JUDGMENT : 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is preferred against the action of Collector, who had exercised the revisional powers under section 76A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act”). 2. The issue relates to the land bearing Block NO.228 of village: Jamnapad, Taluka: Chikhli, District : Valsad (hereinafter referred to as “the land in question/disputed land”). 2.1 The petitioner, according to this petition, carried out his agricultural activities on the land as a tenant from the year 1967. 2.2 It is his say that he is still in possession of the disputed land. Respondents No.1 and 3 were the original owners of the said land. Because of the financial crisis they experienced, the borrowing from Land Development bank in the year 1970 was made where the disputed land was also mortgaged. As the land owners were not in possession to repay the loan, the petitioner paid the said outstanding dues of the bank and additional agreement to sell came be executed by and between the petitioner and the original land owners. For the said land consideration fixed was at Rs.11,751/- on 15.9.1977. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that despite payment of entire amount of sale consideration, the land owners attempted forcible dispossession of the dispute land and, therefore, the petitioners filed an application under section 70B of the Act on 22.9.1997 praying inter alia that the petitioner be declared a tenant of the disputed land and he may be declared entitled under the Tenancy Act, which was registered as Tenancy Case No.70B80 of 1997. This was allowed on 21.4.1998 in favour of the petitioner. He was declared tenant of the land since 1967 and it was further held that the agreement to sell executed in the year 1977 be regularised in exercise of powers under section 84(2)(ii) of the Act. 4. Respondent No.5 carried on the inquiries as contemplated under section 84(C)(2) of the Act and regularised the agreement of sell dated 15.9.1977 by imposing penalty of Rs.201/-. 5. Respondent No.4 took suo motu cognizance of the said order dated 21.4.1998 passed by respondent No.5 and issued show cause notice as to why the order dated 21.4.1988 by respondent No.5 be not declared as illegal and be quashed. 6. 5. Respondent No.4 took suo motu cognizance of the said order dated 21.4.1998 passed by respondent No.5 and issued show cause notice as to why the order dated 21.4.1988 by respondent No.5 be not declared as illegal and be quashed. 6. The grievance on the part of the petitioner is that the said order of Mamlatdar as per the show cause notice issued was taken in revision by exercising suo motu revisional powers under section 76A of the Tenancy Act beyond the period of one year from the date of order. It is an earnest case of the petitioner that the period of limitation prescribed is of one year and Respondent No.4 has no power to exercise revisional powers beyond the period of one year under proviso to section 76A of the Tenancy Act. Resultant effect, according to the applicant, is of quashing and setting aside such order. 7. Thus, the petitioner preferred revision before the Tribunal challenging such order of Collector, which came to be dismissed by the Tribunal on 25.8.20009 and the order of respondent No.4 was confirmed. 8. The respondent filed a Regular Civil Suit being Regular Civil Suit No.40 of 2000 on 18.7.2000 seeking declaration and permanent injunction against the present petitioner and his son. He sought declaration of being the sole owner of the disputed land and permanent injunction was sought to restrain the petitioner from interfering with the possession of the private respondent over the disputed land. Application was also given for temporary injunction. However, vide order dated 21.11.2000, the Court held the petitioner to be in possession prima facie. 8.1 The respondent approached the District Court, Navsri and preferred Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 76 of 2000 and the said appeal also had been dismissed by the Court on 19.1.2001. Against the dismissal order in the revision by the Tribunal on 25.8.2009, aggrieved petitioner is before this Court with the following prayers : “8. 8.1 The respondent approached the District Court, Navsri and preferred Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 76 of 2000 and the said appeal also had been dismissed by the Court on 19.1.2001. Against the dismissal order in the revision by the Tribunal on 25.8.2009, aggrieved petitioner is before this Court with the following prayers : “8. The petitioner, therefore, prays as under : – (A) Your Lordships may be pleased to Admit and Allow this petition; (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or certiorari and/or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 25.8.2009 passed by the Gujarar Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN/BS/50/2000(Annexure-A) AND THE Order dated 8.5.2000 passed by the respondent No.4 in Tenancy Revision Case No.212 of 1999 (Annexure-B) by holding that both the orders are illegal and without jurisdiction and further be pleased to restore the order passed by the respondent No.5 dated 22.0.1007 in Tenancy Case No.70-B-80-1997 (Annexure-C); (C) Pending Admission, hearing and final disposal of the present Special Civil Application, Your Lordship may be pleased to stay the operation, implementation, and execution of the impugned order dated 25.8.2009 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.TEN/BS/50/2000 (Annexure-A) and the Order dated 8.5.2000 passed by the respondent No.4 in Tenancy Revision Case No.212 of 1000 (Annexure-B) and further be pleased to direct the parties to maintain the status quo with regard to the disputed land as mentioned in Para 2.1 of the petition, in the interest of justice; (D) Your Lordship be pleased to pas such other and further orders as may be deemed fit, just and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.” 