JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and decree of the 5th Additional District Judge (F.T.C.), Jamtara dated 30.03.2010 in Title Appeal No. 13 of 2005 whereby and where under, the learned court below dismissed the appeal of the appellant-plaintiffs. 3. The case of the plaintiffs in brief is that the original plaintiff Narsingh Mahto and the defendant no.2 Harendra Nath Mahato were the next surviving heirs of Basudeo Mahato and his wife Rikhu Bala @ Subhasini. According to the case of the plaintiffs, Rikhu Bala @ Subhasini died on 24.09.1995 issueless. The original plaintiff Narsingh Mahto, defendant no.2 and their successors succeeded to the share and interest of the said Rikhu Bala @ Subhasini in the suit property which belonged to Basudeo Mahato who was the husband of Rikhu Bala @ Subhasini. The defendant no.2, Harendra Nath Mahto gave a written information to Bindapather Police Station alleging that the plaintiffs have committed theft of paddy crops and in that written information, the defendant no.2 mentioned that in Title Suit no.1 of 1976 a compromise decree regarding the suit schedule A property was passed and on the basis of compromise decree passed in that suit the defendant no.2 became owner of the suit property. The plaintiffs thus came to know about the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the said compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 was a fraudulent one and is the result of collusion between the defendant no.2 on one hand and Atulya Chandra Mahato and Rikhu Bala on the other hand and as the said compromise decree casted a cloud upon a right, title and interest of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property, hence the plaintiffs filed the Title Suit No. 61 of 1998/105 of 2004 with a prayer for a declaration that the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 in the court of Sub-Judge, Jamtara dated 26.02.1980 is illegal, void and have been fraudulently obtained and further prayed that the compromise decree is not binding upon the plaintiffs and does not confer title to the defendant no.2 in respect of the suit schedule A land of the plaintiffs and other lands. 4. 4. The defendant no.1 Atulya Chand Mahato did not contest Title Suit No. 61 of 1998/105/2004 and was set ex-parte. The case of the defendant no. 2 is that there was no collusion in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 and the compromise was made with free consent and knowledge of the plaintiffs and the defendants of that suit. It is further pleaded by the defendants that the proceeding in the Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 was genuine and a compromise was arrived at by way of family settlement. 5. On the basis of the rival pleadings, the learned trial court altogether framed seven issues, the main issue being the issue no. V which is as under:- “V. Whether the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 1/76 dt. 19th April 1980 is valid, genuine or legal?” 6. Learned trial court after considering the evidence in record came to a finding that the factum of fraud and forgery played in procuring the left thumb impression of Rikhu Bala @ Subhasini in blank papers and thereby using those papers and converting the papers into written statement and compromise petition in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 for the purpose of procuring compromise decree has not been well founded and further held that the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 is valid, genuine and is tenable. Hence, the trial court held that the said judgment and decree is not fit to be declared null and void. 7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 61 of 1998/105 of 2004, the appellant-plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Jamtara which was numbered as Title Appeal No. 13 of 2005. The said appeal was ultimately heard and disposed of by the learned 5th Additional District Judge (F.T.C.), Jamtara by the impugned judgment and decree. The learned first appellate court basing upon the submissions made at the bar considered the following points for determination in the appeal:- (i) Whether the plaintiffs/appellants have locus standi to challenge the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 1/1976? (ii) Whether the suit of plaintiffs/appellants is barred as per provision of Order 23, Rule 3A C.P.C.? (iii) Whether the trial court has committed any mistake of facts or law in dismissing the suit? (ii) Whether the suit of plaintiffs/appellants is barred as per provision of Order 23, Rule 3A C.P.C.? (iii) Whether the trial court has committed any mistake of facts or law in dismissing the suit? Learned first appellate court considered that the adoption deed executed by Rikhu Bala adopting Atulya Chand Mahato has not been declared nullity by any court of competent jurisdiction. Hence, the appellant-plaintiffs have no locus standi to challenge the compromise decree. The learned first appellate court further considered that the appellant-plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden of pleading and proving the alleged fraud in the said compromise decree and dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. 