JUDGMENT : 1. The challenge in this petition is to Government Order No. 166-HME of 2018 dated 02.03.2018 passed by respondent No.2, whereby the petitioner has been transferred from District Hospital, Doda to District Hospital, Ramban. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he while serving in Government Hospital, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu was transferred and posted to CHC RS Pura vide Government Order No.405-HME of 2017 dated 03.08.2017 issued by respondent no.2 and, accordingly, he got relived and joined at his new place of posting i.e. at CHC, RS Pura. While serving at CHC, RS Pura, he again vide Govt. Order No.496-HME of 2017 dated 11.09.2017 issued by respondent No.2 was transferred and posted to District Hospital, Doda in place of private respondent. It is contended that petitioner joined at District Hospital, Doda and just he completed about four months again came to be transferred vide Government Order No.166-HME of 2018 dated 02.03.2018 issued by respondent No.2 and posted to District Hospital, Ramban. 3. The petitioner has challenged the impugned transfer order primarily on following grounds :- (i) That the petitioner has been subjected to frequent transfer by respondent No.2, which act of the official respondents is arbitrary, malafide and actuated by extraneous consideration; and (ii) That impugned transfer order has been passed with total non-application of mind when the fact remains that the petitioner has frequently been transferred from one place to another that too within a span of less than 05 months and without allowing him to complete his normal tenure of posting. 4. Mr. Sanjeev Padha, GA, enters appearance on behalf of official respondents and submits that transfer is a condition of service and respondent department, being employer, is competent to transfer petitioner taking into account the administrative exigencies and public requirements. It is insisted that petitioner’s transfer has been made to meet the administrative requirements. The transfer of petitioner and his previous transfers, according to respondents, were made on account of administrative needs and in no way are reflection on his integrity, character or neither competence nor these transfers have been effected out of any malice or with a view to cause any inconvenience to him. The transfer of petitioner and his previous transfers, according to respondents, were made on account of administrative needs and in no way are reflection on his integrity, character or neither competence nor these transfers have been effected out of any malice or with a view to cause any inconvenience to him. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that at no point of time, the petitioner challenged the first transfer, which suited to him and thus no mala fide or arbitrariness can be alleged with regard to the allegation of premature or frequent transfer. 5. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and considered the pleadings. 6. Petitioner questions order impugned on two counts: first, that petitioner has been subjected to frequent transfer, which act of official respondents is arbitrary, mala fide and pregnant with extraneous consideration; and second, that the transfer of petitioner is in violation of transfer policy as he has been transferred prematurely. 7. I have carefully bestowed my attention to the writ record so as to ascertain as to whether the petitioner has been transferred prematurely or the transfer order has been passed with malafide intentions and is actuated with extraneous consideration. 8. It is a settled position of law that an order of transfer of a government servant is no doubt justifiable, but such transfer order can be interfered with in writ jurisdiction in rarest and exceptional cases. Broadly a transfer order can be interfered with, if such order is issued by an authority, not competent to do so, or if there is violation of any statutory rule, or there is gross discrimination between the petitioner vis-à-vis similarly situated officers/employees, or if the transfer is actuated by mala fide. 9. According to the learned counsel for petitioner the impugned transfer order is violative of the transfer policy and the guidelines. So far as plea of petitioner with regard to transfer policy is concerned, the same is not sustainable for the reason that the transfer policy promulgated by the Government is an executive order having no statutory flavour, as such, cannot be enforced by way of writ of mandamus. So far as plea of petitioner with regard to transfer policy is concerned, the same is not sustainable for the reason that the transfer policy promulgated by the Government is an executive order having no statutory flavour, as such, cannot be enforced by way of writ of mandamus. Policy decisions of the Government are in the shape of executive instructions and the Government, in peculiar facts and circumstances of a case, is well within its competence to modify or change, in the interest of administration, an order unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of malafide exercise or in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer. The Courts, normally, cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine. 10. The plea of the petitioner that he was first time prematurely transferred vide order dated 03.08.2017 (Annexure-A) and thereafter was again transferred vide order dated 11.09.2017 (Annexure-B). Thus by his own saying and shown when plea of premature transfer was available to him, he did not choose to voice any grievance with regard to the same and silently accepted the same. Inference from such conduct of the petitioner that can be drawn is that said place of posting was convenient and suitable to him. Petitioner, therefore, acquiesced and accepted the said order of transfer despite the fact that he was dislodged prematurely/frequently. Now, when petitioner has once again been transferred by the impugned order, he has come forward with the plea of frequent transfer. In the present case, order impugned is not a single transfer order, but as many as 17 persons, which include the present petitioner, have been transferred and posted. In totality of the circumstances, transfer is an incident of service and the government is the best judge how to and where to utilize the services of its employees. 11. The order impugned, as is discernible from its bare perusal, is general order transferring about 17 persons, as such, cannot be called to be either mala fide or arbitrarily. It is for the employer to decide where services of a particular employee can be better utilized and the Courts cannot substitute their opinion in this regard. The impugned common order, transferring petitioner and 16 others, is passed in the interest of administration. It is for the employer to decide where services of a particular employee can be better utilized and the Courts cannot substitute their opinion in this regard. The impugned common order, transferring petitioner and 16 others, is passed in the interest of administration. Except the vague averments in the writ petition that the petitioner was transferred with extraneous consideration to adjust private respondent in place of petitioner, no specific mala fide is alleged or coming forth. It is well settled in law that while alleging mala fide, the same should be proved specifically and on the basis of vague averments of mala fide, the order of transfer should not be interfered with. In these circumstances, the plea of frequent transfer and mala fide would also not be available to the petitioner. 