JUDGMENT : S Serto, J. This is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, praying for condonation of delay of 419 days in filing a Regular First Appeal directed against the judgment and order dated 18.01.2017, passed by the learned District Judge, Aizawl, in L.A Case No. 42/2015. 2. Heard Mr. Ali Hussain, learned counsel for the applicant and also heard Mr. Lalsawirema, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties/respondents and Mr. Samuel Vanlalhriata Chhangte, learned Government Advocate appearing for the proforma respondents No. 178 & 179. 3. The reasons for delay given at para-3 of the application are referred to and read over by the learned counsel of the applicant. The same are reproduced here below verbatim; (a) The applicant/appellant obtained certified copy of the Judgment and Order dated 14/06/2017 and the said Order was delivered on 7/11/2017 through the Ld. Counsel NF Railway, Mr. Ali Hussain. Thereafter, the aforesaid certified copy of the Judgment and Order dated 18/1/2017 was forwarded by him to the concerned authority of NF. Railway, Maligaon, Gauhati - 11, Assam. (b) Thereafter, after following various formalities the concerned Chief Law Assistant (CLA) put up before the concerned Law Officer (Construction) NF. Railway for legal opinion regarding preferring an appeal. (c) On receipt of the above impugned Judgment on dated 7/11/2017 the Order was sent to the concerned Law Officer (Construction), NF.Railway requested the Ld. Counsel of the Railway Mr. Ali Hussain for giving his legal opinion and accordingly, the Ld. Counsel for the NF Railway, Ali Hussain gave his legal opinion on 4/1/2018. However, on perusal of the said legal opinion, the Law Officer (Construction) NF.Railway being not satisfied, further requested the Ld. Counsel of the Railway Ali Hussain to give fresh opinion and accordingly, the Ld. Counsel for the NF. Railways Ali Hussain gave his fresh opinion with suggestion to file Appeal against impugned Judgment and Order dated 18/1/2017. (d) After obtaining opinion of the concerned Ld. Counsel of the NF.Railway Ali Hussai, the matter was forwarded to the Chief Engineer (Construction), NF Railway Maligaon, Gauhati-11, Assam and was further handed over to the other Chief Law Assistant (CLA) for intimating the Deputy Chief Engineer (Construction) Silchar, Assam in this regard and accordingly the Sr. (d) After obtaining opinion of the concerned Ld. Counsel of the NF.Railway Ali Hussai, the matter was forwarded to the Chief Engineer (Construction), NF Railway Maligaon, Gauhati-11, Assam and was further handed over to the other Chief Law Assistant (CLA) for intimating the Deputy Chief Engineer (Construction) Silchar, Assam in this regard and accordingly the Sr. Law Officer (Construction) Maligaon : Gauhati-11, Assam intimated the Deputy Chief Engineer (Construction) Silchar : Assam to arrange for filing appeal before the Hon'ble High Court, Aizawl Bench, Mizoram. (e) Thereafter, the Deputy Chief Engineer (Construction) Silchar : Assam directed the Chief Law Assistant to take immediate steps for nomination of Railway Counsel as well as filing appeal and as such, the Deputy Chief Engineer (Construction) Silchar nominated the Railway Advocate Ali Hussain for filing appeal before the High Court : Aizawl : Bench : Mizoram. (f) On receipt of the approval as well as after consultation with the special Counsel NF. Railway : Gauhati : Assam, nomination of Railway Counsel from the Deputy Chief Engineer (Construction) Silchar : Assam the case file was forwarded for execution and/or signature of Vakalatnama which was signed and finally sent back the case file to the Senior Law Officer (Construction), NF. Railway. (g) Thereafter, the Senior Law Officer (Construction) intimated the Ld. Counsel of the applicants/appellants for filing appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 18/1/2017 before the High Court Aizawl Bench : Mizoram. 4. The learned counsel after having referred to the reasons stated above went on to submit that after the preparation of the memorandum of appeal along with the two I.A. applications was over he intimated to the Chief Law Assistant about the same over phone and asked him to come to Aizawl for finalizing the memorandum of appeal along with the two I.A applications. Thereafter, the memorandum of appeal draft was once again sent to the Sr. Law Officer on 26.03.2018 for final approval. The draft was vetted by the Railways authorities and finally sent to the learned counsel on 30.05.2018 for filing the same before this Court, therefore, the delay of 419 days had occurred. Thereafter, the memorandum of appeal draft was once again sent to the Sr. Law Officer on 26.03.2018 for final approval. The draft was vetted by the Railways authorities and finally sent to the learned counsel on 30.05.2018 for filing the same before this Court, therefore, the delay of 419 days had occurred. The learned counsel submitted that when it comes to condonation of delay the case of Governments both at the Centre and State stands on different footing then the case of private individuals because for Governments it is necessary to go through all the channels of decision making process to come to a conclusion for filing the appeal and the finalization of the draft of the appeal itself. Therefore, the Court's in the Country normally have been liberal in granting condonation of delays. The learned counsel also submitted that from the facts and circumstances given at para-3 of the objection it would be seen that there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on the part of the applicant, therefore, liberal concession may be given for condonation of delay in order to advance substantial justice in the case. In support of his submission, Mr. Ali Hussain, learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Manoharan -versus Sivaranjan & Others, (2014) 4 SCC 163 , para-8. The same is reproduced here below; "8. In the case of State of Bihar and Others. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Another.[1], it was held that power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing the cases on merit. The relevant paragraphs of the case read as under: "11. Power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. This Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 1 LLJ 500 (SC) held that the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in the Limitation Actis adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: 1. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 12. After referring to the various judgments reported in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1976) 2 SCR 266 , Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, (1918) 45 ILR(PC) 94, Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, (1969) 1 SCR 1006 , Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, (1979) 118 ITR 507 (SC), Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, (1970) 2 SCR 90 , State of Kerala v. E. K. Kuriyipe, (1981) Supp1 SCC 72, Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath, (1982) 3 SCC 366 , O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, (1984) AIR SC 1744, Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, (1987) 1 LLJ 500 (SC), Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra, (1987) Supp1 SCC 339, G. Ramegowda, Major v. Sp. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 3 SCR 198 , Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India, (1991) AIR SC 730, Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, (1993) AIR SC 1245, Shakambari & Co. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 3 SCR 198 , Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India, (1991) AIR SC 730, Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, (1993) AIR SC 1245, Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India, (1992) AIR SC 2090, Ram Kishan v. U. P. S. R. T. C., (1994) Supp2 SCC 507 and Warlu v. Gangotribai, (1994) AIR SC 466, this Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (2002) 143 ELT 249 (SC) held ; '11 The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach injustice oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorize the officers to take a decision to give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file the appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.' To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma, (1996) AIR SC 2750. 13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC 614 this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (2008) 228 ELT 162(SC) this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (2008) 228 ELT 162(SC) this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed in 2008 228 ELT 162(SC) : '9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court." 5. The learned counsel for the opposite parties/respondents, Mr. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court." 5. The learned counsel for the opposite parties/respondents, Mr. Lalsawirema objecting the prayer for condonation submitted as follows; That Deputy Chief Engineer, Aizawl has no jurisdiction over the geographical area of the lands for which compensation had been sought for and he was not a party in the proceedings before the District Judge, Aizawl, therefore, he has no locus standi to file the application for condonation of delay the appeal itself. That the application for certified copy of the judgment of the order passed in L.A No. 42/2015 was submitted by the applicant and received by the Office of the certifying officer on 06.11.2017, but date of receipt of the application of the certified copy given at column No.1 of the certified copy (on the top of the certified copy) is given as 14.06.2017, this clearly shows that though the applicant had submitted his application on 06.11.2017 but by manipulation entered the date 14.06.2017 as the date of submission of the application. The learned counsel referred to Annexure-I of the written objection or affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents which is stated to be a copy of the application. To this submission, Mr. Ali Hussain, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the certifying officer did not issue the certifying copy on the application submitted by the applicant, therefore, more than one application was submitted. The learned counsel for the opposite parties/respondents in reply submitted that it is clear case of fraud, therefore, the petition does not deserves consideration of this Court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel cited para-22 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Behari Kunj Sahkari Avas Samiti -versus- State of U. P. & Others, (2008) 12 SCC 306 . The same is reproduced here below; "22. In State of A. P. and Anr. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6 SCC 149 it was observed as follows: "8. By "fraud" is meant an intention to deceive; whether it is from any expectation of advantage to the party himself or from the ill will towards the other is immaterial. The same is reproduced here below; "22. In State of A. P. and Anr. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6 SCC 149 it was observed as follows: "8. By "fraud" is meant an intention to deceive; whether it is from any expectation of advantage to the party himself or from the ill will towards the other is immaterial. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable or of money and it will include and any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non- economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver, will almost always call loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. (See Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, (1963) Supp2 SCR 585 and Indian Bank v. Satyam Febres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 ). 9. A "fraud" is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (See S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 ). 10. "Fraud" as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which includes the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury enures therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury enures therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 319 ). 11. "Fraud" and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability to, 'wing me into the easy hearted man and trap him into snares'. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary "fraud" in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Black's Legal Dictionary, "fraud" is defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines "fraud" as act committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines "fraud" as act committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another. From dictionary meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out of deliberate active role of representator about a fact, which he knows to be untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the representee by making him believe it to be true. The representation to become fraudulent must be of fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading English case i.e. Derry and Ors. v. Peek (1886-90) All ER 1 what constitutes "fraud" was described thus: (All ER p. 22 B-C) "fraud" is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false". But "fraud" in public law is not the same as "fraud" in private law. Nor can the ingredients, which establish "fraud" in commercial transaction, be of assistance in determining fraud in Administrative Law. It has been aptly observed by Lord Bridge in Khawaja v. Secretary of State for Home Deptt., (1983) 1 AllER 765 , that it is dangerous to introduce maxims of common law as to effect of fraud while determining fraud in relation of statutory law. "Fraud" in relation to statute must be a colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute. 20."If a statute has been passed for some one particular purpose, a court of law will not countenance any attempt which may be made to extend the operation of the Act to something else which is quite foreign to its object and beyond its scope. Present day concept of fraud on statute has veered round abuse of power or mala fide exercise of power. It may arise due to overstepping the limits of power or defeating the provision of statute by adopting subterfuge or the power may be exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or administration law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It may arise due to overstepping the limits of power or defeating the provision of statute by adopting subterfuge or the power may be exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or administration law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclosure of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power and procure an order from an authority or tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised. The misrepresentation must be in relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence or non-existence of which the power can be exercised. But non-disclosure of a fact not required by a statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud. Even in commercial transactions non- disclosure of every fact does not vitiate the agreement. "In a contract every person must look for himself and ensures that he acquires the information necessary to avoid bad bargain. In public law the duty is not to deceive. (See Shrisht Dhawan (Smt.) v. M/s. Shaw Brothers, (1992) 1 SCC 534 ). This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100 , Ram Preeti Yadav v. U. P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, (2003) 8 SCC 311 , Ram Chandra Singh's case, Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T. N. and Another, (2004) 3 SCC 1 and State of A. P. & Another. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6 SCC 149 . "14. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (see Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust, (1996) 3 SCC 310 and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu's case. 15. "Fraud" is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud; as observed in Ram Preeti Yadav's case. 16. In Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB 702 , Lord Denning observed at pages 712 & 713, "No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. 16. In Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB 702 , Lord Denning observed at pages 712 & 713, "No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything." In the same judgment Lord Parker LJ observed that fraud "vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity". 6. The learned counsel for the opposite parties/respondents also submitted that the applicant has not explained the delay of 353 days from the date on which the award was passed i.e. 18.01.2017 and the date on which certified copy was applied for i.e. 06.11.2017. The learned counsel further submitted that the law of limitation applies to both the Government Departments and individuals and it does not provide anywhere that the case of the Government Departments should be considered differently. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that it appears from the facts and circumstances that the applicant was not diligent an earnest enough in pursuing the process for filing the delay, therefore, the condonation of delay as prayed for ought not be granted. The learned counsel in support of his submission cited the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which are reported in; (i) (2013) 4 SCC 52 , (ii) (2012) 3 SCC 563 , (iii) (2015) 9 SCC 102 , (iv) (2014) 2 SCC 422 . The relevant portions of the judgments referred to are given here below one after the other; (i) In the case of Amalendu Kumar Bera Bera & Others -versus- State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 , para-9 & 10. "9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent-State. There is no dispute that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of 'sufficient cause' for the explaining every days' delay. However, it is equally well settled that the Courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the Court may refuse to condone the delay in as much as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in the case of Union of India vs. Nirpen Sharma, (2011) AIR SC 1237 the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant-Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the delay on the ground that the appellant-Union of India took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its anguish and distress, the way the State conduct the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational and barred by limitation. 10. In the instant case as noticed above, admittedly earlier objection filed by the Respondent-State under Section 47 of the Code was dismissed on 17.8.2010. Instead of challenging the said order the Respondent-State after about one year filed another objection on 15.9.2011 under Section 47 of the Code which was finally rejected by the executing court. It was only after a writ of attachment was issued by the executing court the respondent preferred civil revision against the first order dated 17.8.2010 along with a petition for condonation of delay. Curiously enough in the application for condonation of delay no sufficient cause has been shown which entitle the respondent to get a favourable order for condonation of delay. True it is, that courts should always take liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay, particularly when the appellant is the State but in a case where there is serious laches and negligence on the part of the State in challenging the decree passed in the suit and affirmed in appeal, the State cannot be allowed to wait to file objection under Section 47 till the decree holder puts the decree in execution. As noticed above, the decree passed in the year 1967 was in respect of declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the Respondent-State from interfering with the possession of the suit property of the plaintiff-appellant. It is evident that when the State tried to interfere with possession the decree holder had no alternative but to levy the execution case for execution of the decree with regard to interference with possession. It is evident that when the State tried to interfere with possession the decree holder had no alternative but to levy the execution case for execution of the decree with regard to interference with possession. In our opinion their delay in filing the execution case cannot be a ground to condone the delay in filing the revision against the order refusing to entertain objection under Section 47 CPC. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court while deciding petition for condoning the delay. Merely because the Respondent is the State, delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot and shall not be mechanically considered and in absence of 'sufficient cause' delay shall not be condoned". (ii). In the case of Postmaster General & Others -versus- Living Media Limited & Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563 , para-21, 27, 28 & 29. "21. Before considering whether the reasons for justifying such a huge delay are acceptable or not, it is also useful to refer the decisions relied on by Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the respondents. (i) In Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay vs. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, (1994) Supp2 SCC 603, there is a delay of 264 days in filing the SLP by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay. The explanation for the delay had been set out in petitioner's own words as under: ".....2 (g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on- Record on July 9, 1993 who re- sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993." After incorporating the above explanation, this Court refused to condone the delay by observing thus: "3........ Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest. 27. It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few". (iii). In the case of Union of India & Others -versus- Tata Yodogawa Limited & Another, (2015) 9 SCC 102 , para-2 & 5 "2. It appears according to the office report on limitation that the special leave petition is delayed by 51 days. The application for condonation of delay was filed on behalf of the petitioners staling therein that cue to "inter-departmental correspondence and processing of the matter to enable the department to file the instant petition". 