JUDGMENT : NIRMALJIT KAUR, J. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-tenant challenging the Order and Judgment dated 03.02.2017 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur and affirmed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur vide Order and Judgment dated 27.09.2017 with respect to the Issue No. 2 regarding the bonafide need of the respondent-landlord. The second prayer of the petitioner-tenant is with regard to the Issue No. 1 seeking a direction to be issued to the Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur Metropolitan to return a finding with respect-to the Issue No. 1 regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant, which the Rent Appellate Tribunal has not given’ in spite of the direction given by the learned Division Bench of this Court vide Order dated 17.10.2016 passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 702/2016 vide which the matter was remanded back to the Rent Tribunal. 2. An eviction suit was filed by the respondent-landlord. In the said eviction suit, two issues were framed. Firstly, whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and secondly, whether there existed a bonafide need. The Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur vide its Order and Judgment dated 25.11.2011, decided the first issue in favour of the petitioner-tenant and therefore, dismissed the eviction suit on the said ground. Being aggrieved with the said order, the respondent-landlord challenged the same before the Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur. The Rent Appellate Tribunal vide its Order and Judgment dated 04.07.2014 set aside the order of the Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur by deciding the Issue No. 1 with respect to the relationship of the landlord and tenant in favour of the respondent-landlord and remanded the matter back to the Rent Tribunal to decide the issue of bonafide need. The said order of remand was 1 challenged before the learned Single Bench of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13918/2015. The said writ petition was dismissed vide Order dated 23.08.2016. The petitioner-tenant challenged the same before the learned Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 702/2016. The learned Division Bench disposed of the appeal with the 1 following direction: “Any interference with the order of remand by the Appellate Tribunal at this stage will only lead to further litigation without finality to the eviction suit. This observation however cannot be construed as any affirmation of the order of the Appellant Tribunal. The learned Division Bench disposed of the appeal with the 1 following direction: “Any interference with the order of remand by the Appellate Tribunal at this stage will only lead to further litigation without finality to the eviction suit. This observation however cannot be construed as any affirmation of the order of the Appellant Tribunal. Till both the issues are not decided all possibilities remain open. It shall be open for the aggrieved to question the order of the Rent Controller on all issues including the issues with regard to the landlord tenant relationship after the Rent Controller passes any fresh orders. Considering the age of the eviction suit, counsel for the parties are further agreed that the Rent Controller be directed to dispose the suit in accordance with law within a maximum period of six months from the date of receipt and/or presentation of a copy of this order unless the time is extended by the Court. The appeal is disposed with observations.” 3. Thereafter, the Rent Tribunal recorded the finding with respect to the issue of bonafide need only and did not go into the issue of relationship between the landlord-tenant as the order of the appellate court and the learned Single Bench was not specifically set aside. The Rent Appellate Tribunal too did not rehear the issue of landlord-tenant relationship as the order of the learned Single Bench on the said issue remained intact. Now, the present writ petition has been filed, inter alia, on the ground that the Rent Tribunal was required to go into the issue of landlord-tenant relationship which he has not done in spite of the observations of the learned Division Bench directing that “this observation however cannot be construed as any affirmation of the order of the Appellate Tribunal” as also the observation that “it was open to both the parties to question the order of the Rent Tribunal on all issues including the issue with regard to the landlord “tenant relationship”. However, it was incumbent upon the Rent Tribunal to decide the said issue afresh which he has not done. However, it was incumbent upon the Rent Tribunal to decide the said issue afresh which he has not done. Thus, the order of the learned Single Bench dated 23.08.2016 not having been specifically set aside by the learned Division Bench while remanding the matter back to the Rent Tribunal, the Rent Tribunal and the Rent Appellate Tribunal did not go into the said issue afresh, although, there was a specific direction that all the issue including the issue with regard to the landlord-tenant relationship could be questioned by both the parties. 4. While hearing the present writ petition, learned counsel for the parties agreed that both the issues can be decided by this Court in the present writ petition afresh on merits with an understanding that neither of the parties shall challenge the order passed by this Court on the ground that the matter should have been remanded back to the Rent Tribunal to decide the issue of landlord-tenant relationship afresh. This submission was duly recorded by this Court in its Order dated 14.02.2018 and the matter was accordingly ordered to be admitted for final disposal. Accordingly, this Court proceeded to hear the same. 5. The arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant qua the Issue No. 1 are as under:— 1. The respondent No. 3 preferred an application for eviction under Section 9 (i) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 on the basis of a will dated 06.06.1993 executed by Late Chhotu Lal and by way of said will, the respondent No. 3 had become the landlord, whereas, the petitioner - tenant had filed reply to the said application stating that the respondent No. 3 has never collected the rent from the petitioner in his capacity as landlord but as an agent of Chhotu Lal. The will was never probated. The property has not been transferred to the respondent No. 3 till date. The will has not been proved. There are other legal heirs of Chhotu Lal including the father and other siblings. Since the respondent No. 3 could not prove that he has, inherited the property, the eviction petition should have been dismissed on this ground alone. The plea of the petitioner that he was the landlord not having been proved, the eviction petition was not maintainable at his behest. 