JUDGMENT Goverdhan Bardhar, J. This appeal has been filed by accused-appellant-Ajji @ Saleem @ Salimuddin under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 assailing the judgment dated 3/2/2018 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, No.12, Jaipur Mahanagar in Sessions Case No. 9/2012 by which accused-appellant was convicted for offence under section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo one year simple imprisonment. 2. Brief facts giving rise to filing of this criminal appeal are that a parcha bayan of Ku.Nazmin d/o Saleem (Ex.P/1) was recorded on 16/10/2008 by the Shammi Khan (PW25) S.H.O. Police Station, Lal Kothi wherein Ku.Nazmin stated that a shop of general provision store was being run by one Ajji @ Salim in her locality and her house was also in the same locality. Ajji is considered in relation with her as maternal grand father. She used to go to the shop of Saleem @ Ajji for purchasing articles. On 16.10.2008, at about 4.30-5.00 P.M, she along with her younger brother Wasim went to the shop of Ajji and her brother Wasim stood outside the shop. She had put lipstick on her lips, which was objected by Ajji @ Saleem, but she responded that she would do whatever she likes. Upon which, Ajji @ Saleem became furious and poured kerosene oil over her body from the plastic container and set her on fire by a matchstick. Neighbours came to her rescue but she did not remember what happened afterwards. She further stated that at that time, she was wearing a baniyan, undergarments and salwar suit which were also burnt and she was not subjected to any sexual assault. She further stated that she was studying in 6th standard. Ajji after setting her on fire fastened the door of the shop and ran away from the place of occurrence and thereafter she unfattered the door and made an exit. 3. On the basis of the parcha bayan, a regular first information report no. 153/2008 (Ex.P/25) for offence under section 307 IPC was registered at PS Lal Kothi and the investigation commenced. During the course of treatment of burn injuries,, the injured girl died on 27.10.2008 due to septicemia brought about as a result of ante-mortem dry heat flame burns and therefore offence of Section 302 IPC was added. 153/2008 (Ex.P/25) for offence under section 307 IPC was registered at PS Lal Kothi and the investigation commenced. During the course of treatment of burn injuries,, the injured girl died on 27.10.2008 due to septicemia brought about as a result of ante-mortem dry heat flame burns and therefore offence of Section 302 IPC was added. During the course of investigation, one complaint was made by the father of the injured girl regarding rape committed upon her daughter prior to setting her on fire, on which the medical examination regarding rape was conducted and statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. was also recorded. Thereafter, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused appellant for the offence under Sections 307, 354, 376 and 302 IPC. 4. The trial court discharged the appellant from the offence under section 376(f) IPC and framed the charges only under Section 302 IPC. Accused appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. Prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 27 witnesses and exhibited 35 documents and the defence exhibited 5 documents. After recording of the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the accused appellant was examined under section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein the appellant disputed the incriminatory evidence adduced by the prosecution and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the matter due to enmity with the family members of deceased as also by the police. He further stated that he had no legal heirs so the parents of the deceased entangled in such a case so as to usurp his property and he did not burn Nazmin. The learned trial court after hearing the parties, vide its impugned judgment dated 03.02.2018 convicted and sentenced the accused appellant as stated above. 5. Mr. Sudhir Jain learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial court passed the impugned judgment which is contrary to the evidence available on record. The entire record preferred by the police is also contrary to the statutory provision of the Police Rules 1956, as it did not deal with the issue in a proper perspective. 