JUDGMENT : KALYAN RAI SURANA, J. 1. Heard Mr. B. Banerjee, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. S.K Ghosh, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant in RFA 30/2005 and RFA 35/2005 and RFA 36/2005. Also heard Mr. H.K Deka, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. M.H Rajbarbhuiya, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents No. 14 and 15. None appears on call for the other respondents. 2. By this appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), while the appellants have preferred three appeals against the judgment and decree dated 07.10.2004, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hailakandi, in TS No. 66/2000, the respondents No. 14 and 15 have preferred a cross objection. By the said impugned judgment, the suit of the appellant was partly decreed. 3. As against that part of the reliefs which were not allowed in the suit, the predecessor of the appellant (i.e plaintiff) had filed an appeal, which is numbered as RFA 30/2005. As against the conditional decree passed in counter-claim of defendant No. 14, the predecessor of the appellants has filed another appeal, which is numbered as RFA 35/2005. As against the conditional decree passed in respect of counter-claim of respondent No. 15, the original appellant had filed another appeal, which was been numbered as RFA 36/2005. The Respondents (defendants) No. 14 and 15 have also filed separate their joint cross-objection which has been numbered as C.O No. 7/2005. 4. The present case has a long list of events as well as long chequered history of six separate litigations. The facts in all the above captioned appeal are common and the parties in all the appeals are common. The three appeals and the cross objection arise out of TS No. 66/2000. Hence, the appeal, being RFA No. 30/2005 is taken up as the lead case and the parties are referred as per their seriatim in the said appeal. 5. The original appellant and/or predecessor of the substituted appellants herein (i.e Sunil Kanta Banik also mentioned in various places as Sunil Kumar Banik and Sunil Kanti Banik) had initiated a proceeding under Sec.107 Cr.P.C, which was numbered as Case No. 136m/1976. The said case was taken up by the Court of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Hailakandi. The fate of the said case is not disclosed in the pleadings of the parties. The said case was taken up by the Court of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Hailakandi. The fate of the said case is not disclosed in the pleadings of the parties. This is the first round of litigation. 6. The following is the history of the second round of litigation. a. The present respondents No. 7 and 8 (i.e Md. Haji Mobarak Ali Borbhuiya and Musstt. Syeda Khatun Borbhuiya) were the plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 80/1986. The said suit was instituted before the Court of Assistant District Judge, Hailakandi. Subsequently, due to enlargement of jurisdiction, the said suit stood transferred to the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Hailakandi, and the said suit was renumbered as Title Suit No. 81/1993. The said suit was contested by the present Respondent No. 1 (Basir Uddin), respondent No. 6 (Monir Uddin) and predecessor-in-in-interest of respondents No. 2 to 5 (namely, Jamir Uddin), by filing their written statement and counter-claim. The predecessor of the present appellants (Sunil Kanta Banik) was arrayed as the defendant No. 1 in the said suit. The suit was dismissed and the counter-claim was allowed by virtue of judgment and decree dated 14.08.1997, passed in Title Suit No. 81/1993. b. The said decree passed in the counter-claim in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) and predecessor-in-interest the of respondents No. 2(a), 3(b), 4(c) and 5(d) and respondent No. 6 herein was assailed in appeal before the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, No. 1, Hailakandi, which was numbered as Title Appeal No. 19/1997. The said appeal was allowed by First Appellate judgment dated 18.05.1998, thereby dismissing the counter-claim of the said respondent. c. Thus, both the suit as well as the counter-claim stood dismissed. d. However, the predecessor of present appellants (i.e Sunil Kumar Banik) had filed an application for execution, which was numbered as Title Execution Case No. 18/1998. The said proceeding was challenged before this Court by filing a revision. This Court had quashed the said execution proceeding by order dated 03.04.2000 passed in CRP No. 121/99 on the ground that the decree is inexecutable. e. This ended the second round of litigation. 7. The said proceeding was challenged before this Court by filing a revision. This Court had quashed the said execution proceeding by order dated 03.04.2000 passed in CRP No. 121/99 on the ground that the decree is inexecutable. e. This ended the second round of litigation. 7. During the pendency of the above referred second round of litigation, the predecessor of the present appellants had initiated another proceeding under Sec.145 Cr.P.C before the Court of Executive Magistrate, Hailakandi, which was numbered as Case No. 223/1987, which was dismissed by order dated 26.08.1988 This was the third round of litigation. 8. After the order dated 03.04.2000 was passed by this Court in CRP No. 121/99, on 10.04.2000, the predecessor of the appellants had initiated another proceeding under Sec.145 Cr.P.C before the Court of Executive Magistrate, Hailakandi, which was numbered as Case No. 25m/2000. The said case was dropped and filed by order dated 03.06.2000 This was the fourth round of litigation. 9. In the meanwhile, Title Suit No. 8/2000 was filed by respondent No. 14 before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hailakandi. However, the said suit was withdrawn by order dated 03.11.2000 with liberty to file a fresh suit (Ext-26). No fresh suit appears to have been filed. This was the fifth round of litigation. 10. Thereafter, the sixth round of litigation was started by Sunil Kanta Banik, the predecessor of appellants herein by filing Title Suit No. 66/2000 before the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hailakandi. This suit is the subject matter of the present appeal. 11. The said TS No. 66/2000 was filed by Sunil Kanta Banik, the predecessor of the appellants for declaration of right, title and interest in respect of land described in Schedule-I of the plaint and the house standing thereon and for recovery of khas possession of the land described in Schedule II of the plaint, with further prayer for removing the defendants, their men, the employees and agents by demolishing their houses standing thereon and for permanent injunction and for confirmation of possession over the land described in Schedule III of the plaint. Originally, there were 14 defendants in the suit. The respondent-defendant No. 15 was impleaded during the pendency of the suit. 12. The said suit was contested by Respondents No. 7 to 15. The Respondents-defendants No. 1 to 6 in the suit did not contest the suit. Originally, there were 14 defendants in the suit. The respondent-defendant No. 15 was impleaded during the pendency of the suit. 12. The said suit was contested by Respondents No. 7 to 15. The Respondents-defendants No. 1 to 6 in the suit did not contest the suit. The Respondent-defendant No. 14 had filed a counter-claim. The Respondent-defendant No. 15 had also filed a separate written statement and counter-claim. The said suit was partly decreed by judgment and decree dated 07.10.2004 and the counter-claim filed by the respondents No. 14 and 15 was conditionally decreed. As against that part of the reliefs which were not allowed in the suit, the predecessor of the appellants has filed an appeal, which is numbered as RFA 30/2005. As against the conditional decree passed in counter-claim of respondent No. 14, the predecessor of the appellants (i.e plaintiff) has filed another appeal, which is numbered as RFA 35/2005. As against the conditional decree passed in respect of counter-claim of respondent No. 15, the predecessor of the appellants has filed another appeal, which was been numbered as RFA 36/2005. The Respondents No. 14 and 15 have also filed separate their joint cross-objection which has been numbered as C.O No. 7/2005. These three appeals and the Cross objection have all been heard analogously. 13. The case in T.S No. 66/2000 in brief is that the said suit was filed for declaration of right, title and interest in respect of the land described in Schedule I of the plaint and the houses standing thereon; and for recovery of Khas-possession of the land described in Schedule II, which was a part of Schedule I land. It was claimed that the predecessor of the appellants had purchased the land from one Aswini Kumar Deb and three others by registered sale deed dated 28.06.1962 and got possession of the same. The said Aswini Kumar Deb was the lessee having possession of the land, and he had sold the land to (i) Basir Uddin, original respondent No. 1, (ii) Jamir Uddin, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 2 to 5), and (iii) Monir Uddin, respondent No. 6, vide registered Deed dated 26.04.1961, which contained a covenant for re-conveyance. The said Aswini Kumar Deb was the lessee having possession of the land, and he had sold the land to (i) Basir Uddin, original respondent No. 1, (ii) Jamir Uddin, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 2 to 5), and (iii) Monir Uddin, respondent No. 6, vide registered Deed dated 26.04.1961, which contained a covenant for re-conveyance. Subsequently, the same land was re-conveyed to the predecessor of the appellant by (i) Aswini Kumar Deb, (ii) Basir Uddin (predecessor of respondent No. 1), (iii) Jamir Uddin (predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 2 to 5) and (iv) Monir Uddin (Respondent No. 6). It is projected that the predecessor of the appellants, being in possession, had informed the landlord about the purchase of joint right over the Schedule-I land. On 05.09.1962, the predecessor of the appellants had sold half portion out of his purchased Schedule-I land to Aswini Kumar Deb. In turn, the legal heirs of Aswini Kumar Deb sold the said land to one Susanta Kumar Nath on 16.02.1962 The same land was again purchased by the predecessor of the appellant vide registered Deed No. 5334 dated 16.07.1970 and came into possession of the entire land described in Schedule-I of the plaint. The said land was mutated in the name of the predecessor of the appellants in the municipal record and it was claimed that he was enjoying peaceful possession of the said land by constructing permanent houses and pucca latrine thereon. 14. As per the plaint, in the year 1986, the predecessor of the appellants had received summons of Title Suit No. 30/1986. The respondents No. 7 and 8 herein were the plaintiffs in the said suit. The said suit was for declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit land described in Schedule-I and for confirmation of possession in respect of land described in Schedule-II, being part of Schedule-I land. It was also prayed that the predecessor of the appellants herein had no title or possession beyond land described in Schedule-III. The predecessor of the appellant had contested the suit by filing his written statement. It was also prayed that the predecessor of the appellants herein had no title or possession beyond land described in Schedule-III. The predecessor of the appellant had contested the suit by filing his written statement. The suit was also contested by Basir Uddin (Respondent No. 1), Monir Uddin (Respondent No. 6) and Jamir Uddin (predecessor-in-interest of Respondents No. 2 to 5), and all three of them had also filed a counter-claim in connection with Title Suit No. 30/1986 in respect of an area of 10 Kathas 11 Chattak (hereinafter referred to as 10k-11c). 