JUDGMENT We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 2. Leave granted. 3. The accused respondent had been convicted by the learned trial Court under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of L 2,000/-, in default, to under undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 30 days. In revision, the High Court has altered the conviction and held the accused respondent to be not guilty. The basis of the order of the High Court seems to be that the red chilli powder which was found to be adulterated was not meant for public sale but was kept for cooking/preparation of food in the eating place from where the sample was taken by the Food Inspector (complainant). Aggrieved, the State has come up in appeal. 4. The issue appears to be covered by the decision of this Court in The Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation v. Cherukattil Gopalan and another, AIR 1971 SC 1725 . Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the said report which deal with the issue are in the following terms: "25. To sum up we are in agreement with the decisions in AIR 1964 All 199 and AIR 1965 Mad 98 , to the extent to which they lay down the principle that when there is a sale to the Food Inspector under the Act of an article of food, which is found to be adulterated, the accused will be guilty of an offence punishable under S.16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act. We further agree that the article of food which has been purchased by the Food Inspector need not have been taken out from a larger quantity intended for sale. We are also of the opinion that the person from whom the article of food has been purchased by the Food Inspector need not be a dealer as such in that article. We are not inclined to agree with the decisions laying the contrary propositions. 26. Coming to the case on had, on the findings of the two Courts the sugar in question has been found to be adulterated. The purchase by the Food Inspector from the accused of sugar for purposes of analysis is a sale under Section 2(13) of the Act. 26. Coming to the case on had, on the findings of the two Courts the sugar in question has been found to be adulterated. The purchase by the Food Inspector from the accused of sugar for purposes of analysis is a sale under Section 2(13) of the Act. Section 7 prohibits a person from selling adulterated article of food. Similarly, under Section 16(1)(a)(i) any person who sells adulterated food commits an offence and is punishable therein. The sugar which is the commodity before us is food under Section 2(5) of the Act. We have already pointed out that sugar by itself is an article used as food or at any rate it is an article which ordinarily enters into or is used in the composition or preparation of human food. In this case the sale was for analysis and the article was an article of food and in view of the concurrent findings of both the Courts that it was adulterated, the respondents have contravened Sections 7 and 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. Hence it must be held that the respondents are technically guilty of the offence with which they were charged and they have been wrongly acquitted by the High Court and the District Magistrate. But in view of the fact that the appellant has argued the appeal only as a test case and does not challenge the acquittal of the respondents, we merely set aside the order and judgment of the High Court. But we may make it clear that apart from holding the respondents technically guilty, we are not setting aside the order of acquittal passed in their favour." 5. From the above it is clear that sale of food item(s) meant for cooking/preparation of vegetables/food in an eating place to the Food Inspector would amount to "sale" under Section 2(xiii) of the Act. 6. In view of the pronouncement of this court in The Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation v. Cherukattil Gopalan and another (supra) and having regard to the facts of the case, the basis of acquittal rendered by the High Court seems to be legally infirm. We, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and restore the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court. The accused respondent is directed to surrender forthwith and serve the remaining part of the sentence. 7. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.