9. The Deputy Collector for and on behalf of respondent No.4 has stated on affidavit, inter alia that the issue of limitation has not been raised before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. It is further explained that when order dated 21.4.1998 was passed by the Tribunal, the petitioner was declared as a tenant. The Deputy Collector was addressed by the Tribunal on 31.7.1998 seeking papers of Tenancy Act for the purpose of taking the same into revision. The communication of the said letter appears to have been received by the office of Collector on 21.5.1999. The Deputy Collector was addressed by the Tribunal on 31.7.1998 seeking papers of Tenancy Act for the purpose of taking the same into revision. The communication of the said letter appears to have been received by the office of Collector on 21.5.1999. On explaining the delay, what has been explained requires to be reproduced in the words of Deputy Collector as under : – “7. I say and submit that earlier, area of Navsari was under the Valsad District and thereafter new district came to be formed as Navsari and hence, the deponent is not able to find any other papers therefore, it is submitted that except the above referred communication dated 31st July, 1998, no other documents are available to answer the contention of the petitioner. However, the above referred letter dated 31st July, 1998 clearly indicates that the records and proceedings appears to be received by the office of Deputy Collector (Land reforms), Valsad and hence, considering the proviso of section 76A of the tenancy Act, the same is within the period of 1 year from the day of order passed by Mamlatdar and Agriculture Land Tribunal dated 21st April, 1998. Looking to the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as at the time of hearing of the present petition, the aforesaid petition may be dismissed.” 10. This Court on passing of order dated 22.6.2017 directed an additional affidavit to be filed by respondent No.4 explaining the procedure for the order of Mamlatdar to reach to the office of Deputy Collector and Collector as the time limit sought by law under section 76A of the Tenancy Act is held to be mandatory. 10.1 Pursuant to the order, additional affidavit came to be filed by respondent No.4 on 1.7.2017, wherein it is stated that once an order is passed by Mamlatdar and Agricultural Land Tribunal (ALT), the relevant case papers are retained by the office of Mamlatdar & ALT for the period of 60 days with a view to meet with any eventuality of the concerned party desiring to prefer appeal under section 74 of the Tanancy Act. Section 79 of the said Act prescribes limitation period of 60 days, within which the litigating party can prefer an appeal. Section 79 of the said Act prescribes limitation period of 60 days, within which the litigating party can prefer an appeal. If no appeal is preferred against such order of Mamlatdar within the period of 60 days, the papers are sent to the office of the Collector for the purpose of examination and exercise of revisional powers. The Collector would study the papers and if he comes to the conclusion that the order of Mamlatdar and ALT is erroneous, he would choose to exercise suo motu revisional powers for which, he would issue notice upon the concerned authorities. 11. Mr. Hriday Buch learned advocate for the applicant appearing for the petitioner strenuously urged that on expiry of period of one year from the date of the order, the Collector would have no authority or power under section 76A of the Tenancy Act, as revisional powers are drawn from section 76A of the Tenancy Act. This being a mandatory provision, proviso would govern the powers given under the said section. 12. On merits also, the learned advocate has urged that the owners never appeared before the Mamlatdar. Again, as the owners were facing the financial crunch, they had borrowed the money from the Land Development Bank. Their loan had been repaid by the petitioner. At no stage, the owner had challenged the decision of Mamlatdar. He agreed that the parties are litigating before the learned Civil Judge, Chikhli in Civil Suit No.40 of 2000. He urged that once Mamlatdar ordered in favour of the present petitioner, the mutation entry had been effected on 2.5.1998 and even on that day, the Collector would have come to know about the order being in favour of the petitioner. 13. He has relied on the following authorities in support of his submissions: – (1) Mangalbhai Fatehsingh Chauhan vs. Vai Naniva, 1970 GLR 163. (2) Thakorebhai Tribhovandas Rao and others vs. The State of Gujarat and others, 1995(1)J GLH 758. 14. Mr. Krutik Parikh, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.4 and 5 has strenuously urged that the delay has occurred only of three months and there was a valid and cogent reason for such delay. According to him, District: Valsad was bifurcated into District: Valsad and District: Navsari. A notification dated 2.10.1997 was issued by the Government of Gujarat bifurcating Valsad District into Valsad and Navsari districts. The order of Mamlatdar was passed on 21.4.1998. According to him, District: Valsad was bifurcated into District: Valsad and District: Navsari. A notification dated 2.10.1997 was issued by the Government of Gujarat bifurcating Valsad District into Valsad and Navsari districts. The order of Mamlatdar was passed on 21.4.1998. Thus, the same ought to have gone to the office of Collector, Navsari for having been passed in post October, 1997 period, despite that, the same was sent to Valsad district and, therefore, the same had been redirected