15. The said suit was transferred to the Court of Munsiff, Hailakandi and re-numbered as T.S No. 81/1993. The suit was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 14.08.1997 and the counter-claim was decreed. The predecessor of the appellants preferred an appeal before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hailakandi, and the said appeal was numbered as T.A No. 19/1997. The said appeal was allowed by First Appellate judgment and decree dated 18.05.1998, thereby the judgment and decree passed in counter-claim was set aside. The predecessor of appellant then instituted an execution proceeding before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Hailakandi, being Title Execution Case No. 18/1998. The proceeding was challenged before this Court by filing CRP No. 121/1999 and this Court by judgment dated 03.04.2000, quashed the execution proceeding. 16. It is projected that during the pendency of T.A.19/1997, in the night of 27.09.1997, Musstt. Tahirun Nessa Choudhury, the respondent No. 14 had forcibly and illegally dispossessed the predecessor of the appellant from the land described in Schedule-II and constructed bamboo structure with bamboo wall and C.I sheet roof. It was projected that thereafter, the predecessor of the appellant had came to know that the Respondents No. 4 and 6 to 10, namely, Lutfa Begum Mozumdar (respondent No. 4C), Monir Uddin (Respondent No. 6), Md. Haji Mubarak Ali Borbhuiya (Respondent No. 7), Musstt. Saida Khatun Borbhuiya (Respondent No. 8), Musstt. Monia Begum (respondent No. 9) and Jahir Uddin Borbhuiya (predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 10), by executing various sale deeds, transferred the ownership right of the land described in Schedule-II vide Deeds No. 2958 dated 29.08.1997, 2994 dated 29.08.1997 It was stated that Rufina Begum Mazumdar (Respondent No. 5) by Deed No. 3261 dated 14.10.1997 sold an area of 1k-8b in ejmali in favor of Musstt. Tahirun Nessa Choudhury, respondent No. 14, and that vide Deed No. 3275 dated 16.10.1997 and Deed No. 3097 dated 17.09.1997, the jot rights (i.e cultivating rights) were surrendered in respect of land measuring 10k-10c, which were all executed during the pendency of T.A 19/1997. It was also claimed that the Respondent No. 15 did not acquire any right, title and interest in respect of land described in Schedule-II on the ground that the suit and the counter-claim by the vendors of Respondent No. 15 (Md. Furmat Ali Choudhury) was dismissed in T.A No. 19/1997 and T.S No. 81/1993. The following reliefs were claimed in the plaint of TS 66/2000:— a. A decree declaring the right title and interest of the plaintiff over the land described in the Schedule-I below by right of purchase and for confirmation of possession over the land described in schedule-III below. b. For recovery of khas possession of the land described in schedule-II below by evicting the defendants, their men, employees and any persons claiming through them by demolishing the structures thereon. c. For a further declaration that the registered documents described in schedule-IV below are void illegal inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff and for cancellation of the same and to adjudging this to be delivered up and cancelled and copy of the decree be sent to the Sub-register, Hailakandi for noting the facts of cancellation in the concerned Book Volume. d. For a further declaration that the defendant No. 1 to 14 have no right title and interest over the land described in schedule I below and that the jot right of the plaintiff have already been merged into ownership right after determination of the lease by afflux of time. e. For permanent and temporary injunction restraining the defendants from any way distributing the plaintiff in peacefully and enjoying the land and house described over the schedule III below and further restraining the defendant No. 1 from changing the nature of the land described in schedule II below by raising either temporary or permanent construction and/or renovating the existing temporary house in any manner whatsoever and from digging earth from the said land. f. For cost of the suit. g. For any other relief/reliefs as the plaintiff may be found entitled in law and equity may also be decreed against the defendants. 17. f. For cost of the suit. g. For any other relief/reliefs as the plaintiff may be found entitled in law and equity may also be decreed against the defendants. 17. The respondents-defendants No. 7 to 14 had filed their joint written statement along with the counter-claim preferred by the respondent-defendant No. 14. It is projected that the original owner of the suit land was Md. Haji Mubarak Ali (Respondent No. 7) and Late Majid Ali Borbhuiya (predecessor-in-interest) of Respondents No. 8 to 13, who had possessed the suit land since the time of their predecessor-in-interest, namely, Abdul Goni Mia. It was projected that the said predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 8 to 13 had leased out the suit land with other land to one Fekuram Kahar by Deed of Lease dated 21.01.1941 for a period of 10 years. After the expiry of the term the said land holder had surrendered his lease right back, who maintained their possession over the said land for about 4 years. Thereafter, the suit land along with other land was leased out to one Aswini Kumar Deb on 25.05.1954 for 10 years. But prior to expiry of the said term, the lease rights was transferred by the said Aswini Kumar Deb to (i) respondent No. 1, (ii) Respondent No. 6, and (iii) predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 2 to 5 by registered deed of lease dated 26.04.1961 and they continued to enjoy the land and house under the landlord i.e predecessor-in-interest of the respondents No. 8 to 13 (Majid Ali Borbhuiya). It was further stated that later on Respondents No. 1, 6 and Jamir Uddin (predecessor-in-interest of Respondents No. 2 to 5), transferred the cultivating rights to Majid Ali Borbhuiya (predecessor-in-interest of Respondents No. 8 to 13) by registered Deed dated 27.04.1962 It is claimed that in this manner, the lease rights of the respondents No. 1 to 6 and their brother Jamir Uddin (predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 2 to 5) was extinguished and the same got merged with the ownership rights of the actual land-owners. It was projected that the lease deeds dated 26.08.1962 was a collusive, forged and fabricated deed. It was projected that the lease deeds dated 26.08.1962 was a collusive, forged and fabricated deed. It was further projected that the lease deed dated 25.05.1954 in favor of Aswini Kumar Deb stood revoked in view of the deed of lease dated 26.04.1961 in favor of Respondents No. 1 to 6 and therefore, the said Aswini Kumar Deb had no right, title and interest or possession over the suit land so as to further sub-lease the land in favor of the predecessor of the appellants. It is projected that the falsity of the said deed dated 27.04.1962 was admitted by the predecessor of the substituted appellants in his evidence recorded on 04.07.1992 in connection with T.S 30/1986 (renumbered as T.S 81/1993), wherein he had admitted that he did not purchased any cultivating right from the respondents No. 1 to 6 and predecessor of respondents No. 2 to 5. It is also projected that he had admitted that in his evidence that he did not seek any relief against the transfer deed dated 27.04.1962 and 26.08.1962 even after a lapse of 29 years from the date of knowledge to the date of deposit record on 04.07.1992 18. It is also projected that in his cross-examination on 09.09.1992, the predecessor of the appellants had admitted that he did not purchase any land from the respondents No. 1, 6 and predecessor of respondents No. 2 to 5 and also admitted that he did not pay rent to the landlord for 25 years. The predecessor of the appellants had also admitted in his cross-examination that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and the predecessor of respondents No. 7 to 13. It is further projected that in the proceeding of Case No. 136m/1996, the predecessor of the appellants had admitted in his petition filed before the Sub-Divisional Executive Magistrate, Hailakandi dated 22.06.1976 that he did not obtain any possession of the suit land and he had admitted in paragraph 5 of the said petition that he was dispossessed by Majid Ali and 9 others and that he was preparing for filing a civil suit for recovery of the suit land. It was also projected that the land described in the proceeding of Case No. 136m/1976 was the same land as described in Schedule-I of the plaint and the suit was filed after 24 years and that the predecessor of the appellants had contradicted himself in lease deed dated 28.06.1962 in petition of case No. 25m/2000 that he was in possession of the suit land for last 30 years which is stated to be contradictory to the alleged lease and lease deed dated 28.06.1962 and nullified the claim of possession over the suit land. It was further projected that the respondent No. 7 and the predecessor of the respondents No. 8 to 13 was in exclusive possession of the suit land and it validly transferred the land to respondent No. 14 whose name stand mutated in the Municipal record by holding No. 221 and 222. It was projected that the suit was barred of principles of res-judicata. Moreover, it was stated that that the respondent No. 1, who is the jot right holder over the suit land covered by Municipal Holding No. 221, by executing 2 deeds dated 17.09.1997 and 16.10.1997, released his rights in favor of defendant No. 14. 19. It is also projected that by obtaining permission on 07.11.1997, the respondent No. 14 had constructed houses over the suit land, covered by Holding No. 221 and 222. It was further stated that as she was threatened of dispossession, the respondent No. 14 had filed T.S 8/2000, which was withdrawn on 03.11.2000, owing to formal defects, but before she could institute the suit, the present suit has been instituted. The following prayers were made in the counter-claim:— a. For declaration that the plaintiff has neither any ownership right, title & interest nor any jute-right, title and possession over the suit land mentioned in schedule below. b. For declaration that the document prepared by the plaintiff respecting jute right of the land or suit patta or the S.L and the Municipal holding etc. are collusive, false, baseless fraudulent, void and in effective and conferred no right title & interest on the plaintiff respecting land of suit patta. b. For declaration that the document prepared by the plaintiff respecting jute right of the land or suit patta or the S.L and the Municipal holding etc. are collusive, false, baseless fraudulent, void and in effective and conferred no right title & interest on the plaintiff respecting land of suit patta. c. For declaration that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants No. 7 to 13 or their predecessors in respect of the suit land or the land of suit patta & dags and further for declaration that there was no relationship of lessor & lessee i.e landlord & tenant among the said person. d. For declaration & confirmation of exclusive ownership right, title interest & possession of the defendant No. 7-13 over the land of suit patta or the S.L mentioned in schedule below till purchases by the counter-claimant and her husband. e. For declaration & confirmation of exclusive purchased right, title interest and possession of the defendant-counter-claimant No. 14 over the S.L and houses under Municipal holding No. 221/222 mentioned below. f. For declaration that the judgment & decree passed by the ld. Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Hailakandi in T.S No. 81/93 on 14.8.97 and the T.A No. 19/97 passed by the ld. this Court on 18.5.97 respectively are not executable and binding or her respecting her bonafide purchased right, title interest & possession over the S.L g. For all the costs of this suit. h. For any other reliefs as the Hon'ble Court would find fit to grant to the counter claimant for which act of your honour's kindness & graciousness the humble defendant No. 14 counter-claimant, as in duty bound, shall ever pray. 20. Similarly, the Respondent No. 15, upon his impleadment in the suit, contested the suit by filing his written statement along with his counter-claim, taking a stand similar to the respondent No. 14, who was his wife. The following prayers were made in the counter-claim:— a. For declaration that the plaintiff has neither any ownership right, title and interest nor any jute right, title and possession over the suit land mentioned in schedule below. b. For declaration that, the documents prepared by the plaintiff respecting jute right of the land of suit patta or the S.L and the Municipal holding etc. b. For declaration that, the documents prepared by the plaintiff respecting jute right of the land of suit patta or the S.L and the Municipal holding etc. are collusive, false, baseless, fraudulent, void and in-effective and conferred no right, title & interest on the plaintiff respecting land of suit patta. c. For declaration that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant among the plaintiff and the defendant No. 7-13 or their predecessors respecting S.L or the land of suit patta & dags and further, for declaration that there was no relationship of lessor & lessee i.e landlord & tenant among the said person. d. For declaration & confirmation of exclusive ownership right, title, interest & possession of the defendant No. 7-13 over the land of suit patta or counter-claimant and her husband i.e the Deft. No. 14/15 counter-claimants. e. For declaration & confirmation of exclusive purchased right, title, interest and possession of the defendant counter-claimant No. 14 over the S.L and houses under Municipal Holding No. 221/222 mentioned below. f. For declaration and confirmation of exclusive purchased right, title, interest and possession of the Defendant-counter-claimant No. 15 over the S.L mentioned in schedule No. V & VI, below, g. For declaration that the judgment & decree passed by the ld. Civil Judge Junior Division) No. 1, Hailakandi in T.S No. 81/93 on 14.08.97 and the T.A No. 19/97 passed by the ld. this Court on 18.5.97 respectively are not executable and binding on the Defendants-counter-claimants No. 14, 15 their bonafide purchased right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. h. For, all the costs of this suit. i. For any other reliefs as the Hon'ble Court would find fit to grant to the counter claimants for which act of your honour's kindness & graciousness, the humble defendants No. 14 and 15 counter-claimants, as in duty bound, shall ever pray. j. That the suit of the plaintiff, (bearing his vexatious, baseless and false claims) may kindly be dismissed with costs along with the special compensatory costs. 21. On the basis of the pleadings, the following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court:— i. Is there any cause of action for the present suit? ii. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and manner? iii. Is the suit barred by law of limitation? iv. 21. On the basis of the pleadings, the following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court:— i. Is there any cause of action for the present suit? ii. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and manner? iii. Is the suit barred by law of limitation? iv. Has the plaintiff right, title, interest and possession over the suit land either as a lessee or acquired right therein by way of adverse possession? v. Whether the counter claimants/defendant Nos. 14 and 15 have acquired any right, title and interest over the suit land by purchase, as alleged? vi. Whether the counter claim of the defendant Nos. 14 & 15 are hit by the principle of resjudicata and also by the principle of lis-pendens? vii. To what relief or reliefs, if any, the plaintiff is entitled? viii. Whether the plaintiff has been dispossessed from the suit schedule land and is entitled to khas possession thereto. ix. Whether the counter claimants are entitled to any relief? 22. In support of his case the predecessor of the appellants had examined 4 witnesses and had exhibited 35 exhibits. The contesting respondents had examined 11 witnesses out of which the evidence of DW-2, 4 and 5 were expunged and they had exhibited 26 documents as Ext. A to Ext.H including Ext.F, Ext.F(1) to Ext.F(63), Ext. G(1) to G(11). The list of exhibits is not reproduced to avoid burdening this judgment with unnecessary particulars. 23. In respect of issue No. (i), the learned trial court held that the matter of facts, which was asserted by one party, was denied by other and therefore, it required adjudicated which give rise to the cause of action to the suit. Issue No. (iv) was thereafter taken up. In this connection it was held that the Aswini, the vendor of the predecessor of the appellants had purchased the jot rights from the legal heirs of one Fekuram vide Ext.1 dated 15.02.1954, and also took settlement from the legal heirs of Abdul Goni vide Ext.2 dated 25.05.1954 for a period of 10 years, but the fact relating to jot settlement of Fekuram is not disclosed in the plaint. It was held that it is not disputed that Aswini Kumar Deb took jot settlement of the suit land from the legal heirs of Abdul Goni vide Ext.2 for a period of 10 years. It was held that it is not disputed that Aswini Kumar Deb took jot settlement of the suit land from the legal heirs of Abdul Goni vide Ext.2 for a period of 10 years. It was held that the suit land falls within the area of Municipality of Hailakandi Ward No. 2 (sic. appears to be a typing mistake because as per plaint, it is Ward No. 1), so, the matter related to lease of the suit land shall be governed by the Assam Non-agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955. It was held that Aswini Kumar Deb, the vendor of the predecessor of the appellants did not construct any permanent structure on the suit land within 5 years from entering into the lease of the suit land and, as such, it was held that the said Aswini Kumar Deb was not entitled to get protection under Section 5 of the aforesaid 1955 Act. It was further held that the subsequent construction of permanent structure, which was not proved, would not protect the predecessor of the appellants under Section 5 of the said 1955 Act. It was also held that there were three houses on the suit premises having three different holding numbers, out of which two houses were possessed by the counter-claimants i.e respondents No. 14 and 15 and the third one is possessed by one Koton Malakar, an alleged licencee of the predecessor of the appellants. Relying on the evidence of Koton Malakar (PW.2), the learned trial court held that in which he was residing a kutcha one and therefore, it was held that status of the original lessee, namely, Aswini Kumar Deb and the status of the subsequent transferees could not be called to be one of the “non-occupancy tenant” for getting protection under Section 5 of the 1955 Act. 24. In respect of Exbt.5 i.e deed dated 28.06.1962, it was held that although the document was 30 years old, due to in challenge of the said document since 1986 vide counter claim in T.S No. 81/1993 (Ext.18), plaint in T.S No. 81/1993 (Ext.19) and counter claim filed by Basir Uddin (predecessor of respondent No. 1), Jamir Uddin (predecessor of respondents No. 2 to 5) and Monir Uddin (respondent No. 6). So it was not acceptable that Ext. So it was not acceptable that Ext. 5 would go in evidence automatically, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as the predecessor of the appellants had failed to prove the execution of the said document by examining the scribe or attesting witnesses. Accordingly, it was held that as the parent document i.e Ext.5 of the predecessor of the appellants was not duly proved, the subsequent transaction vide deeds marked as Exbt.7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 could not confer any jot right to the original appellant in respect of the suit land. Relying on the evidence of Koton Malakar (PW-2) and Amal Chandra Banik (PW-4), it was held that the predecessor of the substituted appellants never resided or used the suit premises for any commercial purpose. It was held that Late Munsi Abdul Goni Borbhuiya, predecessor-in-interest of Respondents No. 7 to 13 was the owner of the suit land and that the fact of purchase of the suit land from respondents No. 1, 6, and Jamir Uddin (predecessor of respondents No. 2 to 5) was held to be virtually admitted by the original appellant in his deposition in T.S No. 81/1993 (Ext.E). The said statement was held to be relevant and admissible under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, it was held that the fact of earlier purchase of jot right by Rasid Ali Barbhuiya (predecessor of Respondents No. 8 to 13) was admitted by the predecessor of the appellant. Relying on the evidence of PW-4, it was held that the predecessor of the appellants could not prove his possession over the entire suit land, excluding the portion of land possessed by Koton Malakar (PW.2) and that the respondents No. 14 and 15 (i.e counter claimants) were in possession of the purchased land, except the land and house in occupation of Koton Malakar (PW.2) described in Schedule-III and therefore, on the basis of probability, it was presumed that the respondents No. 7 to 13 were in possession of the suit land since 1961. It was also held that the merger of ownership by efflux of time was not applicable to the predecessor of the appellants as he had failed to establish his jot right as well as possession of the suit land. It was also held that the merger of ownership by efflux of time was not applicable to the predecessor of the appellants as he had failed to establish his jot right as well as possession of the suit land. It was held that that as the predecessor of the appellants had admitted the title of respondents No. 7 to 13, he cannot claim adverse title by denouncing the title of respondents No. 7 to 13. In view of the admission of respondents No. 7 and Rasid Ali Borbhuiya, predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 8 to 13, a portion of land described in Schedule-III (measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon of land) was held to be hostile to the title of the owners for more than 24 years and therefore, it was held that the predecessor of the appellants had acquired adverse title in respect of the said land and the issue No. (iv) was determined accordingly. 