JUDGMENT Hon’ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.—Heard Sri C.B. Yadav, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri B.S. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 2. Present petition has been filed for setting aside the order dated 23.4.2008 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Allahabad in Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 and the order dated 30.4.2018 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 14, Allahabad in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 66 of 2018 in re Praveen Kumar Sharma v. Allahabad Development Authority and another. 3. By the impugned order dated 23.4.2008, the interim injunction application filed by the plaintiff in Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 was rejected on the ground that in earlier Original Suit No. 711 of 2003 the interim injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff and from perusal of the judgement and order of this Court as well as of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that the directions have been issued with regard to the award of thekas of public footpath etc. and since the earlier injunction was granted by the trial Court in the previous suit, there is no reason to grant the same relief in the present case. It was further noted in the impugned order that in the present suit the question of breach of contract is involved for which suitable compensation can be awarded to the petitioner. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the lower appellate Court after considering the entire material on record as well as the provisions of Sections 38, 39, 40 and 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and it was found that the petitioner is not entitled for interim injunction. It was further noticed that in the suit itself the claim of the plaintiff is that the contract was effective till 26.10.2014 and therefore, now no relief can be granted. It was further noted that the allegation that the contract was extended vide amended theka/agreement dated 11.4.2003 uptill 26.10.2024 is not admitted to the defendants and therefore, no prima facie case has been made out. The balance of convenience is not in favour of the plaintiff and since for breach of contract plaintiff can be suitably compensated, therefore, there is no irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 4. The balance of convenience is not in favour of the plaintiff and since for breach of contract plaintiff can be suitably compensated, therefore, there is no irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 4. From the record, it appears that the petitioner was granted cycle stand theka in the entire premises of Indira Bhawan and syndicate bank including Chandrashekhar Azad market and lower basement of Indra Bhawan for a period of 15 years from 27.10.1999 to 26.10.2014 vide agreement dated 30.6.2001. The petitioner appears to have filed one Original Suit No. 711 of 2003 wherein ex-part interim injunction was granted vide order dated 30.1.2004 in his favour. Subsequently, it appears that there had been some public interest litigation before this Court, which was carried upto the Hon’ble Apex Court in respect of cycle stand and undisputedly, this Court declared the interim injunction granted by the Court below non-est in the public interest litigation being Public Interest Litigation No. 2547 of 2005 (Anand Mohan v. Union of India and others). The aforesaid order was challenged before the Apex Court by the petitioner wherein no interference was made and it was specifically observed that leaving it open to pursue the remedy would not mean that favourble observation has been made in favour of the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner filed Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 (Praveen Kumar Sharma v. Allahabad Development Authority through its Vice Chairman, Indira Bhawan, Civil Lines, Allahabad) wherein it was categorically stated that the contract started from 27.10.1999 and will come to an end on 26.10.2014 and a decree of permanent injunction was made in respect of the aforesaid period. The impugned orders were passed in the aforesaid Original Suit No. 33 of 2008. 5. Submissions of Sri C.B. Yadav, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that theka was awarded in favour of the petitioner being highest bidder and agreement dated 30.6.2001 was granted in his favour for a period of 15 years upto 26.10.2014 in the entire premises of Indira Bhawan and syndicate bank including Chandra Shekhar Azad market and lower basement of Indira Bhawan. It is when the officials of Allahabad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ADA’) failed to pay parking fee for a long period, the petitioner filed Writ-C No. 22561 of 2003, which was disposed of on 22.5.2003 directing the ADA to decide the representation of the petitioner. It is when the officials of Allahabad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ADA’) failed to pay parking fee for a long period, the petitioner filed Writ-C No. 22561 of 2003, which was disposed of on 22.5.2003 directing the ADA to decide the representation of the petitioner. On being annoyed, vide order dated 25.11.2003 the petitioner was directed to close the cycle stand within a week. In view of the aforesaid, he filed Original Suit No. 711 of 2003 wherein interim injunction was granted. Submission is that the injunction still remain good and the said suit is pending. It was further submitted that during the course of hearing of Public Interest Litigation No. 2547 of 2005 filed against the encroachment in city, this Court without any notice directed to remove the cycle stand from the road side and public path. The tekanama was taken in custody and was got verified by this Court