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2018 DIGILAW 1514 (HP)

Shiv Kumar Sood v. Gram Panchayat Dadahu

2018-08-14

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. By way of instant Regular Second Appeal, challenge has been laid to judgment and decree dated 30.3.2017 passed by the learned District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan in Civil Appeal No. 78-CA/13 of 2016, affirming judgment and decree dated 19.7.2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 66/1 of 2013, whereby suit of the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter, ‘plaintiff’) for decree of declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction came to be dismissed. 2. Succinctly, the facts as emerge from the record are that the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the land measuring 0-2 Biswa out of total land measuring 1-0 Bigha, comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 335 min/494 min, Khasra No. 1108/1069/977/874 min, situate at Mauza Chuli Dadahu, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh, is a Gair Mumkin Rasta as per letter dated 20.9.2012 of the Collector, Sirmaur District at Nahan and is being used by the plaintiff and general public for egress and ingress to their properties since times immemorial without any hindrance from anyone including defendants. Plaintiff also sought relief of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants not to interfere/close said passage by erecting gate, which is likely to stop the passage of the plaintiff leading to his office M/s Ahuja Plastic, Hotel Devicos Plaza and house. Plaintiff further prayed that in case defendants succeed in raising construction of gate to close the path as detailed herein above, during the pendency of the suit, a decree of mandatory injunction may be passed. Plaintiff also averred that Gair Mumkin Rasta as detailed in letter dated 20.9.2012, issued by Collector, Sirmaur is being used by him as well as general public for ingress and egress to their properties and defendants have started interfering in the said path and made an attempt to close the same by erecting a gate, which is likely to stop the passage of the plaintiff leading to his office M/s Ahuja Plastic, Hotel Devicos Plaza and his house. Plaintiff further averred that there was no other passage available to him except the above said path. Allegedly on 27.9.2013, defendant No.1 started interfering in the passage by digging the same for raising construction of a gate. Since despite requests having been made by plaintiff, defendants failed to open the passage, plaintiff was compelled to file the suit. 3. Plaintiff further averred that there was no other passage available to him except the above said path. Allegedly on 27.9.2013, defendant No.1 started interfering in the passage by digging the same for raising construction of a gate. Since despite requests having been made by plaintiff, defendants failed to open the passage, plaintiff was compelled to file the suit. 3. Defendants by way of filing separate written statements refuted the aforesaid claim set up in the plaint. Defendant No.1 raised preliminary objections qua maintainability, non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties, limitation, locus standi and suppression of material facts. On merits, Gram Panchayat, Dadahu, i.e. defendant No.1 claimed that it is not aware of the order passed by Collector on 20.9.2012, as it was not a party to the proceedings conducted by the Collector, Sirmaur. Defendant No.1 further claimed that there is no path being used by the general public for egress and ingress to their properties. It was asserted that in fact in the year 2006, one Vineet Kumar filed CWP No. 374 of 2006 before this Court, wherein land comprised in Khewat No. 335 min, Khatauni No. 505, Khasra No. 1108/1069/977/874 min measuring 17 Biswa, consisting of godown, Gram Sewak Hut and parking was held to be the property of Gram Panchayat Dadahu and this Court ordered delivery of the property/land to the Gram Panchayat Dadahu from the plaintiff. After re-possession by Gram Panchayat, a gate was put at the entrance of the parking in the year 2009 and since then the Gram Panchayat has been using the said property for its exclusive use. It was further averred by defendant No.1 in the written statement that plaintiff opened his gate at the outskirt of the Sehan of his building and started parking his vehicle in the parking of defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 further averred that plaintiff, with a view to divest it of the right accrued in its favour by virtue of judgment dated 22.4.2008 passed by this Court in CWP No. 374 of 2006, procured an order regarding alleged path in connivance with the revenue officials, which does not confer any right upon the plaintiff because said order is not legally binding upon it. Defendant No.1 further averred in the written statement that in October, 2013, defendant leased out parking area to a private contractor for one year and in order to frustrate the act of defendant No. 1, plaintiff filed a frivolous suit as there was no public path being used at any point of time by the public at large including plaintiff. It was pleaded that since the gate stood erected in the year 2009, there is no question of causing any irreparable loss and material injury to the plaintiff. On these averments, dismissal of suit was sought by defendant No.1. 