to Collector, Navsari. He further urged that the delay is well explained in the revisional order of the Collector. Moreover, for the first time, in the year 1997 challenge had been made by the petitioner. Prior to that, the original owners were in possession of the disputed land. According to him, transfer of land of tribal to a non-tribal is hit by provisions of sections 73AA of the Tenancy Act and, therefore, it is also not desirable to interfere with the revisional order. Following are the authorities relied upon by learned Assistant Government Pleader of respondents No.4 and 5 : – “(1) COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND ANOTHER, (1987) 2 SCC 107 ; (2) COMMISSIONER OF TRADE TAX, U.P. AND ANOTHER VS. U.P. PAPER CORPORATION PVT. LTD., (2002) 9 SCC 585 ; (3) RASULMIYA REHMANMIYA VS. PATEL LALBHAI SHANKERBHAI, 1983 (1) GLR 714 ; (4) STATE OF HARYANA VS. CHANDRA MANI AND OTHERS, (1996) 3 SCC 132 ; (5) N. BALAJI VS. VIRENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS, (2004) 8 SCC 312 ;” 14.1 The petitioner herein, according to the respondents, was not aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No.5 and hence, no appeal was preferred by the petitioner and therefore, case papers were forwarded by office of respondent No.5, on 31st July, 1998 to the office of Deputy Collector, Valsad and later on 21.5.1999 to the office of Collector, Navsari of the order dated 21.4.1988. The papers were sent to the office of Collector, Valsad and then were redirected as the jurisdiction would be of Navsari Collectorate. Respondent No.5 thus was in actual possession of the papers and, therefore, the delay had occasioned at his end which had been unintended and these were the special and peculiar circumstances, which resulted into the late sending of papers. 15. This Court also had called for the original record and had perused the same closely. Respondent No.5 thus was in actual possession of the papers and, therefore, the delay had occasioned at his end which had been unintended and these were the special and peculiar circumstances, which resulted into the late sending of papers. 15. This Court also had called for the original record and had perused the same closely. The short question that arose in this petition is as to whether the powers under section 76A of the Tenancy Act can be exercised beyond the period of one year for the date of passing of the order with any special and peculiar circumstances as existed in the instant case? 16. Undisputed facts as emerged from the record revealed that the order of respondent No.5 was passed on 21.4.1998. Respondent NO.4 Navsari exercised suo motu revisional powers in exercise of powers conferred upon respondent No.4 under section 76A on 28.7.1999. Ordinarily, to exercise the suo motu revisional powers, the same would need to be on or before 21.4.1000 as the order of Mamlatdar and ALT was passed on 21.4.1998. The delay of three months has occurred in exercising the revisional powers. Therefore, the only question that needs to be addressed is as to whether such exercise is permissible under the law. 17. Referring to the decisions sought to be relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner, in the case of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh Chauhan (supra) the Division Bench of this Court was examining the scope and ambit of powers of the Collector. When he decides to suo motu under section 76A of the Tenancy Act, these are the powers exercised for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Mamlatdar and another question relates to limitation of exercising the powers of review conferred by section 76A. 18. In the matter before this Court the petitioner was a tenant of the land, but, the opponent had filed Tenancy Petition and the relief was sought of recovery of possession of land on the ground of default in payment of rent for the period of 3 years. It was held in favour of owner. This was held in favour of the owner and the authority concerned had directed to the petitioner to hand over possession of the land to the owners. The order was made on 14.5.1958. It was held in favour of owner. This was held in favour of the owner and the authority concerned had directed to the petitioner to hand over possession of the land to the owners. The order was made on 14.5.1958. The Collector, in exercise of powers under section 76A acted suo motu and called for the record and proceedings on 2.5.1959. He then directed the District Collector to review the case under section 76A and District Collector set aside the order on 15.7.1959. Such an order was set aside by the Revenue Tribunal on the ground that the record had been called for after expiry of one year from the date of order passed by Tenancy Mahalkari. Secondly, on the ground that the matter could not be reviewed under section 76A has as an appeal had been filed by the tenant against the order, relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder : – “11. To turn to the other contention of the petitioner relating to the observance of the second condition postulated by sec.76A. I tis urged that the record and proceeding in the case had in fact been called for the Collector within one year of the date of the order and not later. In the earlier part of our judgment we have mentioned certain dates which have bearing on this aspect of the case. The date relied on by the Mr. Amin is the 02.04.1959 whereas the date relied on by Mr. Shah is 22.05.1959. There is no dispute that the starting point of time is the 14.05.1958 when the Mahalkari made his order. The argument of Mr. Shah here is that the date to be regarded as crucial is 22.05.1959 the date no which the Collector forwarded the papers to the District Deputy Collector and that it is said was after