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2018 DIGILAW 1511 (ALL)

KIRAN PAL v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-07-09

A.P.SAHI, BACHCHOO LAL

body2018
JUDGMENT : This is an appeal arising out of the judgment dated 18.11.2013 rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge Court No. 1 Bijnor in Sessions Trial No. 256 of 2012 (State of Vs. Kiran Pal) Police Station- Chandpur, District Bijnor whereby the learned Judge has convicted the appellant for the offences under Sections 302/201 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life coupled with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo an imprisonment of two years. In addition thereto, he has also been sentenced to undergo four years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000/- in default whereof to undergo an additional period of imprisonment of six months for the offence having been committed under Section 201 IPC. The sentences are to run concurrently. A further compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs has been awarded to the complainant made recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Aggrieved the appellant has filed this appeal on various grounds praying for setting aside the impugned judgment. The incident as narrated and recorded in the evidence is that a five year old son Asman of the informant Anil Kumar did not return home whereafter the informant lodged a missing report on 22nd January, 2012 before the Station House Officer In-charge, Police Station- Chandpur, District- Bijnor to the effect that he is a resident of village Rasulpur Nagla within the aforesaid police station and that his son named Asman has gone missing on 20th January, 2012 and therefore, the missing report may be registered and appropriate action be taken. On the very next day, the informant Anil Kumar lodged a written report that he had given an information about his missing son yesterday whereafter he received a call on his mobile no. 9917761376 from mobile no. 9675906003 that his son is in the possession of the caller and if the informant pays a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs, his son would be made available. The number of the telephone upon been located by the informant was found by him to be that of the appellant Kiran Pal. The informant also narrated that the person calling on the telephone was clearly recognizable through his voice which was identified by him to be that of Kiran Pal the appellant. The number of the telephone upon been located by the informant was found by him to be that of the appellant Kiran Pal. The informant also narrated that the person calling on the telephone was clearly recognizable through his voice which was identified by him to be that of Kiran Pal the appellant. He therefore made a request that his son is in the possession of Kiran Pal who should be arrested and his son be recovered. At this stage, we may only indicate that the informant Anil Kumar who was examined as PW-2 during trial in his examination-in-chief has stated that between 5:00 and 5:30 am in the morning on 23rd January, 2012, he had received the said mobile call and he had recognized the voice of the appellant Kiran Pal who had demanded the ransom of Rs. 3 lakhs in exchange for his son. The written information by the informant was not recorded as a check FIR but it was entered in the general diary the extract whereof was exhibited as exhibit Ka-4 and was proved during trial. According to the story of the prosecution, the appellant was arrested on the same day at about 2:00 pm and the mobile bearing no. 9675906003 was recovered from him. It may be mentioned that the investigation was set into motion registering Case Crime No. 60 of 2012 under Section 364-A IPC. This is evident from the memo of recovery prepared after taking the appellant into custody on 23rd January, 2012 which records the recovery of a Chinese make black coloured mobile, the number whereof was 9675906003 which is the same number that was disclosed by the informant in his written report. The mobile had a double SIM system, but it had only one SIM containing the IMEI number as referred to in the recovery memo that was exhibited as exhibit Ka-18. The appellant thereafter is stated to have made a self confessional statement disclosing the fact having murdered the missing child Asman and having hidden his dead body amongst bushes at a particular place concealed in a cement plastic bag bearing the letters ACC which is evident from the recovery memo of the dead body exhibited as exhibit Ka-5 and witnessed by Chatar Pal Singh and Sunder Singh. The recovery therefore according to the prosecution was an outcome of the disclosure statement of the appellant in police custody and in the presence of the said witnesses at about 15:30 pm on the same day. A country made pistol was recovered and a rope that was tied around the neck at the hands and foot of the deceased was also recovered that was taken into custody mentioned in the same recovery memo. The inquest report was prepared at about 15:40 pm and against column no. 2 of the inquest report it was mentioned that it was the informant Anil Kumar who had given information about the location of the dead body. We have mentioned this fact as an argument has been advanced on the strength thereof by the learned counsel for the appellant that the aforesaid recital in the inquest memo contradicts the recovery memo which recites the recovery of the dead body having been made on the pointing out of the appellant. The inquest report refers to the five witnesses to the Panchayatnama including the informant, Sunder Singh, Chatar Pal Singh, Kaluva Singh and Tula Ram. Status of the body recovered indicates the place amongst the bushes besides the wheat field of one Kazim of the same village. The body was found