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2018 DIGILAW 1482 (MAD)

Natarajan v. K. Lakshmi Ananth

2018-04-18

M.SUNDAR

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. This case is a classic but unfortunate exception to the age old adage 'Blood is thicker than water'. 'Classic' because it may be difficult to find a better or closer exception. 'Unfortunate' because the adversaries at lis for nearly two decades are father and son. To be noted, father and son are at loggerheads not on a principle or philosophy, but for properties, that too tangible properties, i.e., immovable properties. 2. This being a second appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ('CPC' for brevity), which turns on substantial question/s of law, it would suffice to give a thumbnail sketch of facts necessary for understanding and appreciating this judgment. Therefore, I give short facts of this case under the caption 'Facts in a nutshell' infra. 3. Facts in a nutshell : 3(a) Immovable properties, which are subject matter of the suit out of which this second appeal arises, are punja agricultural lands which are comprised in four different survey numbers in Keelapavur village, Tenkasi Taluk, Nellai Kattabomman District. Four survey numbers and extents are as follows : Sl. No. Survey No. Extent 1 113/1 2 Acres 62 cents 2 113/4 21 cents and a well 3 131/1 2 Acres 82 cents 4 131/5 6 cents 3(b) To be noted, all survey numbers are in the aforesaid Keelapavur village, Tenkasi Taluk, Nellai Kattabomman District. Further to be noted, all the four survey numbers add up 5 acres and 71 cents of land. The aforesaid punja agricultural lands comprised in four different survey numbers are hereinafter referred to as 'suit properties' for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity. 3(c) One Sivasubramania Nadar who is fourth respondent in this second appeal filed a suit in O.S.No.117 of 1993 dated 9.2.1993 on the file of the District Musif Court, Tenkasi against none other than his son Natarajan, who is the sole appellant in this second appeal before me. I am informed that while appellant Natarajan is son, all the other children of Sivasubramania Nadar are daughters. 3(d) To be noted, aforesaid O.S.No.117 of 1993 filed by the father against his son on the file of District Munsif Court, Tenkasi filed on 9.2.1993 is not the suit out of which this second appeal arises. This second appeal arises out of another subsequent suit being O.S.No.350 of 1993 (filed by son against his father). 3(d) To be noted, aforesaid O.S.No.117 of 1993 filed by the father against his son on the file of District Munsif Court, Tenkasi filed on 9.2.1993 is not the suit out of which this second appeal arises. This second appeal arises out of another subsequent suit being O.S.No.350 of 1993 (filed by son against his father). Both suits are on the file of the same court, i.e., District Munsif Court, Tenkasi. Therefore, for the sake of convenience and clarity, the earlier suit being O.S.No.117 of 1993 filed by father against son is referred to as 'senior suit' and the subsequent suit, i.e., O.S.No.350 of 1993 filed by son against father (filed on 28.6.1993, out of which this second appeal arises), shall hereinafter be referred to as 'junior suit'. 3(e) Senior suit was laid by father arraying his son as sole defendant with prayers for declaration that the suit schedule mentioned properties therein belong to plaintiff therein and for consequential injunction. In the senior suit, there are two schedules to the plaint, i.e., first schedule and second schedule. It is submitted by learned counsel for appellant that item Nos. 5, 6, 10 and 11 in the first schedule of the senior suit constitute suit properties. In other words, four items, i.e., item Nos.5, 6, 10 and 11 in the first schedule of the senior suit is the plaint schedule properties in the junior suit, out of which this second appeal arises is his say. I perused the two and found that with regard to item No.2 of suit properties in the junior suit (O.S.No.350 of 1993) and item No.6 of Schedule 1 of plaint in senior suit (O.S.No.117 of 1993 - Ex.A.1), there is variation in the description of the said two items. However, learned counsel for both sides assert that the same is an inadvertent secretarial error and both sides confirm that item No.6 in Schedule 1 (Ex.A.1) also forms part of suit properties. Therefore, I proceed on this basis. 3(f) Junior suit was launched by son Natarajan (appellant before me) against four defendants, arraying his father Sivasubramanian Nadar as fourth defendant. Defendants 1, 2 and 3 are alienees. In other words, defendants 1, 2 and 3 are vendees of suit properties having purchased the same from Sivasubramanian Nadar. Therefore, I proceed on this basis. 3(f) Junior suit was launched by son Natarajan (appellant before me) against four defendants, arraying his father Sivasubramanian Nadar as fourth defendant. Defendants 1, 2 and 3 are alienees. In other words, defendants 1, 2 and 3 are vendees of suit properties having purchased the same from Sivasubramanian Nadar. 