and found to be in order. It was further directed by this Court in Special Appeal that agreement may not be given effect to, against which Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. (s) 17411 of 2006 was filed by the petitioner before the Apex Court, which was disposed of directing the petitioner to seek appropriate remedy by way of filing clarification application before this Court. The clarification application No. 59868 of 2007 in the aforesaid PIL was disposed of vide order dated 9.3.2007 with the observation that if the petitioner has any right in law or otherwise on the basis of contract of vehicle stand, the same may be pursued in independent proceedings irrespective of the orders passed in the writ petition. In a separate Writ-C No. 31074 of 2017 while disposing of clarification application No. 79925 of 2007 it was observed that contract will not be effected by the order passed in PIL. Submission, therefore, is that subsequent suit No. 33 of 2008 was maintainable and the petitioner was entitled for interim injunction. Regarding amended agreement dated 30.6.2001 (as allegedly amended on 11.4.2003), it was submitted that since the period for running the stand was interrupted due to observation of this Court in PIL, the period was extended by the competent authority. Submission, therefore, is that subsequent suit No. 33 of 2008 was maintainable and the petitioner was entitled for interim injunction. Regarding amended agreement dated 30.6.2001 (as allegedly amended on 11.4.2003), it was submitted that since the period for running the stand was interrupted due to observation of this Court in PIL, the period was extended by the competent authority. Submission is that although this amended agreement was supplied to the learned counsel for the plaintiff (petitioner herein), however, the same was not included by him in the Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 for the reasons best known for him for which the petitioner cannot be made to suffer. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the appeal before the Court below, the petitioner had been permitted to deposit the amount and in pursuance whereof in the year 2015 the petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs. 3,50,000/- and has further deposited a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- in the year 2018. Submission, therefore, is that since the petitioner has deposited the amount, therefore, he is entitled to run the theka and interim injunction is liable to be granted in his favour. Regarding the amended agreement, it was further submitted that during the pendency of appeal, amendment application under Order 6 Rule 17 was filed by the petitioner for amendment of the plaint. The same was rejected by the appellate Court on 6.9.2017, against which Matter under Article 227 No. 6209 of 2017 was filed, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 8.3.2018 and the memo of appeal was permitted to be amended. He further submits that in the light of the observation made by this Court in the aforesaid petition, an amendment application seeking amendment in the suit has also been filed before the trial Court. Submission is that in the aforesaid factual background of the case, right to run the cycle stand continue upto the year 2024 and the petitioner is entitled for interim injunction for the purpose of cycle stand. 6. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgements of this Court rendered in Chunni and another v. Sullahar and anohter, AIR 1972 Alld 418 and Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in M/s Gujarat Bottling Co. 6. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgements of this Court rendered in Chunni and another v. Sullahar and anohter, AIR 1972 Alld 418 and Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in M/s Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and other v. Coca Cola Company and others, AIR 1995 SC 2372 and in The Branch Manager, Magma Leasing and Finance Limited and another v. Potluri Madhavilata and another, (2009) 10 SCC 103 . 7. Per contra, Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the ADA submitted that the suit being Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 filed for enforcement of a contract is not maintainable in view of provisions of Sections 14(1)(c), 38(2) and 41(e) of the Act; in the earlier suit being Original Suit No. 711 of 2003 filed for enforcement of alleged contract dated 30.6.2001 effective from 27.10.1999 till 26.10.2014 a temporary injunction was granted in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 30.1.2004 and as such, subsequent suit being Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 is barred by principles of res judicata and decree of perpetual injunction cannot be granted for breach of contract, which is determinable and the person aggrieved can only file a suit for damages for such alleged breach of contract. Submission is that the Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 itself was not maintainable and therefore, while rejecting the temporary injunction application the trial Court was justified in holding that the plaintiff could have filed a suit for damages for alleged breach of contract. It is further submitted that the lower appellate Court has also rightly observed that in view of the above noted provisions of the Act as well as Order 39 Rule 2(2) CPC where no perpetual injunction could be granted, the temporary injunction application has been rightly rejected. It was further submitted that the alleged contract granted in favour of the petitioner was determined by the order of the Vice Chairman, ADA dated 19.5.2006. It was next submitted that the contract, which had to expire on 26.10.2014, was allegedly extended by a further period of 10 years by agreement dated 11.4.2003, is neither here nor there as the aforesaid document is a forged document. It was next submitted that the contract, which had to expire on 26.10.2014, was allegedly extended by a further period of 10 years by agreement dated 11.4.2003, is neither here nor there as the aforesaid document is a forged document. It was further submitted that this document was never disclosed while filing Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 and existence of the aforesaid document was asserted for the first time before the lower appellate Court after 26.10.2014 and was never disclosed in any of the litigation filed before this Court, which clearly indicates that the aforesaid document is a forged document. It was next submitted that the petitioner is misinterpreting the order of this Court dated 24.7.