JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Akash Bhusan, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 2. Heard Mr. Aditya Raman, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State. 3. Nobody appears on behalf of the respondent nos. 5 to 8. 4. Heard Mr. Shailendra Kumar Singh, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.9. 5. At the outset, counsel for the petitioner submits that vide order dated petition for intervention being I.A. No. 1783 of 2013 was allowed vide order dated 20.06.2013 and the intervener was directed to be added as respondent no. 9, but the necessary insertion has not been carried out in the cause title of the writ petition. Accordingly, the counsel for the petitioner is permitted to carry out the necessary amendment in the cause title so as to insert the name of the intervener as respondent no. 9 in the cause title. 6. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs :- “That the instant writ application is for setting aside the order dated 22.9.98 passed in S.A.R. Revision No. 6 of 92 by the respondent no.2, the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi contained in Annexure-7 and the order dated 7.12.91 passed in S.A.R. Appeal No. 79 of 85-86 by the respondent no.3, the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum West at Chaibasa contained in Annexure-5 whereby the petitioner is directed to remove the structure (the house) immediately and return the lands in question to the respondent nos. 5 to 8 immediately.” 7. Counsel for the petitioner submits the one S.A.R. Case No. 138 of 82-83 was filed by father respondent nos. 5 to 7 against the petitioner in the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate at Seraikella for restoration of possession of land under Khata No. 51 Village Sukhsari, Plot No. 264 & 274, Thana No. 240 Revenue Thana Chandil, District-Singhbhum West having area of total 1.68 acres. 8. By referring to the application for restoration as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, the counsel submits that the date of dispossession has been mentioned as 1968 and the details by which the petitioner has been dispossessed from the property involved in this case is mentioned as Title Suit. 9. 8. By referring to the application for restoration as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, the counsel submits that the date of dispossession has been mentioned as 1968 and the details by which the petitioner has been dispossessed from the property involved in this case is mentioned as Title Suit. 9. He submits that there has been only one title suit between the parties that was Title Suit No.234 of 1969, which ultimately ended in a compromise on 28.07.69 in which the private respondents had filed an affidavit that they had sold the suit land to the father of the petitioner in the month of June 1950 for a consideration of an amount of Rs. 2,400/- and on the basis of this affidavit the title suit ended into a compromise by virtue of order dated 28.07.1969. 10. He further submits that notices were issued and the petitioner filed his show-cause reply before the S.A.R. Court, wherein, the petitioner took specific plea that the petitioner is in possession of the property for more than 30 years since 1950 and this fact has been admitted by the applicant in the title suit also and accordingly the petition was not maintainable against the petitioner. He submits that there was partition in connection with the property and he and his two brothers have constructed pucca house over the said land and are residing over the same with their family members. 11. He further submits that the applicant of S.A.R. Case No. 138 of 82-83, again filed an affidavit before the S.A.R. Court, squarely mentioning that the land in question was settled with the petitioner’s father Ram Lal Singh as back as in the year 1950, and the father of the petitioner was in possession of the property since 1950 and he had also submitted in the affidavit that the father of the petitioner being in possession of the land for more than 30 years. In the said affidavit, it was mentioned that the applicant had also admitted the possession of the father of the petitioner even during the title suit. 12. The S.A.R. Officer, conducted an enquiry through the Circle Officer who in his inspection report dated 05.03.1983 submitted that the property in the record of rights is still in the name of the recorded tenant and that the value of the construction over the property is only for three thousand rupees. 13. 12. The S.A.R. Officer, conducted an enquiry through the Circle Officer who in his inspection report dated 05.03.1983 submitted that the property in the record of rights is still in the name of the recorded tenant and that the value of the construction over the property is only for three thousand rupees. 13. However, the authority passed order for getting property valued through Junior Engineer and the Junior Engineer submitted a report that the value of the constructed property is total for amount of Rs. 35,855/- and there were three houses on the property, the house of Sri Gazadhar Singh was valued at Rs. 5,880/- and value of property of Shiv Ratan Mahto was for a value of Rs. 18,095/- and the property in possession of Bulaki Mahto was valued at Rs. 11,880/- and the total value of the property was 35,855/-. 14. He further submits that as upon on the spot inspection two persons Shiv Ratan Mahto and Bulaki Mahto were also found in possession of the property apart from petitioner. They were also noticed in the S.A.R. case but they did not file any show-cause reply and the matter was contested only by the petitioner. 15. During the inspection it was also found that the last land receipt was issued in the year 1980-81 in the name of the applicant. The S.A.R. Officer, passed order dated 16.08.1985 by considering the affidavit dated 10.07.1985 filed by the applicant himself that the applicant had sold the property orally to the petitioner’s father as back as in the year 1950 for a considering of Rs.2,400/- and that he has no title over the property. 