JUDGMENT : S.B. SHUKRE, J. 1. Heard. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. 3. Heard finally by consent. 4. This is a case which involves an objection taken to the transfer of land from a tribal, one Zitru Atram father of respondent Nos. 3 to 5 to Natthu Laxman Rajurkar husband of respondent Nos. 6 and father of respondent Nos. 7 to 11 respectively. This land was subsequently purchased from Natthuji Rajurkar by the petitioners. The respondent Nos. 3 to 5, being the sons of Zitru Atram, original land owner and the tribal, took an objection under the provision of Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 (in short “MRLS Tribes Act, 1974”) for cancellation of sale-deed and restoring the land to them, it having been transferred by Zitru Atram, in violation of the provision of Section 36A of this Act. 5. The question has been answered in favour of respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 by the Tahsildar and the Competent Authority by passing an order on 9th February, 2016 which it was further confirmed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal when it dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner on 17.1.2018. 6. In the case of Tukaram S/o Laxman Gandewar vs. Piraji S/o Dharmaji Sidarwar, died through LRs. 1989 (3) Bom. C.R. 156, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the protection under the said Act is available to a tribal, who has been declared to be a tribal and included in the list of tribes under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe order, on the date of transfer of land. There is no quarrel about the principle so laid down in this case. But, the question is as to on what date the transfer of the subject land was effected and this can be answered by considering the admitted facts and the law applicable to them. 7. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the sale-deed of the subject land was executed by Zitru Atram in favour of Natthuji Rajurkar on 27.4.1965 and its registration was done on 29.4.1965. It is also not in dispute that Zitru Atram belongs to “Pardhan Tribe” which was not declared to be Scheduled Tribe till 29th April, 1965. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the sale-deed of the subject land was executed by Zitru Atram in favour of Natthuji Rajurkar on 27.4.1965 and its registration was done on 29.4.1965. It is also not in dispute that Zitru Atram belongs to “Pardhan Tribe” which was not declared to be Scheduled Tribe till 29th April, 1965. It is also not in dispute that the tribe “Pardhan” was notified to be a Scheduled Tribe w.e.f. 29th April, 1965. In the light of these facts established on record, let us now consider the law relied upon by both sides. 8. Shri A.V. Bhide, learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case pertaining to lease deed reported as Thakur Kishan Singh (dead) vs. Arvind Kumar, AIR 1995 SC 73 : 1994 (6) SCC 591 . 9. Shri M.P. Khajanchi, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 to 5, the contesting parties relies upon the cases of Har Narain (dead) by LRs. vs. Mam Chand (dead) by LRs. and Others, (2010) 13 SCC 128 and Ghanshyam Sarda vs. Sashikant Jha, Director, M/s. J.K. Jute Mills Company Limited and Others, (2017) 1 SCC 599 . 10. In the case of Thakur Kishan Singh (supra) considering the effect of Section 47 of the Registration Act upon a lease deed executed on one date and registered on a subsequent date with some gap in between, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is well established that a document so long as it is not registered is not valid, yet once it is registered, it takes effect from the date of its execution. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the lease deed that was executed on 5th December, 1949 and registered on 3rd April 1950, conferred interest in the property upon the lessee from the date on which the lease deed was executed and that was by operation of law. 11. However, the principle so laid down in Thakur Kishan Singh was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its two judgments and both these judgments show that it has been explained in terms of the relevant observations made in both these judgments for its appropriate application to the instances of the sale deed. It will be useful for us to first refer to the relevant observations made in both these cases. 12. It will be useful for us to first refer to the relevant observations made in both these cases. 12. In the case of Ghanshyam Sarda (supra) in paragraph 19 the observations which are useful for the present purpose have been made and they read thus: “The document dated 4.4.2013 did not by itself create any interest nor did the title pass upon execution of such document on 4.4.2013 but it was only after the registration on 2.7.2014 that the title in Katihar property passed from the Company in favour of the transferee. The submission of the contemnors however, is that by virtue of Section 47 of the Registration Act, the document in question would operate from 4.4.2013. In our view, the principle embodied in Section 47 of the Registration Act is completely for different purposes. Insofar as the issue of transfer is concerned, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is the governing principle, which is quite clear. It is the date of registration of document which is crucial inasmuch as the transfer is effected and the title passes only upon registration. Viewed thus, it is clear that Katihar property was transferred in the teeth of the order of 8.5.2014 and ex facie there has been violation of the order passed by this Court. It is crucial to note that on 8.5.2014, the Company had appeared on caveat before this Court and certainly had express knowledge about the order of 8.5.2014. It was party to the proceedings and was bound by the order passed by this Court in every respect.” 