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 31074 of 2006 (annexure 10 to the writ petition) as the aforesaid order completely restrained the ADA on executing any contract for carrying on or maintaining vehicle stand in and around Indira Bhawan basement and its premises, which was upheld by Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP (Civil) No. 17411 of 2006 vide its order dated 27.11.2006. It was further submitted that no temporary injunction can be granted in favour of the petitioner, which is sought to be enforced through Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 and the suit itself has become infructuous. It was lastly submitted that by depositing money with the respondent authority as lease rent without any order of the competent authority would not validate or extend the period of the alleged agreement, nor does it create any right in favour of the petitioner and as such, the orders impugned herein do not require any interference. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the judgements of this Court rendered in the cases of State of U.P. v. Tara Singh Jaiswal, AIR 2013 ALD 35 and in Triveni Structurals Ltd. v. Newage Enterprises, Allahabad, AIR 1993 ALD 78. 8. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 9. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of certain observations/findings recorded at various pages of the paper book. The same are being quote as under : 10. Relevant extract of the order dated 24.7.2006 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. 8. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 9. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of certain observations/findings recorded at various pages of the paper book. The same are being quote as under : 10. Relevant extract of the order dated 24.7.2006 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 31074 of 2006 (Praveen Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P. and others): “Taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case hereby issued ad interim mandamus directing A.D.A. Not to accept theka or money or execute contract agreement for the purpose of Vehicle stand and in case they have accepted the money same may be refunded if persons who have deposited the same, request for its refund within two weeks of request being made. We further direct that in case agreement had been executed the same shall not be given effect of. All persons are hereby restrained from carrying on or maintaining Vehicle stand in and around Indira Bhawan Basement and its premises without obtaining prior permission of this Court and maintain status quo ante.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Relevant extract of the order dated 27.11.2006 passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP (Civil) No. 17411 of 2006 (Praveen Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P. and others): “Learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that there is an agreement in favour of the Petitioner to operate a vehicle stand in Indira Bhawan and on account of the impugned order dated 24.7.2006 the Petitioner is not being allowed to operate the same. We are unable to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. The order passed in Civil Miscellaneous Letter (PIL) Writ Petition No. 2547 of 2005 on 31.7.2006 specifically directs the ADA to restore the basement parking in Indira Bhawan. In this view of the matter we do not think that the grievance made by the Petitioner has any substance. Learned counsel has submitted that two orders are creating problem for the ADA and it is not allowing the Petitioner to operate the cycle stand. In our opinion, the appropriate remedy for the Petitioner is to approach the High Court and seek clarification in this regard. We make it clear that neither we have adjudicated upon nor we are expressing any opinion regarding the right of the Petitioner to operate the cycle stand. In our opinion, the appropriate remedy for the Petitioner is to approach the High Court and seek clarification in this regard. We make it clear that neither we have adjudicated upon nor we are expressing any opinion regarding the right of the Petitioner to operate the cycle stand. Subject to the above observations, the special leave petition is dismissed.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. Relevant extract of paragraph 1 as well as prayer ‘A’ of plaint of Original Suit No. 33 of 2008: “Paragraph 1. That the Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad entered into the contract with the plaintiff for 15 years for providing Cycle/Scooter/Car Stand on 30.6.2001. The said contract is valid up to 26th October, 2014. The contract was started from 27.10.99 and it will come to an end on 26.10.2014. The contract of the plaintiff for running the Cycle/Scooter/Car stand is valid up to 26.10.2014 as per contract between plaintiff and the defendants.” “Prayer A. That by a decree for a permanent injunction the defendants may be restrained from interfering in any manner in the functioning of the plaintiff in Theka dt. 27.10.1999 effective up to 26.10.2014 on the basis of the letter dt. 14.12.2007. The defendants may also be restrained from creating any sort of new contract (theka) for Cycle/Scooter/Car Stand in the premises including lower basement parking of the Indira Bhawan, Civil Lines, Allahabad.