tied up with a rope inside the plastic sack with the rope also tied around the neck. The rope was unwound and the cloths on the body are also mentioned in the report. The injury was also noticed namely a blackish deep mark on the neck due to tying of the neck by a rope with contusions. The opinion of the witnesses was also recorded indicating that murder had been committed by tying a rope around the neck of the deceased, and the body was proposed to be sent for postmortem to ascertain the same. The postmortem was conducted by Dr. Gyan Chand who has been examined as PW-5 and the postmortem report has been exhibited as exhibit Ka-12. The postmortem was conducted by Dr. Gyan Chand who has been examined as PW-5 and the postmortem report has been exhibited as exhibit Ka-12. The same indicates the existence of ante mortem injuries, the first being an abrasion of 2.0x0.5cm on the right side of upper part of the face close to the eye, the abrasion of 1.5x1.0cm on the lower part of the right side of face near the mandible level and the third injury is a ligature mark of 22.0x1.0cm to 1.5cm on the upper part of the front side and back of the neck. The tongue was bitten by the teeth, the cause of death has been mentioned as asphyxia as a result of ante mortem strangulation. After the recovery of the dead body the case was converted into an offence under Section 302/201 IPC and the charge sheet appears to have been filed under the said section, whereafter cognizance was taken and the trial proceeded. Constable Naveen Kumar was examined as PW-1 who in his deposition admitted recording of the general diary entering the information of missing on 22nd January, 2012 at about 15:40 pm and proved the same. The first witness of fact examined was Anil Kumar the father of the deceased as PW-2, the second witness of fact examined was Sunil Kumar as PW-3 who deposed before the Court about last having seen the deceased in the company of the appellant and also about the information of his murder. Sohan Lal Sub Inspector of Police deposed as PW-4 to prove the recovery memo as well as other formal documents including the memo of arrest and the inquest report that was prepared after the recovery of the dead body and the other incriminating materials. The doctor who conducted the autopsy was examined as PW-5 namely Dr. Gyan Chand. Head Constable Intezar Ahmad was examined as PW-6 who has proved the contents of the general diary relating to the formalities carried out at the police station. Nanak Chand Hal Sub Inspector of Police deposed before the Court as PW-7 verifying the recovery of the mobile and the arrest of the appellant. Constable Jai Bhagwan was examined as PW-8 who had witnessed the preparation of the inquest report and in whose custody the body was sent for postmortem. Nanak Chand Hal Sub Inspector of Police deposed before the Court as PW-7 verifying the recovery of the mobile and the arrest of the appellant. Constable Jai Bhagwan was examined as PW-8 who had witnessed the preparation of the inquest report and in whose custody the body was sent for postmortem. The Investigating Officer Surya Nath Singh was examined as PW-9 whose testimony assumes importance in view of the arguments that have been advanced on behalf of the appellant. The statement of the accused Kiran Pal was recorded on 09th October, 2013 under Section 313 Cr.P.C, whereafter the Court proceeded to deliver the impugned judgment convicting the appellant and sentencing him as mentioned above on 18.11.2013. The appellant according to the information tendered before the Court has remained in custody through out and is still lodged in jail. Four primary arguments have been advanced by Sri Pundir on behalf of the appellant to contend, that this being a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the conviction and the sentence awarded to the appellant cannot be sustained in law. He submits that the testimony of PW-3 of having last seen the deceased in the company of the appellant on the fatal day is a doctored statement and the witness was planted long after the investigation who came with all together a new statement during trial. The second ground of challenge is that the contents of the conversation for ransom on the mobile were never proved by any evidence much less any cogent evidence and therefore no credibility could be attached to the story of the prosecution that initially began as a case of demand of ransom and consequential murder. The demand of ransom was not proved and therefore motive assigned to the appellant stood demolished. It is for this reason the prosecution carved out a new case of simplicitor murder. The third ground is that the alleged recovery of the dead body on the alleged disclosure statement and confession of the appellant is entirely false, for which reliance has been placed on the second column of the inquest report and also on the contradictions in the statement of witnesses. The third ground is that the alleged recovery of the dead body on the alleged disclosure statement and confession of the appellant is entirely false, for which reliance has been placed on the second column of the inquest report and also on the contradictions in the statement of witnesses. The fourth ground of challenge is that this being a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence much less strong evidence to infer a clear motive on the part of the appellant to have committed the murder of the deceased. It is therefore urged that in the absence of any motive or even the suggestion of a weak motive, the entire links of the chain of events do not get established so as to conclude that the appellant had allegedly committed the murder of the deceased or even otherwise had demanded ransom. The prosecution therefore according to the learned counsel for the appellant has utterly failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant, hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be reversed and the appellant deserves to be acquitted. Countering the said submissions Sri Jai Narain, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the trial court has rightly found the evidence of last seen to have been established, and if the Investigating Officer had committed the lapse of not obtaining the call records of the mobile phone or taking the mobile phone of the complainant into custody, then the same would be at best a lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer and is a minor discrepancy and not a major gap in the investigation so as to warrant disbelieving the entire prosecution story. He submits that the recovery of the mobile of the appellant from him has been proved and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the testimony of the Investigating Officer PW-9 coupled with the proving of the recovery memos on record, there is no doubt that a call had been received by the complainant from the appellant in relation to the possession of the child who had gone missing and was in custody with a demand for ransom. He then submits that the recovery of the dead body on the pointing out of the appellant is sufficient to conclude that the appellant who had a specific knowledge of the dead body having been hidden in a plastic bag and the presumption arising therefrom could not be dislodged by the defence. This strong circumstance therefore completes the link in order to establish the appellants' complicity. On the issue of motive, he submits that the Investigating Officer in his statement as recorded had deposed that a motive was established on the part of the appellant, and therefore, it cannot be said that there is an absolute absence of motive so as to complete the chain of events against the appellant. In rejoinder Sri Pundir reasserted the earlier submissions and urged that the recovery of the body is from an open place and was not in a concealed state so as to draw any inference on the strength of a presumption against the appellant. According to him a criminal would conceal and screen his identity if he has allegedly committed an offence and would not go on telephone to negotiate about the same more so, when according to the postmortem report and the other evidence on record the boy was already dead much before the alleged demand of ransom. He therefore submits that the allegation does not appear to be in the natural course of human conduct, inasmuch as, demanding of ransom after the death of the child by the appellant is absolutely unusual. He further submits that had the murder being committed inside the house and then the body was transported by the appellant, this would have been a different situation but no such evidence has been led. He further submits that the place of murder has been described by the prosecution witness as the place of recovery which is incorrect, inasmuch as, there is no eye witness account or even a probable account by the other witnesses to demonstrate that the murder had taken only at the place of recovery. The confessional statement relied on by the prosecution is inadmissible and there being major lapses in investigation including the absence of call detail records renders the impugned judgment invalid. The confessional statement relied on by the prosecution is inadmissible and there being major lapses in investigation including the absence of call detail records renders the impugned judgment invalid. He also suggests that if the timing of the alleged incident as suggested by the prosecution, which is day light is accepted, then in view of the fact that the place of murder is inside the village itself surrounded by residences, it is impossible to believe that no one could have come to know of the alleged commission of the offence. There is no such indication nor any such witnesses have been produced to prove the case of the prosecution. He has also invited the attention of the Court to the fact that the two witnesses of the recovery memo of the dead body were also not produced to depose before the Court. Thus neither the contents of the mobile were proved nor the last seen incident was explained and established, and therefore even assuming for the sake of arguments, though not admitting, that a recovery had been made, no conviction can be sustained merely on account of recovery in the absence of any other corroborating material. He therefore submits that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the State is unacceptable and the appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. The first submission relating to the appellant having been seen by PW-3 in the company of appellant, we find that PW-3 Sunil Kumar in his cross examination has given the date, time and place specifically identifying the appellant having caught the index finger of the deceased and moving along with him towards his residence. This fact as disclosed in the cross examination has nowhere been contradicted by the said witness during cross examination. He has also categorically stated that he had witnessed this on 20th January, 2012 when he was going to collect his wages from the contractor under whom he had worked. This part of the statement of PW-3 is nowhere diluted nor any evidence has been led by the defence to contradict the same. To the said extent, the statement of PW-3 therefore is consistent and worthy of belief. This part of the statement of PW-3 is nowhere diluted nor any evidence has been led by the defence to contradict the same. To the said extent, the statement of PW-3 therefore is consistent and worthy of belief. In such circumstances, the contentions raised by Sri Pundir that the evidence of last seen is uncorroborated is incorrect and unacceptable, inasmuch