JUDGMENT : RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD, J. 1. This civil review application has been preferred seeking recall of the order dated 13.05.2018 passed by a learned coordinate Bench of this Court in its writ jurisdiction. The petition has been virtually framed by making a prayer to set aside the order dated 13.05.2018 passed in CWJC No.14781 of 2007. Submissions of the Review Petitioner 2. Mr. Lalit Kishore, learned senior advocate representing the Bihar State Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') assisted by Ms. Binita Singh, learned advocate on record has concentrated on his argument that because of the suppression of the material facts by writ petitioner, the order dated 13.05.2018 came to be passed. It is submitted that in course of hearing of the writ application, writ petitioner did not bring to the notice of the learned Writ Court that he had sent a legal notice dated 10.05.2007 to the Managing Director of the Board wherein he had shown his willingness to pay the dues of the Board for purpose of execution and registration of the final lease deed and thereby he had requested the Board that dues amount be furnished to him. 3. It is submitted that the writ petitioner also failed to point out that in course of the submissions advanced on his behalf before the Managing Director of the Board, learned counsel representing the petitioner had shown his willingness to pay up-to-date dues towards payment of remaining installments with interest provided the Board absolved the writ petitioner from the charge of violation of Clauses 3, 4 and 9 of the agreement. It is further pointed out that in the written argument filed on 10.10.2007 before the Managing Director of the Board the writ petitioner had given an undertaking that he would deposit the balance dues amount within one month from the date of order and comply with the conditions of the allotment order. The writ petitioner had taken a plea that his case was exactly on the same footing as was the case of one Cheta Nand Singh in which by order vide memo no.5930 dated 11.10.1999, his allotment had been directed to be continued on the conditions mentioned therein including his paying the dues of the Board. Learned senior counsel further submits that the order dated 17.03.2008 by which the Board modified its earlier impugned order dated 31.10.2007, had brought down the demand from Rs. Learned senior counsel further submits that the order dated 17.03.2008 by which the Board modified its earlier impugned order dated 31.10.2007, had brought down the demand from Rs. 33,42,636/- to the tune of Rs. 9,02,550/- which was due amount as on 31.12.1999. The Board, it is submitted, had raised demand against the petitioner only up to October, 1999 and therefore the modified order dated 17.03.2008 was passed in tune with the submission of the writ petitioner before the Board that his case is similar to the case of Cheta Nand Singh. 4. In the written notes of argument filed on behalf of the Board some more issues have been raised. It is submitted that the writ application itself was not maintainable and once the Board had accepted the submission of the writ petitioner by coming out with modified order dated 17.03.2008, the writ petitioner was precluded from challenging the revised demand against him and the writ application was not maintainable. It is submitted that the writ petitioner was being extended similar treatment as Cheta Nand Singh was given which was part of the impugned order dated 31.10.2007 and the order dated 17.03.2008, but this fact was not brought to the notice of the learned writ Court by the writ petitioner and had it been shown to the Hon'ble Court that the writ petitioner is being treated similarly to that of Cheta Nand Singh, there would have been no occasion for this Court to set aside these two orders especially the order dated 17.03.2008 and thus it would be a good ground for review of the judgment and order dated 13.05.2008 passed by the learned Writ Court. 5. Further contentions have been raised in the written notes of argument stating that the writ petitioner had violated the terms of the agreement by constructing a building up to the four storied and therefore he had made offer to pay the up-to-date dues in case he was absolved of the same. 5. Further contentions have been raised in the written notes of argument stating that the writ petitioner had violated the terms of the agreement by constructing a building up to the four storied and therefore he had made offer to pay the up-to-date dues in case he was absolved of the same. It is submitted that in the writ petition he had made no statement (i) of his complying with the said term of the agreement even though in the impugned order dated 31.10.2007 and in the modified order dated 17.03.2008 it was a specific condition that he would submit an affidavit that he would use the said plot of land as per the agreement or (ii) demolishing the offending fourth floor to make in conformity with the agreement and thus this Hon'ble Court being a Court of equity ought not to have exercised its high prerogative writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. 6. It is lastly submitted that even though the opposite party had by filing a supplementary affidavit in the writ petition brought on record the modified order of the Board dated 17.03.2008, but he neither chose to challenge the said order by way of an interlocutory application nor chose to raise any grievance against the same by any pleading in support thereof and thus in absence of any challenge to the order dated 17.03.2008 the learned writ Court was not justified in granting the relief which was not prayed for and which was not supported by any pleading to that extent. It is submitted that the agreement dated 27.10.1994 was not a statutory contract and in fact the agreement vide Clause 24 provides for arbitration in case of any dispute. It is again submitted that because the impugned order dated 30.10.2007 was in respect of the claim of the dues against the opposite party and the same was arising out of the said agreement which had no public law element and this being a pure contractual dispute arising out of a non-statutory contract, on the face of the arbitration clause the writ petition was not maintainable. 