3(g) Prayer in the junior suit is for declaration that plaintiff / son has possessory right in suit properties and for injunction restraining defendants from interfering with his possession. Besides this limb of prayer, there is another limb of prayer regarding costs and the usual residuary limb asking for such further or other orders. The main limb of the prayer is contained in the first sub paragraph of paragraph 12 and the same reads as follows : “Any Other Language” 3(h) A perusal of the aforesaid prayer would show that for all practical purposes, it is in the nature of a suit for bare injunction qua possession. There shall be elaboration on this aspect of the matter in the later part of this judgment infra. 3(i) To be noted, between filing of the senior suit on 9.2.1993 by father and filing of the junior suit by son on 28.6.1993, father Sivasubramanian had executed one sale deed dated 27.05.1993, conveying suit properties in favour of vendees (who are respondents 1 and 2 before me). I am informed that respondent No.3 is not a vendee, but has been added unnecessarily. One more event of relevance in the interregnum (between filing of senior and junior suits) is an order dated 31.3.1993 which came to be passed by trial court in I.A.No.241 of 1993 in the senior suit. This I.A.No.241 of 1993 was taken out by father with a prayer for interim injunction qua possession. Vide order dated 31.3.1993 after full contest, the trial court dismissed the injunction application. There shall be elaboration on this aspect of the matter also by me in the later part of this judgment infra. 3(j) Before I proceed further with the narration of facts, I deem it appropriate to chronicle and give the sequence in one paragraph for the sake of clarity. I do so in the next paragraph. There shall be elaboration on this aspect of the matter also by me in the later part of this judgment infra. 3(j) Before I proceed further with the narration of facts, I deem it appropriate to chronicle and give the sequence in one paragraph for the sake of clarity. I do so in the next paragraph. 3(k) Senior suit for declaration of title and injunction qua possession was filed by father on 09.02.1993, injunction application in senior suit came to be dismissed on 31.3.1993 after full contest, father alienated four items of properties in the senior suit (suit properties) vide registered sale deed dated 27.05.1993 and son filed junior suit with prayers for possessory rights / injunction qua possession on 28.6.1993. This chronicle would show that trigger for the junior suit is the alienation of suit properties by father on 27.05.1993. 3(l) One other factor with some relevance is both learned counsel before me submit that senior suit filed by father came to be dismissed for default, there is no dispute or disagreement between the learned counsel on this factum, but both of them say that they do not have instructions about the exact date of dismissal. 3(m) Junior suit, after full contest, was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 22.02.1999 by District Munsif Court, Tenkasi, which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'trial court' for the sake of convenience. 3(n) Son Natarajan carried it in appeal by way of a regular first appeal under Section 96 of CPC being A.S.No.47 of 1999 on the file of Additional Subordinate Court, Tenkasi (which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'first appellate court' for brevity). First appellate court dismissed the regular first appeal by judgment and decree dated 31.10.2000 against which the instant second appeal has been filed. Instant second appeal was admitted by this court on two substantial questions of law on 21.2.2001 and it is now before me for final disposal. 3(o) To be noted, this second appeal has been dismissed against fourth respondent father vide order dated 31.7.2012. However, fourth respondent father herein contested the entire suit in the trial court and entire appeal in the first appellate court as fourth defendant and fourth respondent respectively. 4. 3(o) To be noted, this second appeal has been dismissed against fourth respondent father vide order dated 31.7.2012. However, fourth respondent father herein contested the entire suit in the trial court and entire appeal in the first appellate court as fourth defendant and fourth respondent respectively. 4. Discussion : 4(a) This being second appeal under Section 100 of CPC, I deem it appropriate to commence this discussion with the two substantial questions of law on which this second appeal was admitted on 21.2.2001. For this purpose, I extract the order dated 21.2.2001 and the same reads as follows : “The Second Appeal is admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- (1)Whether the courts below erred in law and misdirected themselves in proceeding as if the onus is on the 4th defendant to prove the existence of joint family property, when the existence of sufficient joint family nucleus had been admitted? (2)Whether the Courts below have acted illegally, in that they have failed to give liberty to defendants 1 and 2 to file a suit for general partition?? 