JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - Even though the relief claimed in this writ petition is very innocuous to the effect that "the respondents be directed to refund the earnest money with interest and pay 10% loss of profit of awarded amount to the petitioner", yet the moot question is as to whether such a petition is in fact maintainable. However, before answering this question minimal facts need to be noticed. 2. The Irrigation and Public Health Department on 8.6.2011 awarded the contract in favour of the petitioner for construction work of Shah Nehar project in District Kangra, which is LBC main canal at RD 23618 to 24842 i.e. 1224 metres in length with the time limit of six months for its completion. The petitioner was requested to execute the contract and thereafter commence the work immediately as is evident from the letter dated 8.6.2011 (Annexure P1) addressed by the Executive Engineer to the petitioner. 3. The grievance of the petitioner as set out in this petition is that he was not provided hindrance free site along with structural designs and drawings and apart from that, these were the respondents themselves, who kept on changing the alignment and resultantly, the petitioner could not even enhance much less complete the work in question, and therefore, should be refunded earnest money with interest and damages, as aforesaid. 4. The respondents have contested the petition by filing reply, wherein, factual matrix with regard to the tender of the petitioner being accepted has not been denied, however, it is submitted that the petitioner was asked to collect the drawings from the office of the Assistant Engineer vide letters dated 19.10.2011, 24.10.2011 and 14.2.2012, but he failed to do so. Before that, he was required to sign the agreement, but he failed to do so and without it, under law, he was not entitled to proceed further. It is also averred that the joint inspection was conducted and the petitioner was asked/informed that the site was clear and the drawings were available and he was asked to start the work in question. The other allegation regarding nonavailability of hindrance free site as raised by the petitioner has been denied as would be evident from para 8 of the reply, which reads thus: "8. That the contents of this para are not only wrong but false. The other allegation regarding nonavailability of hindrance free site as raised by the petitioner has been denied as would be evident from para 8 of the reply, which reads thus: "8. That the contents of this para are not only wrong but false. The petitioner never deployed his labour and machinery at the site of work in spite of the request of the department, which is clear from his conduct. Firstly he did not sign the agreement without which he could not have started the work. Secondly, the petitioner is contradicted by himself as he has alleged that there was dispute and the drawings were not supplied, if it was so where was the question of deploying labour and machinery when he had no drawings. So far as representation of farmers is concerned, it was internal matter of department. In fact, on the request of Sh. Hussain and others during 9/2011, the possibilities to execute the work on another route from RD 23700 to RD 24640 were examined/investigated and explored and the request of land owner was not accepted due to non feasibility. The land stood acquired. The Department even had prepared Patra for construction of canal on its own expenses on dated 10.2.2012 which clearly shows that the site was very much clear and free from all hindrances. Beside several requests in writing/personally as well as telephonic ally to the petitioner he did not start the work. Because the site of work remained unchanged and the patra work was done by the department. Therefor, there was no question of the contractor to claim enhanced rates for other site as contractor did not start the work in already approved alignment despite repeated requests. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case carefully. 6. As per the admitted case of the petitioner, the respondents vide letter dated 20.3.2012 (Annexure P23), after holding the petitioner liable for delay in execution of the work, have cancelled the work contract and consequently, earnest money amounting to Rs. 2,13,560/ has also been forfeited to the government account, but strangely enough, the petitioner has not set out any prayer or even claimed relief qua this action of the respondents. 7. One really wonders as to how a writ of mandamus in such circumstances can lie and maintain without praying for a writ of certiorari. 2,13,560/ has also been forfeited to the government account, but strangely enough, the petitioner has not set out any prayer or even claimed relief qua this action of the respondents. 7. One really wonders as to how a writ of mandamus in such circumstances can lie and maintain without praying for a writ of certiorari. After all, in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown there is a statute, which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce such performance. Even if this plea is considered to be technical in nature, even then, admittedly, the petitioner has not executed the contract with the respondents as required under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, which reads thus: "299. Contracts (1) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise. (2) Neither the President nor the Governor shall be personally liable in respect of any contract or assurance made or executed for the purposes of this Constitution, or for the purposes of any enactment relating to the Government of India heretofore in force, nor shall any person making or executing any such contract or assurance on behalf of any of them be personally liable in respect thereof." 8. It is more than settled that no contract made in the exercise of the executive power of a State can be binding unless it is expressed to be made and executed on behalf of the Governor of the State. 9. As observed hereinabove, no contract has been executed between the respondents and the petitioner and consequently, no contractual obligation of the respondents can preferably arise. 9. As observed hereinabove, no contract has been executed between the respondents and the petitioner and consequently, no contractual obligation of the respondents can preferably arise. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. Sipahi Singh and others , (1977) AIR SC 2149, wherein it was observed as under: "Re : Contention No. 1 :It is now well settled that the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution which are mandatory in character require that a contract made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State must satisfy three conditions viz. (i) it must be expressed to be made by the President or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be; (ii) it must be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor, as the case may be and (iii) its execution must be by such person and in such manner as the President or Governor may direct or authorize. Failure to comply with these conditions nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable. (See decisions of this Court in The State of Bihar O. M/s Karam Chand Thapar & Brothers Ltd.(1) Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union of India and State of West Bengal v. M/s. B. K. Mondal & Sons." 10. In addition to above, it would be noticed that the stands taken by the parties are based on disputed questions of facts and it is well settled that the writ Court is loathe to enter the thicket of disputed facts. 11. In Sohan Lal vs. Union of India and another , (1957) AIR SC 529, a Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court while dealing with a writ wherein rival claims of title to the property had been raised held that civil suit is a proper remedy rather than approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for exercising the prerogative of issuing writs. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment as under: "5. We do not propose to enquire into the merits of the rival claims of title to the property in dispute set up by the appellant and Jagan Nath. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment as under: "5. We do not propose to enquire into the merits of the rival claims of title to the property in dispute set up by the appellant and Jagan Nath. If we were to do so, we would be entering into a field of investigation which is more appropriate for a Civil Court in a properly constituted suit to do rather than for a Court the prerogative of issuing writs. There are questions of fact and law which is in dispute requiring determination before the respective claims of the parties to this appeal can be decided. Before the property in dispute can be restored to Jagan Nath it will be necessary to declare that he had title in that property and was entitled to recover possession of it. This would in effect amount to passing a decree in his favour. In the circumstances to be mentioned hereafter, it is a matter for serious consideration whether in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution such a declaration ought to be made and restoration of the property to Jagan Nath be ordered. 6. Jagan Nath had entered into a transaction with the Union of India upto a certain stage with respect to the property in dispute, but no letter of allotment had been issued him. Indeed, he had been informed, when certain facts became known, that the property in question could not be allotted to him as he was a displaced person who had been allotted land in East Punjab. As between Jagan Nath and the Union of India it will be necessary to decide what rights were acquired by the former in the property upto the stage when the latter informed Jagan Nath that the property would not be allotted to him. Another question for decision will be whether Jagan Nath was allowed to enter into possession of the property because it was allotted to him or under a misapprehension as the Union of India was misled by the contents of his application. The case of the Union of India is that under the scheme Jagan Nath was not eligible for allotment of a house in West Patel Nagar, as it was subsequently discovered that he had been allotted, previous to his application, agricultural land in the District of Hissar. The case of the Union of India is that under the scheme Jagan Nath was not eligible for allotment of a house in West Patel Nagar, as it was subsequently discovered that he had been allotted, previous to his application, agricultural land in the District of Hissar. Being satisfied that Jagan Nath was not eligible for allotment, the Union of India refused to allot to him the tenement No. 35, West Patel Nagar and allotment of that house was made to the appellant who was found to be eligible in every way. The appellant was accordingly given possession of the property after Jagan Nath''s eviction. The appellant had complied with all the conditions imposed by the Union of India and a letter of allotment was actually issued to him and he entered into possession of the property in dispute under the authority of the Union of India. Did the appellant thereby acquire a legal right to hold the property as against Jagan Nath? In our opinion, all these questions should be decided in a properly constituted suit in a Civil Court rather than in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution." 12. A constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Thansingh vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and others , (1964) AIR SC 1419 explained the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 and it was held: "7 .. "The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restric tions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain selfimposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Art. 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed." 13. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed." 13. In New Satgram Engineering Workers and another vs. Union of India and others , (1981) AIR SC 124, three Hon''ble Judges Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that whether a workshop or director''s bungalow was a mine or not a mine was to be decided in a civil suit being a civil dispute and not in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and held as under: "23. The question whether the engineering unit was ''situate in, or adjacent to'', the New Satgram Coal Mine and was ''substantially'' used for purposes of the mine as well as the question whether the Technical Director''s Bungalow and the Guest House were ''solely'' used for the residence of officers and staff of the mine and, therefore, fall within the definition of ''mine'' as contained in Section 2 (h) of the Nationalisation Act, cannot obviously be decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The proper remedy is by way of a suit, as rightly observed by the High Court. 