5. Mr. Sudhir Jain learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial court passed the impugned judgment which is contrary to the evidence available on record. The entire record preferred by the police is also contrary to the statutory provision of the Police Rules 1956, as it did not deal with the issue in a proper perspective. He further submitted that the learned trial court relied upon the circumstances for which no explanation was sought from the appellant while recording his explanation under section 313 Cr.P.C. Important independent witness Saleem Kureshi (PW7) who saved the girl did not support the prosecution case and in such a situation, the same lost its significance as there were multiple dying declarations and the trial court without proper consideration of vital issues convicted the accused-appellant. The important witnesses did not support the prosecution case which casts a serious doubt on the case of prosecution. The trial court has not given sufficient weightage to the evidence elicited in cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and wrongly appreciated the evidence. He further submitted that the learned trial court did not apply the binding ratio of various judicial pronouncements in proper legal perspective therefore the impugned judgment dated 03.02.2018 deserves to be set aside. 6. Ms. Soniya Shadilya, learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the arguments advanced on behalf of counsel for the appellant and argued that not only the dying declaration in the shape of Parcha Bayan has been recorded by the S.H.O. at about 9.25 AM even without getting the certificate from medical officer but also another dying declaration was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate after getting the certificate from the medical officer at 11.20 AM and the time gap in between the two is only about two hours so it could not be said to be fatal to the prosecution case. Hence, the trial court has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused appellant. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. Shammi Khan (PW25), deposed that on 16.10.2008 he was posted as S.I at Police Station, Lal Kothi, Jaipur. An information was received at Control Room from compounder Kashyap Singh that a girl named Nazmin suffering from burn injuries had been admitted in SMS Hospital Jaipur. On 17.10.2008, he went for investigation in the burn ward of SMS Hospital and recorded Parcha Bayan of Ku. An information was received at Control Room from compounder Kashyap Singh that a girl named Nazmin suffering from burn injuries had been admitted in SMS Hospital Jaipur. On 17.10.2008, he went for investigation in the burn ward of SMS Hospital and recorded Parcha Bayan of Ku. Nazmin at 9:25 A.M. He also recorded statements of Gulam Rasool (PW4), Saleem (PW1), Nazma (PW5), Saleem Quarashi (PW 7) and Wasim (PW2). Kumari Nazmin told him that whenever she went at the shop of Ajji @ Saleem alone, he used to tease her by hand movements over her body and used to allure by the promise of hand over his shop to her. In cross examination, he stated that on 16.10.2008, he got no information therefore he could not make any entry in the Roznamcha and the entry was made by Indra Raj (PW8). He further deposed that when he went to hospital, Doctor was present and before recording the statement he sought Doctor's permission. He further stated that there is no signature of Doctor and compounder on Parchan Bayan (Ex.P/1. He further deposed that he did not inform the FSL team as he did not seem it proper to call the FSL team and conducted investigation of the matter according to his wisdom. 9. Ex. P/33 the dying declaration of the deceased Nazmin recorded on 17.10.2008 at 11:20 A.M. by the Addl. Chief Judl.Magistrate (Jr. Div.) Jaipur whereas the parcha bayan Ex.P1 was recorded at 9:25 A.M. on the same day wherein the deceased Nazmin stated the same story in same manner. The version stated by Ku. 9. Ex. P/33 the dying declaration of the deceased Nazmin recorded on 17.10.2008 at 11:20 A.M. by the Addl. Chief Judl.Magistrate (Jr. Div.) Jaipur whereas the parcha bayan Ex.P1 was recorded at 9:25 A.M. on the same day wherein the deceased Nazmin stated the same story in same manner. The version stated by Ku. Nazmin in Parcha Bayan and the dying declaration before the Magistrate read as under: izn’kZ ih0 1 esa fy[kk gqvk gS& ^^-------------------------------------dy fnukad 16-10-2008 dks le; djhcu 4%30&5 cts dh ckr gSA eSa vTth dh nqdku o ?kj xbZ FkhA esjs lkFk esjk NksVk HkkbZ clhe Hkh Fkk tks ckgj [kM+k Fkk] eSaus fyfifLVd yxk j[kh FkhA vTth eq>s euk fd;k] eSaus dgk esjh ethZ eSa dqN Hkh yxkma blh ckr ij vTth us eq>s IykfLVd dh ihih ls feV~Vh dk rsy esjs mij Mkydj ekfpl yxk nhA eq>s eksgYys okyksa us cpk;k-----------------------** izn’kZ ih0 33 esa ;g fy[kk gS fd & ^^--------------------dy 'kke 04%30 cts eSa vTth mQZ lyhe dh nqdku ij vTth }kjk cqykus ij x;h FkhA eSaus ml le; esjs gksBksa ij fyfifLVd yxk j[kh Fkh D;ksafd eq>s 'kknh esa tkuk FkkA vTth us eq>ls dgk fd eSaus gksBksa ij fyfifLVd D;ksa yxk j[kh gSA tc eSaus dgk esjh ethZ ls yxkbZ gSA ml le; esjk NksVk HkkbZ olhe Hkh FkkA ftl ij eq>s vTth us fyfifLVd ugha yxkus dh ckr dg dj] ihih esa j[ks feV~Vh ds rsy dks esjs mij Mky fn;kA fQj ekfpl tyk dj eq>s vkx yxk nh-----------------** 10. It can be ascertained by examining Ex. P/1 and P/33 that there are no traces of tutoring. The statements made by deceased Najmin in Parchan Bayan Ex.P1 and statement made before the ACJM, Sunder Lal Banshiwal (PW26) are consistent and same, in view of this even in absence of certificate of Doctor regarding fitness of deceased Najmin to give statement, her parcha bayan recorded by the investigating officer cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) AIR SC 2973, it has been observed as under: "4. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the two decisions of the court which persuaded the bench to make the reference to the Constitution Bench. In Paparambaka Rosamma and Ors. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) AIR SC 2973, it has been observed as under: "4. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the two decisions of the court which persuaded the bench to make the reference to the Constitution Bench. In Paparambaka Rosamma and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1999) CriLJ 4321, the dying declaration in question had been recorded by a judicial magistrate and the magistrate had made a note that on the basis of answers elicited from the declarant to the questions put he was satisfied that the deceased is in a fit disposing state of mind to make a declaration. Doctor had appended a certificate to the effect that the patient was conscious while recording the statement, yet the court came to the conclusion that it would not be safe to accept the dying declaration as true and genuine and was made when the injured was in a fit state of mind since the certificate of the doctor was only to the effect that the patient is conscious while recording the statement. Apart from the aforesaid conclusion in law the court also had found serious lacunae and ultimately did not accept the dying declaration recorded by the magistrate. In the latter decision of this court in Koli Chunilal Savji and Anr. v. State of Gujarat, (1999) CriLJ 4582, it was held that the ultimate test is whether the dying declaration can be held to be a truthful one and voluntarily given. It was further held that before recording the declaration the officer concerned must find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement in question. The court relied upon the earlier decision. In Ravi Chander v. State of Punjab, (1998) 9 SCC 303 , wherein it had been observed that for not examining by the doctor the dying declaration recorded by the executive magistrate and the dying declaration orally made need not be doubted. The magistrate being a disinterested witness and is a responsible officer and there being no circumstances or material to suspect that the magistrate had any animus against the accused or was in any way interested for fabricating a dying declaration, question of doubt on the declaration, recorded by the magistrate does not arise. 5. The magistrate being a disinterested witness and is a responsible officer and there being no circumstances or material to suspect that the magistrate had any animus against the accused or was in any way interested for fabricating a dying declaration, question of doubt on the declaration, recorded by the magistrate does not arise. 5. The court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this court in Harjeet Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1999) CriLJ 4055, case wherein the magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1999) CriLJ 4321, to the effect that "...in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration" has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hyper-technical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind where-after he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1999) CriLJ 4321, must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this court in Koli Chunilal Savji and Anr. v. State of Gujarat, (1999) CriLJ 4582. 12. Mr. Sunder Lal Banshiwal, ACJM, (Jr.Div.) Jaipur who recorded the statement, has categorically stated that Ku. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1999) CriLJ 4321, must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this court in Koli Chunilal Savji and Anr. v. State of Gujarat, (1999) CriLJ 4582. 12. Mr. Sunder Lal Banshiwal, ACJM, (Jr.Div.) Jaipur who recorded the statement, has categorically stated that Ku. Najmin was in a fit condition to give her statement and that opinion of the doctor Anoop Agrawal was also obtained and a note was given at portion 'G to H' that patient was conscious and is fit to give statement. It also contains signatures of the concerned doctor at part I to J who gave the above opinion. We find no reason to disbelieve statement of the Judicial Magistrate specially, when nothing has come on record to create any doubt. 13. In Muthu Kutty and another vs. State by Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113 , wherein their lordships have held that if the person recording the dying declaration is satisfied about the declarant's medical condition, then such declaration will not be considered invalid solely on the ground that the doctor has not certified the condition of the declarant. In this judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the principles governing dying declaration and held that it can be sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence of the court. 