the expiry of the prescribed period of one year. I tis true that the Collector forwarded the papers to the District Deputy Collector after expiry of one year from the date the order of the Mahalkari. The argument however ignores the unmistakable language of the initial words of the proviso in sec.75A. The proviso expressly speaks of the date on which the record is called for. It is that date which has not to be beyond the expiry of one year from the date of the order sought to be reviewed. The argument however ignores the unmistakable language of the initial words of the proviso in sec.75A. The proviso expressly speaks of the date on which the record is called for. It is that date which has not to be beyond the expiry of one year from the date of the order sought to be reviewed. The record in the case before us as we have already pointed out must be regarded as having been sent for before 02.04.1959 as having been sent for before 02.04.1959 since it was on that date that the Mamlatdar in fact sent the record to the Collector. It is this date which on this point of limitation in our judgment affords the terminus a quo of the whole matter. If this be the date to be regarded and we have no doubt on the point it must be held that the record had not been sent if for after the expiry of the prescribed period of the year. 12. These are matters not to be considered in any abstract manner nor should there be any doctrinaire approach in their determination. In our opinion on both the points the Tribunal has biewed the matter in a highly technical manner which is not permissible and which does not accord with the language and import of the relevant sections. The conclusions in these cases must be guided not by any over refined technicalities but having regard to the realities of the situation. The Tribunal took the view that the petitioner tenant had preferred an appeal against the order of the Mamlatdar and in that appeal he had prayed for condonation of delay. It however failed fully to appreciate that the Collector had before the date of the filing of that belated appeal already decided to act suo motu in the matter and sent for the record of the case. That if we may so describe it was the specialty of the whole situation. The Tribunal failed to appreciate that position and fell into an error when it acceded to the contention to the contrary urged on behalf of the opponent-owner. 13. Another argument urged before us by Mr.Shah is that it cannot be said that the Collector had sent for the record and proceedings of the case. It is said that there is nothing on the record to show that the Collector had purported to act u/s. 76A. 13. Another argument urged before us by Mr.Shah is that it cannot be said that the Collector had sent for the record and proceedings of the case. It is said that there is nothing on the record to show that the Collector had purported to act u/s. 76A. It is difficult for us to appreciate this contention. We wonder what reason the Collector had when he sent for the record of the case unless it was the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed by the Mamlatdar. The only view permissible to the Court to take seems to be that the Collector when he sent for the record of the case wanted to satisfy himself and if necessary take action u/s. 76A by passing such order thereon as he deemed fit. 14. Another argument sought to be argued before us by Mr. Shah is that u/s 76A the Collector had no power to transfer the matter to the District Deputy Collector and the District Deputy Collector and the District Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Mr.Shah has drawn our attention to sec.74 which relates to the power of the Collector to transfer appeals. The argument is that the Collector has been expressly authorized to transfer appeals. The argument is that the Collector has been expressly authorized to transfer an appeal pending before him by sec.74A whereas sec.76A does not confer any such power on him in the matter of review. We would have examined this contention from all its aspects but it is not necessary to this judgment by doing so since in our opinion we should not permit burden Mr. Shah to raise this wholly new contention before us at the hearing of this petition. The present contention therefore must also be negatived.” 19. This Court in the case of Thakorebhai Tribhovandas Rao and others(supra)was considering the question of limitation prescribed by the proviso to section 76A of the Tenancy Act for exercising the revisional powers beyond the expiry of 1 year from the date of order and the Court held that the proviso to section 76A would be applicable in case where reference is made by the State Government referring the Collector to call for the record and proceedings for satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The limitation prescribed by the proviso for exercising of the revisional powers beyond the expiry of one year from the date of order of the Division Bench, is clear the explicit and therefore it held that the Collector will have no revisional power to be exercised beyond the period of one year. 19.1 Relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder : – “3. Undisputedly, the orders of the Mamlatdar and A.L.T which are sought to tbe revised under section 76A were passed in the years 1971, 1972 and 1973. The petitioners have received the notice to appear before the Deputy Collector only in September 1981. The provisions of Section 76A read as under: “76A. Where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it the Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the State Government, at any time. (a) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceeding off any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case may