JUDGMENT Hon’ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.—Heard Sri Anupam Kulshreshta, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents. 2. Present petition has been filed for setting aside the order dated 10.11.2017 passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Agra in Misc. Appeal No. 24 of 2009 as well as order dated 8.9.2008 passed by the Prescribed Authority in Case No. 31 of 1994. 3. By the impugned order dated 8.9.2008 passed by the P1-8rescribed Authority the petitioner was held to be unauthorized occupant of the land described in Case No. 31 of 1994 (State of 1-8U.P. v. Buddhu Miya) filed by the State under Section 4/5/7 of the U.P. Public Premiss (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1972). The appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act was dismissed by the lower appellate Court. Hence present petition has been filed challenging the same. 4. Present petition is arising out of the proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Section 4/5/7 of the Act of 1972. Name of the State has been recorded in khatauni of the year 1400 fasli as banzar on plot No. 131/1 area 1.271 hectares. Proceedings under the aforesaid provisions were initiated against one Buddhu Miya s/o Banne, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, on the ground that he is unauthorized occupant of an area measuring 719 sq. mts. for the period of last 5 years and thereby a damage of Rs. 1,61,765/- was also claimed. A notice was issued to the petitioner on 9.8.1994, which was replied by the petitioner after three years vide reply dated 6.1.1997 claiming the land is a private property of the defendant and that the defendant was living over the property in question after construction of house for last about 40 years and that the Collector is not managing the property on behalf of the State and for last 40 years no interference was ever cause by the State. It was further claimed that the Act of 1972 is not applicable in the present case. Lekhpal had appeared as witness on behalf of the State. In the shape of documentary evidence khatauni and khasra were filed to disclose that the property belongs to the government and was recorded in the name of State as banzar. It was further claimed that the Act of 1972 is not applicable in the present case. Lekhpal had appeared as witness on behalf of the State. In the shape of documentary evidence khatauni and khasra were filed to disclose that the property belongs to the government and was recorded in the name of State as banzar. The defendant Buddhu Miya did not lead any evidence although, undisputedly, he was given full opportunity of hearing by the Prescribed Authority. The only document filed by the defendant in support of his case was a decision dated 15.7.1982 passed in Case No. 166 of 1977 (Buddhu Miya and others v. Santosh Kumar Jain and others) and notice issued by Nagar Palika Fatehpur Sikri, Agra to Buddhu Miya regarding House No. 56/1 Shahkuli dated 23.10.1986 and a copy of the license dated 1.4.1989 and one certificate issued by CMO dated 1.4.1988. It was pleaded before the Prescribed Authority that the notice was invalid. Case No. 31 of 1994 filed by the State was allowed. 5. The appeal was filed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Act of 1972 against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 8.9.2008 on the ground that notice under Section 4 of the Act of 1972 was not served by giving full particulars of the disputed property; the disputed property is not a public property or premises and as such proceedings under the Act of 1972 were not maintainable; the defendants has filed sufficient documentary evidence to show his title and possession over the disputed property much prior to 1977 but the Court below did not pay any attention to the same; the State has failed to prove unauthorized possession of the defendants over the property in question and that the property in question is governed by the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 or the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Z.A. Act, 1950). The appeal was dismissing on the ground that the notice was replied by the defendant after three years and he has participated in the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority and has even, cross-examined the State witnesses and as such the notice under Section 4 of the Act of 1972 is sufficiently served and purpose of notice is fulfilled. The appeal was dismissing on the ground that the notice was replied by the defendant after three years and he has participated in the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority and has even, cross-examined the State witnesses and as such the notice under Section 4 of the Act of 1972 is sufficiently served and purpose of notice is fulfilled. It was found that the documentary evidence, in the shape of map paper No. 3Ba/1, 3Ba/2 and 3Ba/3, clearly indicates that the State is the recorded owner of the land and it is a cultivable banzar land. The boundaries of the plot measuring 719 sq. mts. by showing masjid in east, bus stand in west, block road in north and abadi in south has been properly described in the notice. Although, in reply to the notice Buddhu Miya had claimed that he is in possession over the property for last about 40 years with his father and he himself is living with his family on the property for last 25 years, however, it was found that even if the documents filed by the defendant is taken to be true they do not indicate the ownership of the defendant and it is only being claimed that it is his private property but there is no cogent evidence in favour of the defendant and it was further found that the documents that have been submitted by the defendant are in regard to the grave yard and that even if it is assumed that the bald statement made by the defendant that he is in possession from the year 1977 or that he is in possession with his father for last 40 years, after coming into force of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, 1950, still, since 1956 the defendant shall be treated to be an unauthorized occupant, as such, the appeal was dismissed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Act of 1972 does not apply in the present case as the provisions of Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 would apply in the present case and as such proceedings initiated under the Act of 1972 are not maintainable. He further submitted that the notice is bad inasmuch as no description, as required under Section 4 of the Act of 1972 and the rules framed thereunder, has been given. He further submitted that the notice is bad inasmuch as no description, as required under Section 4 of the Act of 1972 and the rules framed thereunder, has been given. The notice is in regard to Santosh Nagar, whereas the eviction order has been passed on the property No. 131/1 situated in arazi Imlak but this fact has not been considered by the Courts below. Elaborating the arguments it was submitted that the arazi Imlak is recorded in the revenue record and is governed by U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, therefore, all the proceedings, if any, against the petitioners could have been taken only under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and thus, the provisions of Act of 1972 are not applicable and the entire proceedings undertaken under the aforesaid Act are bad in law and thus, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. He further submitted that the property is not a public premises within the meaning of the Act of 1972. In support of his arguments he has placed reliance on judgments in the cases of Secretary of State and another v. Farid Uddin and others, AIR 1937 All 622; Baldeo Raj v. State of U.P., 1984 AWC 568 ; Hindoo Pat and another v. District Judge, Hamirpur and others, 1995 ARC 52 and Bikarama v. 4th Additional District Judge, Varanasi, 1984 ARC 241 to contend that the provisions of the Act of 1972 would not apply in the present case. Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken me through various provisions of the Act of 1972 and of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 in support of his arguments. 7. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel has supported the impugned order and submitted that there is no confusion about the identity of the property regarding which the notice was given; the petitioner has replied to the notice after three years and did not lead any evidence in support of his argument; he did not come forward for recording his statement; and that the property is recorded in revenue record in the name of State, which is being managed by the Collector on behalf of the State therefore, no interference is warranted in the impugned orders. 8. I have considered the rival submissions and have perused the record. 9. 8. I have considered the rival submissions and have perused the record. 9. At the very outset, it may be noticed that no document whatsoever regarding exclusive ownership of the property in question that it is private property owned by the defendant was given before the Prescribed Authority. It is not in dispute that Plot No. 131/1 is a huge piece of land measuring 1.271 hectares out of which the defendant is in unauthorized possession over 719 sq. mts. It is also not in dispute that the property was clearly described by showing the boundaries as to how the disputed property was bound and abutted. Khatauni 3Ba/2 1400 fasli and khasra 1401 fasli clearly indicates that the land was recorded in the name of State as banzar. Though certain discrepancies were noticed by the appellate Court in the statement of Lekhpal Hari Om, the witness of the State, however, to dislodge documentary evidence nothing could be placed on record by the defendant to disprove the ownership of the State. Even in appeal it was claimed that the petitioner is in possession since 1977. Buddhu Miya is claiming possession alongwith his father for last 40 years. There was no documentary evidence to indicate that the defendant was in possession of the property for such a long period. The defendant has admittedly participated in the proceedings and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the lower appellate Court has rightly held that the requirement of notice given under Section 4 of the Act of 1972 was fulfilled. A reference may also be made in this regard to judgment of this Court in Smt. Munesh and others v. Deepa Rani and another, 2018 (2) ARC 277, wherein the notice given under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was challenged on the ground that the identity of the shop was not properly disclosed, while observing that there was only one shop rented out to the petitioner and he had contested the proceedings, therefore, there was no confusion about the identity of the property in dispute, rejected the argument. Same analogy would apply in this case also as while defending his case defendant took three years to reply notice and claimed possession over the property in question as his own property and also participated in the proceedings. 10. Same analogy would apply in this case also as while defending his case defendant took three years to reply notice and claimed possession over the property in question as his own property and also participated in the proceedings. 10. Before the lower appellate Court a ground was taken that the property in question is governed by either U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 or U.P. Z.A. Act, 1950, thus, no categorical basis to assert non-applicability of the Act of 1972 was taken before the Court below. Further, before the Court below attempt was made to show applicability of U.P. Z.A. Act, 1950 only on the property in question. However, before this Court learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the provisions of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 would be applicable in the present case and the provisions of the Act of 1972 would not be applicable. 11. Insofar as the abovenoted argument is concerned, it may be noticed that the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 is a general law and after coming into force of the Act of 1972, which has received the assent of the President on 28.4.1972 and published in the government extraordinary gazette on 1.5.1972, the same would prevail over the general law as already settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Thus, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of the Act of 1972 would not be applicable in the present case is misconceived and is hereby rejected. 12. In this regard a reference may be made to various judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court. In the case of Band Box Private Limited v. State Officer, Punjab and Sindh Bank and others, (2014) 16 SCC 321 , while dealing with the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 it was held that the aforesaid provision would not be applicable where a person is in possession of the premises prior to enforcement of the Act of 1972 w.e.f. 16.9.1958. 13. In Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and its State Officers, (2014) 4 SCC 657 dealing with the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 it was held that the Act has no retrospective effect, however, it will prevail over the Rent Control Act after 16.9.1958. 14. 13. In Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and its State Officers, (2014) 4 SCC 657 dealing with the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 it was held that the Act has no retrospective effect, however, it will prevail over the Rent Control Act after 16.9.1958. 14. In Ashoka Marketing Limited and others v. Punjab National Bank and others, (1990) 4 SCC 406 and Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, (1980) 4 SCC 435 the Hon’ble Apex Court whiling dealing with the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 and the Delhi Rent Control Act clearly held that the Special Act will apply and subsequent Act will override the provisions of earlier Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court had taken into account the provisions of Article 246 (4) Schedule 7 List III Entry 6, 7, 13, 32 and 46 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid Act clearly lays down that after coming into force of Special Act particularly which has come into existence subsequently, the Special Act and the subsequent Act would cover the field. 15. In the present case also the U.P. Tenancy Act is of the year 1939, whereas the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 was published in extraordinary gazette on 1.5.1972. This Act has received the assent of the President on 28.4.1972. In the present case the defendant (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein) has failed to place on record any evidence regarding his exclusive ownership, although, in reply to the notice his categorical case was that it is his own private property. He even could not produce any evidence that he was put into possession pursuant to any order, allotment etc. whatsoever, ever issued in his favour by the State authorities. He has also failed to establish his possession over the property in question prior to commencement of the Act. 16. Under such circumstances, I find that the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are clearly not applicable in the present case. 17. In such view of the matter, I do not find any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the orders impugned herein so as to attract exercise of powers by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 18. Present petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.