14. In Ghan Shyam Das Gupta and another vs. Anant Kumar Sinha and others , (1991) AIR SC 2251 the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the remedy under Article 226 was not intended to supercede the modes of obtaining the relief before a civil Court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions and it was only in exceptional cases where provisions are rendered incapable of giving relief to an aggrieved party that a writ would be maintainable. It is apt to reproduce paras 7 and 8 of the judgment, which read thus: " 7. It has been contended, and in our view correctly, that if the claim of the writ petitioners of being in possession of the premises as tenants in their own right is rejected and they are held to have been inducted by Prabhas Kumar Sinha or his father Dr. K.C. Sinha, they are liable to be evicted in execution of the present decree. K.C. Sinha, they are liable to be evicted in execution of the present decree. It was, therefore, necessary to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties and record a finding on the character of possession of the writ petitioners, before proceeding to consider whether the decree is executable or not against them, and having not done so, the High Court has seriously erred in law in allowing the writ petition by the impugned judgment. The decision on the disputed issue was dependent on the consideration of the evidence to be led by the parties, and while exercising the writ jurisdiction the High Court was not expected to go into that question. In the circumstances, the Court ought to have refused to dispose of the writ petition on merits, leaving the writ petitioners to avail of the remedy before the civil court. The error in the judgment as pointed out earlier was the consequence of the initial mistake in entertaining the petition. 8. The principle as to when the High Court should exercise its special jurisdiction under Article 226 and when to refuse to do so on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy has been settled by a long line of cases. The remedy provided under Article 226 is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief before a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. As was observed in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao , (1976) 1 SCR 521 the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory in nature and is not meant for correcting errors like an appellate court. In Thansingh Nathmal and Ors. v.A. Mazid , (1964) 6 SCR 654 a case dealing with liability to pay sales tax, the appellants without following the statutory remedy under the Sales Tax Act, moved the High Court under Article 226 on the ground that the Act was ultra vires. The challenge was rejected. Another contention, namely, that the finding of the Commissioner that the goods were actually within the State at the time of the contract was based on no evidence and was purely specu lative, was also raised. This ground also failed before the High Court and the writ petition was dismissed. The challenge was rejected. Another contention, namely, that the finding of the Commissioner that the goods were actually within the State at the time of the contract was based on no evidence and was purely specu lative, was also raised. This ground also failed before the High Court and the writ petition was dismissed. Approving the decision, this Court observed that if the appellants had persued the statutory remedy under the Act and the question had been referred to the High Court, the Court could have appropriately advised the Commissioner, but not having done so the High Court could not be asked to assume the role of an appellate court over the decision of the Commissioner either on a question of fact or even of law. Again when a learned Single Judge of the High Court and on appeal a Division Bench proceeded to examine the correctness of an order in relation to grant of a permit to ply a vehicle under the Motor Vehi cles Act, it was observed by this Court in M. Naina Mohammed v. K.A. Natarajan & Ors. , (1976) 1 SCR 102 , that the power under Article 226 is supervisory in nature and the Judges at both the tiers had unwittingly slipped into the subtle but, fatal, error of exercising a kind of appellate review. So far the question of executability of a decree is concerned, the Civil Procedure Code contains elaborate and exhaustive provisions for dealing with it in all its aspects. The numerous rules of order XXI of the Code take care of differ ent situations, providing effective remedies not only to judgmentdebtors and decreeholders but also to claimant objectors as the case may be. In an exceptional case, where provisions are rendered incapable of giving relief to an aggrieved party in adequate measure and appropriate time, the answer is a regular suit in the civil court. The remedy under the Civil Procedure Code is of superior judicial quality than what is generally available under other stat utes, and the Judge being entrusted exclusively with admin istration of justice, is expected to do better. It will be, therefore, difficult to find a case where interference in writ jurisdiction for granting relief to a judgmentdebtor or a claimant objector can be justified. It will be, therefore, difficult to find a case where interference in writ jurisdiction for granting relief to a judgmentdebtor or a claimant objector can be justified. The rules 97 to 106 of order XXI envisage questions as in the present appeal to be determined on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties and after the 1976 Amendment, the decision has been made appealable like a decree. The High Court, in the present case, therefore, ought not to have embarked upon a decision of the writ petition on merits, and should have refused to exercise its special jurisdiction on the ground of alternative remedy before the civil court." 