as, it is on that day itself and the night intervening that the murder appears to have taken place which is further corroborated by the duration as explained by the postmortem report and also the deposition of Dr. Gyan Chand PW-5 in support thereof. Thus there is no doubt that the deceased was seen last in the company of the appellant immediately proceeding the fatal incident. The second ground raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the conversation and the contents thereof on the mobile for demand of ransom was not proved by any evidence, inasmuch as, admittedly no call detail records were obtained. The said fact appears to be correct inasmuch as the Investigating Officer has admitted in his cross examination that even though the telephone had been put on surveillance no call detail records have been obtained nor were produced or proved before the trial court. There is no material on record to establish that the mobile phone of the informant on which the call was received had been taken into custody and was made a material exhibit. In the said background, learned counsel for the appellant is correct to this extent that the contents of the conversation for ransom were not proved as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relating to electronic records. However, PW-2 in his statement has supported the prosecution version to the effect that the voice of the telephone was recognized by him to be that of the appellant. There is yet another aspect on which doubt is sought to be created about the aforesaid call for ransom, namely, that it was unnatural to assume that the appellant negotiated with the first informant for receiving the ransom even after he had murdered the child. There is yet another aspect on which doubt is sought to be created about the aforesaid call for ransom, namely, that it was unnatural to assume that the appellant negotiated with the first informant for receiving the ransom even after he had murdered the child. This may be a circumstance but the defence has not led any evidence so as to make this doubt probable enough to give benefit to the appellant in this regard even if the prosecution has not been able to establish the same through its evidence. In the aforesaid circumstances, it may not be possible to attach much weight to the mobile call narration of fact as the manner of proving such evidence appears to be suffering from a procedural flaw. This can also be viewed from the point of view of the law as explained by the Apex Court in the case of Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer and others 2014 (10) SCC 473 and in the case of Tomasoo Bruno and another Vs. State of U.P. 2015 (7) SCC 178 and in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru 2005 (11) SCC 600 and in the case of Harpal Singh @ Chhota Vs State of Punjab 2017 (1) SCC 734 . The same has also been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhuwan @ Sonu Vs. State of U.P. Criminal Appeal Nos. 7054 and 7050 of 2006 decided on 2nd May, 2018. We may mention that in the said Division Bench case the mobile phone call record details had been produced and the officials of the telecom company also deposed before the Court whereupon the Division Bench after considering the observations made in the latest decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shafi Mohammad Vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh in SLP No. 2302 of 2017 decided on 30th January, 2018 distinguished the applicability of the aforesaid provisions. In the present case, no electronic records were produced except for the instrument of the mobile that was recovered from the possession of the appellant. The third ground of challenge raised is about the recovery of the dead body. It is correct that the two witnesses to the recovery memo were not produced as witnesses. In the present case, no electronic records were produced except for the instrument of the mobile that was recovered from the possession of the appellant. The third ground of challenge raised is about the recovery of the dead body. It is correct that the two witnesses to the recovery memo were not produced as witnesses. It is also correct that in the second column of the inquest report as is evident from the record mentions the fact that the first person who gave information about the location of the dead body was the informant PW-2. However, the same inquest report on the reverse refers to the fact that the recovery of the dead body was made on the pointing out of the appellant along with the other incriminating articles. The inquest report was prepared at the same place where the recovery was made. This has been explained by the Investigating Officer during his deposition that it was due to inadvertence that the name of the informant had been filled up against column no. 2 and in fact it was only after the disclosure statement of the appellant in police custody that the recovery was made possible from the place from where the body was recovered. In our considered opinion looking to the evidence on record and the findings recorded by the trial court the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the dead body was recovered from an open place cannot be a ground to disbelieve the recovery, inasmuch as, even though the body was recovered hidden amongst bushes at an open place, the same was clearly a concealed inside a cement bag bearing the letters ACC. The body was therefore clearly in concealed state and therefore its recovery from amongst the bushes cannot be treated to be an unclaimed body from an open place. The illustration and the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant therefore is unacceptable. The nature of the concealment of the body cannot be presumed to be in the knowledge of anyone except for the person who had concealed the same