2. Since the respondent No. 3 could not prove that he has, inherited the property, the eviction petition should have been dismissed on this ground alone. The plea of the petitioner that he was the landlord not having been proved, the eviction petition was not maintainable at his behest. 2. The specific plea of the respondent No. 3 in his suit was that he is the owner in view of the will having been executed in his favour by his grand-father Chhotu Lat. The petitioner had filed the specific reply that the will has not been proved. There was no denial of the facts pleaded by the petitioner in his reply but the Rent Appellate Tribunal travelled beyond the ambit of eviction petition and created a new ground on its own by accepting the right of the respondent to file the eviction petition on the ground that it was not necessary to be the landlord before filing the eviction petition and that on the death of the landlord, if any person has the right to collect the rent, such a person becomes the landlord to the said extent and can file the eviction petition against the tenant of the said premises and since he had right to collect the rent, he also had right to file the eviction petition and moreover, he was also one of the legal heirs of Late Chhotu Lal. This ground was never raised by the respondent No. 3 in his pleadings and hence, the eviction petition could not have been held maintainable on a new ground, which was not a part of the pleadings. Reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of A.V.G.P. Chettiar & sons v. T. Palanisamy Gounder reported in 2002 (5) SCC 337 to contend that the case cannot be decided outside the pleadings of the parties. Para 43 of the said judgment reads thus:— “43. The High Court's reasoning was far removed from the pleadings of the respondent. The respondent had claimed that Gowthaman was the absolute owner of the suit property and that such absolute interest had been purchased by the respondent. Given this pleading the respondent could not be allowed to set up a different case and take shelter behind the definition of ‘landlord’ in the Act. The respondent had claimed that Gowthaman was the absolute owner of the suit property and that such absolute interest had been purchased by the respondent. Given this pleading the respondent could not be allowed to set up a different case and take shelter behind the definition of ‘landlord’ in the Act. The definition of ‘landlord’ is an enabling provision in the sense that it enables persons who are not the owners to ask for eviction under the Act. But it does not mean that a person who has claimed to be the landlord qua owner can jettison his case as pleaded in his eviction petition and establish his claim on the basis that he was otherwise entitled to claim as landlord of the suit premises. As held in Mis. Trojan & Co. v. RM N.N. Nagappa Chettiar: “It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found.” 6. Reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rishab Chand Bhandari (Dead) by LR's v. National Engineering Industry Limited reported in 2009 (10) SCC 601 to contend that the definition of landlord in the Act cannot be read to mean that his agent can also file an eviction petition just because he is collecting the rent and referred to Para 7 and 8 of the said judgment, which read as under:— “7. The natural landlord of a premises is ordinarily the owner. However, an expanded definition has been given in various rent statutes of many States for the reason that sometimes the owner may not himself be in a position to collect the rent and may hence appoint an agent or authorise any person to collect rent on his behalf because he may be abroad or is unable to do so for any other reason. This does not mean that the natural meaning of the word ‘landlord’, who is the owner of the premises, would disappear and that the owner goes out of the picture altogether. This is the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Madan Lal v. Hazara Singh We approve of the view taken in the said decision. 8. If we interpret the definition of ’landlord’ in the Act literally it will result in strange consequences. This is the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Madan Lal v. Hazara Singh We approve of the view taken in the said decision. 8. If we interpret the definition of ’landlord’ in the Act literally it will result in strange consequences. It will mean that even if the owner, who is the natural landlord, does not want to evict a tenant, his agent may do sc Surely this is an absurd situation. It is well settled that if a literal interpretation leads to absurd consequences, it should be avoided and a purposive interpretation be given.” It is further contended that the respondent No. 3 was the grandson Thus, the eviction petition filed at his behest when the son of Late Chhotu Lal, who is the first degree legal heir was still alive cannot be maintained and the grandson if at all is only a licensee. Reliance was placed on the judgment rendered in the case of Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar reported in 1987 (1) SCC 204. Learned counsel for the petitioner also cited the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad reported in 2002 (1) SCC 90 to support the same ground. 