16. Counsel for the petitioner submits that this particular affidavit dated 10.07.1985 indicates that it is an admitted fact on record by the original applicant that he was dispossessed from the property as back as in the year 1950. He further submits that the application for restoration of land was filed in the year 1982 i.e., after expiry of more than 30 years and accordingly the application for restoration itself was time barred being filed much beyond the reasonable period and in the meantime much water had flown. He further submits that the application for restoration of land was filed in the year 1982 i.e., after expiry of more than 30 years and accordingly the application for restoration itself was time barred being filed much beyond the reasonable period and in the meantime much water had flown. He submits that considering this aspect of the matter and considering the affidavit filed by the applicant himself, the S.A.R. Officer held that the application for restoration of land was time barred and also recorded that as per the affidavit itself the applicant was not interested in the property any more. The S.A.R. Officer dismissed the application for restoration being S.A.R. 138 of 82-83 vide order dated 16.8.1985. 17. However the applicant filed an appeal against the order passed by the S.A.R. officer which was numbered as S.A.R. Appeal No. 79 of 85-86 and the appellate authority allowed the appeal by holding that the applicant were dispossessed from the property only in the year 1964 and there is no material on record that the petitioner was in possession of the property since 1950. The appellate court further held that as the value of the property as per report of the Circle Officer is only Rs.3000/- therefore the same cannot be considered to be substantial structure as per the second proviso to Section 71 A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. 18. Counsel for the petitioner submits that appellate authority ignored two material facts, one was the inspection report regarding the value of the property given by the junior engineer wherein a specific finding was given that the total value of the property was amounting to Rs. 35,855/- and secondly, the affidavit filed by the applicant himself who filed specific affidavit before the S.A.R. Court that he was dispossessed from the property in the year 1950. He submits that order passed by the appellate authority is perverse on account of non-consideration of relevant materials on record. 19. Against this appellate order, the petitioner filed revision before the revisional authority which was numbered as S.A.R. revision No. 6 of 1992 in which the specific ground regarding filing of affidavit in the S.A.R. case by the applicant as well as the valuation of the property were also taken and was argued that the application filed by the applicant under Section 71 A was clearly bared by limitation. However, the respondent for the first time before the revisional court submitted that the affidavit filed in the year 1985 is forged and fabricated document and it cannot be relied, although no such ground was ever taken by the private respondents before the appellate authority. The revisional authority after hearing the parties again did not consider the affidavit filed by the applicant before the S.A.R. Court and held that the land in question was transferred after regulation 1 of 1969 came into force by means of a compromise decree and thereby dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner. 20. Counsel for the petitioner submits that it was never the case of the applicant that applicant was dispossessed after coming into force of Regulation 1 of 1969. As per the application for restoration of land itself, the date of dispossession has been mentioned as 1968. He submits that the revisional authority also did not consider the aforesaid material which was on record and dismissed the revision application. 21. Counsel for the petitioner submits that order of the appellate authority as well as the order of the revisional authority do not deal with the reasons which has been given in the original order of the S.A.R. Court and also do not consider the material on record on the basis of which the original S.A.R. Court had passed the final order. Therefore, it is submitted that the order of the appellate court as well as the order of the revisional Court are perverse and are fit to be set-aside. 22. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.8 has entered in this case by virtue of Intervention Application and he submits that he has purchased the property from the father of the respondent nos.5 to 7 by virtue of Sale deed dated 06.09.1986, after due permission from the Deputy Commissioner which was granted vide order dated 13.08.1986. The permission for transfer as well as the sale deed are contained in Annexure to the intervention application. He submits that as the other private respondents herein are no more interested in the property therefore they are not appearing in this case. 23. The permission for transfer as well as the sale deed are contained in Annexure to the intervention application. He submits that as the other private respondents herein are no more interested in the property therefore they are not appearing in this case. 23. On the merits of the matter, Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.8 submits that the case of the petitioner is based on the stand taken by the applicant in the title suit and before the title suit the Deputy Commissioner was not a party and the compromise which was entered into the title suit was collusive and therefore the appellate court has rightly not taken into consideration the case of the petitioner that they were in possession of the property since 1950. He further submits that in a proceeding under Section 71 A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, the records relating to the title suit and the compromise could not have been taken into consideration and therefore the appellate authority has rightly passed the order by holding that the petitioner was in possession of the property only since 1964, and therefore, the petition filed by the applicant was not barred by the limitation. He submits that this aspect of the matter has been rightly considered by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority and there is no perversity or illegality in the impugned order and therefore the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 24. Counsel for the State submits that impugned order has been rightly passed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority after considering the material on record and the oral claim of the petitioner that they are in possession of the property since 1950 cannot be considered particularly in view of the fact that as per the records of right the property was still running in the name of the recorded tenant till 1964 and he submits