14. The Supreme Court in Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 9 SCC 1 , while revisiting its previous judgments in Munnu Raja vs. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 , Paras Yadav vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126 , Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 283 , State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC 550 , Bijoy Das vs. State of W.B., (2008) 4 SCC 511 , Muthu Kutty vs. State, (2005) 9 SCC 113 , Panneerselvam vs. State of T.N., (2008) 17 SCC 190 , culled out the following principles to be kept in view while dealing with a case of dying declaration: (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. 15. According to post mortem report (Ex.P/4), the deceased sustained the following injuries: (I) II to III degree burns with pus and slough formation blackening and peeling of skin and singeing of hair present over following parts of the body. (1) scalp hair as a whole upto root at mid parietal region & singeing at fronto parietotemporal region & occipital region. (2) Face as a whole with singeing of facial hair with both ear pinnas. (3) Front & back of neck as a whole. (4) Front & back of chest as a whole. (5) Front & back of abdomen as a whole (6) Both upper limbs as a whole. (7) External genitalia as a whole with singeing of pubic hair. (8) Both buttocks as a whole. (9) Both lower limbs as a whole with sparing of both soles. (4) Front & back of chest as a whole. (5) Front & back of abdomen as a whole (6) Both upper limbs as a whole. (7) External genitalia as a whole with singeing of pubic hair. (8) Both buttocks as a whole. (9) Both lower limbs as a whole with sparing of both soles. All above burns are ante-mortem in nature and total burnt surface area of body is about 99%. 16. The post mortem report (Exhibit P-4) indicates that the deceased suffered burns of about 99% and the cause of death was septicemia brought about as a result of antemortem dry heat flame burns which were ante mortem in nature. 17. The act of pouring kerosene oil on the body deceased and setting her on fire, in our opinion, implies an intention on the part of the appellant to cause her death. If a person pours kerosene on the body of a victim and then sets fire, the only intention can be inferred that it was done for causing the death of that person. 18. In B. Venkateshwarlu v. State of A.P., (1975) CriLJ 21, it was held that when one of the accused poured kerosene on the boy after which the appellant lighted a match and set fire to his clothes, the intention was to cause death of that boy and there was no doubt about that intention. 19. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad the accused had poured kerosene oil on his wife and then set her clothes on fire. The Supreme Court held that it was obvious that the accused must have known that he was running the risk of causing death of his wife or such bodily injury which was likely to cause her death. The Supreme Court held that the act could even be covered under clause fourthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. It was, therefore, held that his offence was culpable homicide amounting to murder. 20. In Suresh v. State of M.P., (1987) CriLJ 775, the victim had sustained 100% burns of the second degree and her dying declaration was recorded by Dr. Bhargava in the hospital. The evidence on record also disclosed that while Dr. Bhargava was recording her statement, the victim had started going into coma, yet, the Apex Court accepted dying declaration made by her to Dr. Bhargava. 21. Bhargava in the hospital. The evidence on record also disclosed that while Dr. Bhargava was recording her statement, the victim had started going into coma, yet, the Apex Court accepted dying declaration made by her to Dr. Bhargava. 21. In Kundula Bala Subrahmanayam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) CriLJ 1635, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, noted extensive burns to the extent of 90% on the body of the deceased and opined that the deceased had died due to extensive burns all over the body and the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Apex Court accepted the dying declarations made by the victim and on their basis recorded conviction of the accused. 22. In Ganpat Mahadeo Mane v. State of Maharashtra, (1993) CriLJ 298, the victim had 97% burns all over the body and conviction was maintained by the Apex Court on the basis of dying declarations. 23. In view of the law discussed above, there is ample evidence in the present case to hold that septicemia was the direct consequence of the burns injuries caused to the deceased as the deceased sustained 99% burns. 