7. On the point of power of review under Article 226, the petitioner-Board has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Shivdeo Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana, (1963) AIR SC 1909 (Para 8), Jamun Poddar Vs. 7. On the point of power of review under Article 226, the petitioner-Board has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Shivdeo Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana, (1963) AIR SC 1909 (Para 8), Jamun Poddar Vs. State of Bihar, (1988) AIR Patna 314 (Para 6, 7 and 8). On the point that relief could not have been granted when not prayed for, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Manohar Lal (Dead) by LRs Vs. Ugrasen (Dead) by LRs, (2010) 11 SCC 557 (Para 2(c), 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34) and Bharat Amritlal Kothari & Another. Vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi and Others., (2010) 1 SCC 234 (Para 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36). Further on the point that the writ petition was not maintainable, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. Vs. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22 (Para 16, 17 and 18). Submissions of the Writ-Petitioner-Opposite Party 8. On the other hand, learned counsel representing the original writ petitioner-opposite party submits that the review application is only misconceived and misleading. It is submitted that the order of the learned Writ Court itself is a well reasoned order and it takes note of the submissions of the Board that in similar matter interest and dues have been calculated and order was passed on 11.10.1999 with regard to other writ petitioner. The modified order dated 17.03.2008 itself takes note of the similar view taken with regard to the other person and therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the learned writ Court was not aware of the facts and circumstances under which the writ petitioner-opposite party had initially agreed to pay in the manner it was allowed to one Cheta Nand Singh. 9. 9. Learned counsel representing the opposite party submits that a bare perusal of the impugned order dated 30.10.2007 issued on 31.10.2007 (Annexure-1 to the writ application) which was available on the record of the Writ Court shows that the said order clearly mentions about the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner before the Managing Director of the Board but then by rejecting the offer of the writ petitioner-opposite party the impugned order was passed directing him to pay a sum of Rs. 33,42,623/-. Paragraph 6 of the order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007 (Annexure-1 to the writ application) clearly takes note of the submission of the learned counsel representing the original writ petitioner and therefore it cannot be allowed to be argued on behalf of the Board that the petitioner had suppressed these facts from the learned Writ Court. 10. Learned counsel submits that in fact the learned Writ Court was also pointed out that initially when the allotment of the plot of the petitioner was cancelled on 21.12.1993 alleging two consecutives defaults on his part in paying the installments, he had moved this Court in CWJC No.1344 of 1994. The impugned order in the said writ application was quashed with a direction vide order dated 05.07.1994 to the Board to take a fresh decision in accordance with law after complying with the principles of natural justice. It took 13 years to the Board in taking this decision and therefore when it was pointed out to the learned Writ Court in the second round of litigation in CWJC No.14781 of 2007 and it was submitted that for the inordinate and abnormal delay on the part of the Board in not taking a decision for thirteen years, the petitioner cannot be made liable to pay interest save and except for a reasonable period after the order dated 05.07.1994 was passed by the learned Writ Court in CWJC No.1344 of 1994, this argument of the petitioner was able to persuade the learned Writ Court in accepting the challenge to the impugned order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007 as well as the modified order dated 17.03.2008. 11. Learned counsel submits that at this stage in the garb of the review application the Board cannot be allowed to take a plea as to the maintainability of the writ application and such efforts being made by the Board at this stage are required to be deprecated. 11. Learned counsel submits that at this stage in the garb of the review application the Board cannot be allowed to take a plea as to the maintainability of the writ application and such efforts being made by the Board at this stage are required to be deprecated. It is also submitted that the present review application has been filed on the same facts and grounds which were available to the Board at the time of filing of the pleadings in the writ petition and at the stage of final hearing and, therefore, in the garb of review application the Board cannot be allowed to request this Court to sit in appeal over the order of the learned Writ Court. The opposite party has also relied upon the provisions as contained in Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule-1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to submit that the principles on which the review application may be maintained even in respect of a writ proceeding will be the same principles . Even though the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply in its entirety in respect of the writ proceedings, but the principles laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure have been cited at the bar on several occasions to draw an analogy. 