be, and (b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit: Provided that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of such order and no order of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal shall be modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard.” It will be seen that no record can be called for the Collector after the expiry of one year from the date of the order made by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Mamlatdar or Tribunal. The proviso to Section 76A would be applicable in a case where a Reference is made by the State Government requiring the Collector to call for the record and proceedings for he purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The proviso to Section 76A would be applicable in a case where a Reference is made by the State Government requiring the Collector to call for the record and proceedings for he purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The limitation prescribed by the proviso for the exercise of the revisional powers beyond the expiry of one year from the date of the order is clear and explicit and the Collector will have no revisional power to be exercised beyond the period of one year prescribed by the proviso to Section 6A. Therefore, the only contention which was raised on behalf of the petitioners against the validity of the impugned notices belatedly seeking to take up the orders of Mamlatdar and A.L.T. Passed in 1971, 1972, 1973 for Revision under Section 76A of the Act deserves to be accepted. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents had hardly any answer to the mandatory provisions of the proviso to Section 76A prescribing the time limit during which the power could be exercised for revising the orders of the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal. This petition therefore, deserves to be allowed. The impugned notices issued by the Deputy Collector, Kheda in Tenancy Revision Nos.183 to 224 dated 491981 seeking to revise under Section 76A, the orders made by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal in 1071, 1972 and 1973 are hereby set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.” 20. In the matter before the Division Bench the inquiry under section 32G of the Act was by Mamlatdar and ALT in Tenancy Case where the order came to be passed on 30.12.1971. This is taken in revision pursuant to the reference made by the State Government. The objection was raised that no reference could be made beyond the period of one year. The orders of Mamlatdar which were sought to be revised were passed in the year 1971, 1972 and 1973. 21. The petitioners received the notice in September, 1981 after about a decade. Pursuant to the reference made by the State Government and hence this judgment. 22. The orders of Mamlatdar which were sought to be revised were passed in the year 1971, 1972 and 1973. 21. The petitioners received the notice in September, 1981 after about a decade. Pursuant to the reference made by the State Government and hence this judgment. 22. There is no reference of earlier decision of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh Chauhan (supra) in the later judgment of Thakorebhai Tribhovandas Rao and other (supra), where also, the interpretation made of the said proviso was by adopting pragmatic approach and calling for the record within one year was held sufficient compliance to the said proviso so far as issue of limitation was concerned. 23. It is quite clear from the decision of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh Chauhan (surpa) where the Court, while considering the question of one year period in relation to section 76A, had held that the record and proceedings were needed to be called for by the Collector within one year of the date of the order and not later. In that matter, as mentioned hereinabove, the record and proceedings had already been called for within one year and the Division Bench held that the proviso expressly speaks of the date on which the record is called for, that date should not be beyond the period of one year from the date of order sought to be reviewed. In the matter before the Division Bench, the record had been called for before 2.4.1959, whereas there is no dispute that the starting point of time in that case of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh Chauhan (surpa) was 14.5.1998. If that date is to be regarded, the Court held that it had no doubt on the point that the record had not been sent after expiration of the prescribed period one year. 24. Of course, in the matter before the Division Bench appeal had already been preferred against the order of Mamlatdar and in that view of the matter, the petitioner tenant had prayed for condonation of delay and the Collector had before the date of filing of that appeal belatedly had already decided to act suo motu and sent for the record of the case. Since the Collector had already called from the record of the case, according to the said decision, the only view found sustainable by the Court was that the Collector within this period of limitation of one year must call for the record to satisfy himself and, if necessary to take action under section 76A by passing such order as he deems fit. 25. The decisions, which have been relied upon by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents No.4 and 5 are concerned with condonation delay, wherein the Court in N. Balaji vs. Virendra Singh and others, (2004) 8 SCC 312 , was considering the question under the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 1984 to hold that even in absence of application for condonation of delay, the Central Registry can condone the delay without there being any obligation for condonation, if the facts emerging in the case are sufficient to satisfy himself of the reasonable cause for not referring the dispute within the period of limitation. 