24. Mohd. Wasim (PW2) deposed that he and his sister went to purchase some articles from the shop of Ajji @ Saleem. When they reached there, accused Ajji @ Saleem reprimanded him and his sister. After dragging his sister Nazmin in a room behind the shop caught hold her hands and when he rushed to protect his sister he was also rebuked and forced to get out from the room and afterwards when his sister came outside after opening the door, she was burning in flames and she took shelter in a nearby house, at that time, Ajji was present in the room. 25. Saleem (PW1) father of the deceased deposed that his son Wasim came to him and informed that his daughter has been burnt. After that, he reached on the place of occurrence where Nazmin was lying in a burnt condition. She was unconscious and with the help of neighbors, he got admitted the girl in SMS hospital. When his daughter regained consciousness, she told that she was subjected to sexual harassment by the accused Ajji and he had threatened his daughter not to disclose anything about the incident. She was unconscious and with the help of neighbors, he got admitted the girl in SMS hospital. When his daughter regained consciousness, she told that she was subjected to sexual harassment by the accused Ajji and he had threatened his daughter not to disclose anything about the incident. In cross-examination, this witness stated that her face, lips and most of the front part of the body got burnt. He also deposed that from outside of the shop of accused Ajji @ Saleem, she was taken to SMS Hospital. 26. Nazma (PW5) mother of the deceased deposed that deceased Nazmin was her daughter and the accused Ajji @ Saleem is well known to her as he was residing nearby her house. She stated that her children used to go to the shop of the accused. She further deposed that on receiving an information about the incident, she, her husband along with her brother-in law went to the general provision shop running by Ajji. They saw that her daughter was severely burnt. They took her to SMS hospital and got admitted her in the burn ward. Nazmin told that Ajji @ Saleem committed sexual assault on her and when she resisted, he poured kerosene oil and set her on fire with match stick. In cross-examination Nazma admits that she was not present at the time of incident. PW5 further deposed that when she arrived at the hospital, her daughter was unconscious. In police statement Ex.P/4 she narrated all the facts. 27. Saleem Quarshi (PW7) deposed that one girl came to his house. He knew that the girl resides at some distance to his house. In cross-examination, he stated that the girl was burning in flames. He further stated that in Part B to C of Ex. P8 he disclosed that no one else came to cease the fire except him and part C to D of Ex. P8 was not narrated by him before the police and within a short span of time of five minutes, the girl was taken to the hospital, when the parents of the deceased girl reached the fire was extinguished. 28. Indisputably, the accused appellant was running a general provision store in a shop and residing in the room attached to the shop where the deceased Najmin used to visit. 28. Indisputably, the accused appellant was running a general provision store in a shop and residing in the room attached to the shop where the deceased Najmin used to visit. On the day of occurrence, when she went to the shop, the accused appellant behaved abnormally by saying that why had she put on lipstick and dragged her inside which itself goes to show that the conduct of the accused could not be said to be just towards Najmin and after incident he ran away from the place of occurrence, it itself indicates that he had some ill motive. 29. Since the occurrence had taken place in the shop of the appellant accused, therefore it is for the accused appellant to disclose as to how Najmin minor girl aged about 13 years had died. The accused appellant failed to give plausible explanation. In the statement of PW7 Saleem Kureshi who was neighbour of the accused deposed that no one else came to save the deceased Nazmin and PW2 Wasim brother of the deceased deposed that accused Ajji was present in the shop at the time of incident. 30. We find no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW2 Wasim, PW4 Gulam Rasool, PW5 Najma and PW7 Saleem Kureshi, as all these witnesses stated that the incident took place in the shop of the accused appellant which is corroborated by the parcha bayan Ex.P/1 and Ex.P/33, the dying declaration. There is almost no contradictions in the parcha bayan Ex. P/1 as also in dying declaration Ex. P/33 and no reason appears to disbelieve on Ex.P.33 dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate. 31. In the instant case, we are in agreement that 90% extensive burns suffered by the victim were sufficient to cause her death in the ordinary course of nature. Hence, the case is also covered by clause third of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the offence under Section 302, IPC is clearly made out against the accused appellant. 32. In the result, the appeal being bereft of any merits is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial court are confirmed.