12. As already discussed above, the impugned transfer order is not a lone transfer order of petitioner. In fact, by the said order as many as 16 more persons have been transferred. Thus, the impugned order is an order of chain of transfers and interference in transfer of one transferee would disturb the entire chain and would also affect functioning of the department adversely. It has been repeatedly held by the Courts that transfer policy does not create an enforceable right in favour of a Government employee as it merely incorporates guidelines required to be considered while effecting transfer of a Government employee. 13. The Division Bench of this Court in Anil Kumar Prabhakar vs. State, 2014 (3) JKJ 346 (HC) has held that the transfer policy is in the nature of non-statutory administrative instructions and does not create any enforceable right. 14. In State of U.P. vs Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11 SCC 402 , the Supreme Court has held that transfer is the prerogative of the authorities concerned and the Courts should not normally interfere therewith. It would be relevant to reproduce paragraphs7 and 8 thereof hereunder: “7. It is too late in the day for any Government Servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or Rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. 8. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or Tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that Courts or Tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of competent authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer.” 15. In Union of India vs. S. L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 , it has been held as under: “7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by malafides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the Court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly, if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, the husband and the wife must be posted at the same place. The said guideline, however, does not confer upon the government employee a legally enforceable right.” 16. Further, in a series of judicial pronouncements it has been held that transfer is an incident of service and the scope of judicial review of transfer order under Article 226 is very limited. What is held by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Kashmir Singh, (2010) 13 SCC 306 is reproduced hereunder: “14. In our opinion, the High Court has taken a totally impractical view of the matter. If the view of the High Court is to prevail, great difficulties will be created for the State administration since it will not be able to transfer/deploy its police force from one place where there may be relative peace to another district or region/range in the State where there may be disturbed law and order situation and hence requirement of more police. Courts should not, in our opinion, interfere with purely administrative matters except where absolutely necessary on account of violation of any fundamental or other legal right of the citizen. After all, the State administration cannot function with its hands tied by judiciary behind its back. As Justice Holmes of the US Supreme Court pointed out, there must be some free-play of the joints provided to the executive authorities.” 17. As regards the contention of petitioner that he has been transferred prematurely, it can be safely held that transfer order cannot be termed as premature, because even under the transfer policy, the Government is empowered to pass a premature transfer order depending upon the exigency of service. As regards the contention of petitioner that he has been transferred prematurely, it can be safely held that transfer order cannot be termed as premature, because even under the transfer policy, the Government is empowered to pass a premature transfer order depending upon the exigency of service. The Government, being employer, is the master to transfer its employees as per the administrative exigency and depending upon the need of service of efficient employees required at a particular place. Such discretion of the Government cannot be interfered with without any proper and substantial reasons. 18. It is well settled in law that executive instructions and government orders are subject to Statutory Rules and the Legislature, which frames the Rules, cannot delegate its power to the authorized officer or executive and the executive can issue government orders only within the bounds of the Rules. The Full Bench of this Court in Syed Hilal Ahmad & ors. vs. State of J&K & ors reported in SLJ 2015 (I) 01, has held that a government servant has no enforceable right to insist that he/she shall be permitted to serve for definite/specific period in a particular station or a post. 19. Apart from the above, it is very sad state of affairs that petitioner, like persons are trying to elude the responsibilities that is cast upon them the moment they join the government service. It cannot be said that it is unknown that today’s youth, particularly in J&K State, which has limited resources, are facing alarming unemployment and they are ready to serve and work not only in any part of the Country but overseas as well. Such unemployed youth leave their families here and work 1000-2000 kilometres away from their families, whether their families are through thick and thin. Then how come, petitioner, like persons/employees, be permitted to make lame excuses in not working or serving the State and its people even at a distance of, say, 50 or 100 kilometres, within or outside the District. Such practice should be deprecated with iron hand. My view is also fortified by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in E.P.Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1974 SC 555 . 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment passed by the Supreme Court in case titled B. Varadha Rao Vs. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1986 SC 1955 . My view is also fortified by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in E.P.Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1974 SC 555 . 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment passed by the Supreme Court in case titled B. Varadha Rao Vs. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1986 SC 1955 . In the said judgment, allegation levelled was that transfer order was issued contrary to the policy with a view to accommodate one Dr. R.P.Patil because of the political influence he wielded. However, in the present case, no such allegation can be levelled against the private respondent because it is not only two persons, viz. petitioner and private respondent, who have been transferred but 36 persons, besides them, have also been transferred from their respective present places and posted to difference places. 21. That being the situation and in view of the above discussion, order impugned, on being examined, does not appear to be suffering from any colourable exercise of power, or is made on the ground of violation of any statutory rules/regulations or transfer policy or is based on malafide, nor do I find that the order on the face of it appears to be stigmatic or in the nature of a punitive order. The petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference in the impugned order. Consequently, I do not find any merit in the writ petition. The same is, accordingly, dismissed along with connected MP(s).