instant case the court had examined the different claims not to find out whether these claims were within the disputes referable to the arbitrator, but to find out whether in arriving at the decision, the arbitrator had acted correctly or incorrectly. This, in our opinion, the court had no jurisdiction to do, namely, substitution of its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. This, in our opinion, the court had no jurisdiction to do, namely, substitution of its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be sustained, was a decision within the competency of the arbitrator in this case. By purporting to construe the contract the court could not take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction. It has to be determined that there is a distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised. There may be a conflict as to the power of the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. See Commercial Arbitration by Sir N.J. Mustil and Stewart C. Boyd page 84." (I) hence making trite expostulation, of, law qua it being impermissible for the High Courts, to substitute their view, vis-a-vis, the view adopted, by the learned Arbitrator, (ii) thereupon, the construction(s) meted, by the learned Arbitrator, vis-a-vis, the relevant clauses, of the agreement/contract, obviously hence enjoy reinforced vigour. (iii) More so, when, there is no apparent misdemeanor committed by the learned Arbitrator, comprised, in, his rendering, an, award, (a) which is per se patently in conflict, with public policy, (b) or is contrary to fundamental policy of India, (c) or is contrary to interest of India, (d) or is contrary to justice or morality, (e) or is patently illegal, (f) whereas, only upon evidence being adduced in respect of the aforestated vices, hence, ingraining the award, thereupon, also alone this Court standing foisted with jurisdiction, to, make interference(s), with, the award rendered, by the learned Arbitrator. Contrarily, with no evidence in satiation of the aforesaid basic trite rubric, hence, existing on record, (iv) thereupon, the apt mandate rather expostulating the aforesaid parameters, upon satiation whereof alone render empowered courts of law, to, interfere with the award of the Arbitrator, parameters whereof, are, comprised in, a verdict, rendered by the Hon''ble Apex Court in case titled as J.G. Engineers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India and another reported in (2011) 5 SCC 758 , relevant paragraphs No. 10, 22, 23 and 27, paras whereof stand extracted hereinafter, (v) whereas, with, the apt mandate enshrined therein, rather not begetting its satiation hereat, thereupon, hence, the impugned award, is enjoined to rather beget validation, from, this Court. 10. A Civil Court examining the validity of an arbitral award under section 34 of the Act exercises supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction over the awards of an arbitral tribunal. A court can set aside an arbitral award, only if any of the grounds mentioned in sections 34(2)(a) (i) to (v) or section 34(2)(b)(i) and (ii), or section 28(1)(a) or 28(3) read with section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, are made out. An award adjudicating claims which are ''excepted matters'' excluded from the scope of arbitration, would violate section 34(2)(a)(iv) and 34(2)(b) of the Act. Making an award allowing or granting a claim, contrary to any provision of the contract, would violate section 34(2)(b)(ii) read with section 28(3) of the Act. 22. In view of the above, the question whether appellant was responsible or respondents were responsible for the delay in execution of the work, was arbitrable. The arbitrator has examined the said issue and has recorded a categorical finding that the respondents were responsible for the delay in execution of the work and the contractor was not responsible. The arbitrator also found that the respondents were in breach and the termination of contract was illegal. Therefore, the respondents were not entitled to levy liquidated damages nor entitled to claim from the contractor the extra cost (including any escalation in regard to such extra cost) in getting the work completed through an alternative agency. The arbitrator also found that the respondents were in breach and the termination of contract was illegal. Therefore, the respondents were not entitled to levy liquidated damages nor entitled to claim from the contractor the extra cost (including any escalation in regard to such extra cost) in getting the work completed through an alternative agency. Therefore even though the decision as to the rate of liquidated damages and the decision as to what was the actual excess cost in getting the work completed through an alternative agency, were excepted matters, they were not relevant for deciding claims 1, 3 and 11, as the right to levy liquidated damages or claim excess costs would arise only if the contractor was responsible for the delay and was in breach. 23. In view of the finding of the arbitrator that the appellant was not responsible for the delay and that the respondents were responsible for the delay, the question of respondents levying liquidated damages or claiming the excess cost in getting the work completed as damages, does not arise. Once it is held that the contractor was not responsible for the delay and the delay occurred only on account of the omissions and commissions on the part of the respondents, it follows that provisions which make the decision of the Superintending Engineer or the Engineerin-Charge final and conclusive, will be irrelevant. Therefore, the Arbitrator would have jurisdiction to try and decide all the claims of the contractor as also the claims of the respondents. Consequently, the award of the Arbitrator on items 1, 3 and 11 has to be upheld and the conclusion of the High Court that award in respect of those claims had to be set aside as they related to excepted matters, cannot be sustained. 27. Interpreting the said provisions, this court in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. [ 2003 (5) SCC 705 ] held that a court can set aside an award under section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, as being in conflict with the public policy of India, if it is (a) contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (b) contrary to the interests of India; or (c) contrary to justice or morality; or (d) patently illegal. This Court explained that to hold an award to be opposed to public policy, the patent illegality should go to the very root of the matter and not a trivial illegality. It is also observed that an award could be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court, as then it would be opposed to public policy. 