ORDER : D.N. PATEL, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner, whose writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3988 of 2016 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 6th March, 2017 whereby, the prayer of this appellant (original petitioner) to operate select list dated 22nd January, 1992 was not accepted by the learned Single Judge and hence, the original petitioner has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant is an original petitioner, who had applied for Class-IV post with the respondent bank and he was interviewed on 04.08.1991. 3. Select list of 41 candidates were prepared which is at Annexure-2 to this memo of Appeal, dated 22nd January, 1992 and this appellant is at serial no. 22 in the said select list. 4. It appears that thereafter, the select list was omitted and the management for any reason whatsoever wanted not to appoint the candidates from the select list. This is a bone of contention of the appellant after several years. It ought to be kept in mind that there is no right vested in the selected candidates to be appointed. 5. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha & others reported in (1974) 3 SCC 220 especially in paragraph nos. 10 and 11 as under: “10. One fails to see how the existence of vacancies give a legal right to a candidate to be selected for appointment. The examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for consideration. The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the rules in this respect. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the rules in this respect. The true effect of Rule 10 in Part C is that if and when the State Government propose to make appointments of Subordinate Judges the State Government (i) shall not make such appointments by travelling outside the list, and (ii) shall make the selection for appointments strictly in the order the candidates have been placed in the list published in the Government Gazette. In the present case neither of these two requirements is infringed by the Government. They have appointed the first seven persons in the list as Subordinate Judges. Apart from these constraints on the power to make the appointments, Rule 10 does not impose any other constraint. There is no constraint that the Government shall make an appointment of a Subordinate Judge either because there are vacancies or because a list of candidates has been prepared and is in existence. 11. It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. This Court has pointed out in Dr Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute impose a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. Since there is no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived.” (Emphasis supplied). 6. It has been held by the Hon’bl1e Supreme Court in the case of Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 47 . especially in paragraph nos.7, 8 and 9 as under: “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. especially in paragraph nos.7, 8 and 9 as under: “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana, or Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab. 8. In State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha 15 vacancies of Subordinate Judges were advertised, and out of the selection list only 7, who had secured more than 55 per cent marks, were appointed, although under the relevant rules the eligibility condition required only 45 per cent marks. Since the High Court had recommended earlier, to the Punjab Government that only the candidates securing 55 per cent marks or more should be appointed as Subordinate Judges, the other candidates included in the select list were not appointed. They filed a writ petition before the High Court claiming a right of being appointed on the ground that vacancies existed and they were qualified and were found suitable. The writ application was allowed. While reversing the decision of the High Court, it was observed by this Court that it was open to the government to decide how many appointments should be made and although the High Court had appreciated the position correctly, it had “somehow persuaded itself to spell out a right in the candidates because in fact there were 15 vacancies”. While reversing the decision of the High Court, it was observed by this Court that it was open to the government to decide how many appointments should be made and although the High Court had appreciated the position correctly, it had “somehow persuaded itself to spell out a right in the candidates because in fact there were 15 vacancies”. It was expressly ruled that the existence of vacancies does not give a legal right to a selected candidate. Similarly, the claim of some of the candidates selected for appointment, who were petitioners in Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab, was turned down holding that it was open to the government to decide how many appointments would be made. The plea of arbitrariness was rejected in view of the facts of the case and it was held that the candidates did not acquire any right merely by applying for selection or even after selection. It is true that the claim of the petitioner in the case of Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana, was allowed by this Court but, not on the ground that she had acquired any right by her selection and existence of vacancies. The fact was that the matter had been referred to the Public Service Commission which sent to the government only the names of 17 candidates belonging to the general category on the assumption that only 17 posts were to be filled up. The government accordingly made only 17 appointments and stated before the court that they were unable to select and appoint more candidates as the Commission had not recommended any other candidate. In this background it was observed that it is, of course, open to the government not to fill up all the vacancies for a valid reason, but the selection cannot be arbitrarily restricted to a few candidates notwithstanding the number of vacancies and the availability of qualified candidates; and, there must be a conscious application of mind by the government and the High Court before the number of persons selected for appointment is restricted. The fact that it was not for the Public Service Commission to take a decision in this regard was emphasised in this judgment. None of these decisions, therefore, supports the appellant. 9. The fact that it was not for the Public Service Commission to take a decision in this regard was emphasised in this judgment. None of these decisions, therefore, supports the appellant. 9. Mr Goswami appearing in support of the appeal has contended that in view of the relevant statutory rules, the authorities were under a duty to continue with the process of filling up all the vacancies until none remained vacant. Reference was made to Rule 4 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, Rules 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 and Regulations 2(1)(a), 2(1)(c), 8 and 13 of the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1965. We do not think any of these rules comes to the aid of the appellant. Rule 3 of the Cadre Rules directs constitution of separate cadres for States or group of States, and Rule 4 empowers the Central Government to determine the strength in consultation with the State Governments. The strength has to be re-examined at intervals of 3 years. Rule 3 of Recruitment Rules deals with the constitution of the Service, and Rule 4 the method of recruitment. Rules 6 and 7 give further details in this regard. The learned counsel could not point out any provision indicating that all the notified vacancies have to be filled up. Similar is the position with respect to the Competitive Examination Regulations. Regulation 2(1)(a) defines available vacancies as vacancies determined by the Central Government to be filled on the results of the examination, described in Regulation 2(1)(a). Regulation 8 prescribes that the candidates would be considered for appointment to the available vacancies subject to provisions 9 to 12 and Regulation 13 clarifies the position that a candidate does not get any right to appointment by mere inclusion of his name in the list. The final selection is subject to satisfactory report on the character, antecedent and suitability of the candidates. We, therefore, reject the claim that the appellant had acquired a right to be appointed against the vacancy arising later on the basis of any of the rules. (Emphasis supplied). 7. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Another v. Rajkishore Nanda & others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 777 especially in paragraph nos. 14 to 18 as under: “14. (Emphasis supplied). 7. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Another v. Rajkishore Nanda & others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 777 especially in paragraph nos. 14 to 18 as under: “14. A person whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment at the best is a condition of eligibility for the purpose of appointment and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed. The vacancies have to be filled up as per the statutory rules and in conformity with the constitutional mandate. 15. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India held that appearance of the name of a candidate in the select list does not give him a right of appointment. Mere inclusion of the candidate's name in the select list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remain unfilled. The candidate concerned cannot claim that he has been given a hostile discrimination. 16. A select list cannot be treated as a reservoir for the purpose of appointments, that vacancy can be filled up taking the names from that list as and when it is so required. It is the settled legal proposition that no relief can be granted to the candidate if he approaches the court after the expiry of the select list. If the selection process is over, select list has expired and appointments had been made, no relief can be granted by the court at a belated stage. 17. The instant case is required to be examined in view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition. The 1985 Rules provide for determining the number of vacancies and holding competitive examination ordinarily once in a year. The select list prepared so also is valid for one year. In the instant case, 15 vacancies were advertised with a clear stipulation that the number of vacancies may increase. The authorities had taken a decision to fill up 33 vacancies, thus, a select list of 66 persons was prepared. It is also evident from the record that some more appointments had been made over and above the 33 determined vacancies. In the instant case, 15 vacancies were advertised with a clear stipulation that the number of vacancies may increase. The authorities had taken a decision to fill up 33 vacancies, thus, a select list of 66 persons was prepared. It is also evident from the record that some more appointments had been made over and above the 33 determined vacancies. Thus, once the selection process in respect of number of vacancies so determined came to an end, it is no more open to offer appointment to persons from the unexhausted list. 18. It is the exclusive prerogative of the employer/State Administration to initiate the selection process for filling up vacancies occurred during a particular year. There may be vacancies available but for financial constraints, the State may not be in a position to initiate the selection process for making appointments. Bona fide decision taken by the appointing authority to leave certain vacancies unfilled, even after preparing the select list cannot be assailed. The courts/tribunals have no competence to issue direction to the State to initiate selection process to fill up the vacancies. A candidate only has a right to be considered for appointment, when the vacancies are advertised and selection process commences, if he possesses the requisite eligibility.” (Emphasis supplied). 8. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Balu & Another v. State of Kerala & another, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479 especially in paragraph no.12 as under: “12. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot also be lost sight of. A person does not acquire a legal right to be appointed only because his name appears in the select list. (See Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti.) The State as an employer has a right to fill up all the posts or not to fill them up. Unless a discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or an arbitrariness is committed, the candidate concerned will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. (See Batiarani Gramiya Bank v. Pallab Kumar.) In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India a Constitution Bench of this Court held: “7. Unless a discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or an arbitrariness is committed, the candidate concerned will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. (See Batiarani Gramiya Bank v. Pallab Kumar.) In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India a Constitution Bench of this Court held: “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted.” (Emphasis supplied). 9. In view of the aforesaid decisions also, there is no duty vested in the respondent-Management to give employment to the candidates who are already selected. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Selected candidates cannot say that even if, the employer does not want the appointments to be given, as they are selected, the employer must appoint them. There is no such right vested in the selected candidates. Even if the candidates have been selected, the respondent bank can say that they do not want to appoint them. There are varieties of reasons, not to give appointment to the selected candidates like: (a) Lack of infrastructure; (b) Lack of finance; (c) There is no need to appoint the selected candidates etc. 10. In the facts of the present case, there is no allegation of arbitrariness, malafides nor there is any allegation of arbitrariness nor any violation of rule has been pointed out by the appellant nor any violation of comparative merit has been established by the appellant. 11. 10. In the facts of the present case, there is no allegation of arbitrariness, malafides nor there is any allegation of arbitrariness nor any violation of rule has been pointed out by the appellant nor any violation of comparative merit has been established by the appellant. 11. We are not sitting in an appeal against the policy decision of the respondents, not to give employment to the selected candidates. Apart from these facts at Annexure-3, the workman and employer had also entered into an agreement to omit such select list. 12. It is further contented by the counsel for the appellant that the representation was made in detail by this appellant dated 15th March, 2010 and it was rejected and therefore, the petition was preferred in the year 2016. It ought to be kept in mind that if the other candidates have been appointed, they have been appointed by the order of the Court and not by the free violation of the respondents. Here, never such direction was given previously to appoint this appellant. If the employer do not want to give appointment to a selected candidate he is also free to do so. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant. There is no allegation of arbitrariness or discrimination. 13. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and hence, the same is hereby, dismissed.