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Relevant extract of the order dated 8.5.2006 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Letter (PIL) Writ Petition No. 2547 of 2005 (Anand Mohan v. The Union of India and others): “We are orally informed that some body illegally holding Theka though their theka has expired. We are informed that some civil suit has been filed and stay order obtained by unauthorized Thekadar. Be that as it may, taking into account the welfare of the public at large, any order passed by any Court subordinate to this Court with regard to Parking of vehicles in Indra Bhawan premises against Rules and Regulations shall be treated nonest but subject to order of this Court or Apex Court. Aggrieved person may be asked to approach this Court. We are convinced such interim order is obtained with the collusion from beneficiaries and officers of the ADA. Aggrieved person may be asked to approach this Court. We are convinced such interim order is obtained with the collusion from beneficiaries and officers of the ADA. We direct any interim order obtained from Civil Court with regard to the structure which is on road side land, road patri or public path, shall be removed by ADA/Police Department.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. Relevant extract of the order dated 8.3.2018 passed by this Court in Matters under Article 227 No. 6209 of 2017 (Praveen Kumar Sharma v. Allahabad Development Authority and another): “On query made by the Court as to how the appellate Court in a Misc. Appeal arising out of order of temporary injunction could permit amendment in the plaint, learned counsel for the petitioner very fairly agreed that the appellate Court does not have any such power and application in that regard is to be filed before the trial Court. He accordingly also very fairly stated that there is no substance in the application filed by the petitioner paper No. 175-C leading to passing of order dated 18.9.2017. In view of said statement made by learned counsel for the petitioner, the controversy in the instant petition gets confined to adjudging the validity of the order dated 6.9.2017, whereby the appellate Court has refused to permit amendment in the memo of appeal. ............. Before parting, it is clarified that in case any application for amendment of the plaint is filed by the petitioner in same terms before the trial Court, it shall be decided having regard to the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, without being influenced by the present order which, as noted above, only deals with a matter relating to amendment in the memo of appeal. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.” 15. From perusal of the aforesaid extract, it is very much clear that the interim injunction granted in favour of the petitioner in Original Suit No. 711 of 2003 was declared as non-est by this Court vide its order 8.5.2006 passed in Civil Misc. Letter (PIL) Writ Petition No. 2547 of 2005 as noted above. vide order dated 24.7.2006 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Letter (PIL) Writ Petition No. 2547 of 2005 as noted above. vide order dated 24.7.2006 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 31074 of 2006 as noted above, the ADA was directed not to accept theka or money or execute contract agreement for the purpose of vehicle stand and in case any money is deposited, the same may be refunded and specific direction was issued restraining all persons (of course, including petitioner) from carrying on or maintaining vehicle stand in and around Indira Bhawan basement and its premises without obtaining prior permission of this Court and maintain status quo ante. Against the same, SLP filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Hon’ble Apex Court with an observation that the petitioner shall approach the High Court and seek clarification in this regard and it was made clear that Hon’ble Apex Court has neither adjudicated upon nor expressed any opinion regarding the right of the petitioner to operate the cycle stand. Subsequently, Misc. Application No. 59868 of 2007 was dismissed by this Court on 9.3.2007 with the observation that in case the applicant has any right in law or otherwise on the basis of contract between him and Local Body, the same may be pursued in independent proceedings irrespective of the orders passed by this Court. In the suit filed by the petitioner in the year 2008, in paragraph 1 as well as in prayer A, it was categorically mentioned that the theka is effective from 27.10.1999 upto 26.10.2014. 16. It is also not in dispute that the alleged order of extension of theka dated 11.4.2003 was never asserted in the Original Suit No. 33 of 2008 and categorical case was that the contract was effective till 26.10.2014. It is only after expiry of the aforesaid period for the first time in appeal, amendment was sought by moving an application 175-C seeking amendment in the plaint and the application 152-Ga seeking amendment in the memo of appeal whereby the petitioner sought substitution of the figure ‘2014’ with the figure ‘2024’. This amendment sought in the plaint at the appellate stage was rejected but amendment in memo of appeal was permitted and the amendment that is being sought in the plaint shall be decided by the Court under the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. 