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2018 DIGILAW 1421 (ALL)

Manik Chandra v. State Of U. P.

2018-05-31

BALA KRISHNA NARAYANA, RAJIV GUPTA

body2018
JUDGMENT : B.K. Narayana, J. 1. The arguments of this case concluded on 31.05.2018. 2. We then passed the following order :- “Heard Sri Noor Mohammad, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri J.K. Upadhyay, learned A.G.A. for the State. We will give reasons later. But we make the operative order here and now. This criminal appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order 16.04.2014 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Aligarh in Sessions Trial No. 677 of 2010 (State Vs. Manik Chandra and others) by which the appellant, Manik Chandra has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life together with fine of Rs. 40,000/-under Section 302 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine two years additional rigorous imprisonment, are hereby set aside. The appellant, Manik Chandra is acquitted of all the charges framed against him. He is reported to be in jail. He shall be released forthwith, unless he is wanted in some other case subject to his complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C.” 3. Here are the reasons : Briefly stated the facts of this case are that P.W.1 Ram Singh, son of Chunni Singh, resident of Virsua, P.S.-Dholna, Kashiramnagar gave a written complaint (Ext.Ka.1) to S.H.O., P.S.-Gangiri, District-Aligarh on 13.10.2009 at about 16:30 hours stating therein that marriage between his daughter Ramwati and accused-appellant, Manik Chandra, son of Chandrapal, resident of Ramnagar Bhilet, P.S.-Gangiri, District-Aligarh, was solemnized on 28.02.2009. He had spent a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/-at the time of the marriage out of which Rs. 2,10,000/-was paid by him to Manik Chandra in cash from which he had purchased a Maruti Van but his daughter's husband-Manik Chandra, brothers-in-law (jeth)-Ravendra and Ompal, father-in-law-Chandrapal, mother-in-law-Bhudevi, sisters-in-law (jethani)-Savitri and Samlesh, daughter of Ravendra-Girija Kumari, sisters-in-law (nanad)-Seema and Mamta, son of Kehri-Shilendra, maternal uncle of Manik Chandra-Murli, resident of Ishepur, P.S.-Dholna etc., were not satisfied with the dowry given to them at the time of the marriage and they were demanding motorcycle, buffalo etc. as additional dowry. However, since P.W.1 Ram Singh could not fulfill the aforesaid demands of additional dowry, the accused after strangulating his daughter Ramwati to death, tried to dispose of her dead body by putting it in a Maruti Van but they were seen by Mamta, wife of Sanju and other villagers on which they ran away in their Maruti Van. However, since P.W.1 Ram Singh could not fulfill the aforesaid demands of additional dowry, the accused after strangulating his daughter Ramwati to death, tried to dispose of her dead body by putting it in a Maruti Van but they were seen by Mamta, wife of Sanju and other villagers on which they ran away in their Maruti Van. Information about the death of his daughter Ramwati was given to him on his mobile by the villagers. On receiving the aforesaid information, he came to the house of accused in a tractor along with large number of his villagers but by the time he reached there, the accused had fled. On the information given by the Gram Pradhan to P.S.-Gangiri, the police arrived at the place of occurrence. The incident was witnessed by Ratan Singh, son of Ram Singh and Rajvir, son of Jhanu Singh, residents of Virsua. 4. On the basis of written complaint of the incident (Ext.Ka.1), Case Crime No. 260 of 2009 u/s 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act was registered on 13.10.2009 at P.S.-Gangiri, District-Aligarh against the accused-appellant Manik Chandra, his brothers-Ravendra Singh and Ompal, his father-Chandrapal, his mother-Bhudevi, sisters-in-law-Savitri and Samlesh, Ravendra's daughter-Girija Kumari, his neice-Seema and Mamta, Kehri's son-Shilendra and maternal uncle of Manik Chandra-Murli. Check F.I.R. (Ext.Ka.5) and corresponding G.D. Entry vide rapat no. 32 time 16:30 hours (Ext.Ka.6) were prepared on the same day by P.W.4 Constable 581- Rampal Singh. 5. The investigation of the case was entrusted to P.W.6 S.P. Pratima Ambedkar, posted as Circle Officer, Barla at the relevant point of time. She reached the place of occurrence and after inspecting the same, prepared its site plan (Ext.Ka.8). The inquest on the body of deceased Ramwati was conducted by P.W.3 Virendra Singh, Tehsildar, Tehsil-Kol, District-Aligarh, who after completing the inquest proceedings, prepared the inquest report of the deceased (Ext.Ka.3) and other papers on 13.10.2009 at about 5:30 p.m. P.W.7 S.H.O.- Arjun Lal Verma who had collected the broken pieces of bangles and stol of the deceased, prepared its recovery memo (Ext.Ka.2) whereafter the body of deceased Ramwati was sealed and dispatched to the District Hospital for conducting postmortem. 6. P.W.5 Dr. Vinod Kumar Gupta, who was posted at Malkhan Singh Hospital, Aligarh on 14.10.2009, had conducted postmortem on the body of deceased Ramwati at 04:30 p.m. and prepared her postmortem report (Ext.Ka.7). 