ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner whose writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1548 of 2007 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 10th January, 2018, whereby, the prayer of this appellant (original petitioner) for getting appointment on the post of “Daftary” was not accepted by the learned Single Judge and, hence, the original petitioner has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. Reasons : 2. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that for the post of Daftary, process of selection was initiated in the year 1991 in pursuance of public advertisement. 3. This appellant had applied for the aforesaid post and was placed in the select list for the post of Daftary. 4. The respondents-State Government has not appointed any candidate from the said select list for several reasons and, hence, the writ petition was preferred by this appellant for the reason that once he had been in the select list, he must be appointed. This is not permissible in the eye of law. This is a wrong notion in the mind of this appellant that once he had been selected on the post of Daftary, the respondents must appoint him. There is no such right vested in the selected candidates to be appointed. There is no duty vested in the respondents that selected candidates must be appointed on the post. 5. It ought to be kept in mind that selected candidates cannot compel the employer-Government to give appointment because the Government has several constraints not to appoint selected candidates like : (a) Financial constraint; (b) Infrastructural constraint; (c) Every post requires secondary type of support which may not be available with the Government; and (d) After selection process is over, the Government may of the opinion that now there is no need to fill up the posts. Thus, selected candidates have no vested right to be appointed. 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr) v. Nalanda College, reported in 1962 Supp (2) SCR 144, in paragraph 5, which reads as under : “5. Thus, selected candidates have no vested right to be appointed. 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr) v. Nalanda College, reported in 1962 Supp (2) SCR 144, in paragraph 5, which reads as under : “5. A great deal of controversy was raised before us as to whether the Statutes framed by the University under Section 20 of the University of Bihar Act have or have not the force of law and whether a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can issue against the Governing Body of the College i.e. whether the appellant has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the respondents. In order that mandamus may issue to compel the respondents to do something it must be shown that the Statutes impose a legal duty and the appellant has a legal right under the Statutes to enforce its performance. It is, however, wholly unnecessary to go into or decide this question or to decide whether the Statutes impose on the Governing Body of the College a duty which can be enforced by a writ of mandamus because assuming that the contention of the appellant is right that the College is a public body and it has to perform a public duty in the appointment of a Principal, it has not been shown that there is any right in the appellant which can be enforced by mandamus. According to the Statutes all appointments of teachers and staff have to be made by the Governing Body and no person can be appointed, removed or demoted except in accordance with Rules but the appellant has not shown that he has any right entitling him to get an order for appointment or reinstatement. Our attention has not been drawn to any article in the Statutes by which the appellant has a right to be appointed or reinstated and if he has not that right he cannot come to court and ask for a writ to issue. It is therefore not necessary to go into any other question.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 220 , in paragraphs 10 and 11, which read as under : “10. It is therefore not necessary to go into any other question.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 220 , in paragraphs 10 and 11, which read as under : “10. One fails to see how the existence of vacancies give a legal right to a candidate to be selected for appointment. The examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for consideration. The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the rules in this respect. The true effect of Rule 10 in Part C is that if and when the State Government propose to make appointments of Subordinate Judges the State Government (i) shall not make such appointments by travelling outside the list, and (ii) shall make the selection for appointments strictly in the order the candidates have been placed in the list published in the Government Gazette. In the present case neither of these two requirements is infringed by the Government. They have appointed the first seven persons in the list as Subordinate Judges. Apart from these constraints on the power to make the appointments, Rule 10 does not impose any other constraint. There is no constraint that the Government shall make an appointment of a Subordinate Judge either because there are vacancies or because a list of candidates has been prepared and is in existence. 11. It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. This Court has pointed out in Dr Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. This Court has pointed out in Dr Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. Since there is no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 47 , in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9, which read as under : “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana, or Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab. 8. In State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha 15 vacancies of Subordinate Judges were advertised, and out of the selection list only 7, who had secured more than 55 per cent marks, were appointed, although under the relevant rules the eligibility condition required only 45 per cent marks. 8. In State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha 15 vacancies of Subordinate Judges were advertised, and out of the selection list only 7, who had secured more than 55 per cent marks, were appointed, although under the relevant rules the eligibility condition required only 45 per cent marks. Since the High Court had recommended earlier, to the Punjab Government that only the candidates securing 55 per cent marks or more should be appointed as Subordinate Judges, the other candidates included in the select list were not appointed. They filed a writ petition before the High Court claiming a right of being appointed on the ground that vacancies existed and they were qualified and were found suitable. The writ application was allowed. While reversing the decision of the High Court, it was observed by this Court that it was open to the government to decide how many appointments should be made and although the High Court had appreciated the position correctly, it had “somehow persuaded itself to spell out a right in the candidates because in fact there were 15 vacancies”. It was expressly ruled that the existence of vacancies does not give a legal right to a selected candidate. Similarly, the claim of some of the candidates selected for appointment, who were petitioners in Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab, was turned down holding that it was open to