17. This amendment sought in the plaint at the appellate stage was rejected but amendment in memo of appeal was permitted and the amendment that is being sought in the plaint shall be decided by the Court under the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. 17. The position as on record thus, clearly indicates that the allegation that the theka period was extended till the year 2014 was never alleged by the petitioner since its alleged execution on 11.4.2003 till the filing of Misc. Appeal i.e. for a period of about 15 years. The said document is being categorically denied by the ADA and the categorical stand taken is that it is forged document, therefore, prima facie, the suit itself has become infructuous, if at all it was maintainable. 18. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the interim injunction granted in Original Suit No. 711 2003 is still continuing, is, therefore, contrary to record, inasmuch as the same was declared as non-est by this Court in PIL as noted above and the restraint order passed by this Court was not set aside by the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is only while disposing of the clarification application filed in the PIL, liberty was given to pursue its remedy as may be available and on this stand subsequent suit was filed by the petitioner. Even as per first paragraph as well as prayer clause in Original Suit No. 33 of 2008, the contract period was effective till 26.10.2014. The story that the theka period was extended by agreement dated 11.4.2003 is concerned, the record reflects that this case was never taken by the petitioner before any forum since the year 2003 and it is only after 15 years the same was asserted during the pendency of the Misc. Appeal, which too was pending since the year 2008, therefore, argument of extension of the period does not inspire confidence. The deposit of any amount in the years 2015 and 2018 as lease rent without any order of the competent authority is neither here nor there and has no legal effect. 19. Appeal, which too was pending since the year 2008, therefore, argument of extension of the period does not inspire confidence. The deposit of any amount in the years 2015 and 2018 as lease rent without any order of the competent authority is neither here nor there and has no legal effect. 19. Insofar as the rulings relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is respectfully observed that there is no quarrel with the law insofar as the tests for deciding the interim injunction application are concerned and even if those test i.e. (i) prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience; and (iii) irreparable injury as noticed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. (supra) are taken into account, I do not find any legal infirmity in the impugned orders whereby the Court below has refused to grant the interim injunction in favour of the petitioner. 20. In the opinion of the Court, lower appellate Court has rightly taken note of provisions of Sections 14, 38, 40 and 41 of the Act. Section 14(1) of the Act clearly provides that a contract, for the non-performance of which damages is an adequate relief, which in its nature is determinable, decree for specific performance cannot be passed. The enforcement of contracts by mandatory injunction order is not permissible in law in view of Sections 14, 38(2) and 41(h) of the Act as held by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Tara Singh Jaiswal (supra), relevant extract of paragraphs 10 and 11 whereof is quoted as under: “10. ..........We may also usefully refer Section 14(1)9a) of the Act which provides that a contract for the non performance of which damages is an adequate relief, decree for specific performance cannot be passed........” 11. ..........Here, the plaintiff in effect seeking the enforcement of the contracts by mandatory injunction order, which is not permissible under law in view of Sections 14, 38(2) and 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act........” 21. In Triveni Structurals Ltd. (supra), provision of Order 39 Rule 2 CPC (UP Amendment) was also taken note of, relevant extract of paragraphs 11 and 12 is quoted as under: “11. We do not agree with learned counsel for the respondent that under R. 2 quoted above, the Court should issue an injunction restraining the appellant from cancelling the contract. In Triveni Structurals Ltd. (supra), provision of Order 39 Rule 2 CPC (UP Amendment) was also taken note of, relevant extract of paragraphs 11 and 12 is quoted as under: “11. We do not agree with learned counsel for the respondent that under R. 2 quoted above, the Court should issue an injunction restraining the appellant from cancelling the contract. A proviso has been added by the U.P., Government to R. 2 of O. 39 of the Code. The relevant portion of this proviso is: “Provided that no such injunction shall be granted: (a) where no perpetual injunction could be granted in view of the provisions S. 38 and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Act 47 of 1963), or ........... and any order for injunction granted in contravention of these provisions shall be void.” 12. The above clause (1) to proviso clearly states that if the respondent cannot get a permanent injunction under Sections 38 and 41 of the Act, then no temporary injunction can be granted under Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code to prevent breach of a contract.” 22. In such factual background and in view of the aforesaid law, the orders impugned herein do not suffer from any legal infirmity or perversity and there is no jurisdictional error in the impugned orders warranting interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 23. Present petition is devoid of merit and dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.