Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1517 (RAJ)

Dinesh Arora v. Vibhore Kapoor

2018-07-18

ALOK SHARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT : ALOK SHARMA, J. 1. Under challenge is the order dated 12.09.2017 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 426/2013 whereby the two applications filed by the petitioner-tenant-defendant (hereinafter ‘tenant’), one under Section 21 of the Act of 2001 (hereinafter ‘the Act of 2001’) read with Section 151 CPC dated 30.01.2014 and the other under Section 15(4) of the Act of 2001 read with Section 21 of the Act of 2001 have been dismissed. 2. The Rent Tribunal in its impugned order has negating the tenant’s case held that the rejoinder to the reply to the eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord-plaintiff (hereinafter ‘landlord’) be taken on record as on reply to the eviction filed on 25.11.2013, the Rent Tribunal had fixed the date of 4.1.2014 for filing the rejoinder when the rejoinder, actually came to be filed. 3. The case of the tenant before the Rent Tribunal as also before this court advocated by Mr. Anil Upman is that in terms of Section 15(4) of the Act of 2001, the petitioner could file a rejoinder to the reply to the eviction petition only within a period of 30 days from the date of the reply being filed. He submitted that admittedly reply having been filed on 25.11.2013 the rejoinder in terms of Section 15(4) of the Act of 2001 had to be filed on or before 24.12.2013 but was filed on 04.01.2014-after about forty days and could not be taken on record. Mr. Anil Upman further submitted that in fact the Rent Tribunal has no authority to extend the time for filing a rejoinder beyond the time provided under Section 15(4) of the Act of 2001. He submitted that the period of 30 days for filing a rejoinder constitutes a special limitation which excludes by implication, the provision of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter ‘the Act of 1963’). Mr. Anil Upman submitted that even otherwise the rejoinder could not have taken on record for reasons of the fact that there was no application for condonation of delay beyond 30 days following the filing of the reply by resort to Section 5 of the Act of 1963, even if the Act of 1963 were to apply. Mr. Anil Upman relied upon the judgment in the case of Nasirudin v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003 (1) RCR 337) in support of his contention. 4. I have heard Mr. Mr. Anil Upman relied upon the judgment in the case of Nasirudin v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003 (1) RCR 337) in support of his contention. 4. I have heard Mr. Anil Upman and perused the impugned order. 5. The Rent Tribunal has negated the submission of the delay in filing of the rejoinder to the reply to the eviction petition on the ground that in terms of its own order dated 25.11.2013 rejoinder was to be filed before the next dated fixed on 04.01.2014. And it was so filed. On the objections on merit to the rejoinder the Tribunal held that no averment therein tantamounted to a new ground or fact for the eviction of the tenant and the rejoinder was limited to controverting the averments in the reply to the eviction petition. So holding the tribunal has dismissed the two applications at the instance of the tenant, differently agitating the same issue, vide the impugned order dated 12.09.2017. 6. I am of the considered view that on the principle that an unsolicited act of the court by itself cannot prejudice anyone, this petition has to fail. Actus curiae neminem gravabit is a well accepted maxim of equity. The Apex Court in (2015) 16 SCC 31 Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech Private Limited held that when the facts of the case so warrant, the court’s should invoke the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit meaning that an act of the court shall prejudice no man. It was further held that a person cannot be penalized for no fault of his and the act of the court would cause no prejudice to one’s rights. The maxim is founded upon justice and good cause and affords a safe and certain guide for administration of justice as the principle is fundamental to any system of justice. There is thus no force in the contention of Mr. Anil Upman with regard to the purported delay in filing of the rejoinder despite it being filed within the date fixed by the Rent Tribunal as it is an admitted fact that on reply to the eviction petition filed on 25.11.2013, the matter was indeed put up by the order of the Rent Tribunal for 04.01.2014 specifically for the purpose of filing a rejoinder. And no objection to time granted to filing of the rejoinder beyond the period of 30 days of the reply was taken at the relevant time. 7. In this view of the matter and the rejoinder admittedly not setting up a new case or new facts in support of the eviction petition, as found by the Tribunal in its impugned order the petition deserves dismissal. For the view taken above, I am of the view that it is not necessary to go into the issue agitated as to the whether the time for filing of rejoinder can be granted by the Tribunal for a period beyond 30 days subsequent to filing of reply to the eviction petition. Petition dismissed.