15. In Smt. Parvatibai Subhanrao Nalawade vs. Anwarali Hasanali Makani and others , (1992) AIR SC 1780, the Hon''ble three Judges Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under: "10 .Before closing this judgment, we would, like to emphasise that in cases relating to immoveable properties which are governed by the ordinary civil law the High Court should not exercise its special jurisdiction under the Constitution unless the circumstances are exceptional. This aspect has been discussed by this Court earlier on several occasions." 16. In State of Rajasthan vs. Bhawani Singh , (1992) AIR SC 1018 the Hon''ble Supreme Court while considering the jurisdiction as well as disputed question of title held that the writ court cannot go into disputed questions appurtenant to title of the property and it was observed: "7. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the writ petition was misconceived insofar as it asked for, in effect; a declaration of writ petitioner''s title to the said plot. It is evidence from the facts stated hereinabove that the title of the writ petitioner is very much in dispute. Disputed question relating to title cannot be satisfactorily gone into or adjudicated in a writ petition." 17. In Mohan Pandey and another vs. Smt. Usha Rani Rajgaria and others , (1993) AIR SC 1225 the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered the question whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked for enforcement of a private right to immoveable property claimed by and against a private individual. The Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under: "6 There is no doubt that the dispute is between two private persons with respect to an immovable property. The Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under: "6 There is no doubt that the dispute is between two private persons with respect to an immovable property. Further, a suit covering either directly a portion of the houseproperty which is in dispute in the present case or in any event some other parts of the same property is already pending in the civil court. The respondent justifies the step of her moving the High Court with a writ petition on the ground of some complaint made by the appellants and the action by the police taken thereon. We do not agree that on account of this development, the respondent was entitled to maintain a writ petition before the High Court. It has repeatedly been held by this court as also by various High Courts that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged. And in such a case, the court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned. If the grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of criminal proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, she must avail of the remedy under the general law constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was in error in issuing the impugned direction against the appellants " 18. It is thus well settled that the principle of law that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private parties. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is not available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of the statutory authority is alleged and in such a case, the court will issue appropriate direction to the authorities concerned. The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes for which remedies lie under the general law, civil or criminal are available. The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes for which remedies lie under the general law, civil or criminal are available. It is not intended to replace the oridinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary should not be exercised casually or lightly. The writ petition is filed in public law remedy. The High Court while exercising a power of judicial review is concerned with illegality, irrationality and procedural in propriety of an order passed by the State or a statutory authority etc. Remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked for resolution of a private law dispute as contradistinguished from a dispute involving public law character. It is also well settled that a writ remedy is not available for resolution of a property or title dispute. 19. The following principles emerge from the aforesaid decisions: (i) Writ Petition is a public law remedy and cannot be invoked for resolution of private law disputes. Therefore, a writ petition is not maintainable for resolution of a property dispute or for declaration of title. (ii) Where there is an alternative effective and effacious remedy available under law the High Court wil not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. But, rule of such exclusion is a rule of discretion and where the matter involves enforcement of fundamental right or failure to follow principles of natural justice discretion may be exercised to entertain petition under Article 226. (iii A Writ Petition is not intended to replace ordinary remedies by way of suit or application. Where an alternative remedy was available, a petitioner cannot allow that remedy to be time barred or allow it to be dismissed and then apply under Article 226 contending that he has no other remedy. (iv A writ petition is not an appropriate remedy where the matter requires determination of disputed questions of fact involving elaborate examination of evidence. But, where fundamental rights are infringed, writ petition may, in appropriate cases, be entertained, even if the matter involves determination of disputed questions of fact. 20. Therefore, on this additional ground also, the writ petition is not maintainable. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 20. Therefore, on this additional ground also, the writ petition is not maintainable. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. However, this will not prevent the petitioner from seeking redressal of his grievance(s) before the competent court, if he so wishes and desires and in the event of his approaching the competent court for redressal of his grievance(s) before 30.9.2018, then it will not be open to the respondents to raise plea of limitation and even the court shall proceed to determine the lis strictly in accordance with law. The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.