6. P.W.5 Dr. Vinod Kumar Gupta, who was posted at Malkhan Singh Hospital, Aligarh on 14.10.2009, had conducted postmortem on the body of deceased Ramwati at 04:30 p.m. and prepared her postmortem report (Ext.Ka.7). He noted following ante-mortem injuries on the dead body of Ramwati : (1) An abraded contusion 8 cm x 1 cm front of lt. side neck middle part (2) A contusion 3 cm x 1 cm on back of neck rt. side 7. According to P.W.5 Dr. Vinod Kumar Gupta, cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. 8. P.W.6 S.P. Pratima Ambedkar, after completing the investigation submitted charge-sheet against the appellant Manik Chandra, his brothers, Ravendra Singh and Ompal Singh, his parents Chandrapal and Bhudevi u/s 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh who committed the accused for trial to the Court of Session Judge from where the case was made over for trial to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Aligarh who on the basis of evidence on record and after hearing the prosecution as well as the accused on the point of charge framed charge u/s 498-A, 304-B and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act against all the five accused on 10.08.2010 while on 02.04.2014, an additional charge u/s 302 I.P.C. was framed against the appellant Manik Chandra and other accused who abjured the charge and claimed trial. 9. The prosecution in order to prove its case against the accused-appellant examined as many as seven witnesses of whom P.W.1 informant Ram Singh, father of the deceased, P.W.2 Ratan Singh, brother of the deceased were examined as witnesses of fact while P.W.3 Virendra Singh, Tehsildar, P.W.4 Rampal Singh, P.W.5 Dr. Vinod Kumar Gupta, P.W.6 S.P. Pratima Ambedkar and P.W.7 Arjun Lal Verma were produced as formal witnesses. 10. The accused in their statements recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case and alleged false implication. The appellant Manik Chandra in addition stated that at the time of the incident, he was in his “bajra” field and further denied that he had either ever demanded any dowry from the deceased or maltreated her. At the time of the incident, he was living separately from his parents and on account of village rivalry, he was falsely implicated in the present case. The other accused also stated that they were living separately from the appellant Manik Chandra and his wife Ramwati. 11. At the time of the incident, he was living separately from his parents and on account of village rivalry, he was falsely implicated in the present case. The other accused also stated that they were living separately from the appellant Manik Chandra and his wife Ramwati. 11. The accused also examined Ram Prakash, Prem Pal Singh and Ajai Prasad Sant as D.W.1, D.W.2 and D.W.3 respectively. 12. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Aligarh after considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties before him and scrutinizing the evidence on record, both oral as well as documentary, convicted the appellant Manik Chandra and sentenced him to imprisonment for life together with a fine of Rs. 40,000/-and in case of default in payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment of two years u/s 302 I.P.C. while the other accused were acquitted. 13. Hence, this appeal. 14. Sri Noor Mohammad, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court has acquitted the appellant of the charge framed against him u/s 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act in the absence of any evidence even remotely indicating that the appellant was seen in or around his house or going into or coming out of his house at the time of the incident, the conviction of the appellant u/s 302 I.P.C. recorded by the trial court by illegally invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act is per se illegal and cannot be sustained even for a moment. He next submitted that no explanation is coming forth from the side of the prosecution for not producing Mamta, wife of Sanju and other persons who were named as witnesses in the F.I.R. or for that matter any other neighbour of the appellant who had allegedly seen the appellant dumping the body of the deceased in his Maruti Van with the intention of disposing it off after strangulating her to death. The trial court was bound to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution for having withheld the best witnesses whose evidence would have corroborated the allegations made by P.W.1 informant Ram Singh in the F.I.R. He next submitted that in a case based upon circumstantial evidence, motive assumes considerable relevance and in the instant case, the prosecution has failed to come up with any motive for the appellant to commit the murder of his wife especially in view of his acquittal u/s 498-A I.P.C. and ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act. The circumstances in this case do not rule out every other hypothesis except that of the guilt of the appellant. 