JUDGMENT Hon’ble Attau Rahman Masoodi, J.—When the case was taken up on 31.5.2018, learned counsel for opposite party No. 2 reiterated the same objection as was raised by him on an earlier date i.e. 6.4.2018 when the following order came to be passed: “Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner has filed this writ petition for quashing of the order dated 12.1.2018 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ambedkar Nagar, whereby the revision filed by Shyam Narain was dismissed but the revision filed by the opposite party No. 2, was allowed. The learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been submitted that the order sought to be quashed is a judicial order and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, 2015 (5) SCC 423 , the writ petition under Article 226 against judicial order of Civil Court is not maintainable. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Suraj Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2016 (34) LCD 1860 , has held that though the judgment of Radhey Shyam is in respect of Civil Court but the same will equally applied to revenue Court also. In view of the above, the petitioner is directed to satisfy the Court as to how in view of the aforesaid legal position, the writ petition for quashing of the judicial order under Article 226, is maintainable. List this petition for hearing on admission on 18th April, 2018.” 2. In order to repel the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for opposite party No. 2, Sri I.D. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance upon a catena of judgements to make out a distinction between the revenue/consolidation Courts and Civil Courts and thus, it is argued that the revenue/consolidation Courts not being strictly the Civil Courts in essence, would thus, not be covered under the judgements mentioned in the order on the basis of which a preliminary objection has been raised. 3. The judgement cited by Sri I.D. Shukla may be mentioned as under: 4. 3. The judgement cited by Sri I.D. Shukla may be mentioned as under: 4. This Court does not find it proper to venture into the distinction between the Civil Courts and revenue/consolidation Courts for the simple reason that the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) under Section 5 by itself defines the revenue Courts being different from that of the Civil Courts under the CPC and for ready reference Section 5 (2) of CPC may be extracted as under: “5. Application of the Code to Revenue Courts.— (1)................ (2) “Revenue Court” in sub-section (1) means a Court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or other proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes, but does not include a Civil Court having original jurisdiction under this Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature.” 5. Section 40 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 provides as under: “40. Proceedings before Settlement Officer Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer to be judicial proceedings.—A proceeding before a Director of Consolidation, Deputy Director, Consolidation, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of Section 197 of the Indian Penal Code. 6. Even if the revenue Courts stand distinctly defined under the CPC but essentially the discharge of judicial function by the revenue/consolidation Courts by and large have trappings of the Civil Courts and it is for this reason that a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Suraj Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2016 (34) LCD 1860 , in paragraph-5 has observed as under: “5. At this stage, it may be mentioned that all the orders impugned in this writ petition have been passed by Revenue Courts and hence writ petition under Article 226 would not lie in view of three Judges decision of Apex Court in Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, 2015 (5) SCC 423 , wherein Court has held that against judicial orders of Civil Courts, writ petition under Article 226 would not lie. Though it is a judgment in respect to Civil Courts, but the reasons assigned therein will apply equally to revenue Courts also.” 7. Though it is a judgment in respect to Civil Courts, but the reasons assigned therein will apply equally to revenue Courts also.” 7. The distinction between the two jurisdictions under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has elaborately been dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, 2015 (5) SCC 423 and it is needless to embark on the issue any further. 8. The nature of disputes before the revenue/consolidation Courts are also by and large between the private parties, except for certain categories of disputes which involve a direct conflict of interest or rights between a private person and the State. There is no reason to differ from the proposition of law, as has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) wherever the disputes are between two private parties but the aid of Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be permissible read with Article 227 where conflict of rights/interest is between private parties and the State which is not a case at hand, therefore, without entering into any exhaustive consideration on the aspect that the principles embodied in the verdict of Radhey Shyam (supra) may or may not be applicable to the revenue/consolidation Courts, this Court would concur with the observation made by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Suraj Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) and for that matter, the present petition can very well be entertained under Article 227 of the Constitution of India so as to set the dispute between the parties at rest. 9. In view of above, the petition is therefore, entertained to have been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and it is ordered accordingly. 10. On the aspect of merit, this Court on a close scrutiny of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation would find that the said authority has equitably adjusted the claims of co-tenure holders after due application of mind and for this purpose, an elaborate discussion essential for the consideration of rival claims has been gone into. 10. On the aspect of merit, this Court on a close scrutiny of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation would find that the said authority has equitably adjusted the claims of co-tenure holders after due application of mind and for this purpose, an elaborate discussion essential for the consideration of rival claims has been gone into. The equitable consideration on the basis of which the Deputy Director of Consolidation has founded his decision does not suffer from any error calling for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for the reason that the opposite party No. 2 has been accommodated by allotting a chak in close proximity of his residence whereas other cotenure holder belonging to the same family whose residence is distantly situated has been accommodated on other part of the original holdings, therefore, parties have been allotted chaks in a just manner. There is no dispute on the aspect of chak road or irrigational source being deficient or any dispute as far as the area is concerned. 11. Since the decision taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation does not suffer from any legal infirmity or perversity, therefore, no fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the present matter pending and hence the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby affirmed and the petition being bereft of any merit, is hereby dismissed.