5. It is further stated in the rejoinder-affidavit to the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents that "such delay is always beyond the control of especially in government matters as the file has to be routed through several sections of the Department". We are aware of the fact that the Government being impersonal takes longer time than the private bodies or the individuals. Even giving that latitude, there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay." (iv). In the case of State of U. P. -versus- Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422 , para-2. The same was quoted in the above case, therefore, it is not reproduced. "2. In the application the petitioner has attributed the delay to the moving of file from one Department/ Officer to the other. We hardly find this to be a sufficient explanation for condoning such an abnormal delay. This Court in the case of Postmaster General and Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 has deprecated such practices on the part of the Government Authorities/ Departments in the following words:-" 7. What can be gathered from the above judgments referred to by the learned counsels of the opposite parties/respondents is that State or Central Government Departments may be given some latitude while considering their cases for condonation of delay since decision making in Government is institutional and sometime requires a long process. However, that does not mean that sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay is not necessary from them. However, that does not mean that sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay is not necessary from them. If there is gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide a liberal concession ought not to be given while considering their prayers for condonation of delay. Further, Government Departments being public institutions they are under special obligation to ensure that they performed their duties with diligence, promptitude and commitment. Therefore, they are expected to be so while dealing with official matters including timely filing of appeals against judgments or awards in public interest. Lastly, condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government Departments. 8. Now reverting to the facts, the judgment and order against which the appeal has been preferred was passed on 18.01.2017 but application for obtaining certified copy as may be seen from the certified copy of the judgment itself, though it is disputed by the learned counsel of the opposite parties/respondents, was made on 14.06.2017. Even if it is accepted that the application for certified copy was submitted on 14.06.2017 and not on 06.11.2017 as claimed by the learned counsel of the opposite parties/respondents, there was a delay of 147 days which is not explained at all by the applicant. Further, as can be seen from the explanation given at para-3(b) & (C) of the application which has already been reproduced in this judgment, on receipt of the certified copy of the judgment and award on 07.11.2017, the same was sent to the concern Law Officer (Construction) N.F. Railway and thereafter it was sent to the learned counsel of the Railways who happens to be the learned counsel appearing in this case for his opinion, and on 04.01.2018, the learned counsel gave his opinion. Between 07.11.2017 and 04.01.2018 there are 58 days. To take 58 days to obtain a legal opinion from the legal counsel that too when almost 1 year's time has already passed from the date the judgment and award was passed i.e. 18.01.2017 shows nothing but total in difference and negligence on the part of the N.F. Railways on the matter. Between 07.11.2017 and 04.01.2018 there are 58 days. To take 58 days to obtain a legal opinion from the legal counsel that too when almost 1 year's time has already passed from the date the judgment and award was passed i.e. 18.01.2017 shows nothing but total in difference and negligence on the part of the N.F. Railways on the matter. Furthermore, after receiving of the opinion which was given by the legal counsel on 04.01.2018, the matter, as it appears from the explanation given at para-3(d) (e) (f) (g) was channeled through all the authorities concerned and thereafter the draft of the appeal was vetted by the Railway authorities and sent to the learned counsel only on 30.05.2018 for filing. The time taken for the same i.e. from 04.01.2018 to 30.05.2018 (146 days) also shows the indifferent attitude and gross negligence of the authorities concerned. Such a long time is not required for taking a decision for filing an appeal against the judgment and award, specially, when they knew very well that they are already late. The Railways have legal officers and people who are well aware in legal matters, therefore, they are expected to know the time limit provided in law for filing such appeal and to take appropriate step or steps promptly. Explanations like being a Government machinery such time taken on the decision making process is necessary does not appear to be reasonable and sufficient in the light of the principle of law enunciated and established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases stated above. Condonation of delay being an exception, the burden to show that the reasons for the delay are reasonable lies heavily on the one who seeks for the same. From the facts stated above, it would be seen that the applicant has failed to discharge its burden. Therefore, I find no sufficient reason or reasons to allow the application. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.