in a special manner. This special act of having packed the body in a particular sack or bag therefore can only be in the knowledge of the same person who had concealed the body and thrown it amongst the bushes. This special act of having packed the body in a particular sack or bag therefore can only be in the knowledge of the same person who had concealed the body and thrown it amongst the bushes. This person could be no other than the appellant and it is only he who could have pointed out the location of the body found in the manner described hereinabove. It is not the case that the dead body was lying open in some other open place. The defence has nowhere brought any material on record nor has the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C, given any explanation to avoid this special disclosure that led to the recovery and in our opinion clearly confirms to the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. We are supported in our view on the basis of the law laid down in the case of Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. State of Bihar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 relevant part of which is extracted hereinunder:- "71.The two essential requirements for the application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are that (1) the person giving information must be an accused of any offence and (2) he must also be in police custody. In the present case it cannot be disputed that although these essential requirements existed on the date when Gurbachan Singh led PW 59 and others to the hillock where according to him he had thrown the dead body of Urshia but instead of the dead body the articles by which her body was wrapped were found. The provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and consequently the said information can safely be allowed to be given in evidence because if such an information is further fortified and confirmed by the discovery of articles or the instrument of crime and which leads to the belief that the information about the confession made as to the articles of crime cannot be false. In the present case as discussed above the confessional statement of the disclosure made by the appellant Gurbachan Singh is confirmed by the recovery of the incriminating articles as said above and, therefore, there is reason to believe that the disclosure statement was true and the evidence led in that behalf is also worthy of credence. 72.In the light of the facts stated above we are afraid the two decisions mentioned above and relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants have no application to the facts of the present case and do not advance the case of the appellants challenging the discovery and seizure of the incriminating articles discussed above. In Nari Santa the accused of that case was charged for the theft and it is said that in the course of investigation the accused produced certain articles and thereafter made a confessional statement and it was in these facts and circumstances it was held that there was no disclosure statement within the meaning of Section 27 as the confessional statement was made only when the articles were already discovered having been produced by the accused. Similarly the decision rendered in Abdul Sattar also does not help the appellants in the present case. In the case of Abdul Sattar recovery of wearing apparels of the deceased is said to have been made at the instance of the accused of that case more than three weeks after the occurrence from a public place accessible to the people of the locality and, therefore, no reliance was placed on the disclosure statement and recovery of the wearing apparels of the deceased. But in the present case it was soon after the arrest of appellant Gurbachan Singh that he took the Police Officer while in custody to the place where according to him he had thrown the dead body of Urshia wrapped by the incriminating articles. Those articles were not found lying on the surface of the ground but they were found after unearthing the Khad gaddha dumping ground under the hillock. Those articles were neither visible nor accessible to the people but were hidden under the ground. They were discovered only after the place was pointed out and it was unearthed by the labourers. Those articles were not found lying on the surface of the ground but they were found after unearthing the Khad gaddha dumping ground under the hillock. Those articles were neither visible nor accessible to the people but were hidden under the ground. They were discovered only after the place was pointed out and it was unearthed by the labourers. No fault therefore could be found with regard to the discovery and seizure of the incriminating articles." Consequently, this circumstance of the recovery of the body coupled with the fact of the deceased being in the company of the appellant when he was last seen consolidates the case of the prosecution. The fourth ground of challenge raised is that this is a case of circumstantial evidence and therefore motive assumes importance which could not be proved, inasmuch as, the case of ransom as set up by the prosecution being demanded through a mobile phone was not established by any conclusive evidence. We may point out that another alternative motive has been suggested that the appellant was issueless and since he had been commented upon to be an impotent person, there was likelihood of his having taken revenge by murdering the child of the informant. There is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the said allegation and it is also correct that this may be a weak motive. However, an absence of motive cannot be a ground to throw out the prosecution case as unbelievable if further corroborative evidence to point out the guilt of the appellant is present on record. We are