4(b) Though this second appeal was admitted on two substantial questions of law, Mr.V.Meenakshisundaram, learned counsel appearing on behalf of counsel on record for appellant very fairly submits that he would argue final disposal of this second appeal only on substantial question of law No.1 supra. In other words, learned counsel for appellant very fairly submits that substantial question of law No.2 supra does not arise in this case. As the junior suit was filed only for declaration of possessory right and protection of possession, learned counsel fairly submits that, as the junior suit was not filed for any declaratory relief, partition or other possible reliefs, substantial question of law No.2 does not arise in this second appeal and therefore, he is not pressing the same. 4(c) In the light of the above mentioned fair stand of learned counsel for appellant, this entire discussion in this second appeal will be pivoted on substantial question of law No.1 supra. 4(d) With regard to substantial question of law No.1 supra, learned counsel for appellant submits that burden of proof no doubt is on plaintiff. 4(c) In the light of the above mentioned fair stand of learned counsel for appellant, this entire discussion in this second appeal will be pivoted on substantial question of law No.1 supra. 4(d) With regard to substantial question of law No.1 supra, learned counsel for appellant submits that burden of proof no doubt is on plaintiff. Learned counsel for plaintiff submits that onus of proof qua proving that suit properties were not purchased from the income generated from joint family nucleus shifted to fourth respondent the moment the plaintiff was able to show that there was a joint family nucleus. 4(e) Responding to the above assertion, it was urged by learned counsel Mr.T.S.Venkatramana that plaintiff should stand or fall by his pleadings and the burden of proof is always on plaintiff. 4(f) However, in my considered view the proposition that burden of proof never shifts, but onus of proof shifts and in fact, swings like a pendulum from one end of the lis to the other is indisputable. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to examine the argument of Mr.V.Meenakshisundaram and find out whether onus actually shifted in the instant case. 4(g) The second point urged by Mr.V.Meenakshisundaram, learned counsel for appellant is fourth respondent father vide sale deed dated 27.5.1993 (Ex.B.3 which is also Ex.A.4) had sold more than what he had purchased. It is his specific assertion that fourth respondent (appellant's father) purchased suit properties under two registered sale deeds dated 02.01.1960 and 30.03.1960. These two sale deeds have been marked as Exs.B.8 and B.9 respectively. The entire suit properties were sold by fourth respondent father in favour of respondents 1 and 2 in and by sale deed dated 27.5.1993 which has been marked as Ex.B.3 on the side of defendants and Ex.A.4 on the side of plaintiff in the trial court. 4(h) It is the specific submission of learned counsel for appellant that the extent of land sold under Ex.B.3 / Ex.A.4 sale deed dated 27.5.1993 is much more than the land purchased by his father under Ex.B.8. Learned counsel took me through both documents, i.e., Ex.B.3/ Ex.A.4 on one side and Ex.B.8 on the other side. It was pointed out that under Ex.B.8, fourth respondent father had purchased only half share in that part of suit properties contained therein, whereas under Ex.B.3/ Ex.A.4, he had sold the entire properties. Learned counsel took me through both documents, i.e., Ex.B.3/ Ex.A.4 on one side and Ex.B.8 on the other side. It was pointed out that under Ex.B.8, fourth respondent father had purchased only half share in that part of suit properties contained therein, whereas under Ex.B.3/ Ex.A.4, he had sold the entire properties. It is the specific case of the appellant that owing to this scenario also, the onus of how fourth respondent acquired suit properties shifted and rested on fourth respondent herein. On this basis, the argument advanced is that fourth respondent did not discharge onus cast on him and therefore, the trial court and first appellate court erred in non suiting the plaintiff and confirming the non suiting of plaintiff respectively. 4(i) Now, I go back to first point urged by learned counsel for appellant that onus of establishing that suit properties belonged to fourth respondent and were not purchased by fourth respondent from and out of income generated from joint family nucleus shifted to fourth respondent the moment plaintiff marked a copy of the aforesaid interlocutory order dated 31.3.1993 made by trial court in I.A.No.241 of 1993 in the senior suit. This order dated 31.3.1993 made by trial court in the interlocutory injunction application in senior suit has been marked as Ex.A.2. 4(j) Learned counsel for appellant submits that injunction application was no doubt dismissed. However, learned counsel contended that a perusal of the interlocutory order Ex.A.2 (which was passed after full contest) would demonstrate that existence of joint family nucleus has been established. I was taken through Ex.A.2. Relevant portion of Ex.A.2 is paragraphs 5 and 6 and the same read as follows : “Any Other Language” (underlining made by me for highlighting and supplying emphasis) 4(k) Adverting to the order of trial court as well as first appellate court and taking me through the same, it was contended by learned counsel for appellant that courts below erred in taking the approach that nucleus of joint family is small and that nucleus is actually smaller than the subsequently purchased properties, i.e., suit properties. 