25. In respect of issue No. (v), it was held that in view of the decision in issue No. (iv), where it was held that the predecessor of the substituted appellants had failed to establish his jot right or possession or ownership right, it was held that the execution of sale deeds marked as Ext. F, H, J, N and O (sic. ‘Ext.O’ should be read as ‘Ext.L’), which were created during the pendency of T.A No. 19/1977 and that sale deeds marked as Ext. L and N were executed during the pendency of the present suit, did not prejudice the interest of the predecessor of appellants because it has been held that he had no right over the suit land, except one part of schedule-III land (measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon of land) and, as such, it was held that the said sale deeds executed in favour of the respondents No. 14 and 15 (i.e counter claimants) by the respondents No. 7 to 13 were not illegal or void and therefore, the said issue No. (v) was decided against the appellants. It was further held that the predecessor of appellants had the opportunity to challenge the right, interest and possession of the original respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 in the earlier T.S No. 81/1993 and, as such, referring to the provisions of Explanation-IV of Section 11 CPC, it was held that the suit of the original appellant was hit by the said provision. Further, it was held that as the right, title and possession had not been finally decided in the previous suit i.e T.S No. 81/1993, so, a second suit for the same land on independent title was not barred. In respect of issue No. (vi), the learned trial court had held that the counter claim was not hit by the principle of resjudicata as substantially the right, title, interest and possession were not finally decided in the earlier suit and therefore, the issue was decided in the negative. 26. In respect of issue No. (ii), it was held that as the matter of tile and possession of the parties were not decided in the previous suit, the suit and the counter-claim were both maintainable. 27. In respect of issue No. (iii), the learned trial court relied on the observations made in respect of issue No. (iv) and referring to the complaint petition filed in Misc. Case No. 139m/1976 (Ext.A), it was held that in para 5 thereof, the predecessor of the appellants (PW-1) had admitted that he had been dispossessed by the original owners from three corners and in course of cross-examination, the said witness had admitted the filing of Misc. Case No. 139m/1976 and filing of further proceedings under Section 144/145 Cr.P.C in the year 1987 and, as such, inference was drawn that the original appellant had lost his possession over the suit land prior to year 1976, except the land and house in possession of Koton Malakar (PW-2). Accordingly, it was held that the right of the predecessor of the appellants was extinguished by lapse of time except for the land of Schedule-III measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon and accordingly, the said issue No. (iii), was decided in affirmative. 28. Accordingly, it was held that the right of the predecessor of the appellants was extinguished by lapse of time except for the land of Schedule-III measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon and accordingly, the said issue No. (iii), was decided in affirmative. 28. In respect of issue No. (vii), it was held that the predecessor of the appellants could not prove the dispossession on 27.11.1997 and in this regard, the learned trial court relied on the evidence of PW-4, who had stated that the respondents No. 14 and 15 had carried out the construction works of the house for a month together and it was further admitted by the said PW-4 that during this construction period, the predecessor of the appellants had never visited the suit land described in Schedule-II or any other land and, as such, issue No. (vii) was decided in negative. 29. In respect of issue No. (viii), in view of the findings recorded in respect issue No. (iv), it was the suit was decreed in respect of a portion of Schedule-III land measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon. In respect of issue No. (ix), in view of the decision in issues No. (iii) and (v), it was held that the respondents No. 14 and 15 (counter-claimants) had acquired title in respect of their purchased land measuring 19K-13C, as per schedules given in their respective sale deeds or as described in schedule of their written statement, but if any of the deeds attracts the land and house of Schedule-III declared in favour of the predecessor of the appellants, the same would stand quashed to that extent. Accordingly, the right of adverse title of the appellants was declared in respect of land measuring 2 Jasti-3 Rek-3 Pon and house thereon as described in Schedule-III of T.S No. 81/1993 (Ext.18) and in the same time, the counter claim preferred by the respondents No. 14 and 15 was also decreed in respect of land measuring 19K-13C of Schedule-I, subject to the condition that the any of the purchased deeds attracts the Schedule-III land of the predecessor of the appellants as described above, such deeds shall stand quashed to that extent. 30. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the learned trial court had misread the pleadings and had misconstrued the evidence in record and had arrived at an incorrect finding both in facts and in law. 30. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the learned trial court had misread the pleadings and had misconstrued the evidence in record and had arrived at an incorrect finding both in facts and in law. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellants had referred to the registered sale deed dated 16.02.1954 (Ext.1) executed by Fekuram Kahar in favour of Aswini Kumar Deb. It is submitted that the said Fekuram had acquired title over the suit land from Abdul Goni, by virtue of Sale Deed dated 21.01.1941 Thereafter, by registered sale deed dated 26.05.1954 (Ext.2), (i) Rasid Ali (predecessor of respondents No. 8 to 13), (ii) Abdul Rasid, (iii) Sarafat Ali, (iv) Idris Ali, and (iii) Mubarak Ali (plaintiff in T.S No. 81/1993), all sons of Late Abdul Goni, had executed sale deed in favour of Aswini Kumar Deb. Thereafter, registered sale deed dated 17.02.1961 (Ext.3) was executed by Rasid Ali in favour of Aswini Kumar Deb. Thereafter, Basir Uddin [predecessor of respondents No. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c), Jamir Uddin (predecessor of respondents 2A, 3B, 4C, and 5D), and Monir Uddin (respondent No. 6) had executed a registered sale deed (Ext.4) in favour of Aswini Kumar Deb. Thereafter, by a registered Sale Deed dated 28.06.1962 (Ext.5), (i) Aswini Kumar Deb, (ii) Basir Uddin, (ii) Jamir Uddin, (iii) Monir Uddin had sold their jot rights in respect of Schedule-I land measuring 1 kedar in favour of the predecessor of the appellants. Similarly, on the same date i.e 28.06.1962, the predecessor of the appellants had entered into an agreement with Aswini Kumar Deb vide Ext.6 Thereafter, by registered sale deed dated 05.11.1962 (Ext.7), Aswini Kumar Deb transferred the jot rights in respect of 1 Kedar land to the predecessor of the appellants. Thereafter, on 16.02.1965 vide registered sale deed (Ext.8), the legal heirs of Aswini Kumar Deb had transferred the jot rights to one Sushanta Kumar Nath. Thereafter, by registered sale deed dated 16.02.1965 (Ext.9), the legal heirs of Aswini Kumar Deb had transferred the jot rights in favour of Sushanta Kumar Nath. Thereafter, by registered Sale Deed dated 16.07.1970 (Ext.10) Sushanta Kumar Nath sold his jot rights to the predecessor of the appellants. In the meanwhile, by order dated 30.01.1960 passed by the learned Munsiff, Hailakandi, the Rent Suit No. 29/1959, filed by Aswini Kumar Deb was dismissed. Thereafter, by registered Sale Deed dated 16.07.1970 (Ext.10) Sushanta Kumar Nath sold his jot rights to the predecessor of the appellants. In the meanwhile, by order dated 30.01.1960 passed by the learned Munsiff, Hailakandi, the Rent Suit No. 29/1959, filed by Aswini Kumar Deb was dismissed. Later on, by order dated 10.02.1960 (Ext.12), the said Rent Suit No. 29/1959 was decreed in favour of Aswini Kumar Deb. As against the dismissal of Rent Suit No. 29/1959 (Exbt.11) Aswini Kumar Deb had preferred Rent Appeal No. 17/1960 and the said appeal was allowed by order dated 04.04.1961 (Exbt.13). However, Tilakdhari Kahar, who had lost in Rent Appeal No. 17/1960, executed a registered Sale Deed dated 28.01.1971 (Ext.15) in favour of the predecessor of the appellants, transferring jot rights. The Hailakandi Town Committee permitted the predecessor of the appellants to construct houses and kitchen as well as sanitary latrine as per approved plan vide Ext. 16(26) and Ext. 16(27) and another house vide Ext.16(28). Thereafter, on 03.04.1986, Majid Ali, the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 8 had filed T.S No. 30/1986 before the court of Additional District Judge, Hailakandi, subsequently, re-numbered as T.S No. 81/1993 against (i) the original appellant, (ii) Basir Uddin, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents No. 1(a) to 1(c), (iii) Jamir Uddin, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 2(a), 3(b), 4(c) and 5(d), (iv) Monir Uddin (respondent No. 6), and (v) Rasid Ali, predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 9 to 13. The following prayers were, inter-alia, made in the said suit— ka) that the plaintiff had right, title and possession over the land described in Schedule-II; kha) declaration of right of defendant No. 1 over the schedule-IV land, being part of Schedule-I land; ga) any other relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled to. 31. It was further submitted that in the said suit, the respondents No. 7 and 8, Basir Uddin, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents No. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) as well as Jamir Uddin, predecessor-in-interest of the respondent No. 2(a), 3(b), 4(c) and 5(d) had preferred a counter-claim. The prayers in the counter claim, inter-alia, were— Ka) for declaration that he deed dated 30.05.1962 and 28.08.1962 executed by them in favour of the appellant was liable to be dismissed. kha) declaration that there was no transfer by relinquishment for the counter claimants in favour of Rasid Ali, predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 9. The prayers in the counter claim, inter-alia, were— Ka) for declaration that he deed dated 30.05.1962 and 28.08.1962 executed by them in favour of the appellant was liable to be dismissed. kha) declaration that there was no transfer by relinquishment for the counter claimants in favour of Rasid Ali, predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 9. Ga) for declaration of tenancy rights over the land described in Schedule-II and IV. Gha) that if they are dispossessed by the appellant and others during the pendency of the suit they would have right for repossession for cost. 32. It is submitted that while the said suit was dismissed by judgment dated 14.08.1997, the counter-claim filed by the defendants therein was decreed. Aggrieved by the decree passed in the said counter-claim (Ext. 21 and Ext.22), the predecessor of the appellants had filed an appeal which was registered as T.A No. 19/1997. The said appeal was allowed by judgment and decree dated 18.05.1998, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hailakandi (Ext. 23 and Ext.24) and, as such, the counter-claim stood dismissed. The predecessor of the appellants i.e Sunil Kanta Banik had put the said decree to execution and aggrieved by the said execution process, a revision preferred before this Court, which was registered as CRP 121/999. This Court by judgment dated 03.04.2000 (Ext.25), held that the decree could be executed only when there is an executable decree and in the present case there was no executable decree in the eye of law in this case and therefore, question of execution did not arise and it was further held that it could not be shown that there was any decree for recovery of khas possession of the land mentioned on the schedule of the execution petition. In view of the said situation, it is submitted that the predecessor of the appellants herein was not found to be a decree holder by this Court and therefore, T. Ex. Case No. 18/1998 to execute the said appellate decree was quashed. In the meanwhile, T.S No. 8/2000 was filed by Musst. Tahirunnessa Choudhury, in respect of the said suit land, however, the said suit was withdrawn by order dated 03.11.2000 (Ext.26). Case No. 18/1998 to execute the said appellate decree was quashed. In the meanwhile, T.S No. 8/2000 was filed by Musst. Tahirunnessa Choudhury, in respect of the said suit land, however, the said suit was withdrawn by order dated 03.11.2000 (Ext.26). It is submitted that before fresh plaint/suit could be filed, by sale deed dated 29.08.1997 (Ext.27), Mubarak Ali (respondent No. 7), Moina Bibi (respondent No. 9), Asarunnessa (respondent No. 13), Zahir Uddin [predecessor of respondents No. 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c)], Eklas Uddin (respondent No. 11) and Basir Uddin (respondent No. 12) sold their share in the suit land to the respondent No. 14 by Sale Deed dated 29.08.1997 (Ext.28). By another registered Sale Deed dated 17.07.1997 (Ext.29), Basir Uddin (respondent No. 12) sold his share in the suit land in favour the respondent No. 14. By gift deed dated 16.12.1992 (Ext. 30) Basir Uddin (respondent No. 12) gifted his share in the suit land in favour of the respondent No. 14. By another registered Sale Deed dated 14.10.1997 (Ext.31), Mustt. Syeda Khatun (respondent No. 8) transferred land in favour of the respondent No. 14. By registered Sale Deed dated 13.01.2000 (Ext.32), Mubarak Ali Barbhuiya (respondent No. 7) transferred land in favour of respondent No. 15. By another Sale Deed dated 13.01.2000 (Ext.33), the said Mubarak Ali (respondent No. 7) transferred land to the respondent No. 15. 33. It is submitted that the three sale deeds dated 14.10.1997, 17.09.1997 and 16.10.1997 in favour of the respondent No. 14, were made during the pendency of T.A No. 19/1997. It is further projected whatever rights Aswini Kumar Deb had got, the same stood extinguished. It is also submitted that the Sale Deed of jot right (Ext.5) was wrongly held to be inadmissible merely on the ground that that the due execution of Ext.5 was not proved. In this regard, it is submitted that the learned trial court had failed to appreciate that the vendors of the respondents No. 14 and 15 had no title in respect of any part of the suit land because of the fact that in T.S No. 81/1993, the said vendors had failed to prove their title. Moreover, it is submitted that the relevant issues were incorrectly decided by holding that the predecessor of the appellants was dispossessed from the suit land in the year 1976, which is not borne by any pleadings. Moreover, it is submitted that the relevant issues were incorrectly decided by holding that the predecessor of the appellants was dispossessed from the suit land in the year 1976, which is not borne by any pleadings. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has pointed out that T.S No. 81/1993 was filed by the vendors of the respondents No. 14 and 15 and therefore, by the dismissal of the suit, the said vendors could not establish their existence of any rights in their favour to sell and/or otherwise transfer the suit land described in Schedule-I of the plaint to the respondents No. 14 and 15 in respect of jot rights and/or lease hold rights or in respect of transfer of title. Hence, it is submitted that the counter-claimants i.e respondents No. 14 and 15 had measurably fail to prove their valid right, title and interest and therefore, the right of the predecessor of the appellants ought to have been declared and decreed on the basis of registered sale deed dated 28.06.1962 (Ext.5). In this regard, it is submitted that while deciding issue No. (iv), it was wrongly held by the learned trial court that the said Ext.5 was not duly proved. It is further submitted that when T.A No. 19/1997 was decreed, the jot rights purportedly purchased by the respondents No. 14 and 15 had been rendered invalid and therefore, the purported transfer in favour of the said respondents No. 14 and 15 was de-hors the title. In this regard, the prayers made in the counter-claim filed in connection with TS 81/1993 were referred to. It is further submitted that the vendors of the respondents No. 14 and 15 were already parties in the previous suit i.e T.S No. 81/1993 (old T.S No. 30/1986) and therefore, when the said suit was dismissed by the learned trial court and the dismissal of the counter-claim by the learned appellate court, the vendors did not have any right to transfer the either the jot rights and/or lease rights as well as the ownership right in respect of the suit land in favour of the respondents No. 14 and 15. Hence, it is submitted that the present suit was liable to be decreed in appeal. 34. Hence, it is submitted that the present suit was liable to be decreed in appeal. 34. Per-contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents No. 14 and 15 submits that as the claim of the appellants was that their predecessor, namely, Sunil Kanta Banik was a purchaser of the jot rights and/or lease rights, there is no way that adverse possession in favour of the predecessor of the appellants can be decreed. In this regard, it is further submitted that adverse possession must be shown to be hostile against true owner and in this case the respondents No. 7 to 13 were the true owner of the suit land, against whom no statement was made in the plaint. It is also submitted that original owner of the land was Abdul Goni, who had settled the land to Fekuram and transfer the rights to Fekuram is not in challenge therefore, the respondents No. 14 and 15 having purchased the suit land from the respondents No. 5 to 13, the jot rights and ownership rights i.e the title over the suit land had validly passed on to the respondents No. 14 and 15 in the absence of the claim of the adverse possession in favour of the appellants. It is further submitted that as both the suit as well as counter claim was dismissed, there was no decree in existence either in favour of the appellant or against any of the respondents and therefore, no one was bound by the decree. Hence, sale deeds, which were in favour of respondents No. 14 and 15 were free from the mischief of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and they were not hit by the said doctrine of lis-pendens. 35. The learned Senior counsel for the respondents No. 14 and 15 has submitted that the predecessor of the appellants out to have lodged a claim in the previous suit for his title based on Ext.5 It is submitted that the predecessor of the appellants had not asserted his title in connection with the previous suit i.e T.S No. 30/1986, which was re-numbered as T.S No. 81/1993. In this regard, it is further submitted that the predecessor of the appellants had filed the suit after being dispossessed from the suit land, but the previous suit was filed without asserting his jot rights flowing from Ext.5 It is further submitted that the predecessor of the appellants could not show or prove that how by efflux of time, he, as a tenant who had acquired both jot rights as well as lease right, can claim title in respect of the suit land. In this regard, it is submitted that the long possession by a tenant cannot be converted into title. 36. Countering the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, it is submitted that the records of Case No. 136M/1976 filed under Section 107 Cr.P.C had been exhibited as Ext. A, and that in paragraph 5 thereof, it was the admitted case of the predecessor of the appellants was that he had already been dispossessed from the suit land by the second parties therein from all three sides. The persons arrayed as second parties in the said case are Mazid Ali, Rasid Ali, Monir Ali, Lalu Miya, Jalal Miya, Aadil Miya, Muskandar Ali, Momtaz Ali, Bokkar Miya and Rashid Ali and there was no evidence of re-entry into the suit land. The disputed land was measuring about 1 kedar, covered by Dag No. 441 and 442, Second K.S Patta No. 109 of Pargana Hailakandi, Mouza Ranauti Part-II, Hailakandi Town Committee, Ward No. 1. It is, therefore, submitted that the reference to dispossession must be considered to have occurred in the year 1976, when the said Case No. 136m/1976 was instituted. Hence, it is submitted that as the present suit, i.e TS No. 66/2000 was not filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Articles 64 and 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, calculated from the year 1976, the present suit was barred by limitation. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent has referred to the finding recorded in paragraph 15 of the judgment in respect of issue No. (iv), wherein it had been held that the purchase of jot rights by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 8 and 13 was admitted by the original appellant. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent has referred to the finding recorded in paragraph 15 of the judgment in respect of issue No. (iv), wherein it had been held that the purchase of jot rights by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 8 and 13 was admitted by the original appellant. However, when the jot rights got merged with the ownership right in favour of the respondents No. 14 and 15, which can be tacked to the year 1961, there is no way that the jot right over said suit land could not have been validly transferred to the predecessor of the appellants. It is further submitted that in the previous suit the title of respondents No. 7 to 13 over the suit land was not fact in issue and therefore, when the issue of title was neither proved nor disproved in the previous suit i.e T.S No. 81/1983, it is not open to the appellant to submit that after suit was dismissed, the vendors of the respondents No. 14 and 15 had lost their right to transfer the suit land. It is submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court in all the issues are sustainable on facts and in law and therefore, the appeal of the appellants deserves to be dismissed and the cross-objection of the respondents No. 14 and 15 deserved to be allowed. 