12. According to said provision any person who is aggrieved by the order and who, from discovery of new and important fact or evidence which after exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the fact of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desire to obtain a review of the order, he may apply for review of the judgment. It is submitted that in the case of Inderchand Jain Vs. Motila, (2009) 14 SCC 663 (Para 10) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is submitted that in case of Haridas Das Vs. Motila, (2009) 14 SCC 663 (Para 10) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is submitted that in case of Haridas Das Vs. Usharaini Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of mistake but not to substitute the view. Further in paragraph 13 it has been held that where the order in question is appealable, aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and in such case the Court should exercise the power of review of its order with great circumspection. Learned counsel submits that the review application is fit to be dismissed on this ground alone. CONSIDERATION 13. After having heard the learned senior counsel representing the Board and learned counsel representing the original petitioner-opposite party as also after perusal of the records, this Court finds that the ground of suppression of facts raised on behalf of the review-petitioner has no basis to stand. This Court finds that the fact that the original petitioner had in course of argument before the Managing Director of the Board on 10.10.2007 submitted that he would be ready to pay the amount in similar manner as has been done in the case of one Cheta Nand Singh is not in dispute. The submissions made on behalf of the petitioner was available on the record of the Managing Director of the Board, he took note of it in his order dated 30.10.2007, but could not be persuaded by the writ petitioner to agree to receive the amount in similar manner as was done in the case of one Cheta Nand Singh. By the impugned order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007, the Managing Director of the Board directed the original petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 33,42,623/-. This order clearly takes note of the submission of the learned counsel representing the original writ petitioner before the Managing Director of the Board. It is recorded in paragraph 6 that the learned advocate for the first party had agreed that on being absolved of the conditions contained in paragraph 3, 4 and 9 of the agreement, he would be ready to pay the up-to-date dues of the plot in question. It is recorded in paragraph 6 that the learned advocate for the first party had agreed that on being absolved of the conditions contained in paragraph 3, 4 and 9 of the agreement, he would be ready to pay the up-to-date dues of the plot in question. This order was challenged by the original petitioner before the learned Writ Court on the grounds inter alia that after more than thirteen years, for no fault of the petitioner he cannot be asked to pay a fine and interest to the tune of Rs. 33,42,636/-, the order challenged is being arbitrary, illegal and malafide in nature. 14. When the writ application came to be heard on 25.02.2008 a learned coordinate Bench of this Court observed as under:- "Though a detailed counter affidavit on behalf of the Housing Board has been filed but a basic question still needs to be answered which has a vital bearing to the demand made by the Housing Board contained in Annexure-1. An earlier action of cancellation was challenged in a writ application, namely, CWJC No. 1344 of 1994. The impugned order was set aside, matter was remanded on 5.7.1994 by the High Court. The authorities could only pass the order which is under challenge on 30.10.2017. Why a matter should take more than 13 years to decide has not been satisfactorily explained or even stated in the counter affidavit. It is moot question to be decided dependent on the satisfactory explanation which is required by the Housing Board. List this case as prayed for after three weeks to enable the counsel for the Housing Board to file a supplementary affidavit along with supporting documents for the assertions and submissions which may be made in the matter." 15. After the aforesaid order was passed the Board on it's own modified the impugned order dated 30.10.2007/31.07.2007. The modified order was passed and this time the petitioner was called upon to pay a sum of Rupees nine lacs two thousand and five hundred fifty. The order dated 17.03.2008 was brought on record with supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner as Annexure-12. Since this order was passed after the observations of the learned writ Court in its order dated 25.02.2008, the learned Writ Court proceeded to consider the writ application in its entirety. The order dated 17.03.2008 was brought on record with supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner as Annexure-12. Since this order was passed after the observations of the learned writ Court in its order dated 25.02.2008, the learned Writ Court proceeded to consider the writ application in its entirety. This Court also finds that while trying to defend the order dated 17.03.2008 the Board submitted before the learned writ Court that in similar matters interest and dues had been calculated and orders passed on 11.10.1999 with regard to other writ petitioners and therefore it will be consistent to likewise assess the liability of the petitioner as on 13.12.1999. If this is the position, this Court would reiterate that the ground stating that it is a case of suppression of facts that the petitioner had agreed to pay like similarly situated Cheta Nand Singh in whose respect the order dated 11.10.1999 was passed is not correct. 16. This Court also finds that the learned writ Court took note of the inordinate delay on the part of the Board in fresh disposal of the matter after the order dated 05.07.1994 was passed in CWJC No.1344 of 1994. The learned writ Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/S Hindustan Times Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (1998) AIR SC 688 to come to a conclusion that the re-determination could have been done within a reasonable time and that period would be a period of 2- 3 months. In its ultimate analysis the learned Writ Court rejected the contention of the Board that similarly situated persons had not challenged the fixation of their dues on 31.12.1999 and took a view that when the petitioner has laid down a challenge to the action of the Board, he cannot be ousted on the ground that others have not challenged the fixation. 17. Since the order dated 17.03.2008 was in the nature of a modification of the impugned order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007 which was pending consideration before the learned Writ Court in the totality of the circumstances the learned writ Court held that the impugned order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007 as modified by the order dated 17.03.2008 are liable to be set aside to the extent indicated in the order of the learned Writ Court. 18. 