7. In order to adjudicate upon the issue involved, it is necessary to reproduce the definition of ‘landlord’ as per the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, which reads as under:— 2(c) “landlord” means any person who for the time being is receiving, is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant. 8. A perusal of the above definition shows that for maintaining an eviction petition, the landlord need not be the owner himself and the same can also be filed at the behest of the person who is receiving the rent. Admittedly, the petitioner has been paying the rent to the respondent No. 3. Thus this admission in itself is sufficient to include the respondent No. 3 under the definition of landlord for the purpose of filing the eviction petition being the person receiving the rent of the premises. 9. Admittedly, the petitioner has been paying the rent to the respondent No. 3. Thus this admission in itself is sufficient to include the respondent No. 3 under the definition of landlord for the purpose of filing the eviction petition being the person receiving the rent of the premises. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the Receipts (A/2, A/3 & A/4) to show that on certain occasions, the rent was also being collected by the other legal heirs of Late Chhotu Lal, Hence, it was not clear as to which one of them had the authority to collect the rent. In the absence of any permission or document by other legal heirs in favour of the respondent No. 3, he can not be held to be person, who had the authority to collect the rent. It was stated that since he had no authority to collect the rent, he also has no authority to file the eviction petition. 10. The said argument cannot be sustained as the issue as to whether in the absence of other co-owners, the suit filed by one of the co-owners is maintainable is well settled and dealt by the Apex Court in number of judgments. The respondent No. 3 has a will in his favour. Although, the will has not been challenged, the respondent No. 3 cannot be declared as owner in these proceedings. However, he cannot be denied the right to file eviction petition in view of the fact that he is otherwise one of the legal heirs being the grandson, a co-owner and the petitioner - tenant was also paying the rent to him and he was receiving the rent on behalf of his grandfather as well as his parent. 11. The judgment rendered by the learned Single Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Ratan Lal v. Gopal reported in 2014 (3) RLW 2340 (Raj.) after taking into consideration the various judgments rendered by the Apex Court is a complete answer. It reads. “10. The suit in the present case has admittedly been filed by Gopal, who is one of the co-owners of the suit premises, which was owned by Fateh Lal Arora and besides him, at the time of filing of the suit, Subhash, Munna Devi and Radha Devi were the co-owners of the said premises. It reads. “10. The suit in the present case has admittedly been filed by Gopal, who is one of the co-owners of the suit premises, which was owned by Fateh Lal Arora and besides him, at the time of filing of the suit, Subhash, Munna Devi and Radha Devi were the co-owners of the said premises. It is also an admitted fact that the appellant-defendant has been paying rent of the suit premises lastly to Gopal - plaintiff only, which was proved by rent receipts (Exhibits-A/17 to A/33 - two sets of exhibits have been similarly marked, the relevant being marked on 20.08.2008). Further, the appellant has also claimed in the written statement that when Gopal refused to accept rent, he has tendered the rent by more order to Gopal, which money order was refused by him, as such, there is no dispute about the relationship of landlord (lessor) and tenant (lessee) between the appellant and the plaintiff. Further, it is not the case of the appellant that other co-owners are opposed to such eviction. 11. The issue as to whether in absence of other co-owners, the suit filed by a co-owner is maintainable or non has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath; 1977 (1) SCR 395 , wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that under the general law, in a suit between the landlord and tenant, the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant and, therefore, it was inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-impleading of other co-owners as such, specially in view of the clear acknowledgment and admission of the defendants that plaintiff was their landlord. 12. The judgment in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha (supra) has been followed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai; 2002 (6) SCC 16 , wherein, it was mater alia observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court as under : “……that one of the co-owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for ejectment of tenant and it is no defence open to tenant of question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming subject matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object.” 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla, 2004 (3) SCC 178 held it to be well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. The principle was held to be based on doctrine of agency and one co-owner filing a suit or eviction against the tenant was held to be doing so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of other co-owners and the consent of other co-owners was assumed as taken unless it was shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed inspite of their disagreement. 14. In FGP Ltd. v. Saleh Hooseini Doctor: 2009 (10) SCC 223 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:— “37. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the suit which has been filed by the respondents they have not asserted that they are filing if as co-owners but they have claimed that they are filing it as executors/executrix. So they cannot now meet the challenge of maintainability of the suit on the ground that it was filed by the respondents as co-owners. It is not possible to accept the aforesaid contention in the facts of this case. This Court is of the opinion that if the status of the respondents as co-owners of the property transpires clearly from the admitted facts of the case, they cannot be denuded of the said status at the instance of some objections by the tenants. Normally, a tenant's right to question the title of a landlord is very limited in view of the rule of law which is codified in Section 116 of the Evidence Act. 38. Normally, a tenant's right to question the title of a landlord is very limited in view of the rule of law which is codified in Section 116 of the Evidence Act. 38. Apart from that it has been held in some decisions of this Court that a co-owner of a property is an owner of the property, till the property is partitioned. 39. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath it has been held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner. In coming to the said finding, the learned Judges relied on the proposition laid down in Salmond on Jurisprudence (13th Edn.). The relevant principles in Salmond on Jurisprudence are set out herein below: “….. It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time in more than one person …… The several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of the two co-owners begins to own a part of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned.” 40. Relying on the aforesaid jurisprudential principles, this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha held as under: (SCC p. 190, para 27). “27. Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place.” 41. Since in the instant case, no partition has taken place, the plaintiffs status as co-owners cannot be disputed by the tenant and it is nobody's case that there is a clash of interest between the respondent and the co-owners. 42. There fore, the suit is maintainable. 43. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of this Court in Mohinder Prasad Jain v. Manohar Lal Jain. In para 10 of the said Report, learned Judges referred to a decision of this Court in India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla which in turn relies on Sri Ram Pasricha. 44. 43. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of this Court in Mohinder Prasad Jain v. Manohar Lal Jain. In para 10 of the said Report, learned Judges referred to a decision of this Court in India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla which in turn relies on Sri Ram Pasricha. 44. The principles which have been affirmed in Mohinder Prasad Jain are that one co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. In this matter, the consent of the other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement. (See para 10, p. 727 of the Report). It is nobody's case here that other co-owners are objecting to the filing of the suit in question.” 12. In fact, the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Kasthurl Radhakrishan and Ors. v. M. Chinniyan reported in AIR 2016 SC 609 to held in no uncertain terms that it was not necessary to implead all the co-owners in an eviction suit with respect to the premises owned by several owners:— “35. Likewise, so far as issue pertaining to joinder of all co-owners in eviction petition filed against the tenant under the Rent Laws, is concerned, the same also remains no more res integra and stands settled by several decisions of this Court. In Dhannalal v. Kalawathibai, (Supra), this Court took note of all case laws on the subject and explained the legal position governing the issue. Justice R.C. Lahoti (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench held in paragraph 16 as under: “16. It is well settled by at least three decisions of this Court, namely, Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, 1976 (4) SCC 184 Kanta Goel v. B.P Pathak, 1977(2) SCC 814 and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, 1989(1) SCC 444 that one of the co-owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for ejectment of the tenant and it is no defence open to the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming the subject-matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. In Sri Ram Pasricha case reliance was placed by the tenant on the English rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit for possession on the ground that a dwelling house is required for occupation of one of them as a residence the suit would fail; the requirement must be of all the landlords. The Court noted that the English rule was not followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and Gujarat which High Courts have respectfully dissented from the rule of English law. This Court held that a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff though he was not the absolute and full owner of the premises because he required the premises for his own use and also satisfied the requirement of being “if he is the owner”, the expression as employed by Section 13 (1) (f) of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.” 36. The issues involved in this case need to be decided keeping in view the law laid down in the aforesaid three cases and the one cited infra.” 13. The above settled proposition of law leaves no doubt that the eviction petition was maintainable at the behest of the respondent No. 3. Moreover, no one from the other legal heirs has come forward to dispute the right of the respondent No. 3 to file the eviction petition. 14. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Rent Tribunal could not have proceeded beyond the pleadings and the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of AVG.P. Chettiar & Sons (supra) does not help the petitioner in the facts of the present case. In the said case, the suit property belonged to the religious trust. The same was purchase by one of the trustees. In the said case, the suit property belonged to the religious trust. The same was purchase by one of the trustees. The tenant filed the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed and it was sound that the dispute regarding the landlords’ title so raised by the tenant was bonafide, which was prima facie established in support of the tenants’ stand which could not be ignored. In the present case, there is no doubt as discussed above that the respondent was receiving the rent. He has a will in his favour which has not been challenged. He was the grandson of the original owner and was admittedly collecting the rent on behalf of his father and mother. The petitioner tenant has admitted that he has been paying rent to the respondent No. 3. In these circumstances, his strong claim as landlord within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 can not be challenged just because he has also claimed himself as landlord on the basis of the will, as well. This issue was discussed by the Apex Court in the case R. Kapilanath (dead) through LR's v. Krishna reported in AIR 2003 SC 565 wherein the Court held that the adopted son of the Pujari who was entitled to collect the rent would also be entitled to maintain action for eviction and the relief cannot be denied merely because he claimed himself to be the owner in his capacity as a son. Para 5 of the judgment answers the very objection of the petitioner reads :— “5. It was next submitted that though a petition for eviction under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act can be filed by a landlord and it is not necessary that he must also be the owner of the premises yet it is necessary that the petitioner must claim himself to be only a landlord and not an owner. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent has claimed himself to be the owner of the premises which claim is inconsistent with his being a mere rent collector on behalf of the temple and so the claim for eviction at his instance should have been refused. This submission too is wholly devoid of any merit. A petition for recovery of possession of any premises can be filed by the landlord against the tenant within the meaning of Section 21 (1). This submission too is wholly devoid of any merit. A petition for recovery of possession of any premises can be filed by the landlord against the tenant within the meaning of Section 21 (1). Clause (h) of Section 3 includes in the meaning of ‘landlord’ any person who is for the time being receiving or entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person etc. It cannot be doubted nor has it been disputed that the respondent is ‘landlord’ within the meaning of Section 3 (h) abovesaid. Though the appellant claimed himself to be an owner also so long as he has been found to be a landlord he is entitled to maintain the action for eviction under Section 21 (1) (p). The plaintiff of petitioner may claim a higher right and may succeed in proving only a smaller right or entitlement to relief but that would not result in disentitling the plaintiff or petitioner from succeeding so long as the smaller right successfully substantiated by him is enough in law to entitle him to a relief against the defendant.” 15. There is also no doubt with respect to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rishab Chand Bhandari (dead) by LR's (supra). Thus, the respondent No. 3 can not be declared as owner in these proceedings but a smaller right or entitlement to relief seeking eviction falling otherwise in the definition of ’landlord’ by virtue of his capacity as the person receiving the rent cannot be refused. 16. The landlord under the definition of Section 2 (c) of the Act of 2001 has a different concept than an owner of the premises. The interpretation of the definition of landlord under Section 2 (c) includes a person who for the time being is receiving the rent of any premises which does not amount to declaring him as owner. Hence, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced. 17. The interpretation of the definition of landlord under Section 2 (c) includes a person who for the time being is receiving the rent of any premises which does not amount to declaring him as owner. Hence, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced. 17. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 cannot be held to be the legal heir of Chhotu Lal while the son of Chhotu Lal, the father of the respondent No. 3, is still alive, does not change the complexion of the dispute in hand or the definition of the landlord as per Section 2 (c) of the Act of 2001. The fact remains that he is the grandson and was admittedly collecting the rent on behalf of his father and mother. The averments of the petitioner himself to this effect in the reply filed by him before the Rent Tribunal are reproduced as under :— ^^izkFkhZ vizkFkhZ ls Lo- Jh NksVsyky th o viuh ekrk o firk dh rjQ ls fdjk;k izkIr dj jgk gS u fd dfFkr olh;r ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ vius vkidks HkwLokeh ek= dfFkr olh;r tks fd ,d QthZ nLrkost gS] ds vk/kkj ij crk jgk gS A vr% izkFkhZ dh ;kfpdk iks"k.kh; ugha gS A izkFkhZ us olh;r fd ckr u rks dHkh vizkFkhZ dks crkbZ vkSj u gh olh;r ds vk/kkj ij dHkh fdjk;k olwy fd;k A izkFkhZ us viuh futh gSfl;r ls dHkh vizkFkhZ ls u rks fdjk;k ek¡xk vkSj u gh olwy fd;k vkSj u gh vizkFkhZ us fn;k A Lo- NksVsyky th o viuh ekrk o firk dh vksj ls fdjk;k ysus ls izkFkhZ dks ekStwnk ;kfpdk is'k djus dk vf/kdkj ugha gS A** 18. From the above discussion, it is evident that any person who is entitled to receive the rent of the premises is included in the definition of landlord and the petitioner herein himself has admitted that the respondent No. 3 was receiving the rent of the premises in question on behalf of his grandfather and his parents. Thus, there is no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 and that he was not the landlord. Thus, there is no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 and that he was not the landlord. Accordingly, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the evidence on record as well as law cited on the subject, this Court finds that the eviction petition was duly maintainable at the behest of the respondent No. 3. 19. No argument at all was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to the finding returned by the learned tribunal below with respect to the Issue No. 2 regarding the bona fide need of the respondent No. 3. Hence, the finding recorded qua Issue No. 2 by the Rent Tribunal and the Rent Appellate Tribunal decided against the petitioner is upheld. 20. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed being devoid of merit. Dismissed accordingly.