37. Upon hearing the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsels for both sides, this Court has perused the materials on record. Based on the said arguments, the following points of determination arise for consideration of this Court:— a. Whether the learned trial court had correctly appreciated and decided the issues No. (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) and (viii)? b. To what reliefs the appellant and/or the respondents No. 14 and 15 are entitled to? 38. The issues No. (i) and (ii) as framed by the learned trial court appear to be a mere formality. In view of the materials on record, there can be no doubt that there was a cause of action for the suit as well as for the counter claim. Hence, this court does not find any infirmity in the decision by the learned trial court on issue No. (i). In view of the materials on record, there can be no doubt that there was a cause of action for the suit as well as for the counter claim. Hence, this court does not find any infirmity in the decision by the learned trial court on issue No. (i). Insofar as the issue No. 2 is concerned, no defect in the form of the suit could be shown by the learned senior counsel for the respondents No. 14 and 15, as such, no infirmity is found in the decision of the learned trial court on the issue No. (ii). 39. The issue No. (iv) as framed by the learned trial court is “Has the plaintiff right, title, interest and possession over the suit land either as a lessee or acquired right therein by way of adverse possession?”. The said issue is re-visited as under:— a. At the outset, it must be mentioned that as per the statements made in paragraph-2 of the plaint, the predecessor of the appellants had projected and claimed that he had purchased the land described in the Schedule of the plaint and houses thereon by registered Deed dated 28.06.1962 as well as by registered Deed No. 5334 dated 16.07.1970 and came into the possession of the entire land described in Schedule-I of the plaint. Without any amendment in the pleading, in the evidence on affidavit, it is revealed that vide registered Sale Deed dated 28.06.1962 (Ext.5), the predecessor of the appellants had purchased entire jot rights from (i) the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents No. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c), (ii) respondent No. 6, (iii) predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 2A, 3B, 4C & 5B, and (iv) Aswini Kumar Deb. Therefore, though beyond pleadings, it is the positive case of the predecessor of the appellants in his evidence as PW-1 was that he had purchased only the jot right (i.e cultivating rights) over the Schedule-I land. However, as per prayer (a) of the plaint, the appellants had prayed declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land described in Schedule-I of the plaint by right of purchase and for confirmation of possession over the land described in Schedule-II of the plaint. However, as per prayer (a) of the plaint, the appellants had prayed declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land described in Schedule-I of the plaint by right of purchase and for confirmation of possession over the land described in Schedule-II of the plaint. Admittedly, as per Ext.5 there was no transfer of the ownership over the Schedule-1 land in favour of the original appellant, as such, the said prayer (a) cannot be allowed to the extent of declaring title of the appellants over the suit land because of the simple reason that the predecessor of the appellants had not purchased ownership rights and the sale of jot (cultivation) right is not a immovable property within the meaning of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and therefore, the purported transfer of jot rights cannot be termed as sale of immovable property within the meaning of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. b. The interconnected plea was taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants to the effect that the appellants had perfected title by way of adverse possession. In this regard, it is well settled that the plea of adverse possession can be taken as a shield and/or defence but the said plea cannot be used as a sword. If one requires an authority on the point, the case of Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala, (2014) 1 SCC 669 may be referred to. As per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case, even if the appellants are found to be in adverse possession of the suit land, they cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership and that only if proceeding is filed against the appellants, and the appellants are arrayed as defendants, then they can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence. c. Moreover, as per the evidence of the predecessor of the appellants (PW-1), it is claimed that rent was sent to the land-owner, namely, Rasid Ali Barbhuiya, the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 9 vide postal money order marked as Ext.17, 17(1), 17(2), 17(3) and 17(4). c. Moreover, as per the evidence of the predecessor of the appellants (PW-1), it is claimed that rent was sent to the land-owner, namely, Rasid Ali Barbhuiya, the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 9 vide postal money order marked as Ext.17, 17(1), 17(2), 17(3) and 17(4). Therefore, by his act of tendering rent to one of the land owners, the predecessor of the appellants has not been able to establish that he had perfected his title over the Schedule-I land by virtue of adverse possession. In the opinion of this Court, by his own conduct, the predecessor of the appellants had relegated himself to the status of a tenant and therefore, upon refusal of the landlord to accept rent from the tenant, the tenant merely acquires the status of a “statutory tenant” and nothing more. No proof of adverse possession in respect of the Schedule-I land could be shown to have been tendered by the predecessor of the appellants, as such, in absence of evidence that any hostile title or possession was claimed as on the date of filing of the suit, the plea of perfection of adverse possession stands not-proved. d. On a perusal of the evidence on record, the appellants has relied on the (i) order dated 14.03.1963 [(Ext.16(26)], by which construction of house was allowed by Hailakandi Town Committee, (ii) order dated 21.04.1964 [(Ext. 16(27)], for construction of sanitary latrine issued by Hailakandi Town Committee, and (iii) order dated 21.12.1965 [(Ext. 16(28)] by Hailakandi Town Committee for allowing construction. However, no proof of actual construction having being carried out on the suit land has been brought on record. The aforesaid three exhibits do not reflect the dag and patta nos. of the land where construction was permitted by the Hailakandi Town Committee. As per the evidence-on-affidavit of the predecessor of the appellants (PW-1), he had exhibited municipal tax bills and receipts as Ext.16(1) to Ext.16(25). The said bills/exhibits cannot be accepted as a proof of continuous and hostile possession of the suit property by the appellants. e. There are three essential elements for establishing the plea of adverse possession, viz., (i) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading adverse possession, and (iii) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of the real owner. None of these three elements has been found to be proved by the appellants. None of these three elements has been found to be proved by the appellants. f. In the present case in hand, there is no pleading in the plaint about the date on which the predecessor of the appellants had asserted his hostile claim over the Schedule-1 land against the interest of the actual landlords. It is noteworthy that in the plaint there is absolutely no reference about the name of the land owners. There is no reference as to how the vendors of the predecessor of the appellants had acquired title in respect of the suit land. As already referred above, in the plaint, the predecessor of the appellants had projected that he had purchased the suit land by way of registered Sale Deed dated 28.06.1961 from Aswini Kumar Deb and three others. The status of the said vendors in respect of the suit land had not disclosed in the plaint, as such, one gets an impression that the vendors of the predecessor of the appellants was the title holder and possessors of the suit land, which is revealed from the statements made in the written statement cum counter-claim of the respondent No. 14, where it has been disclosed that the original owner of the suit land was Abdul Goni Mia, who was the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent No. 7 and 8 to 13. It was further disclosed that the respondents No. 1, 6 and the predecessors of respondents No. 2 to 5 transferred their jot rights of the suit land along the other land by way of Deed dated 27.04.1962 (registered on 30.04.1962) in favour of respondent No. 8 and accordingly, the jot/cultivation rights got extinguished and got merged with the ownership right of the land owners. g. As stated above, the predecessor of the appellants has not been able to prove that he had made any construction over the suit land described in Schedule-I of the plaint. There is no evidence to show that the original jot-holder, namely, Aswini Kumar Deb had made any permanent construction over the suit land. It is an admitted case of the appellants in Ext.16 series and Ext.17 series that the said suit land was within the municipal area. Hence, there cannot be any quarrel with the finding recorded by the learned trial court that the suit land would be governed by the provisions of Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955. It is an admitted case of the appellants in Ext.16 series and Ext.17 series that the said suit land was within the municipal area. Hence, there cannot be any quarrel with the finding recorded by the learned trial court that the suit land would be governed by the provisions of Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955. Therefore, in the absence of proof of construction by the original tenant cannot provide the appellants with protection under Section 5 of the said 1955 Act. As per the statements made in the plaint as well as in the affidavit by the predecessor of the appellants (PW-1), it is not the case of the appellants that the tenancy rights granted by the original land owner/landlord was a transferable right. Moreover, it is a specific pleaded case of the predecessor of the appellants (PW-1) in his evidence-on-affidavit that he had purchased jot rights (i.e cultivation rights). Nothing could be shown before this Court that the suit land did not fall within the scope of the Assam Non-Agricultural Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 or that the predecessor of the appellants had ever exercised jot rights. h. As per the sequence of events projected by the appellants, by Deed No. 4009 dated 26.04.1961, Aswini Kumar Deb sold jot rights to Late Basir Uddin, Late Jamir Uddin and Late Monir Uddin. Thereafter, on 05.01.1962, the appellant sold half of the said rights in respect of Schedule-1 land to Aswini Kumar Deb. Thereafter, the legal representatives of Aswini Kumar Deb sold the said half portion of rights to Susanta Kumar Nath. Thereafter, the predecessor of the appellants purchased the said half land from Susanta Kumar Nath. Therefore, when half of his rights was purportedly purchased only on 16.07.1970, as pleaded in the plaint, in the absence of any pleadings or evidence as to in which portion of Schedule-I land, the predecessor of the appellants had constructed houses on the basis of construction orders dated 14.03.1963, 26.08.1964 and 21.12.1965 [Ext.16 (26), Ext.26(27) and Ext.26(28)], it