that the petitioner never took any steps for the purposes of mutation and accordingly the story of the petitioner that they are in possession of the property since 1950 is fit to be discard. He further refers to para-16 of the writ petition to submit that the petitioner himself has stated that the construction took place after the death of his father and he further submits that as the house was constructed after the death of his father and the father had filed title suit in the year 1969 this goes to show that father had expired after 1969 and the construction had come up after 1969, therefore they cannot have any advantage of the second proviso to Section 71-A regarding substantial structure. The value of the constructed property being less than Rs.10,000/- or more than Rs.10,000/- is totally meaningless because the construction had come up only after 1969 as per the documents available on record. He submits that the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 25. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court finds that the private respondent nos.5 to 7 herein had filed their application for restoration under Section 71-A before the S.A.R. Court which was numbered as S.A.R. Case No.138 of 82-83, wherein, the applicant had mentioned the date of dispossession as 1968 and the mode of dispossession was mentioned as title suit. From the records of the case it appears that the title suit which was being referred to was Title Suit No. 234 of 1969. Before the S.A.R. Court the applicant had filed a specific affidavit dated 10.07.1985 by mentioning that he had transferred the property to the petitioner’s father in the year 1950 orally for a consideration of Rs.2,400/- and he had filed similar affidavit in the title suit also. Thus from the records of the case, it is clear that the applicant was dispossessed from the property in the year 1950 as per his own affidavit which he had submitted before the S.A.R. Court. On the basis of this affidavit dated 10.07.1985, the S.A.R. Court held that the application for restoration which was filed in the year 1982-83 was filed after more than 30 years from the date of dispossession and accordingly the same was held to be time barred. The appeal was filed being S.A.R. Appeal No.79 of 1985-86 and from the appellate order, it appears that it was never the case of the applicant even before the appellate court that the affidavit dated 10.07.1985 filed before the S.A.R. Court was forged, fabricated or collusive. The appeal was filed being S.A.R. Appeal No.79 of 1985-86 and from the appellate order, it appears that it was never the case of the applicant even before the appellate court that the affidavit dated 10.07.1985 filed before the S.A.R. Court was forged, fabricated or collusive. Even before the appellate court, the applicant never disputed the affidavit dated 10.07.1985 which was filed before the S.A.R. Court. The order in S.A.R. appeal was passed on 03.12.1991, and this affidavit which was filed by the applicant in the S.A.R. Court which was a basis of the order passed by the S.A.R. court, was not considered by the appellate authority. In this view of the matter, this Court finds that the order passed by the appellate court is perverse for non-consideration of affidavit of the original applicant dated 10.07.1985 which was the basis of passing the order by the S.A.R. Court. 26. Against this order, the petitioner filed revision before the revisional authority and the revision was dismissed and the revisional Court also did not take into consideration this aspect of the matter and ignored the affidavit dated 10.07.1985 which was the basis of the order passed by the S.A.R. Court. Therefore, this Court finds that order passed by the appellate Court as well as the revisional court suffers from non-consideration of material on record particularly affidavit dated 10.07.1985 and are accordingly perverse. 27. This Court finds that the order passed by the S.A.R. Court was based on the affidavit dated 10.08.1985 which was filed by the applicant before the S.A.R. Court and not on the basis of any title suit or any compromise which was entered into in the title suit. The stand of the applicant taken before the revisional court that the affidavit in the year 1985 was forged and fabricated is clearly an afterthought as no such stand was taken before the S.A.R. Court and also before the appellate court although the S.A.R. Court had passed the order on the basis of the affidavit of the applicant dated 10.08.1985. On the basis of the aforesaid, this court finds that the applicant was dispossessed from the property as back as in the year 1950 and filed application for restoration of land beyond the reasonable time only in the year 1982 after much water had flown, therefore this court finds that the application for restoration of land was barred by limitation. 28. 28. This Court further finds that the order before the appellate court in favour of the applicant was passed on 03.12.1991 in S.A.R. appeal No.79 of 1985-86, but the Deputy Commissioner passed order permitting transfer on 13.08.1986 after order dated 16.08.1985 passed by the S.A.R. Court rejecting the application for transfer and prior to the order dated 3.12.1991 passed in S.A.R. Appeal setting aside the order dated 16.08.1985. The sale deed was also executed during this period on 06.09.1986. Thus, this Court finds in such circumstances that the private respondent no.9 herein had taken calculated risk and on the date the permission for transfer was granted by the Deputy Commissioner, the permission could not have been granted as the application for restoration of land under section 71 A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 stood dismissed on the date of such permission. 29. From the records of the case it appears that interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 24.11.98 and accordingly it is apparent that the petitioner is in possession of the property involved in this case in spite of sale deed dated 6.9.86 executed by the applicant in favour of the respondent no.9. 30. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 22.9.98 passed in S.A.R. Revision No.6 of 92 by the respondent no.2, the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi contained in Annexure-7 and the impugned order dated 7.12.91 passed in S.A.R. Appeal No. 79 of 85-86 by the respondent no.3, the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum West at Chaibasa contained in Annexure-5 are hereby set-aside.