26. In the case of State of Gujarat and others vs. Sumitradevi Babulal Agrawal and another decided by this Court, in Letters Patent Appeal No.489 of 2017 and allied matters on 27.3.2017, has held that ecercising suo motu revisional powers after the period of one year is not permissible relying on the decision of thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao and others(supra). 27. In the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and other, (1996) 3 SCC 132 it was held by the Apex Court that under section 5 of the Limitation Act where if appeals brought by the State are lost for default, no person is individually affected but in that event, unless public interest suffers the expression “sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach, rather than technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining sufficient delay. Relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder : – “11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court-be it by private party or the State-are bared by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. When the Tat is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the state is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. I tis axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or other-wiseis a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what is the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In that event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible. The individual would always be quick in-taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. In that event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible. The individual would always be quick in-taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.” 28. Likewise, in case of Commissioner of Trade Tax vs. U.P.Paper Corporation Pvt. Ltd., (2002)9 SCC 585 , the Court held that sufficient cause to condone the delay should weigh with the Court in allowing the same. 29. The Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 held that the Court should adopt a liberal and justice oriented approach. 30. Admittedly, in the matter on hand, the petitioner claims to be a tenant of disputed land since 1967 for the loan taken by the original owners who are tribals. They were incapable of repaying, and therefore, the petitioner tenant paid the said amount and agreement to sell also was executed in the year 1977. It is his case that on 22.9.1997 when tenancy case was going on before respondent no.5 Mamlatdar and ALT, he was in possession of the property and agreement to sell also was executed in his favour. This had resulted in his favour. 31. In suo motu revision the said order dated 21.4.1998 came to be quashed on 8.5.2000. 32. Revision Application was preferred before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal where the application for stay of the impugned order also was preferred on 25.8.2009. the revision preferred by the petitioner got dismissed and the order dated 8.5.2000 was confirmed. Petitioner, in the present petition has sought, therefore, the restoration of the order dated 21.4.1998. This Court notices that in the judgment in the case of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh (supra) the Court had been categorical that the for exercise of powers under section 76A of the Act, the record and proceedings shall need to be called for within the period of one year. This Court notices that in the judgment in the case of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh (supra) the Court had been categorical that the for exercise of powers under section 76A of the Act, the record and proceedings shall need to be called for within the period of one year. It is also to be noted that in that matter, the authority concerned had called for record before the expiry of one year period. 33. Factual details of the present case are quite similar to those which are found in the case of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh (supra). 34. As can be noticed from the record Mamlatdar and ALT Navsari passed an order dated 21.4.1998 before that on 2.10.1997 the Valsad district was bifurcated into two districts, namely Valsad and Navsari. After the period of appeal was over on completion of 60 days period on 21.7.1998 the Mamlatdar and ALT addressed a latter to the DLT, Valsad for the authority concerned to exercise the powers of revision, and thereafter, the same had been sent to the office of Collector, Valsad on 21.5.1999. Thus, it was beyond the period of one year that the papers were sent to the Collector, Navsari. These are very special and exceptional circumstances which have emerged in this matter. The Mamlatdar and ALT, Navsari had passed an order, whereby the petitioner was declared a tenant. Since the bifurcation was on 2.10.1997, there was no question of Mamlatdar and ALT not being aware of this bifurcation, when he himself was Mamlatdar and ALT of Navsari. There was no real reason for him to address the communication to the District Collector, Valsad as on expiry of 60 days' appeal period the same ought to have been referred to the Collector, Navsari only. However, the papers initially sent on 31.7.1998 to the Collector, Valsad have reached the office of Collector, Navsari only on 21.5.1999. Therefore, to say, at this stage, that the authority having exercised the revisional jurisdiction beyond the period of one year, cannot find favour with this Court. Record needed to be called for by the concerned Collector within one year of the order of Mamlatdar & ALT. Therefore, to say, at this stage, that the authority having exercised the revisional jurisdiction