supported in our view by the pronouncement of the Apex Court in paragraph no. 17 of the decision in the case of Nathuni Yadav and others Vs. State of Bihar 1998 (9) SCC 238 extracted hereinuder:- "17. Motive for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area for prosecution. One cannot normally see into the mind of another. Motive is the emotion which impells a man to do a particular act. Such impelling cause need not necessarily he proportionally grave to do grave crimes. Many a murders have been committed without any known or prominent motive. It is quite possible that the aforesaid impelling factor would remain undiscoverable. One cannot normally see into the mind of another. Motive is the emotion which impells a man to do a particular act. Such impelling cause need not necessarily he proportionally grave to do grave crimes. Many a murders have been committed without any known or prominent motive. It is quite possible that the aforesaid impelling factor would remain undiscoverable. Lord Chief Justice Champbell struck a note of caution in Reg v. Palmer (Shorthand Report at page 308 SCC May 1850; thus: "But if there be any motive which can be assigned, I am bound to tell you that the adequacy of that motive is of little importance. We know, from experience of criminal courts that atrocious crimes of this sort have been committed from very slight motives; not merely from malice and revenge, but to gain a small pecuniary advantage, and to drive off for a time pressing difficulties". Though, it is a sound proposition that every criminal act is done with a motive, it is unsound to suggest that no such criminal act can be presumed unless motive is proved. After all motive is a psychological phenomenon. Mere fact that prosecution failed to translate that mental disposition of the accused into evidence does not mean that no such mental Condition existed in She mind of the assailant. In Atlcy v. Slate of U.P., AIR (1955) SC 807 it was held: "That is true; and where there is clear proof of motive for the crime, that lends additional support to the finding of the court that the accused was guilty but absence of clear proof of motive does not necessarily lead to the contrary conclusion," In some cases, it may not be difficult to establish motive through direct evidence. While in some other cases inferences from circumstances may help in discerning the mental propensity of the person concerned. There may also be cases in which it is not possible to disinter the mental transaction of the accused which would have impelled him to act. No proof can be expected in all Cases as to now the mind of the accused worked in a particular situation. Sometimes, it may appear that the motive established is a weak one. That by itself is insufficient to lead to any inference adverse to the prosecution." We further find this to have been reiterated by the Apex Court in paragraph no. Sometimes, it may appear that the motive established is a weak one. That by itself is insufficient to lead to any inference adverse to the prosecution." We further find this to have been reiterated by the Apex Court in paragraph no. 25 in the case of Bipin Kumar Mondal Vs State of West Bengal 2010 (12) SCC 91 which is extracted hereinunder:- "25. In a case relating to circumstantial evidence, motive does assume great importance, but to say that the absence of motive would dislodge the entire prosecution story is giving this one factor an importance which is not due. Motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be fathomed with any degree of accuracy. (Vide Ujagar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 90 ). Thus, the argument that the motive not having been established, disrupts the link of the chain of events so as to disbelieve the prosecution story, cannot be accepted if there is sufficient material on record to corroborate the involvement of the appellant. We have already recorded hereinabove that the appellant was last seen in the company of the deceased and this fact has been established by the Statement of PW-3. The recovery of the dead body from the place which was at the pointing out of the appellant has also been held to have been established by us hereinabove. In our considered opinion no other plausible or probable case has been brought-forth by the defence before us to dislodge the prosecution of the appellant of his involvement in the incident. We therefore do not find any doubt in the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution to prove its case. The procedural flaw in not proving the contents of the mobile phone, in our opinion, does not dilute the chain of events so as to cause such a disruption in order to disbelieve the entire story of the prosecution. This being the position of the evidence that has emerged on record, we see no reason to reverse the judgment of the trial court. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Kiran Pal Vs State of U.P. 2009 (65) ACC 50 and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Makhann Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1988 Supp 1 SCC 526 does not come to the aid of the appellants. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Kiran Pal Vs State of U.P. 2009 (65) ACC 50 and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Makhann Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1988 Supp 1 SCC 526 does not come to the aid of the appellants. We find that in the circumstances of the murder of a young child aged about 5-7 years, it would be apt to remember Daniel Webster who said that every unpunished murder takes away something from the security of every man's life. In the circumstances of this case, our conscience and our conclusions drawn hereinabove does not permit us to grant any benefit of doubt to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.