13. In the case of Thakur Kishan Singh (supra) the principle of law laid down in the case of Ram Saran Lall vs. Mst. Domini Kuer, AIR 1961 SC 1747 was considered. The principle is that the object of Section 47 is to decide which of two or more registered instruments in respect of same property is to be given effect to and that the act of giving effect to an instrument has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore, would have no concern with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. It was also held in Ram Saran Lall (supra) that a sale which is not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because of the provision of Section 47 of the Registration Act. This principle of law was reiterated in the case of Har Narain (supra) and it was held that the sale of immovable property becomes complete and effective only when it stands registered and that fiction of Section 47 of the Registered Act is not applicable to deed of sale and immovable property before its actual registration. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court appearing in paragraph 14, 15 and 16 are reproduced thus: “14. A similar issue though in a case of right of preemption was considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ram Saran Lall vs. Domini Kuer by the majority of 3:2 the Court came to the conclusion that as the mere execution of the sale deed could not make the same effective and registration thereof was necessary, it was of no consequence unless the registration was made. Thus, in spite of the fact that the 1908 Act (sic registration) could relate back to the date of execution in view of the provisions of Section 47 of the 1908 Act, the sale could not be given effect to prior to registration. However, as the sale was not complete until the registration of instrument of sale is complete, it was not completed prior to the date of its registration. The Court held: (AIR p.1749, para 8) "8........Section 47 of the Registration Act does not, however, say when sale would be deemed to be complete. It only permits a document when registered, to operate from a certain date which may be earlier than the date when it was registered. The object of this section is to decide which of two or more registered instruments in respect of the same property is to have effect. The section applies to a document only after it has been registered. It has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore, nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. The section applies to a document only after it has been registered. It has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore, nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of Section 47 the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date. Therefore, we do not think that the sale in this case can be said, in view of Section 47 to have been completed on 31.1.1946." (Emphasis added) 15. This view has subsequently been followed and approved by this Court as is evident from the judgments in Hiralal Agrawal vs. Rampadarath Singh, Sk. Mohammad Rafiq vs. Khalilul Rehman, Thakur Kishan Singh vs. Arvind Kumar and Chandrika Singh vs. Arvind Kumar Singh. 16. However, all these cases are related to right to preemption though the legal issue involved therein remained the same. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that in spite of the fact that the registration of the sale deed would relate back to the date of execution, the sale can not be termed as complete until its registration and it becomes effective only once it stands registered. Thus, the fiction created by Section 47 of the 1908 Act, does not come into play before the actual registration of the document takes place.” 14. So, it is clear that the transfer of an immovable property having value of Rs.100/or more, would be complete, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, only upon the date of registration of the transfer or sale and the effect of Section 47 of the Registration Act is only confined to making the registration of instrument of sale relate back to the date of execution of the deed. 15. In the present case, we have already seen that registration of the sale-deed took place on 29th April, 1965 and therefore, in view of the law crystallized by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforestated cases, it would be this date which would have to be taken as the date on which the sale was effected and completed in terms of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. If it is seen like this, I do not think any difficulty would arise in determining the question involved in the present case. The tribe of Zitru Atram was declared to be a Scheduled Tribe w.e.f. 29th April 1965 and that would mean that on the date on which the sale was completed in the instant case, the provision of the law requiring seeking of prior permission was applicable to the transaction of sale and as it was not taken, the transfer of the land by sale was hit by the prohibition under the law. 16. Having discussed so, I find that the orders impugned in the present case have been passed by the authorities below by following settled principles of law and therefore, leave no scope for making any interference with them at least on this aspect. 17. As regards the objection about the application filed before the competent authority seeking restoration of the land was beyond limitation, I find that this objection too is not tenable and has been rightly rejected by the authorities below, the reason being that the limitation period has been extended by a subsequent notification till the year 2034. Thus, I find no merit in this petition and it deserves to be dismissed. 18. The writ petition stands dismissed. No costs. 19. Rule is discharged accordingly.