cannot be said that the predecessor of the appellants had been able to prove that he had actually carried out any construction as projected. For the same reasons, when the predecessor of the appellants purchased half portion of land on 16.07.1970, it was not explained how he could tender rent to Rasid Ali Barbhuiya (predecessor of Respondent No. 9) vide money orders, viz., (i) dated 08.02.1966 (Ext.17), (ii) dated 26.03.1969 [Ext.17(1)], (iii) dated 07.02.1964 [Ext.17(2)], (iv) dated 02.02.1965 [Ext.17(3)], and (v) dated 02.02.1965 [Ext.17(4)]. It is a well accepted principle of evidence that a mere marking of a document as exhibit does not amount to proof of its contents. Therefore, if as per plaint, the predecessor of the appellants had sold jot rights over half of Schedule-I land to Aswini Kumar Deb on 05.01.1962, it was his burden to specifically prove the exact dimension of the land sold as well as the location where he could have made his projected construction. i. On a perusal of the statements made in the petition of the herein before referred Case No. 136M/1976 (Ext.A), with which the predecessor of the appellants (PW.1) was confronted during his cross-examination, it is seen that in paragraph-5 thereof, it had been stated that as many as ten persons named therein including Majid Ali (predecessor of Respondent No. 8), Rasid Ali (predecessor of Respondent No. 9) were gradually dispossessing the predecessor of the appellants from all three sites since a long time and that he was preparing for instituting a civil suit for recovery of possession of land already dispossessed by the second party members. Therefore, the said evidence having not been demolished, this Court is unable to accept that the predecessor of the appellants had perfected his possession, adverse to the interest of the landlord. j. Under the circumstances, this Court is of the view that the appellants could not prove their right, title and possession over the land described in Schedule-I of the plaint either by acquiring title or by way of adverse possession. k. On a perusal of the decision of the learned Trial Court on issue No. (iv) and in light of the discussions above, this Court does not find any infirmity in respect of finding that no permanent structure was proved to have been built on the Schedule-I land either by the original lessee, namely, Aswini Kumar Deb. k. On a perusal of the decision of the learned Trial Court on issue No. (iv) and in light of the discussions above, this Court does not find any infirmity in respect of finding that no permanent structure was proved to have been built on the Schedule-I land either by the original lessee, namely, Aswini Kumar Deb. In view of the said finding, this Court is of the opinion that the appellants cannot claim the benefit of the “doctrine of tacking”, by which the possession held by the original lessee can be tacked by the sub-lessee for the purpose of claiming protection under section 5 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Areas Tenancy Act, 1955. Thus, the learned trial court has rightly held that the appellants are not a non-occupancy tenant for getting protection under Section 5 of the said 1955 Act. Moreover, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants could not point out any provisions either under the said 1955 Act or under any other law for time being in force by virtue of which a non-agricultural tenant could acquire the title or any non-evictable right by afflux of time. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept that the long possession, if any, by the appellants over the suit land could be converted into title, notwithstanding that as per the statement made in Case No. 136m/76, the predecessor of the appellants was dispossessed from the suit land in the year 1976. l. The learned Senior counsel for the appellants had laid much stress that the original Deed dated 23.01.1971 by Tilak Dhari Kahar (Ext.15), which was more than 30 years old document was not correctly appreciated and wrongly discarded by the learned Trial Court. It was submitted that the said lease (Ext.15) in favor of Aswini Kumar Deb ought to have been accepted as a valid documentary evidence of transfer of jot/lease right. It is also submitted that the said 30 years old document was discarded in ignorance of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and it is stated that this had caused grave injustice to the appellant. In this regard, it is found that while appreciating issue No. (iv), the learned Trial Court had not accepted Ext.5 although the said document was 30 years old, on the ground that the said document was a subject matter of challenge in the proceedings of T.S No. 81/1993. In this regard, it is found that while appreciating issue No. (iv), the learned Trial Court had not accepted Ext.5 although the said document was 30 years old, on the ground that the said document was a subject matter of challenge in the proceedings of T.S No. 81/1993. However, it appears that it is a well settled principle of law that under the provisions of section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 a general presumption of a 30 years old document can be taken with regard to the genuineness of the signature, execution and attestation, but the Court cannot presume the correctness of the contents of the said document, which is required to be proved by other admissible evidence. Thus, in the present case, the learned Trial Court had rightly mentioned that a mere marking of the document as Exhibit is not sufficient. In this regard, the law is very well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148 . Hence, although for different reasons, but this Court agrees with the ultimate finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that the contents of the registered deed dated 28.06.1962 (Ext.5) had not been proved. Hence, the learned trial court was right in holding that as the parent document (Ext.5) was not proved, the subsequent transactions vide various other deeds like Ext.7, Ext.8, Ext.9, Ext.10 and Ext.15, does not give any right to the appellant in respect of the suit land described in Schedule-I. It would be pertinent to mention that as per the evidence of the appellant (PW-1), which although beyond pleadings, it has been stated therein that “… On 05.11.1962, in terms of ekrar, the plaintiff executed and registered deed of sale in respect of half share of the joth rights in favor of Aswini Kr. Deb and Aswini Kr. Deb in turn finally purchased the other half on valuable consideration and his possession was confirmed in respect of the same with right to use the water of the pond by the plaintiff. Exbt.7 and Exbt.8 are the said documents. After execution of deed Exbt.7, I constructed house permanently in nature with CI sheet roofing having pucca wall and wooden post …” A perusal of the said Ext.7 shows that Ext.7 was executed by Aswini Kr. Deb and not by the predecessor of the appellants. Exbt.7 and Exbt.8 are the said documents. After execution of deed Exbt.7, I constructed house permanently in nature with CI sheet roofing having pucca wall and wooden post …” A perusal of the said Ext.7 shows that Ext.7 was executed by Aswini Kr. Deb and not by the predecessor of the appellants. Therefore, though beyond pleading the above quoted statement made in the affidavit does not tally with the contents of the said document. m. On the contrary, it is the case of the respondents No. 14 and 15 that Basir Uddin [predecessor of respondents No. 1(a), 1(b), 1(c)], Monir Uddin (respondent No. 6) and Jamir Uddin [predecessor of respondents No. 2A, 3B, 4C and 5D] sold their jot rights to Rashid Ali Barbhuiya (predecessor of respondent No. 9) vide deed dated 27.04.1962, registered on 13.05.1962 Surprisingly, the said deed is not found to be exhibited by any of the defendants in the suit. In this regard, it would be relevant to state that as per the judgment dated 14.08.1997 in T.S No. 81/1993 (Ext.21), the issue No. (v) therein was “whether the disputed sale deeds in respect of the same suit land claimed by the plaintiff (Majid Ali Barbhuiya, predecessor of respondent No. 8) and the defendant No. 1 (appellant) respectively to have been executed by the defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 (Amir Uddin, Jamir Uddin, Monir Uddin) on 27.04.1962 and 28.06.62 respectively are genuine and forged?” The said deed was marked as Ext.3 in the said TS 81/1993 and the learned trial court had held that the said deed was false and collusive, inter-alia, on the ground that Monir Uddin (defendant No. 4 in said suit/Respondent No. 6 in this appeal) was 5 years old and minor at that time and the issue was decided against the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 therein (i.e the predecessor of the appellants herein) and in favor of the counter-claimant therein. Accordingly, this Court is unable to accept the finding recorded by the learned Court below to the effect that “… therefore the fact of earlier purchase of joth right by the predecessor of defendant Nos. Accordingly, this Court is unable to accept the finding recorded by the learned Court below to the effect that “… therefore the fact of earlier purchase of joth right by the predecessor of defendant Nos. 8 to 13 is virtually admitted by the plaintiff.”, on the ground that there was no admission by the predecessor of the appellants and even assuming that there was any such admission, the finding on issue No. (v) vide judgment dated 18.08.1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Hailakandi in T.S No. 81/1993 would definitely prevail or override the effect of such admission, assuming there was any. Thus, although for different reasons, this Court concurs with the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that the appellants had failed to establish his jot rights over the suit land. n. The finding by the learned Trial Court is that the suit land falls within the meaning of Assam Non Agricultural Urban Tenancy Act, 1955. In this connection the learned Trial Court has referred to the definition of land as prescribed u/s 3(b) of the said 1955 Act. This finding is supported by various documents like Ext.16 (series) and Ext.17 (series), showing that even during the years 1962-63, the suit land was well within the jurisdiction of Hailakandi Town Committee. Therefore, by a mere transfer of the alleged jot rights (i.e agricultural rights) by one party to another, irrespective of the number of similar transactions of alienating jot rights, such transfers per se, cannot confer any substantive right like title in favor of the tenant, save and except, a limited right of tenancy and/or jot rights only. o. Under the circumstances, no infirmity is found in the finding recorded by the learned Court below that the predecessor of the appellants did not occupy the suit land for residential or business purpose or for purposes incidental thereto, which is one of the ingredients of section 3(b) of the said 1955 Act. p. Earlier herein above, relying on the case of Gurudwara Sahib (supra), it has been held that the appellants are not entitled to declaration of right by way of adverse possession. p. Earlier herein above, relying on the case of Gurudwara Sahib (supra), it has been held that the appellants are not entitled to declaration of right by way of adverse possession. In view of the said well settled position of law, the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court on issue No. (iv) to the effect that the appellant had acquired title by way of adverse possession respect of Schedule-III (measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon of land) and house as described in Schedule III of plaint of T.S 81/93 (Ext.18) is not sustainable and the said finding is interfered with and reversed. q. As a result, the finding of this Court on issue No. (iv) as framed by the learned trial court is that the predecessor of the appellants (i.e plaintiff) had not acquired any right, title, interest or possession in respect of the suit land described in Schedule-I of the plaint, save and except, that the appellant is found to be in possession in respect of a part of the said suit land, which is described by the learned Trial Court as Schedule-III (measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon of land) and house thereon as described in Schedule III of plaint of T.S 81/1993 (Ext.18). 