4. Defendant No.2, by way of a separate written statement sought dismissal of the suit for non-compliance of provisions of Order 7 Rule 3 CPC. On merits, it was pleaded that there is no such path/passage, which is being used by the general public for egress and ingress to their properties and instant suit has been filed just to grab the parking land of the Gram Panchayat. It was also averred that defendants never caused any interference to anyone unnecessarily. The Gram Panchayat raised/erected the gate of parking ground in the year 2009 over Khasra No. 1108/1069/977/874 measuring 1 Bigha immediately after the possession of this area of parking, Gram Sewak Hut and Godown was delivered to the Gram Panchayat as per judgment dated 22.4.2008 of this Court passed in CWP No. 374 of 2006. It was specifically denied that the plaintiff has no other path/passage available on the spot and the remedy was available with the plaintiff under the Easements Act. It was further denied by defendant No.2 that on 27.9.2013, defendants started any construction work for erecting the gate as the gate was already erected in the year 2009. In the year 2001, parking place, godown and Gram Sewak Hut of Gram Panchayat Dadahu situate over Khasra No. 977/874 measuring 0-17 Biswa were erroneously leased out to plaintiff through lease deed, which later-on was revoked and the possession of these was taken back by the Gram Panchayat vide Sub Division Collector, Nahan, order dated 7.11.2001. Rest of the averments made in the plaint were also denied. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court, framed following issues on 5.3.2014: “1. Whether the path is in existence on an area measuring two Biswas forming part of the suit land, as alleged? ... OPP 2. Rest of the averments made in the plaint were also denied. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court, framed following issues on 5.3.2014: “1. Whether the path is in existence on an area measuring two Biswas forming part of the suit land, as alleged? ... OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is using the aforesaid passage for egress or ingress to his property since the time immemorial and he has no alternative passage to reach his property, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the defendant no. 1 has erected gate and blocked the passage used by the plaintiff, as alleged? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable as Section 193 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1950 and Section 73 of H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, has not been complied, as alleged? OPD 6. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD 7. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is time barred, as alleged? OPD 8. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed for non-compliance of provisions of Order 7 Rule 3, CPC, as alleged? OPD 9. Whether the plaintiff has suppressed the material facts from the Court, as alleged? OPD 10. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form, as no relief of declaration based on easement rights has been sought, as alleged? OPD 11. Relief.” 6. Subsequently, learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 19.7.2016, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 96 CPC before the learned District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, which came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 30.3.2017, as a consequence of which, judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, plaintiff has approached this Court, in the instant proceedings, praying therein to decree his suit, after setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. 7. In the aforesaid background, plaintiff has approached this Court, in the instant proceedings, praying therein to decree his suit, after setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. 7. Since both the parties agreed for disposal of the appeal at hand at the admission stage, as stands recorded in order dated 18.6.2018, present appeal was taken up for hearing and is being disposed of accordingly. 8. Ms. Shashi Kiran, learned counsel representing the plaintiff, while referring to the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below argued that same are not based upon correct appreciation of the evidence and as such not sustainable and may be set aside. Ms. Shashi Kiran vehemently argued that bare perusal of the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below clearly suggests that there is misreading and misappreciation of evidence adduced on record and as such, impugned judgments and decrees can not be allowed to sustain. While inviting attention of this Court to order dated 20.9.2012, passed by Collector Sirmaur at Nahan, Ms. Shashi Kiran strenuously argued that once revenue authority had specifically concluded that there exists a path over the suit land, learned Courts below had no option but to decree the suit for declaration as well as injunction having been preferred by the plaintiff. 