4(l) My attention was drawn to two portions of paragraph 8 of trial court order and the same reads as follows : “8. ......In this case first of all the 2nd schedule does not contain the suit property. 4(l) My attention was drawn to two portions of paragraph 8 of trial court order and the same reads as follows : “8. ......In this case first of all the 2nd schedule does not contain the suit property. Even in O.S.117/93 the 4th defendant herein has given the list of the self acquired property under the first schedule in which the suit property finds a place. Moreover the total extent of the 2nd schedule property, though it comprises of many items of property consists of only around 2 Acres. From and out of this the 4th defendant has heard to maintain a family of 4 daughters one son. So it is natural that such a small nucleus would not have been enough for the maintenance of the family and its legitimate expenses like marriage of daughters etc. Moreover from the evidence of P.W.1 it is clear that he remained a student for a prolonged period. So he could not have assisted his father. Till now no independent income of the plaintiff to assists the family has been proved. So the entire income from the ancestral property would have been utilized for the maintenance of the family. No doubt ancestral nucleus raised the presumption of joint family property. But when the nucleus is small, and the nucleus is actually smaller than the subsequently purchased properties, with greater value or extent the presumption cannot help the plaintiff. In this case clear document of title exists in favour of the 4th defendant. According to Ex.A2 the previous suit has been dismissed as there can be injunction against a co-owner because the relief in that suit was claimed against first schedule of properties which included the ancestral properties also......” 4(m) It was also contended before me that the trial court had dismissed the injunction application in the senior suit primarily on the ground that properties therein (it includes suit properties) include ancestral properties also and therefore, injunction qua possession cannot be granted against co-owner. 4(n) The above argument on first blush appeared attractive. However, on a closer scrutiny and when viewed in the light of submissions made by learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3, Mr.T.S.R.Venkatramana, a different scenario emerges. 4(o) It was contended by learned counsel for respondents that junior suit out of which this second appeal arises is for all practical purposes a mere suit for bare injunction. However, on a closer scrutiny and when viewed in the light of submissions made by learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3, Mr.T.S.R.Venkatramana, a different scenario emerges. 4(o) It was contended by learned counsel for respondents that junior suit out of which this second appeal arises is for all practical purposes a mere suit for bare injunction. Though prayer says it was for declaration of possessory right and bare injunction, according to learned counsel, it makes no difference to the position that this is a suit for declaration qua possession of suit properties. In other words, the entire junior suit turns on possession of plaintiff qua suit properties. Therefore, the scope of junior suit is to the extent of plaintiff proving and establishing that he was in possession of suit properties on the date of filing of suit, i.e., on 28.6.1993. It was also argued by learned counsel for respondents that plaintiff / appellant for reasons best known to him had not chosen to file a partition suit. It was also pointed out that plaintiff / appellant had not chosen to ask for declaratory relief or for any other relief in the nature of relief under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Not having done so, plaintiff cannot now be heard to contend that issues pertaining to joint family nucleus much less onus touching upon the same arises. In other words, it is the specific case of learned counsel for respondents that issue of joint family nucleus and onus shifting in that regard does not at all arise in a suit for declaration of possessory right and protection of possession, particularly when plaintiff / appellant has not chosen to ask for any declaratory relief or relief under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. 4(p) There is no doubt that a civil suit has to perambulate within the four corners of the pleadings in the plaint. The scope of the plaint has already been discussed. Therefore, I also had a look at the issues framed in the trial court. Interestingly, five issues were originally framed and subsequently the issues were recast. This is contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the trial court judgment and the same read as follows : “5.The following issues are framed for trial: 1. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled to? 2. Interestingly, five issues were originally framed and subsequently the issues were recast. This is contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the trial court judgment and the same read as follows : “5.The following issues are framed for trial: 1. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled to? 2. Whether the suit properties belong to the defendants 1 & 2 through sale whether it is in their possession? 3. Whether the 3rd defendant is an unnecessary party to the suit? 4. Whether the suit properties are the self acquired properties of the 4th defendant? 5. Whether the sale deed dt.27.5.93 is valid? 6. On 22.2.99 issues 2-4-5 are recasted as follows: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration of his possessory right and for the consequential injunction?” 4(q) Answer to issue No.3 is contained in paragraph 7 and the same reads as follows : “7. Issue No.3 No cause of action has been proved against the 3rd defendant. Hence the 3rd defendant is an unnecessary party to the suit.? 4(r) It would be seen that issues were recast and in my considered view rightly so. 4(s) I have already extracted two portions of paragraph 8 of the trial court order, to which my attention was drawn by learned counsel for appellant. Now, I find another portion of paragraph 8 and a portion of paragraph 9 of trial court judgment which are relevant and the same reads as follows : “8......So it would by syllogistic to say that since O.S.No.117/93 is dismissed, this suit should be decreed Even if 4th defendant has not proved to be in possession a tenant mortgagor trespasser act, could have been in possession. If the plaintiff wants a decree for his possessory right the plaintiff has to prove his possession. In this case there is no document to show that the plaintiff is in possession. ...... 9. Since no declaration of title over the property has been sought for, the extent of title over the suit property need not be decided in this suit. As the plaintiff has not proved his possessory right in the first plea. As long as Ex.A4 sale deed is not set aside...........” 4(t) In this regard, learned counsel for respondents pressed into service two case laws. One is a judgment of a Privy Council in Appalaswami Vs. As the plaintiff has not proved his possessory right in the first plea. As long as Ex.A4 sale deed is not set aside...........” 4(t) In this regard, learned counsel for respondents pressed into service two case laws. One is a judgment of a Privy Council in Appalaswami Vs. Suryanarayanamurti and others reported in AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 189 which arose from Madras (Appalaswami case) and the other is Srinivas Krishnarao Kango Vs. Narayan Devji Kango and others reported in AIR 1954 SC 379 (Kango case). To be noted, the principle laid down in Appalaswami case by Privy Council has been referred to and reiterated by Supreme Court in Kango case. Both case laws were pressed into service to highlight the principle that merely because a joint family nucleus exists and merely because a member of joint family holds a property, there can be no presumption that every property owned by a member of joint family belongs to joint family nucleus. In other words, the principle is that when a member of joint family owns a property, there is no presumption that such property owned by the member also forms part of joint family nucleus or that such property also has been purchased from the income generated from joint family nucleus. A portion of paragraph 11 of Privy Council judgment in Appalaswami case and a portion of paragraph 10 in Kango case are of relevance. I extract the same, which read as follows: Appalaswami case : “11.......Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property is joint to establish the fact. .....” Kango case : “10. ....... In - ' AIR 1947 PC 189 (C)', in holding that the father had discharged the burden of proving that the acquisitions were his own, the Privy Council observed: “The evidence establishes that the property acquired by the appellant under Exhibit A is substantially intact, and has been kept distinct. .....” Kango case : “10. ....... In - ' AIR 1947 PC 189 (C)', in holding that the father had discharged the burden of proving that the acquisitions were his own, the Privy Council observed: “The evidence establishes that the property acquired by the appellant under Exhibit A is substantially intact, and has been kept distinct. The income derived from the property and the small sum derived from the sale of part of it have been properly applied towards the expenses of the family, and there is no evidence from which it can be held that the nucleus of joint family property assisted the appellant in the acquisition of the properties specified in the schedule to the written statement.” Likewise, in the present case all the ancestral Watan lands are intact, and are available for partition, and the small income derived from them must have been utilised for the maintenance of the members of the family. 4(u) I have carefully considered the rival submissions. I have no difficulty in accepting the submission on behalf of respondents that question of joint family nucleus much less question of onus shifting on fourth respondent does not arise in a mere possessory suit. Even plaintiff / Appellant did not have the burden of proof in this regard in the junior suit. Only when there is some burden of proof on plaintiff and when plaintiff in the course of discharging such burden brings into existence a document or some obtaining position, the further question of onus shifting to the adversary would arise. I have also extracted the issues in the trial court, and particularly the recast issue. 