JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. A. Acharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. D. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1. None appears for the respondent No.2, may be for the reason that the respondent No.2 is a formal respondent in this proceeding. 2. This is a petition under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. directed against the order dated 25.09.2017 delivered in Crl. Misc (Condo) 13/2017 arising from the Criminal Appeal No.22 of 2017 by the Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. By the said order dated 25.09.2017, the prayer for condoning the delay of 202 days has been rejected on observing that: “There is no explanation as to what happened during the period from 17.11.16 to 14.01.17 and 29.01.17 to 09.03.17. More so, petitioner in his prayer stated that after recovery from his illness he met with his Ld. Advocate in the last part of April, 2017. So there is also no explanation as to what happened during the period w.e.f. 10.03.17 to last part of April, 2017. There is no suitable explanation as to why the petitioner appellant applied for certified copy on 07.06.17 only whereas Judgment was delivered on 16.11.16. Appeal could have been presented with the copy of Judgment supplied after its delivery and pronouncement of sentence. But there is no explanation as to why the appellant did not prefer appeal by dint of copy of judgment supplied soon after delivery of Judgment. Even if, I exclude the period as alleged to have been covered by the latches of Ld. Advocates, it is found that appellant petitioner was gross negligent in taking steps for preferring appeal in time. Ld. Counsel appearing for the appellant petitioner in support of his submission referred a judgment of Hon’ble High Court as reported in (2016) 2 TLR 878 (Maya Bhowmik Vs. Jitendra Kumar Shil). In the aforesaid judgment Hon’ble High Court in Para-11 observed: 11. It is a settled position of law that the expression “sufficient cause” in section 5 must receive liberal construction so as to advance substantive justice where no gross negligence or deliberate in action or lack of bonafide is imputable to a party seeking condonation of the delay. The period of delay does not matter, but what matters is the reason for which the delay is caused. The period of delay does not matter, but what matters is the reason for which the delay is caused. Here in this case upon hearing of both sides and on careful perusal of petition for condonation I find that there was gross negligence or deliberate in action on the part of appellant petitioner in preferring appeal and the delay has not been explained with sufficient reasons for which appellant petitioner is not entitled to get any benefit under the circumstances of present case.” 3. Mr. A. Acharjee, learned counsel has submitted that a hyper-technical view has been taken in appreciating the delay, even though the causes for delay in filing the appeal within the time as prescribed has been properly explained. Moreover, Mr. Acharjee, learned counsel has quite emphatically submitted that the judgment challenged in the appeal emanates from serious misconstruction of the provisions of Section 139 read with Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Mr. Acharjee, learned counsel has referred to the following observation returned by the trial court: “In this case on perusing evidence of the complainant I find that the Ld. Advocate for the accused has stressed on the fact that the statement of the account does not show how the over dues accrued the agreement which is made with the accused has not been submitted before the court, accused has issued a post dated cheque and the statement of account in details does not reflects the auction amount of the vehicle which was adjusted from the loan account and some other denials. These are all the probable defence raised by the accused to rebut back the presumption upon the complainant. But these defence raised by the accused is not sufficient to rebut back the presumption upon the complaint because the foundation of liability U/S 138 of NI Act is the issuance of cheque for consideration and its dishonor and not existence of the original consideration/transaction. The complainant is not obliged to prove the original transaction or original consideration. Of course when the accused discharges his burden U/S 139 of the Act, the court would turn back to the complainant to establish his case about the liability beyond doubt. But that situation can arise only when the burden on the accused is discharged successfully U/S 139 of NI Act. Of course when the accused discharges his burden U/S 139 of the Act, the court would turn back to the complainant to establish his case about the liability beyond doubt. But that situation can arise only when the burden on the accused is discharged successfully U/S 139 of NI Act. So long as the accused fails to discharge the burden, the presumption stands in favour of the complainant U/S 139 of NI Act. In the present case only some assertions and denials were given by the accused in the cross-examination and the accused also failed to adduce any defence evidence to prove the contention. So, in absence of such I hold that the accused has failed to discharge the burden which was casted upon him.” 4. From the other side, Mr. D. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 has submitted that the delay is the outcome of gross negligence and there is no infirmity in the order dated 25.09.2017. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel has further submitted that the so called probable defence as observed by the trial court is without any evidence and as such the petitioner cannot take any advantage of the observation in any manner. 5. Mr. A. Acharjee, learned counsel in reply has submitted that in the decision of Gurdial Singh vs. Surjit Singh and Others [the order dated 02.05.2013 delivered in CR No.4566 of 2012], Punjab-Haryana High Court has observed that the merit of the case is one of the components of the sufficient cause. On scrutiny, this court finds that Punjab & Haryana High Court was satisfied in that case that the petitioner had set up sufficient cause and shown his bona fide. But, it is not the case here. 6. There is no infirmity in the observation of the Addl. Sessions Judge. But what has rushed through the mind of this court is that the interpretation of Section 138 vis-a-vis Section 139 as provided by the trial court requires a fresh appreciation to avert any miscarriage of justice. This court is therefore of the view that the laches as pointed out in the order dated 25.09.2017 may not be allowed to overshadow the merit of the appeal as projected by the petitioner herein. 7. In view of the above observations, this petition is allowed by condoning the delay in preferring the appeal and as consequence, the impugned order is set aside. 7. In view of the above observations, this petition is allowed by condoning the delay in preferring the appeal and as consequence, the impugned order is set aside. The appeal be restored to the file, as the order by which the appeal is dismissed, is recalled. However, the petitioner shall pay cost of Rs.3,000/- (three thousand) to the respondent No.1 before the appeal is considered for admission. A copy of this order be sent to the court of the Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, Court No.5 forthwith.