JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Pankaj Patel, learned counsel for petitioner, Sri R.C. Tewari, learned counsel for respondent and perused the record. 2. With the consent of parties, the writ petition is decided at the admission stage. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that one Sri S.K. Awasthi who was imprisoned in Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad, in pursuance of the directions issued by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad in compliance of the order dated 22.04.2008 passed by this Court in Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 5335 of 2008, fallen ill, so in order to provide medical treatment, hospitalized in Swaroop Rani Nehru Hospital, Allahabad w.e.f. 10.05.2008 to 13.05.2008 and on 13.05.2008 during his treatment. And respondent No. 1/Vijay Singh who was posted as Bandi Rakshak in Central Jail, Naini was deputed in the security duty of prisoner S.K. Awasthi in the hospital along with other personnel. 4. It is submitted on behalf of petitioner that respondent No. 1/Vijay Singh has tied hands and legs of S.K. Awasthi by bell chain with the Bed in the hospital, the same is in violation of circulars issued by the Jail headquarters. 5. So, the enquiry has been conducted against the respondent No. 1 as per the provisions of U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1999). After completion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer, submitted the inquiry report to the Punishing Authority/Senior Superintendent of Jail, Naini, Allahabad/petitioner No. 3 who has issued a show cause notice to which he submitted reply. 6. After taking into consideration the reply of the respondent to the show cause, punishment order dated 05.02.2009 has been passed against the respondent No. 1 by punishing authority/respondent No. 3 thereby withholding five annual increments with future effects as well s recovery order dated 03.09.2010 has been passed against respondent No. 1, challenged by filing an appeal before the appellate authority, the same was dismissed by order dated 04.09.2009. 7. Punishment order as well as appellate order were challenged by filing Claim Petition No. 2160 of 2010 (Vijay Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others). 8. 7. Punishment order as well as appellate order were challenged by filing Claim Petition No. 2160 of 2010 (Vijay Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others). 8. After exchange of the pleadings, the Tribunal on the basis of material on record was partly allowed the same, the order dated 05.07.2016 reads as under:- ^^funsZ’k ;kfpdk vkaf’kd #i ls Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA ;kph ds fo#/n foi{kh la0&3] miegkfujh{kd ¼dkjkxkj½] bykgkckn ifj{ks=] bykgkckn }kjk ikfjr olwyh vkns’k fnukad 03-09-2010 ¼vuqyxUud&3½ LFkfxr fd;k tkrk gSA foi{khx.k dks ;g funsZf’kr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;kph ls ‘kklu dks gqbZ foRrh; Nkrh fd olwyh dk fuj;.k ysus ds iwoZ ;kph dks dkj.k crkvks uksfVl fuxZr dj mls vius cpko dk volj Ánku djrs gq, bl lEcU/k esa fof/k ds vuq#i vkns’k ikVhZ djasA mijksDr ds vfrfjDr foi{khx.k dks ;g funsZf’kr fd;k tkrk gSA fd os fu.kZ; esa mfYyf[kr rdksZa] rF;kas o foospuk ds vkyksd esa ;kph dks fn, x, naM fd ek=k ij iquj fopkj djsa] rc rd ;kph ds fo#/n ikfjr n.Mkns’k fnukad 05-02-2009 ¼vuqyxUud &1½ o vihyh; vkns’k fnukad 04-09-2009 ¼vuqyxUud &2½ dk fØ;kUo;u LFkfxr jgsxkA mDr leLr dk;Zokgh bl vkns’k fnukad 04-09-2009 ¼vuqyxUud &2½ dk fØ;kUo;u LFkfxr jgsxkA mDr leLr dk;Zokgh bl vkns’k fd ÁkIrh ds 04 ekg ds vanj lEikfnr dj yh tk;sA** 9. We have heard learned counsel for parties and gone through the record. 10. In order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, we feel appropriate to consider the meaning of the word "stay order/LFkfxr" first. 11. In the law Lexicon (at page 180) "stay order" is defined as under:- "The stay of operation of an order only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative form the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. V. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras, AIR 1992 SC 1439 , 1444 (Constitution of India Art. 226) 12. In Words and Phrases (permanent Edition) Vol.-40 page 374, the "stay order" is defined as" "A "stay order" or a "stay of proceedings," is a stopping, the act of arresting a judicial proceeding by the order of a court or the temporary suspension of the regular order of proceedings in a cause by direction or order of the court." 13. In Words and Phrases (permanent Edition) Vol.-40 page 374, the "stay order" is defined as" "A "stay order" or a "stay of proceedings," is a stopping, the act of arresting a judicial proceeding by the order of a court or the temporary suspension of the regular order of proceedings in a cause by direction or order of the court." 13. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. V. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras, (1992) 3 SCC 1 , has interpreted the word stay order in the following terms: "While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence." 14. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board, (1997) 5 SCC 772 explained the meaning of the word stay order as under:- "It is equally well settled that an order of stay granted pending disposal of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding, comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceeding and that it is the duty of the court in such a case to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim order of the court." 15. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of B.P.L. Ltd. and ors. Vs. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of B.P.L. Ltd. and ors. Vs. R. Sudhakar and ors., 2004 (7) SCC 219 , after placing reliance on its earlier judgment in the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India and Others (1994) Supp (2) SCC 641, in para No. 14 held as under:- "Dealing with the staying of the operation of the order of disqualification, passed by the Speaker of the Assembly in regard to two members of the House, this Court held that the order of disqualification made by the Speaker dated 13.12.1990 was not operative and consequently it could not be said that they were not members of Goa Assembly. The Court, looking to the terms of the interim order and its effect on the disqualification of the members on the relevant date, held, it is settled law that an order, even though interim in nature, is binding till it is set aside by a competent court". Similarly, in the present case also looking to the terms of the interim order granted by the High Court staying the very operation of order of reference it could not be said that dispute was pending before the Tribunal on the relevant date, viz., the date on which the workmen were dismissed from service." 16. In the case of State of Gujrat and others Vs. Dilipbhai Shaligram Patil, (2006) 8 SCC 72 , Hon'ble the Apex Court in para Nos. 5 and 7 held as under:- "Para No. 5 -It is well settled that an order granting pending disposal of the writ petition/suit or other proceedings, comes to an end with the disposal of the substantive proceedings and that it is the duty of the Court in such a case to put the parties in the same position, they would have been but for the interim orders of the Court. Any other view would result in the act or order of the court prejudicing the party for no fault of his and would also mean rewarding writ petitioner in spite of his failure. Any such unjust consequence cannot be countenanced by the courts. [(See Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. 1997 (5) SCC 772 )] "Para No. 7 – Merely because an interim order had been passed pursuant to which reinstatement had been done, that cannot be a ground for allowing relief. Any such unjust consequence cannot be countenanced by the courts. [(See Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. 1997 (5) SCC 772 )] "Para No. 7 – Merely because an interim order had been passed pursuant to which reinstatement had been done, that cannot be a ground for allowing relief. (See Union of India v. Narender Singh ( 2005 (6) SCC 106 ). 17. In the case of Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and others (2010)9) SCC 437, Hon'ble the Apex Court in para Nos. 15 and 16 held as under:- "Para No. 15 – No litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the Court. The fact that the case is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, or the party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim "Actus Curiae neminem gravabit", which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a situation the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by the delayed action of the Court. (vide: Dr. A.R. Sircar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 734; Shiv Shanker & Ors. v. Board of Directors, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Anr., 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 726; the Committee of Management, Arya Inter College, Arya Nagar, Kanpur & Anr. v. Sree Kumar Tiwary & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 3071 ; GTC Industries Ltd. v. 10 Union of India & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1566 ; and Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C.L. Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423 ). Para No. – 16 – In Ram Krishna Verma & Ors. v. Sree Kumar Tiwary & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 3071 ; GTC Industries Ltd. v. 10 Union of India & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1566 ; and Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C.L. Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423 ). Para No. – 16 – In Ram Krishna Verma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 1888 , this Court examined the issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Limited v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 656 and held that no person can suffer from the act of the Court and in case an interim order has been passed and the petitioner takes advantage thereof, and ultimately the petition stands dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralized. Thus, the position which is emerged out is that by merely passing of a stay order the operation of the order which is under challenge is kept in abeyance/non-operative from the date when the stay order is passed but it does not mean that the effect of the said order is nullified or wiped out and stay order finally merged in the final decision given in the matter in question in which the same is passed. 18. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the position which emerges out is that by means of impugned order dated 05.07.2016, the Tribunal has stayed the operation of the recovery order dated 03.09.2010, punishment order dated 05.02.2009 and appellate order dated 04.09.2009 and issued direction as mentioned therein, the said action on the part of Tribunal is without jurisdiction rather non-est because by staying an order/ LFkfxr its effect has been kept in abeyance but it does not mean that the same is quashed or nullified because without quashing the said orders Tribunal cannot issue the direction as mentioned in the impugned order to the respondent. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 05.07.2016 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide a fresh in accordance with law expeditiously, say, within a period of three months from the date of receiving certified copy of this order.