15. Per contra Sri J. K. Upadhyay, learned A.G.A. appearing for the State submitted that the deceased was the wife of the appellant and she had died in her matrimonial home where she was living with him. The circumstances under which she had died an unnatural death were the facts which were within the special knowledge of the appellant and the appellant having failed to come up with any explanation for the unnatural death of his wife in his house, the trial Judge did not commit any illegality or legal infirmity in convicting the appellant and awarding aforesaid sentence to him. The chain of circumstances in this case fully establish that it was the appellant who had committed the murder of his wife. This appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 16. We have very carefully considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire lower court record. 17. The only question which arises for our consideration in this case is that whether the prosecution has been able to prove its case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts or not ? 18. Record shows that although the F.I.R. in this case was registered u/s 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. And ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act and the appellant was charge-sheeted under the aforesaid sections but during the trial in addition to the aforesaid sections, charge u/s 302 I.P.C. was also framed against the appellant. The learned trial Judge after appraising the evidence on record, came to a definite conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge framed against the appellant u/s 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned trial Judge after appraising the evidence on record, came to a definite conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge framed against the appellant u/s 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act. However, the learned trial Judge proceeded to convict the appellant u/s 302 I.P.C. and awarded sentence of life imprisonment to him. There is no dispute about the fact that no appeal or revision has been preferred either by the informant or the State against the acquittal of the appellant u/s 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act and the same has attained finality. The only issue which is to be decided by us is that whether the trial court was justified in convicting the appellant u/s 302 I.P.C. The facts which are not in dispute inter alia are that marriage between the appellant Manik Chandra and the deceased Ramwati, daughter of P.W.1 informant Ram Singh was solemnized in the year 2008; at the time of her death, the deceased was living with her husband in his house in village Ramnagar, District-Aligarh; that neither the F.I.R. recitals nor the facts stated by the witnesses of fact examined by the prosecution during the trial disclose the exact time of death of the deceased although in the check F.I.R., the time of death is mentioned as 13.10 hours; that from the medical evidence on record comprising of the statement of P.W.5 Dr. Vinod Kumar Gupta who had conducted the postmortem on the body of the deceased and proved the same during the trial as (Ext.Ka.7), it is established that the deceased had died due to asphyxia as a result of ante-mortem strangulation about one day before the date on which her autopsy was conducted on her body; that the postmortem report of the deceased (Ext.Ka.7) indicates that the postmortem on the body of the deceased was conducted at 14.10.2009 at about 4:30 p.m., thus, the approximate time of her death comes to about 4:30 p.m. on 13.10.2009. Thus, from the medical evidence on record, it is established that the death of the deceased was homicidal and the time of her death was possibly between 13.10 hours and 4.30 p.m. on 13.10.2009. The next question of paramount importance which arises is that whether the appellant is the author of the ante-mortem injury which caused the death of the deceased ? 19. The next question of paramount importance which arises is that whether the appellant is the author of the ante-mortem injury which caused the death of the deceased ? 19. Before examining the aforesaid issue, it will be useful to examine the law on the aforesaid issue. 20. In Woolmington Versus Director of Public Prosecution, 1935 AC 462, it has been held :- "Just as there is evidence on behalf the prosecution so there may be evidence on behalf of the prisoner which may cause a doubt as to his guilt. In either case, he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But while the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner, there is no such burden laid on the prisoner to prove his innocence and it is sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt; he is not bound to satisfy the jury of his innocence. . . Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have 26 already said as to the defence of insanity and Subject also to any stationary exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there reasonable doubt created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained." (emphasis ours) 21. Above view has been approved by the Apex Court in a catena of its decisions. In Vijayee Singh versus State of U.P. reported in 1990 Cr.L.J. (SC) 1510, Apex Court has observed thus:- "15. The phrase "burden of proof" is not defined in the Act. In respect of criminal cases, it is an accepted principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden is always on the prosecution and never shifts. In Vijayee Singh versus State of U.P. reported in 1990 Cr.L.J. (SC) 1510, Apex Court has observed thus:- "15. The phrase "burden of proof" is not defined in the Act. In respect of criminal cases, it is an accepted principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden is always on the prosecution and never shifts. This flows from the cardinal principle that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty by the prosecution and the accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt". 