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2018 DIGILAW 1469 (JHR)

Kali Charan Mahto, S/o Sri Tanik Lal Mahto @ Tarik Lal Mahto v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited, through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director

2018-07-09

AMITAV K.GUPTA, D.N.PATEL

body2018
ORDER : D.N. PATEL, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner whose money-suit type of writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3657 of 2015 was dismissed by the learned Single vide order dated 8th October, 2015. 2. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that several work orders were given for different amount and for different construction type of work and money suit type of writ petition was preferred by this appellant (original petitioner) for getting aforesaid amount, for which, respondents have raised dispute about the nature of the work and completion of the work. Reasons: 3. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that money suit type of writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3657 of 2015 was preferred by this appellant (original petitioner) for getting amount of Rs.2,43,630/- for several work orders, which are as under: Sl. No. Date of work order Amount of the construction 1 07.03.2009 Rs.40,920/- 2 09.03.2009 Rs.39,800/- 3 12.05.2009 Rs.36,740/- 4 22.06.2009 Rs.16,940/- 5 01.10.2009 Rs.20,130/- 6 04.03.2010 Rs.39,600/- 7 09.09.2010 Rs.49,500/- Total Rs.2,43,630/- 4. For the aforesaid different work orders, different types of amounts are being claimed by this appellant. It appears that the claim made by this appellant is disputed claim which can be established by this appellant (original petitioner) by laying down cogent and convincing evidences, before the learned trial court. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3657 of 2015 preferred by this appellant vide order dated 8th October, 2015. 5. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suganmal v. State of M.P., reported in AIR 1965 SC 1740 , in paragraphs 6 and 9, which read as under: “6. On the first point, we are of opinion that though the High Courts have power to pass any appropriate order in the exercise of the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, such a petition solely praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State to refund the money is not ordinarily maintainable for the simple reason that a claim for such a refund can always be made in a suit against the authority which had illegally collected the money as a tax. We have been referred to cases in which orders had been issued directing the State to refund taxes illegally collected, but all such cases had been those in which the petitions challenged the validity of the assessment and for consequential relief for the return of the tax illegally collected. We have not been referred to any case in which the Courts were moved by a petition under Article 226 simply for the purpose of obtaining refund of money due from the State on account of its having made illegal exactions. We do not consider it proper to extend the principle justifying the consequential order directing the refund of amounts illegally realised, when the order under which the amounts had been collected has been set aside, to cases in which only order for the refund of money are sought. The parties had the right to question the illegal assessment orders on the ground of their illegality or unconstitutionality and therefore could take action under Article 226 for the protection of their fundamental right, and the courts, on setting aside the assessment orders, exercised their jurisdiction in proper circumstances to order the consequential relief for the refund of the tax illegally realised. We do not find any good reason to extend this principle and therefore hold that no petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus will be normally entertained for the purpose of merely ordering a refund of money to the return of which the petitioner claims a right. 9. We therefore hold that normally petitions solely praying for the refund of money against the State by a writ of mandamus are not to be entertained. The aggrieved party has the right of going to the civil court for claiming the amount and it is open to the State to raise all possible defences to the claim, defences which cannot, in most cases, be appropriately raised and considered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied) 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., reported in (2004) 3 SCC 458 , in paragraph 6, which reads as under: “6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., reported in (2004) 3 SCC 458 , in paragraph 6, which reads as under: “6. On 5-1-1972, West Coast Paper Mills Limited filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the Railway Administration to refund the amount of freight collected by the Railway Administration to the extent it was in violation of the declaration given by the Tribunal. This writ petition related to the period 26-4-1963 to 1-10-1966 and the freight realised by the Railway Administration during this period. This petition came to be dismissed on 29-10-1973 by the High Court forming an opinion that for a money claim of the nature made in the writ petition, writ jurisdiction was not appropriate forum and the writ petitioner was at liberty to file a civil suit for the claim. The merits of the claim were not adjudged by the High Court and rightly so.” (emphasis supplied) 7. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 439 , in paragraph 8, which read as under: “8. The observations in Suganmal related to a claim for refund of tax and have to be understood with reference to the nature of the claim made therein. The decision in Suganmal has been explained and distinguished in several subsequent cases, including in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd. and ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. The legal position becomes clear when the decision in Suganmal is read with the other decisions of this Court on the issue, referred to below: (i) Normally, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not be entertained to enforce a civil liability arising out of a breach of a contract or a tort to pay an amount of money due to the claimants. The aggrieved party will have to agitate the question in a civil suit. But an order for payment of money may be made in a writ proceeding, in enforcement of statutory functions of the State or its officers. (Vide Burmah Construction Co. The aggrieved party will have to agitate the question in a civil suit. But an order for payment of money may be made in a writ proceeding, in enforcement of statutory functions of the State or its officers. (Vide Burmah Construction Co. v. State of Orissa.) (ii) If a right has been infringed—whether a fundamental right or a statutory right—and the aggrieved party comes to the Court for enforcement of the right, it will not be giving complete relief if the Court merely declares the existence of such right or the fact that existing right has been infringed. The High Court, while enforcing fundamental or statutory rights, has the power to give consequential relief by ordering payment of money realised by the Government without the authority of law. (Vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai.) (iii) A petition for issue of writ of mandamus will not normally be entertained for the purpose of merely ordering a refund of money, to the return of which the petitioner claims a right. The aggrieved party seeking refund has to approach the civil court for claiming the amount, though the High Courts have the power to pass appropriate orders in the exercise of the power conferred under Article 226 for payment of money. (Vide Suganmal v. State of M.P.) (iv) There is a distinction between cases where a claimant approaches the High Court seeking the relief of obtaining only refund and those where refund is sought as a consequential relief after striking down the order of assessment, etc. While a petition praying for mere issue of a writ of mandamus to the State to refund the money alleged to have been illegally collected is not ordinarily maintainable, if the allegation is that the assessment was without a jurisdiction and the taxes collected was without authority of law and therefore the respondents had no authority to retain the money collected without any authority of law, the High Court has the power to direct refund in a writ petition. (Vide Salonah Tea Co. Ltd. v. Supdt. of Taxes.) (v) It is one thing to say that the High Court has no power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of mandamus for making refund of the money illegally collected. It is yet another thing to say that such power can be exercised sparingly depending on facts and circumstances of each case. of Taxes.) (v) It is one thing to say that the High Court has no power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of mandamus for making refund of the money illegally collected. It is yet another thing to say that such power can be exercised sparingly depending on facts and circumstances of each case. For instance, where the facts are not in dispute, where the collection of money was without the authority of law and there was no case of undue enrichment, there is no good reason to deny a relief of refund to the citizens. But even in cases where collection of cess, levy or tax is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, refund is not an automatic consequence but may be refused on several grounds depending on facts and circumstances of a given case. (Vide U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd.) (vi) Where the lis has a public law character, or involves a question arising out of public law functions on the part of the State or its authorities, access to justice by way of a public law remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution will not be denied. (Vide Sanjana M. Wig v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.) We are therefore of the view that reliance upon Suganmal was misplaced, to hold that the writ petition filed by the appellant was not maintainable.” (emphasis supplied) 8. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728 , in paragraph 69, which reads as under: “69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1 The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1 The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2 Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4 Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances.” (emphasis supplied) 9. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while dismissing “money-suit” type of writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3657 of 2015 preferred by this appellant vide order dated 8th October, 2015. We are in full agreement with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal, the same is, therefore, dismissed.