9. However, this court, after having carefully examined evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, be it ocular or documentary, is not persuaded to agree with the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel representing the plaintiff, rather this Court is convinced and satisfied that both the learned Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously. Both the learned Courts below have appreciated the evidence in its right perspective, as such, it can not be concluded that there is misreading or misinterpretation of evidence led on record by the respective parties by the learned Courts below, while adjudicating the suit having been filed by the plaintiff. Plaintiff, who tendered his evidence Ext. PW-1/A deposed that the defendants erected a gate for stopping the passage to his hotel M/s Ahuja Plastic, Hotel Devicos Plaza and house and there is no alternative passage except the aforesaid path, which is being blocked by the defendants. Plaintiff, who tendered his evidence Ext. PW-1/A deposed that the defendants erected a gate for stopping the passage to his hotel M/s Ahuja Plastic, Hotel Devicos Plaza and house and there is no alternative passage except the aforesaid path, which is being blocked by the defendants. It has further come in his evidence that on 27.9.2013, defendants started interfering in the passage by way of raising construction of gate over the passage and despite the requests of the plaintiff, defendants did not pay any heed to the same. However, in his cross-examination, he admitted that he has not arrayed general public as party in the suit. Though in his cross-examination he deposed that there is no alternative path, but plaintiff admitted in his cross-examination that the suit land belongs to Gram Panchayat Dadahu. He denied the suggestion put to him that he being an influential person wanted to grab the land but admitted that one Vineet Kumar had filed a petition before this Court regarding this path and this property along with other parking, Gram Sewak Hut, one government store and forest Department quarters was handed over to the Gram Panchayat through Collector, in terms of judgment rendered by this Court. He further admitted that since then the Gram Panchayat is in possession of this property. Though in the suggestion put to him this witness denied that gate was constructed in the year 2009 but categorically admitted that property in question is being used by Gram Panchayat after passing of order by this Court in CWP No. 374 of 2006. He feigned ignorance that gate was constructed in the year 2009 by Gram Panchayat by spending Rs.10,712/-. 10. PW-2 Ravinder Gupta, who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit, Ext. PW-2/A, admitted in his cross-examination that these days, Pradhan of Gram Panchayat is one Shri Manesh Kumar, who has contested elections against him. He feigned ignorance qua the fact that gate was erected in the year 2009, however, he admitted that the property in question is being used by the Gram Panchayat. He also admitted the factum with respect to passing of judgment by this Court in the Civil Writ Petition. 11. PW-3 Farid Khan brought the record of the office order dated 20.9.2012, Ext. PW-3/A and letter which was addressed to SDM Nahan, Tehsildar and Naib Tehsildar, Dadahu. This letter is not addressed to the Gram Panchayat. 12. He also admitted the factum with respect to passing of judgment by this Court in the Civil Writ Petition. 11. PW-3 Farid Khan brought the record of the office order dated 20.9.2012, Ext. PW-3/A and letter which was addressed to SDM Nahan, Tehsildar and Naib Tehsildar, Dadahu. This letter is not addressed to the Gram Panchayat. 12. PW-4 Shamsher Singh, Kanungo, prepared letter No. 218 dated 17.9.2013 Ext. PW-4/A and this letter was sent to Pradhan, Gram Panchayat as per dispatch No. 217 dated 17.9.2013. In his cross-examination, this witness deposed that he had visited the spot on 9.9.2013 by the order of the Tehsildar Nahan. He deposed further that the suit land was in possession of the Gram Panchayat, Dadahu. He feigned ignorance qua judgment of this Court in case titled Vineet Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, vide which the property was ordered to be handed over to the Gram Panchayat through Collector. He further feigned ignorance qua the fact that gate was erected in the year 2009. In his cross-examination, he admitted that there is an alternative path to the Hotel of plaintiff from the road, which version put forth by this witness is in total contradiction to the statements made by PW-1 and PW-2, wherein they have stated that there is no alternative path to the property of the plaintiff. 