beyond the period of one year, cannot find favour with this Court. Record needed to be called for by the concerned Collector within one year of the order of Mamlatdar & ALT. However, here the procedure has been explained in the additional affidavit made pursuant to the order of this Court dated 22.6.2007, which makes it incumbent upon the Mamlatdar and ALT to send the papers, if no appeal had been preferred within 60 days against his order. In such circumstances, how could it be held that exercise of powers beyond the period of one year would be against the provisions of law. This situation does not come often. In fact, the same is noticed exceptionally. Moreover, the circumstance cannot be looked at in isolation. The proviso prescribes for calling of record of inquiry and proceedings of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality and propriety of any order passed by and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal. The proviso provides that no such record shall be called for after expiry of one year from the date of such order and no order of Mamlatdar and Tribunal shall be modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard. 35. As is quite obvious in the judgment of Thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao and others (supra), (supra), there was a reference made by the State Government after a decade and the Court interpreted the proviso without any reference to the decision of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh Chauhan (supra). Here is a case where there has been a delay in exercising the powers by three months and that delay is on account of the fact that there was bifurcation and Mamlatdar, Navsari chose to send the papers when no appeal was preferred in 60 days period to Collector, Valsad which was a parent District. A separate district was made with effect from 2.10.1997 and there was no reason as to why he should have sent the papers to Collector, Valsad after once the district has been bifurcated. Land in question also is situated at Navsari and in such circumstances for the land of tribal, which is prohibited and impermissible under section 73AA to be transferred to non-tribal. Land in question also is situated at Navsari and in such circumstances for the land of tribal, which is prohibited and impermissible under section 73AA to be transferred to non-tribal. The Collector, if has exercised suo motu soon on receiving the papers, revision in the opinion of this Court, this exceptional circumstance shall need to weigh with this Court, by adopting justice oriented approach as it is in the larger public interest not to allow the land in question from the tribals to the non-tribals. 36. From another angel this can be looked at is that papers were sent to the Deputy Collector, Valsad, on 31.7.1998 by Mamlatdar & ALT and in ordinary circumstances, had the bifurcation not taken place, the papers had reached the office of Collector i.e. receipt of papers was within one year by the office of Collector and as also held in the case of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh (supra), calling for the record within one year could be said to be sufficient compliance. However, for all practical purposes, sending of papers at Valsad Collectorate would not work and Navsari District Collector received the same belatedly as mentioned hereinabove by three months and in these backdrop of facts also, in the opinion of this Court, petition does not deserve to be entertained against the order of revisional authority. 37. The Court is of the firm opinion that the factual matrix of the present case are more in tune with the facts of the case of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh Chauhan(supra) and not with facts of the case of Thakorebhai Tribhovandas Rao and others(supra) of the Court, in that case. 38. It is a matter of inquiry as to how the Mamlatdar and ALT could commit such a blunder of sending the papers to the Collector, Valsad and thereby allowing the time of revision to lapse. 39. It also deserves scrutiny at the end of higher official. Moreover, the procedure narrated by the officer in additional affidavit also deserves rethinking. If after appeal period is over and no appeal is preferred, the papers are sent to the Collector by Mamlatdar & ALT. No intimation/report goes to the Collector of the disposal of matters by Mamlatdar and, therefore, mischief could easily be made for the one year period to be lapsed. Even mistake is possible with the workload in absence of a full-proof system. 40. No intimation/report goes to the Collector of the disposal of matters by Mamlatdar and, therefore, mischief could easily be made for the one year period to be lapsed. Even mistake is possible with the workload in absence of a full-proof system. 40. If such an order is not corrected in powers under Article 226, this Court could do complete justice, it would also amount to giving impetus to such tendency of overreaching the process of law by adopting a hyper-technical approach, which surely is not endorsable. 41. Since the learned advocate does not have any clue with regard to the pending Civil Suit, pending before the learned Civil Judge, Chikhli, District Valsad, it would suffice to observe that none of the observations made hereinabove shall come in way of either side in final adjudication of the disputes pending before the Civil Court. The petitioner since is enjoying the possession of land from the year 1977 and has been enjoying protection of the Civil Court, the further proceedings in respect of the possession of the land in question by the Revenue authority shall be subject to the final outcome of the suit. The Court concerned shall determine all the issues that may have been agitated before it in accordance with law.