22. In K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1962 SC 605 , Apex Court has observed as follows:- "In India, as it is in England, there is a presumption of innocence in 27 favour of the accused as a general rule, and it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused." 23. In Gurchran Singh versus State of Punjab reported in AIR 1956 SC 460 , Apex Court has laid down that :- “6. But even so, the burden of proving the case against the appellants was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused have made out a plausible defence." 24. Some of the other decisions on this point are Sawal Das versus State of Bihar reported in AIR 1974 SC 778 ; Baidya Nath Prasad Srivastava versus State of Bihar reported in AIR 1968 SC 1393 ; R venkatkrishnana versus CBI reported in (2009) 11 SCC 737 ; Subramaniam versus State of T.N. reported in (2009)14 SCC 415 and many more. 25. The residue of the above decisions are that prosecution has to establish guilt of the accused filtered of all reasonable prognosis favourable to the accused to secure conviction and it is never relieved of this initial duty. It is only when it has discharged its initial burden of proof that the defence of the accused has to be looked into. At this juncture, we advert to the most contentious contention mooted before us that Section 106 of the Evidence Act can be applied to fasten guilt of the appellant even if prosecution has failed in its initial burden. From what we have noted above, it is sufficiently born out that even in cases which are covered under Section 106 of Evidence Act, the same principle applies which applies in cases of eye witness account for establishing guilt of the accused. From what we have noted above, it is sufficiently born out that even in cases which are covered under Section 106 of Evidence Act, the same principle applies which applies in cases of eye witness account for establishing guilt of the accused. Section 106 has to be read in conjunction with and not in derogation of Section 101 of Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve prosecution of its primary and foremost duty to establish accused guilt beyond all reasonable doubt independent of weaknesses of the defence. It is only when prosecution, for well perceptible and acceptable reasons, is unable to lead evidence because of circumstances beyond its control including the reason that the fact required to be proved was "within the special knowledge of the accused alone" and prosecution could not have known it by due care and diligence, that Section 106 can be resorted to by shifting burden on the accused to divulge that fact which is "in his special knowledge" and if accused fails to offer any reasonable explanation to satiate judicial inquisitive scrutiny, he is liable to be punished. But even in such a situation prosecution, has firstly to establish entire chain of circumstances woven together in a conglomerated whole unerringly indicating that it was accused alone who is the perpetrator of the crime and the manner of happening of the incident is known to him alone and is within his special knowledge. It is then that the burden shift from the prosecution to the accused to explain how and in what manner offence was committed. Section 106 of the Evidence Act can not be utilized to make up for the prosecution's inability to establish its case by leading cogent and reliable evidences, especially when prosecution could have known the crime by due diligence and care. Aid of Section 106 of the Evidence Act can be had only in cases where prosecution could not produce evidence regarding commission of crime but brings all other incriminating circumstances and sufficient material on record to prima facie probablise its case against the accused and no plausible explanation is forthcoming from the accused regarding fact within his special knowledge about the incident. That section lays down only this much that if a fact is in the "special knowledge of a person" and other side could not have due knowledge of it in spite of due diligence and care then burden of proving that fact lies on that person in whose special knowledge it is. Section 106 of the Evidence Act has no application if the fact is in the knowledge of the prosecution or it could have gained its knowledge with due care and diligence. Here we refer some of the decisions countenancing our view. The Apex court in Shambhu Nath Mahra versus State of Ajmer reported in AIR 1956 SC 404 has held as hereunder:- "11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and S. 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not.” 26. It is evident that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B) 27. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B) 27. We recognize that an illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrate but equally it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit; and if knowledge of certain facts is as much available to the prosecution, should it choose exercise due diligence, as to the accused, the facts cannot be said to be especially" within the knowledge of the accused. 28. This is a section which must be considered in a common sense way; and the balance of convenience and the disproportion of labour that would be involved in finding out and proving certain facts balanced against the triviality of the issue at stake and the ease with which the accused could prove them, are all matters that must be taken into consideration. The section cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 29. Another decision on this aspect is Attygalle versus The King reported in AIR 1936 PC 169 . In P. Mani versus State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 2006 SC 1319 , the Apex Court has held as hereunder :- "10. We do not agree with the High Court. In a criminal case it was for the prosecution to prove the involvement of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It was not a case where both, husband and wife, were last seen together inside a room. The incident might have taken place in a room but the prosecution itself has brought out 32 evidences to the effect that the children who had been witnessing television were asked to go out by the deceased and then she bolted the room from inside. As they saw smoke coming out from the room, they rushed towards the same and broke open the door. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, to which reference was made by the High Court in the aforementioned situation, cannot be said to have any application whatsoever." 30. In yet another decision, Murlidhar and others versus State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2005 SC 2345 , the Apex Court has held as hereunder:- "22. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, to which reference was made by the High Court in the aforementioned situation, cannot be said to have any application whatsoever." 30. In yet another decision, Murlidhar and others versus State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2005 SC 2345 , the Apex Court has held as hereunder:- "22. In our judgment, the High Court was not justified in relying on and applying the rule of burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to the case. As pointed out in Mir Mohammand Omar (supra) and Shambu Nath Mehra (supra), the rule in Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply when the facts are "especially within the knowledge of the accused" and it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish such facts, "especially within the knowledge of the accused." In the present case, the prosecution did not proceed on the footing that the facts were especially within the knowledge of the accused and, therefore, the principle in Section 106 could not apply. On the other hand, the prosecution proceeded on the footing that there were eye-witnesses to 33 the fact of murder. The prosecution took upon itself the burden of examining Babulal (PW-5) as eye-witness. Testimony of Ram Ratan (PW-7) and Isro (PW-10) shows that their agricultural land was situated in a close distance from the house of Khema Ram. As rightly pointed out by the High Court, it is highly unlikely and improbable that their kith and kin Ramlal would have been given beating resulting in his death by the accused-appellants while keeping lights of their house on and door of the room opened. It is also unlikely that the accused-appellants would have taken the risk of dragging Ramlal to the house of Khema Ram, which was situated in the vicinity of agricultural land and well of Isro (PW10), the father of Ramlal. The evidence of Govind (PW-13) also appears to be unnatural, as he had not disclosed the incident to anybody. The High Court has correctly analysed that all the witnesses, namely, Babulal (PW-5), Ram Ratan (PW-7), Isro (PW10) and Govind (PW-13) are wholly unreliable as their evidence is replete with contradiction and inherent improbabilities.” 23. The evidence of Govind (PW-13) also appears to be unnatural, as he had not disclosed the incident to anybody. The High Court has correctly analysed that all the witnesses, namely, Babulal (PW-5), Ram Ratan (PW-7), Isro (PW10) and Govind (PW-13) are wholly unreliable as their evidence is replete with contradiction and inherent improbabilities.” 23. In the result, we are of the view that the prosecution having put forward a case that, what transpired after Ramlal was dragged away by the assailants was within the knowledge of witnesses, utterly failed in proving the said facts. Once this is established, it was not open for the High Court to have fallen back on the rule of burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In fact, as we notice, it was 34 nowhere the case of the prosecution that Section 106 of the Evidence Act applied to the facts on record. The High Court seems to have brought it out on its own, but without any justification." 