13. In the case at hand, plaintiff claimed path through the land of the Gram Panchayat on the ground that there is no alternative path but it stands duly proved on record from the statement of Kanungo PW-4 Shamsher Singh that there is an alternative path to the Hotel of the plaintiff from road. 14. There is yet another interesting fact in the case at hand that the plaintiff claimed that path from the land comprising in Khata Khatauni No. 375/4945, Khasra No. 1108/1069/977/874 measuring 1 Bigha, out of which land measuring 0-2 Biswa is Gair Mumkin Rasta, is blocked by Gram Panchayat in the year 2009, but the fact remains that the suit at hand came to be filed in the year 2013 and it is not understood that in case path was blocked in the year 2009 and there being no other alternative path to the property of the plaintiff, then which path was being used by the plaintiff to access his property. 15. 15. DW-1 Mahesh Kumar, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, deposed that suit land is in possession of the Gram Panchayat, possession whereof was delivered to it by the judgment of this Court in CWP No. 374 of 2006. This witness categorically stated that the gate was constructed at the entrance of the parking in the year 2009 and since then Gram Panchayat is using property in question peacefully for the purpose of parking. This witness further stated that thereafter plaintiff opened his gate at the outskirt of the Sehan of his building and started parking his vehicle in the parking of the defendants in order to divest the right accrued to the Gram Panchayat by judgment dated 22.4.2008, passed by this Court in CWP No. 374 of 2006. This witness further stated that plaintiff in connivance with the revenue officials, procured order of path from the revenue agency for ousting the Gram Panchayat. This witness also deposed that there is no path for ingress and egress to M/s Ahuja Plastic, Hotel Devicos and house over suit land being used by the plaintiff and there is an alternative path available to the aforesaid property. DW-2 Vineet Kumar also tendered his affidavit Ext. DW-2/A and corroborated the version of DW-1. He also placed on record copy of judgment dated 22.4.2008 passed in CWP No. 374 of 2006. 16. DW-3 Sandeep Kumar Walia has also tendered his evidence by way of affidavit as Ext. DW-3/A and corroborated the version put forth by other defence witnesses and categorically stated that there is an alternative path. Careful perusal of cross-examination conducted on these witnesses, nowhere suggest that plaintiff was able to shatter their testimony because all the defence witnesses stuck to their statements made in their examination-in-chief. 17. DW-4 Chaman Lal brought record with regard to the construction of gate at parking i.e. entries in the cash book Ext. DW-4/A, which were recorded in the Panchayat record. He also brought bills of construction of gate Exts. DW-4/B to DW-4/E. In his cross-examination, this witness deposed that the gate was constructed in the parking. 18. DW-5 Manoj Gupta stated that he had issued bills Exts. DW-4/B to DW-4/C and had supplied the material. This witness though admitted that he did not know where the material was to be used by the Gram Panchayat but denied the letter Ext. PW-3/A. 19. 18. DW-5 Manoj Gupta stated that he had issued bills Exts. DW-4/B to DW-4/C and had supplied the material. This witness though admitted that he did not know where the material was to be used by the Gram Panchayat but denied the letter Ext. PW-3/A. 19. Dinesh Sharma, Advocate, while tendering copy of judgment passed by this Court, Ext. DX deposed that suit property came in occupation and possession of defendant No.1 after passing of judgment by this Court in CWP No. 374 of 2006. 20. Perusal of aforesaid judgment, Ext. DX suggests that father of the plaintiff was directed to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of entire property comprising of Gram Sewak Hut and Godown to the Deputy Commissioner as he was not held entitled to occupy the same and as such, learned Courts below rightly arrived at a conclusion that plaintiff has no right, title or interest over the suit property. Moreover, in the case at hand, plaintiff has failed to prove on record that cause of action, if any, accrued in his favour in the year 2013, rather it stands duly proved on record that gate was erected on the suit property in the year 2009, as has been stated by all the defence witnesses. Defendant No.1 by producing ample evidence, be it ocular or documentary, successfully proved on record that construction material was purchased in the year 2009 and same was utilized for the erection of gate on the suit property. Photographs, Mark A to H further corroborate the version put forth by the defence witnesses and falsifies the stand of the plaintiff that gate in question came to be erected in the year 2013. It stands duly proved on record that the plaintiff is having an alternative path and as such, relief sought by him by way of decree of declaration can not be granted. So far communication dated 20.9.2012 passed by Collector, Sirmaur, is concerned, same is of no relevance in view of the judgment rendered by this Court in CWP No. 374 of 2006, wherein admittedly father of the plaintiff was declared to be an encroacher and was directed to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of entire property consisting of Gram