JUDGMENT : MANOJ KUMAR GARG, J. 1. Instant criminal revision petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 16.05.2018 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities Act Cases) Bikaner in Sessions Case No. 45/2017 whereby, the trial court has framed charges against the petitioners for offences under Section 304B & 498A IPC. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 08.04.2017, Amit Kumar Sharma filed a written report before the Women Police station Sadar Bikaner stating therein that his daughter Pallawi @ Tannu got married with Nagesh Gaur @ Bunty on 19.02.2016. At the time of marriage, sufficient dowry was given to the family members of the groom but they were not contended with the dowry and therefore, started harassing his daughter demanding Swift Dezire Car. It was stated in the complaint that on the previous day, an information was given by brother-in-law of Nagesh that Pallavi had locked the door and was not opening the door. Upon informing, when the complainant reached Bikaner, he saw that the body of his daughter was lying in the mortuary. 3. On this report, the police started investigation and after due investigation, the police filed challan against the present petitioners. Thereafter, the case was committed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Women atrocities Cases, Bikaner where arguments on charge were heard and after hearing the arguments, learned trial court framed charges against the petitioners for aforesaid offences. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the trial court has committed an error of law in framing charges for offences under Section 498A and 304B IPC as in the suicide note recovered from the deceased, she had stated that she was happily residing with her in laws and none of them was responsible for her death. Thus, the trial court has not properly looked into the matter and therefore, the order passed by the learned trial court is liable to be set aside. 5. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor argued that on perusal of statement of witnesses, a clear cut case of demand of dowry and harassment is made out against the petitioners and due to the harassment, the deceased committed suicide. It is further argued that the deceased wife died just after two years of marriage, therefore, the revision petition may kindly be dismissed. 6. It is further argued that the deceased wife died just after two years of marriage, therefore, the revision petition may kindly be dismissed. 6. I have considered the rival arguments and perused the material available on record. 7. It is not in dispute that the marriage of petitioner No. 2 with the deceased had taken place about two years back and according to the statement of complainant Amit Kumar who is the father of the deceased, Mannu who is the brother of deceased, Smt. Rama who is the mother of deceased and other witnesses Pawan Kumar, Smt. Santosh, Babu Sharma who are near relatives have categorically stated that the husband of deceased as well as the brother-in-law and mother-in-law used to harass the deceased demanding dowry. Since the death of the wife occurred within seven years of her marriage and she had been subjected to harassment by her in-laws, therefore, the Court may presume that such person had caused the dowry death. 8. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Major Singh and another vs. State of Punjab reported in (2015) 5 SCC 201 while considering the question with regard to conviction under Section 304-B IPC has held as under:- "10. To sustain the conviction under Section 304B IPC, the following essential ingredients are to be established:- (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a 'normal circumstance; (ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; (iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry; and (v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. 11. If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these Sections304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. 11. If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these Sections304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows:- "113B: Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this Section, 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." It is imperative to note that both these sections set out a common point of reference for establishing guilt of the accused person under Section 304B, which is "the woman must have been 'soon before her death' subjected to cruelty or harassment 'for or in connection with the demand of dowry'". 9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in yet another case of Maya Devi & Ors. vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2016 SC 125 has held as under:- "21. Section 304B Indian Penal Code does not categorise death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. This is because death caused by burns can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death caused by bodily injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Finally, any death occurring "otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304B Indian Penal Code are fulfilled, any death (homicidal or suicidal or accidental) whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and the woman's husband or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused her death". The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death. ... The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death. ... The presumption Under Section 113B of the Act is mandatory may be contrasted with Section 113A of the Act which was introduced contemporaneously. Section 113A of the Act, dealing with abetment of suicide, uses the expression "may presume". This being the position, a two-stage process is required to be followed in respect of an offence punishable Under Section 304-B Indian Penal Code: it is necessary to first ascertain whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out against the accused; if the ingredients are made out, then the accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman but is entitled to rebut the statutory presumption of having caused a dowry death. From the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that in the present case Kavita died an unnatural death by committing suicide as she was subjected to cruelty/harassment by her husband and in-laws in connection with the demand for dowry which started from the time of her marriage and continued till she committed suicide. Thus, the provisions of Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code will be fully attracted. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that Kavita @ Kusum suffered death at her matrimonial home, otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, and the case squarely falls within the ambit of dowry death. In the present case, from the evidence of the Doctor (DW-2), PW-3 and PW-4, we find that the harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce her to convince her parents to meet the demands for dowry." 10. Recently, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'State of Rajasthan vs. Fatehkaran Mehdu reported in AIR 2017 SC 796 while discussing the scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. has held as under: "26. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference Under Section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference Under Section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the Accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the Accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure. 27. Now, reverting to the limit of the scope of jurisdiction Under Section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding. 28. It is useful to refer to judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor vs. (sic) Ramesh Chander and Anr. (2012) 9 SCC 460 , where scope of Section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure have been succinctly considered and explained. Para 12 and 13 are as follows: 12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 29. The Court in para 27 has recorded its conclusion and laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 397 particularly in context of quashing of charge framed Under Section 228 Code of Criminal Procedure Para 27, 27(1), (2), (3), (9), (13) are extracted as follows: 27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court Under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the Rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 30. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 30. Applying the above tests, we are of the considered opinion that High Court erred in quashing the charges framed by the order dated 05.05.2009. In result, both the appeals are allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the order dated 05.05.2009 is restored. The learned Special Judge may proceed with the trial in accordance with the law expeditiously." 11. In the present case, the learned trial Court has recorded cogent reasons for framing charges and it is settled law that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view of finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed or not. At this stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, would justify the framing of the charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 12. In view of above, this Court is of the opinion that trial court has not committed any error in framing charge for offence under Section 498A and 304B IPC. The revision thus being bereft of any force, is hereby rejected.