5. Uncontrovertedly, the assumption, of, jurisdiction by the learned Arbitrator, is, visibly valid, given, the apt arbitration clause No. 70 hence existing in the apposite contract. However, apparently, the learned Arbitrator had propounded a view, ex facie anviled upon clause 11 of the apt contract, the, relevant portion whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- "11. Time, Delay and Extension:- (A)...................................If the works be delayed:- (I) by force majeure, or (ii) by reason of abnormally bad weather, or (iii) by reason of serious loss or damage by fire, or (iv) by reason of civil commotion, local combination of workmen, strike or lockout, affecting any of the trades employed on the work, or (v) by reason of delay on the part of nominated sub contractors, or nominated suppliers which the Contractor has, in the opinion of G.E., taken all practicable steps to avoid, or reduce, or (vi) by reason of delay on the part of Contractors or tradesmen engaged by Government in executing works not forming part of the contract, or (vii) by reason of any other cause which in the absolute discretion of the Accepting officer is beyond the Contractor''s control; then in any such case the officer herienafter mentioned may make fair and reasonable extension in the completion dates of individual items or groups of items of Works for which separate period of completion are mentioned in the contract documents or Works Order, applicable. Upon the happening of any such even causing delay, the Contractor shall immediately, but not later than 30 days of the happening of the event, give notice thereof in writing to the G.E., but shall nevertheless use constantly his best endeavour to prevent or make good the delay and shall to all that may reasonable be required to the satisfaction of the GE. To proceed with the works................." (I) more importantly, upon, an apt force majeure clause, as, borne therein, and, also upon inclemency of weather, rather precluding the respondent, to complete the awarded works, within, the stipulated period, hence, had made conclusions, qua, all benefits thereof being ensuable, vis-a-vis, the respondent/contractor, and, also hence partly allowed the claims'' of the respondent. 6. Before testing the merit of the aforestated construction, as apparently, made by the learned Arbitrator or hence fathoming the validity, of, his attracting, the, apt force majeure clause or the efficacy, of, his apparently, rather attracting, the, clause appertaining to inclemency of weather, hence, impeding, the contractor, from making progresses, in, implementing the awarded works, (i) it is to be ascertained from the records, whether the petitioner herein, had, in consonance with the afore referred clause, meted the apposite extension(s), to, the respondent/contractor. An allusion, to, a communication, of, 5th December, 2006, brings forth the factum qua three months'' time therefrom, commencing from 1st June, 2007, and, ending on 31st August, 2007, being granted, vis-a-vis, the respondent/contractor, for his completing the awarded works. Thereafter also a communication of 10th November, 2007, unfolds qua further extension (s), being granted to the respondent/contractor, for the relevant purpose, upto 31st July, 2008. The effects, of, the aforesaid extensions being meted by the petitioner, to, the respondent/contractor, "does benumb", the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, (a) that with time being the essence of the contract, and, with the respondent/contractor, abysmally failing, despite repeated reminders, hence to speed up the progress of his completing execution, of, awarded works, also benumbs the espousal of the petitioner qua thereupon, the part allowing, of, the claims reared, by the respondent/contractor, being hence per se permeated, with vices of fraud or misrepresentations, or hence militating against the apt parameters set forth, in, the judgment(s) supra. 7. Nowat, it has to be determined, whether there also existed adequate material, before, the learned Arbitrator to apparently attract qua the respondent/contractor, the apt force majeure clause, borne in clause-11, of, the relevant contract. 7. Nowat, it has to be determined, whether there also existed adequate material, before, the learned Arbitrator to apparently attract qua the respondent/contractor, the apt force majeure clause, borne in clause-11, of, the relevant contract. A perusal of the page 7, of, the award rendered by the learned Arbitrator, and, as appended with the instant petition, (I) unfolds qua the respondent being deterred, to complete hence within the initially stipulated period or within the extended period, the awarded works, given the apt site being not completely handed over to the respondent, and, the aforesaid deterring or impeding factors, in, the respondent/contractor, being rather disabled to complete the awarded work, within, the initially stipulated period or within the extended period, stands pronounced, by the learned Arbitrator, to be amenable, qua an affirmative inference being drawn, vis-a-vis, the respondent/contractor, (i) given the apt video graphic evidence in respect thereof being adduced, by the respondent/contractor. The petitioner, did not, apparently adduce cogent evidence in rebuttal thereof. In aftermath, the apt attraction, vis-a-vis, the aforesaid deterring or precluding circumstances, hence, of, the apposite force majeure clause, rather obviously, does not suffer, from, any legal frailty or fallibility. The apt sequitur therefrom, is, qua the objective construction apparently made upon the apt force majeure clause, is per se unimpeachable, and, also its apt applicability, vis-a-vis, claim of the respondent/contractor, hence, too stands founded upon, apt appraisal, of, sound evidence, germane thereto, (ii) and, when it is mandated, in judgment (supra), qua the objective construction, made by the learned Arbitrator, upon, the relevant clause also being impermissible, for interference, besides being also impermissible hence for substitution by this Court, unless, the parameters enshrined in judgment (supra) are meted satiation, (iii) whereas, with no evidence being adduced by the petitioner, qua, in the learned Arbitrator, rendering, the impugned award, his hence militating, against, public policy, nor with evidence emerging, with displays therein qua his award being visibly ingrained, with, vice(s) of misrepresentations or fraud, thereupon, it is concluded qua the impugned award, not, suffering from any vice of fraud or misrepresentation. In aftermath, it is amenable for validation. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is dismissed and the award impugned before this Court, is affirmed and maintained. All pending applications also stand disposed of. Records, if any, received, be sent back forthwith to the concerned quarter.