Sewak Hut and Godown to the Deputy Commissioner. Otherwise also, if the aforesaid letter is read and perused carefully, it suggests that the Tehsildar Nahan, District Sirmaur vide communication dated 15.9.2012 apprised the Collector, Sirmaur at Nahan that the path measuring 2 Biswa on Khasra No. 1108/1069/977/874 measuring 1 Bigha exists and same is being used by the concerned persons since times immemorial. He further informed the Collector that though land is recorded as Banjar Kadeem and is in the ownership of the Government of Himachal Pradesh, but same may be recorded as path in the revenue record to avoid any dispute in future. On the basis of aforesaid recommendations made by Tehsildar, Nahan, Collector Sirmaur, without associating defendant No.1, Gram Panchayat Dadahu, ordered 2 Biswa of land in aforesaid Khasra number to be recoded as path. Though the record suggests/reveals that communication dated 20.9.2012 was brought on record by the plaintiff but otherwise it has no relevance, especially in view of findings recorded by this Court in CWP No. 374 of 2006, whereby land comprising of Khewat No. 335 min Khatauni No. 505 Khasra No. 1108/1069/977/874 min measuring 17 Biswa was ordered to be delivered to the Gram Panchayat, Dadahu. Finding given by this Court in CWP No. 374 of 2006 has attained finality because, admittedly, no appeal whatsoever has been filed against the same. 21. This court has no hesitation to conclude that both the learned Courts below have appreciated evidence in its right perspective and there appears to be no error of law, if any, committed by the learned Courts below, in passing the impugned judgments and decrees and no question of law much less substantial question of law arises in the present appeal for determination/adjudication by this Court. 22. Now, it would be appropriate to deal with the specific objection raised by the learned counsel representing the defendants with regard to maintainability and jurisdiction of this Court, while examining concurrent findings returned by both the Courts below. Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, Advocate, invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 23. Perusal of the judgment, referred hereinabove, suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. There can be no quarrel (dispute) with regard to aforesaid observation made by the Court and true it is that in normal circumstances High Courts, while exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, are restrained from reappreciating the evidence available on record. 24. In this regard reliance is placed upon judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through LRs and Others vs. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs and Others, (2013)15 SCC 161 wherein the Court held: “35. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 , wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para 24, which is extracted below : (SCC pp.555-56) “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case to hold that the High Court has framed substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and there is no error in the judgment of the High Court in this regard and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same.” (pp.174-175) 25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Parminder Singh versus Gurpreet Singh, Civil Appeal No. 3612 of 2009, decided on 25.7.2017, has held as under: “(14) In our considered opinion, the findings recorded by the three courts on facts, which are based on appreciation of evidence undertaken by the three Courts, are essentially in the nature of concurrent findings of fact and, therefore, such findings are binding on this Court. Indeed, such findings were equally binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal. (15) It is more so when these findings were neither found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings nor these findings were found to be against the evidence, nor against the pleadings and lastly, nor against any provision of law.” 26. It is quite apparent from aforesaid exposition of law that concurrent findings of facts and law recorded by both the learned Courts below can not be interfered with unless same are found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings. In the case at hand, as has been discussed in detail, there is no perversity as such in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, rather same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence as such, deserve to be upheld. 27. In the case at hand, as has been discussed in detail, there is no perversity as such in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, rather same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence as such, deserve to be upheld. 27. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above, I find no merit in the appeal at hand, which is accordingly dismissed. Judgment and decree 30.3.2017 passed by the learned District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan in Civil Appeal No. 78-CA/13 of 2016 are upheld. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, are vacated.