40. The decision by the learned trial court on issue No. (iii) is re-visited now. a. In view of the discussions in respect of issue No. (iv) above, it has been held that the appellant did not have title in respect of the suit land described in Schedule-I of the plaint. b. Moreover, it has been also held that save and except the land described by the learned trial court as Schedule-III (measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon of land) and house thereon of plaint of T.S 81/1993 (Ext.18), the predecessor of the appellants had been dispossessed from three sides as per the statement made Case No. 136m/76. Therefore, suit filed in the year 2000 was after about 24 years from the time of such dispossession. c. Hence, the suit filed by the appellant is found to be barred by limitation. Therefore, suit filed in the year 2000 was after about 24 years from the time of such dispossession. c. Hence, the suit filed by the appellant is found to be barred by limitation. d. In view of the finding recorded in paragraph 39(p) above, the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court in issue No. (iii) to the effect that the right of the predecessor of the appellants had been not been extinguished in respect of land and house described in Schedule-III (measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon of land) of plaint of T.S 81/93 (Ext.18) is not sustainable and the said finding is interfered with and reversed. e. Save and except as mentioned in paragraph 40(d) above, the finding by the learned trial court in respect of issue No. (iii) is affirmed. 41. In respect of the decision of the learned trial court in respect of issue No. (v), this court does not find any infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned trial court. The reasons are as follows:— a. The suit land is in the possession of the respondents No. 14 and 15 on the strength of the various deeds of conveyance exhibited by the appellant as Ext.27 to Ext.33 out of which the respondents No. 14 and 15 have exhibited some Conveyance Deeds as Ext.F Ext.H, Ext.J, Ext.L, and Ext.N For the sake of clarity, the comparative exhibits are given below: Sl. Deed No. Plaintiff Exhibit Defendant's Exhibit 1. 2958 27 F 2. 2994 28 H 3. 3097 29 - 4. 3295 30 - 5. 3261 31 J 6. 51 32 L 7. 52 33 N b. The appellants had succeeded in his projection that the said conveyance deeds were made during the pendency of the TS 81/1993 and/or TA No. 19/1997. However, there is force in the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents No. 14 and 15 that the suit as well as the counter-claim were both ultimately dismissed. Hence, there was no decree in favour of anyone, for which the said decree of dismissal of suit as well as counter-claim did not affect any of the rights of the respondents No. 14 and 15, in so far as it concerned the said deeds of conveyance. Hence, there was no decree in favour of anyone, for which the said decree of dismissal of suit as well as counter-claim did not affect any of the rights of the respondents No. 14 and 15, in so far as it concerned the said deeds of conveyance. c. Moreover, it has been well settled that the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does not annul the conveyance or transfer made pendente lite and that its effect is to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to a litigation and the pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations as his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court. The authority on this point are the cases of (i) Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397 : AIR 2013 SC 2389 , (ii) A. Nawab John v. V.N Subramaniyam, (2012) 7 SCC 738 ; (iii) Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh (Dead) by LRs., (2007) 2 SCC 404 . d. Under the circumstances, and in view of the findings recorded in connection with issue No. (iv) above, this court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has correctly decided the issue No. (v). The transfer of land made to the respondents No. 14 and 15 are held to be valid. 42. In respect of issue No. (vi):— a. It is seen that the following prayers (free-hand rough translation from Bengali) were made in the counter-claim in TS No. 81/1993:— ka) Sale deed dated 27.04.1962 registered on 30.05.1962 in favour of defendant No. 1 (appellant) by the legal representatives of defendants No. 2 to 4 is void, collusive, fraudulent, etc. kha) Deed of Relinquishment by Defendant No. 5 in favour of Defendants No. 2 to 4 was never given and the same is void, fraudulent, etc. ga) Declaration of jot rights purchased by defendants No. 2 to 4 in respect of 10k-10C of Schedule-II land within Schedule-I land and for confirmation of possession. Gha) If during the pendency of the suit, the defendants No. 2 to 4 are evicted by the defendant No. 1, then they are entitled to restoration of possession by removing the defendant No. 1, his men, agents, etc. Unga) Declaration of jot right of defendants No. 2 to 4. Gha) If during the pendency of the suit, the defendants No. 2 to 4 are evicted by the defendant No. 1, then they are entitled to restoration of possession by removing the defendant No. 1, his men, agents, etc. Unga) Declaration of jot right of defendants No. 2 to 4. Cha) Declaration of right of defendant No. 1 in respect of 5k-5C land of Schedule-IV and confirmation of possession of the defendants No. 2 to 4 in respect of land measuring 10k-10C, described in Schedule-II and Schedule-III within Schedule-I land by way of purchase in favour of defendants No. 2 to 4. Chha) Cost. (b) It has been stated herein before that the defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 in the suit, viz., Basir Uddin, Jamir Uddin and Monir Uddin had sold jot rights to the predecessor of respondent No. 8, one of the vendors of the respondents No. 14 and 15. (c) The vendors of the respondent No. 14 and 15 are found to have title in respect of the suit land described in Schedule-I of the plaint. (d) It has already been held that the suit land is covered under the provisions of the Assam Non-Agricultural Areas Tenancy Act, 1955. Hence, in the considered opinion of this Court, the transfer of jot rights is immaterial and does not affect the right, title, interest and possession of the lawful owner of the land. Therefore, notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the presence of absence of jot right is immaterial for the lawful owner to transfer a valid title to the purchaser of the land. (e) The appellants could not successfully demonstrate that the right of the owner of the suit land stood clouded in any manner so as to invalidate the lawful conveyance of the suit land to the respondents No. 14 and 15 vide various Deeds of Conveyance marked as Ext.27 to Ext.33 (f) In view of above, the learned trial court is found to have correctly appreciated that the matter of right, title, interest and possession were not finally decided in the previously instituted TS No. 81/1993 and, as such, the counter-claim was not barred by the principles of resjudicata. 43. In light of the discussions above in respect of issues No. (iii) and (iv) above, this court is of the considered opinion that the appellants are not entitled to any relief. 43. In light of the discussions above in respect of issues No. (iii) and (iv) above, this court is of the considered opinion that the appellants are not entitled to any relief. Hence, the finding of the learned trial court on the issue No. (vii) is hereby affirmed. 44. Consequently, as it is the specific finding in respect of issues No. (iii) and (iv) that the predecessor of the appellants (i.e plaintiff) was not in possession of the suit premises described in Schedule-I, save and except from, the land and house described in Schedule-III (land measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon) of plaint in T.S 81/1993 (Ext.18), the appellants are not entitled to khas possession thereof. Moreover, in view of the finding on issue No. (iv), given in paragraph 39(p) and 39(q) above, where it has been held that the predecessor of the appellants is not entitled to declaration of right by way of adverse possession. Hence, the decision of the learned trial court that the predecessor of the appellants was entitled to decree in respect of said Schedule-III premises described in plaint of TS 81/1993 (Ext.18) stands set aside and reversed. It is, however, held that the appellants are in possession of the said premises as elaborated in paragraph 39(q) above. 45. In view of the decision rendered in respect of issue No. (viii) above, the respondents No. 14 and 15 are found to have acquired title in respect of suit land described in Schedule-I. However, the appellants are found/held to be in possession of the said premises as elaborated in paragraph 39(q) above. As a result, the finding by the learned trial court that if any of the sale deeds attracts above referred Schedule-III land, the same shall stand quashed deserves to be set aside, which is hereby done by following the ratio of the case of Gurudwara Sahib (supra). 46. In view of the foregoing discussions, the point of determination No. (ii) is answered by holding that the partial decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hailakandi in TS No. 66/2000 is liable to be set aside. However, with a rider to the limited effect that the appellants are found to be in possession of the land and house described in Schedule-III (land measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon) of plaint in T.S 81/1993 (Ext.18). ORDER 47. However, with a rider to the limited effect that the appellants are found to be in possession of the land and house described in Schedule-III (land measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon) of plaint in T.S 81/1993 (Ext.18). ORDER 47. To sum up, both the appeals, being RFA No. 30/2005, RFA 35/2005 and RFA 36/2005 stands dismissed. The cross objection, being C.O No. 7/2005 stands partly allowed by setting aside the decree passed by the learned trial court in respect of a part of land including house thereon, forming part of Schedule-I land, and morefully described in Schedule-III (land measuring 2 Jasti 3 Rek 3 Pon) of plaint in T.S 81/1993 (Ext.18), which is subject to a finding that the appellants are in possession of the said land and house, as such, subject to the said rider, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court stands set aside and reversed to the extent as indicated above. 48. Prepare a decree accordingly. 49. Send back the LCR.