8. Mr. Jay Prakash Jha the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants submitted that the learned first appellate court failed to consider the evidence available in record in its proper perspective and erred by holding that there was no forgery or fraud played in taking left thumb impression of Rikhu Bala, wife of late Basudeo Mahato. It is, further, submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants that the claim of the plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 that suit property was gifted in his favour by the defendant no.2 of that suit-Rikhu Bala is not sustainable in law being hit by Section 20(1) of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act (Supplementary Provision Act, 17 of 1949). Hence, Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 could not have been decreed in favour of the plaintiffs of that suit namely Harendra Nath Mahato, hence in such a suit where the compromise entered into between the parties to that suit amounts to fraud played upon the court, more so because Rikhu Bala having only a limited right of maintenance over the property of Basudeo Mahato, she was not competent to enter into any compromise, having no absolute right over the property concerned. 9. Mr. 9. Mr. Rahul Gupta, the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand defended the impugned judgment and submitted that the plaintiffs did not plead in their plaint that Rikhu Bala was not competent to enter into any compromise in the Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 or that she was not entitled to inherit the property of Basudeo Mahato and not even pleaded that the suit is hit by Section 20(1) of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act (Supplementary Provision Act, 17 of 1949) because the claim of the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 that suit property was gifted in his favour by the defendant no.2 of that suit-Rikhu Bala. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the seven grounds pleaded by the plaintiff in this suit filed inter alia with a prayer for a declaration that the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 by the Sub-Judge, Jamtara dated 26.02.1980 is illegal and void, is basically on the ground that the same has been fraudulently obtained and is the result of collusion between the defendant no.2 of this suit on one hand and Atulya Chandra Mahato (defendant no. 1 of this suit) and Rikhu Bala on the other hand. It is further submitted that the new grounds agitated for the first time in this second appeal by the appellants that Rikhu Bala is not entitled to inherit the property of Basudeo Mahato or that the suit is hit by Section 20(1) of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act (Supplementary Provision Act, 17 of 1949) because the claim of the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 that suit property was gifted in his favour by the defendant no.1 of that suit-Rikhu Bala, are the two fresh grounds agitated by the appellants for the first time in this second appeal. It is then submitted that in the absence of any specific pleadings in this respect in the plaint of this suit and as none of the seven grounds pleaded in the plaint, for the prayer for declaration that the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 by the Sub-Judge, Jamtara dated 26.02.1980 is illegal and void, is not even remotely relates to the said two new submissions made in this second appeal for the first time, hence the appellants are not entitled to raise such new pleas for the first time in this second appeal. It is, further, submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the plaintiffs in paragraph no.5 of the plaint have pleaded that the original plaintiff Narsingh Mahato has right over the suit property by way of reversion, hence, any decree in respect of the suit property which is binding on a person having ownership of that property is also binding upon the plaintiffs and hence he submits that there is no merit in this appeal. 10. After hearing the parties and considering the material on record including the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below, I find that learned lower Appellate court has considered all the relevant facts, evidences and materials on record in correct perspective and has arrived at the finding of fact on the basis thereof that the appellant-plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden of pleading and proving the alleged fraud in the said compromise decree. It is a settled principle of law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse, as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme of India, in paragraph-10 of the case of Gurvachan Kaur and Others vs. Salikram (dead) through LRS., reported in (2010) 15 SCC 530 as under:- "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." (Emphasis Supplied). Learned Counsel for the appellants could not point out any specific instance of any particular evidence being not considered and certainly the appellant–plaintiffs are not entitled to raise new pleas for the first time in the second appeal in respect of which there is no pleading in the record. The learned Counsel for the appellants also could not point out any illegality or error in the impugned judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court giving rise to any substantial question of law to be framed and decided by this Court in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. 11. Accordingly, this appeal being without any merit is dismissed but in the circumstances without any costs.