18. In the written notes of argument the Board has taken a plea that the writ petition was not maintainable, this Court would only say that such baseless plea cannot be allowed to be taken by the Board at this stage in the review application. The ground which was available to the Board to argue but could not be argued before the learned writ Court cannot be allowed to be taken while seeking review of the order passed by the learned Writ Court. This amounts to re-hearing of the matter which is forbidden in the review jurisdiction. The plea of the Board that the order dated 17.03.2008 would not have been interfered with by the learned Writ Court because there was no challenge to the same would also not impress this Court sitting in its review jurisdiction. It is an admitted position that only after the order dated 25.02.2008 was passed by the learned Writ Court, the Board on its own reviewed the impugned order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007. The lis was pending before this Court and the order dated 17.03.2008 was nothing but in the nature of an amendment of the order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007. Thus, in the given facts and circumstance, the learned Writ Court in its extraordinary writ jurisdiction could have very well considered the fact of the amendment of the impugned order. It cannot be argued by the Board that in the given circumstance the technicality of challenging the said modified order afresh would have come in the way of the writ petitioner in getting appropriate relief which were based on the pleadings and the reasonings advanced by the petitioner in the writ petition. On record is also a counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Board. In paragraph 30 of the counter affidavit the Board has pointed out that the petitioner had given an undertaking to pay the balance cost of the allotted plot of land and has in fact stated that the same would appear from the order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007 (Annexure-1). This strengthens the finding of this Court that the ground based on suppression of facts by the writ petitioner is totally baseless. It is not the case of the Board that any of the grounds taken by the Board in its counter affidavit was though argued but not considered by the learned Writ Court. This strengthens the finding of this Court that the ground based on suppression of facts by the writ petitioner is totally baseless. It is not the case of the Board that any of the grounds taken by the Board in its counter affidavit was though argued but not considered by the learned Writ Court. In fact in the garb of the review application the Board is now trying to raise certain arguments which were not advanced before the learned Writ Court. 19. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of review jurisdiction in the case of Sasi (Dead) Through Legal Representatives Vs. Aravindakshan Nair and Ors., (2017) 4 SCC 692 and in paragraphs 6 to 9 held as under:- "6. The grounds enumerated therein are specific. The principles for interference in exercise of review jurisdiction are well settled. The Court passing the order is entitled to review the order, if any of the grounds specified in the aforesaid provision are satisfied. 7. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., (1964) AIR SC 1372 , the Court while dealing with the scope of review had opined:(AIR p.1377, para 11) "11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an "error apparent on the face of the record". The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an "error apparent on the face of the record", for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error." 8. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error." 8. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , the Court after referring to Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. State of A.P., (1964) AIR SC 1372), Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 , held thus: (Parsion Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , SCC p.719, para 9) "9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". 9. The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out the nature, scope and ambit of power to be exercised. The error has to be self-evident and is not to be found out by a process of reasoning. We have adverted to the aforesaid aspects only to highlight the nature of review proceedings." 20. The judgments on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner-Board with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition or the power of review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case as also to decide the issues which have fallen for consideration before this Court. 21. The context in which the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was rendered in the case of Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. and in the case of Shivdeo Singh are not present in this case. Similarly, the judgments in the case of Manohar Lal (Dead) and Bharat Amritlal Kothari would not be attracted in the facts of the present case. Similarly, the judgments in the case of Manohar Lal (Dead) and Bharat Amritlal Kothari would not be attracted in the facts of the present case. This Court has already discussed hereinabove that the impugned modified order dated 17.03.2008 was nothing but a kind of amendment of the impugned order dated 30.10.2007/31.10.2007 and the modified order was passed after this Court had observed in its order dated 25.02.2008, thus, the ratio of the judgment of the aforementioned two cases on the point that relief not prayed for should not be granted to the petitioner would not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case. 22. It is well settled that each judgment of the Court has to be looked into in the context in which the judgment has been rendered. In the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. Vs. N. R. Vairamani & Others, (2004) 8 SCC 579 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has cautioned that the judgments/observations of the Court should not be cited like euclid's theorems as the slightest of change in the facts of the case would make a sea difference in the judgment of the Court. 23. In result, no ground at all could be found to recall or modify/set aside the order of the learned Writ Court. The review application has no merit. It is, accordingly, dismissed.