4(v) A perusal of trial court order would clearly reveal that the entire issues in the Trial court were only on possession and rightly so. First appellate court, for all practical purpose, has rightly confirmed the approach and the verdict of the trial court as the suit is for mere possessory right qua suit properties. 4(w) In a suit for mere possessory right, if the scope is expanded to the extent of whether the property was joint family property and as to whether the property was purchased from the income generated from the nucleus of joint family property, it would run contrary to the basic principle of civil law litigation. Plaintiff should stand or fall by his pleadings. Plaintiff should stand or fall by his pleadings. Even with regard to the issue of onus shifting, plaintiff should be able to show that onus shifts by perambulating within the four corners of pleadings in the plaint. 4(x) Plaintiff has admittedly not chosen to ask for any declaratory relief. Plaintiff has not chosen to file a partition suit. Plaintiff has not even chosen to take recourse to Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, though the trigger is sale deed dated 27.5.1993 being Ex.B.3/Ex.A.4. 4(y) With regard to second point urged by learned counsel for appellant that his father has acquired only half share in the properties contained in Ex.B.8, but has sold the entire property under Ex.B.3 /Ex.A.4, this is completely outside the scope of the suit in the trial court. In any event, as rightly contended by learned counsel for respondents that is the look out of the vendor and vendee and it does not help the appellant in any manner. 4(z) When the lis reaches the High Court by way of second appeal under Section 100 of CPC, the scope is in the nature of a pyramid. While, by the time the lis reaches the High Court under Section 100 CPC, the scope is so narrowed down that it is heard and disposed of merely on substantial question/s of law. To be noted, not even question of law, but substantial question of law. The difference between question of law and substantial question of law has been well settled by Supreme Court in a long line of authorities and in considering the scope of the instant second appeal, I am of the view that it may not be necessary to catalogue those authorities here. However, this pyramid theory is being set out in the instant second appeal only to highlight the position that if this second appeal is entertained on the basis of submissions made by appellant, it would clearly be an inverted pyramid. In other words, what started as possessory suit in the trial court may end up as suit testing the very source of purchase of suit properties and as to character of suit properties, i.e., as to whether suit properties are owned by a member of joint family in his personal capacity or in his capacity as a member of joint family in a second appeal, that too under section 100 CPC. In other words, it will tantamount to examining as to whether character of suit properties is joint family property or not. That is the reason why I have no hesitation in holding that going into those aspects in the second appeal under Section 100 CPC would certainly amount to inverted pyramid theory and would militate against the principle underlying section 100 CPC. 4(aa) In the light of the narrative supra and owing to all that have been set out above, I have no hesitation or difficulty in answering the substantial question of law in favour of respondents and against appellant. In other words, I answer the substantial question of law that falls for consideration in this second appeal by holding that question of existence of joint family property or whether nucleus was sufficient qua suit properties did not arise in junior suit out of which this second appeal arises and therefore, the question of onus in this regard shifting from plaintiff to fourth respondent in the suit (from appellant to fourth respondent herein before me) certainly does not arise and therefore, courts below did not err in this regard. On the contrary, courts below were perfectly correct in their approach. I thus answer the sole substantial question of law. 5. CONCLUSION : 5(a) In the light of discussion supra and in the light of my answer to the sole substantial question of law, this second appeal fails and the same is liable to be dismissed. 5(b) I part with the case with the fervent hope that father and son bury their adversarial character by giving quietus to this lis and have a pleasant father and son relationship in the days to come. 6. DECISION : This Second appeal, being S.A.No.247 of 2001 is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, i.e., Additional Subordinate Court, Tenkasi made in A.S.No.47 of 1999 dated 31.10.2000 which in turn confirms the judgment and decree of the trial court, i.e., District Munsif Court, Tenkasi, made in O.S.No.350 of 1993 dated 22.2.1999. Considering the relationship between the parties, I leave the parties to bear their respective costs.