31. In Ch. Razik Ram versus Ch. J.S.Chouhan reported in AIR 1975 SC 667 , the Apex Court has held as hereunder :- "116. In the first place, it may be remembered that the principle underlying Section 106, Evidence Act which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof -applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the defendant-respondent. It cannot apply when the fact is such as to be capable of being known also by persons other than the respondent." 32. In State Of West Bengal versus Mir Mohammad Umar reported in 2000 SCC (Cr) 1516, the Apex Court has held as hereunder :- "36. In this context we may profitably utilise the legal principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows : "When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him." 37. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the Section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn 35 regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the Court to draw a different inference.” 38. Vivian Bose, J. had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, 1956 SCR 199 : ( AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794) the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus (para 11 of AIR): "This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are 'especially' within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word 'especially' stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge." 33. Thus the legal principle which is culled out from the reading of the aforesaid authorities is that although the prosecution has to establish the charge independently standing on its leg and the defense of the accused cannot be singularly used to hold him guilty and convict him when prosecution evidence is weak, incredible, insufficient and does not inspire any confidence and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve the prosecution of its duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts specially within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. 34. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts specially within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. 34. In this regard, after having very carefully scanned the statements of the three witnesses of fact produced by the prosecution during the trial, we have noted that none of them have deposed that they had either seen the incident or the appellant trying to put the body of the deceased in the Maruti Van. Considering the time of the occurrence, notwithstanding the fact that the deceased had died in her matrimonial home, no presumption can be drawn about the presence of the appellant in his house at the time of the incident in the absence of any direct evidence in this regard as normally during the afternoon, the men folk are away from their house in connection with earning their livelihood. Moreover, the appellant in his statement recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C. has categorically deposed that at the time of the incident, he was working in his “bajra” field. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, it cannot be said that the fact pertaining to the unnatural death of the deceased was within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant and since he failed to furnish any explanation, he could be convicted with the aid of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 35. In our opinion, the conviction of the appellant recorded by the trial court by invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be maintained for the reason that the prosecution in this case has failed to discharge its burden of proof by leading evidence to establish the presence of the appellant at the time and place of the occurrence despite, it being categorically stated in the F.I.R. that Mamta, wife of Sanju, Ratan Singh and Rajveer had seen the appellant putting the dead body of the deceased in his Maruti Van. 36. The recorded conviction of the appellant is liable to be set-aside also on the ground that motive assumes considerable relevance in a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence. 36. The recorded conviction of the appellant is liable to be set-aside also on the ground that motive assumes considerable relevance in a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence. The motive setup in the F.I.R. was demand of dowry by the appellant from the deceased and her parents, her maltreatment and torture by them on account of non-fulfilment of the alleged demands of dowry and her eventually being strangulated to death by her husband in her matrimonial home on account of unfulfilled demands of dowry. The trial court having acquitted the appellant of the charge u/s 498-A I.P.C. and ¾ of Dowry Prohibition Act, the motive for the appellant to commit the offence disappeared and in the absence of motive, the most vital link in the chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution at the guilt of the appellant stood snapped. 37. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge u/s 302 I.P.C. against the accused-appellant beyond all reasonable doubts and the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. 38. These are the reasons on account of which we had allowed this appeal.