the government to decide how many appointments would be made. The plea of arbitrariness was rejected in view of the facts of the case and it was held that the candidates did not acquire any right merely by applying for selection or even after selection. It is true that the claim of the petitioner in the case of Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana, was allowed by this Court but, not on the ground that she had acquired any right by her selection and existence of vacancies. The fact was that the matter had been referred to the Public Service Commission which sent to the government only the names of 17 candidates belonging to the general category on the assumption that only 17 posts were to be filled up. The government accordingly made only 17 appointments and stated before the court that they were unable to select and appoint more candidates as the Commission had not recommended any other candidate. The government accordingly made only 17 appointments and stated before the court that they were unable to select and appoint more candidates as the Commission had not recommended any other candidate. In this background it was observed that it is, of course, open to the government not to fill up all the vacancies for a valid reason, but the selection cannot be arbitrarily restricted to a few candidates notwithstanding the number of vacancies and the availability of qualified candidates; and, there must be a conscious application of mind by the government and the High Court before the number of persons selected for appointment is restricted. The fact that it was not for the Public Service Commission to take a decision in this regard was emphasised in this judgment. None of these decisions, therefore, supports the appellant. 9. Mr. Goswami appearing in support of the appeal has contended that in view of the relevant statutory rules, the authorities were under a duty to continue with the process of filling up all the vacancies until none remained vacant. Reference was made to Rule 4 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, Rules 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 and Regulations 2(1)(a), 2(1)(c), 8 and 13 of the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1965. We do not think any of these rules comes to the aid of the appellant. Rule 3 of the Cadre Rules directs constitution of separate cadres for States or group of States, and Rule 4 empowers the Central Government to determine the strength in consultation with the State Governments. The strength has to be re-examined at intervals of 3 years. Rule 3 of Recruitment Rules deals with the constitution of the Service, and Rule 4 the method of recruitment. Rules 6 and 7 give further details in this regard. The learned counsel could not point out any provision indicating that all the notified vacancies have to be filled up. Similar is the position with respect to the Competitive Examination Regulations. Regulation 2(1) (a) defines available vacancies as vacancies determined by the Central Government to be filled on the results of the examination, described in Regulation 2(1)(a). The learned counsel could not point out any provision indicating that all the notified vacancies have to be filled up. Similar is the position with respect to the Competitive Examination Regulations. Regulation 2(1) (a) defines available vacancies as vacancies determined by the Central Government to be filled on the results of the examination, described in Regulation 2(1)(a). Regulation 8 prescribes that the candidates would be considered for appointment to the available vacancies subject to provisions 9 to 12 and Regulation 13 clarifies the position that a candidate does not get any right to appointment by mere inclusion of his name in the list. The final selection is subject to satisfactory report on the character, antecedent and suitability of the candidates. We, therefore, reject the claim that the appellant had acquired a right to be appointed against the vacancy arising later on the basis of any of the rules.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of All India SC & ST Employees' Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 380 , in paragraph 10, which reads as under : “10. Merely because the names of the candidates were included in the panel indicating their provisional selection, they did not acquire any indefeasible right for appointment even against the existing vacancies and the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies as laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court, after referring to earlier cases in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India. Para 7 of the said judgment reads thus : “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana or Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab State Electricity Board and Others v. Malkiat Singh, reported in (2005) 9 SCC 22 , in paragraph 4, which reads as under : “4. Having considered the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in proceeding on the basis that the respondent had got a vested right for appointment and that could not have been taken away by the subsequent change in the policy. It is settled law that mere inclusion of name of a candidate in the select list does not confer on such candidate any vested right to get an order of appointment. This position is made clear in para 7 of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India which reads: (SCC pp. 50-51) “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana or Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 637 , in paragraphs 24, which reads as under : “24. A person whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment at the best is a condition of eligibility for the purpose of appointment and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed. The vacancies have to be filled up as per the statutory rules and in conformity with the constitutional mandate. In the instant case, once 13 notified vacancies were filled up, the selection process came to an end, thus there could be no scope of any further appointment.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that selected candidates may not be appointed by the employer. The only exception to this rule is arbitrariness and discrimination. None of these ground has been agitated by this appellant (original petitioner) that out of the aforesaid select list, which was prepared in the year 1995, the juniors have been appointed leaving aside this appellant. This contention is missing. Hence, no prayer can be granted, as prayed for in the memo of writ petition. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P. (S) No. 1548 of 2007 vide judgment and order dated 10th January, 2018. 13. This contention is missing. Hence, no prayer can be granted, as prayed for in the memo of writ petition. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P. (S) No. 1548 of 2007 vide judgment and order dated 10th January, 2018. 13. Even otherwise also, the select list prepared in the year 1995 can not be made operative in the year 2018. Thus, select list of the year 1995 has already been lapsed by passage of time and, hence also, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P. (S) No. 1548 of 2007 vide judgment and order dated 10th January, 2018. We are in full agreement with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge. We see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. There is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal, the same is, therefore, dismissed.