ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioners whose W.P. (S) No. 4721 of 2017 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 20th November, 2017. The appellants had challenged the conditions attached with public advertisement no. 05 of 2017 for the post of Sub-Inspector. 2. These appellants are the original petitioners. They have applied for the competitive examination in the year 2017 in pursuance of a public advertisement. As they are age barred, they have preferred the writ petition, challenging the cut-off date which is 1st August, 2017, so that they may become eligible to apply for the public post. The date of birth of appellant no.1 is 14th February, 1990 whereas the date of birth of appellant no.2 is 28th June, 1986. The age limit, as per the public advertisement no. 05 of 2017, was 26 years for the post of Sub-Inspector, as on 1st August, 2017. 3. This type of prayer for changing the cut-off date is not permissible by this Court. Fixing the cut-off date is a policy decision taken by the Government. Whenever, any cut-off date is prescribed, there are bound to be few candidates who will fall on a wrong side of the said cut-off date. Even if this Court is changing the cut-off date, so as to accommodate these two appellants, still there can be few applicants who will be age barred. Again, they will come before this Court for changing the cut-off date so that they become eligible. This situation will continue infinite. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be altered by this Court. 4. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another v. M/s Parameswaran Match Works & others, as reported in (1975) 1 SCC 305 , at paragraph no.10 as under: “10. The concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the notification. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Dr Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. per Justice Holmes.” (Emphasis Supplied) 5. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad & Another v. B. Sarat Chandra & others, as reported in (1990) 2 SCC 669 , at paragraph nos. 6, 7 and 8 as under: “6. There is no dispute that the eligibility of a candidate as to age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police should be determined according to Rule 5 of the A.P. Police Services Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to look first at that Rule. Rule 5 so far as is relevant provides: “5. 6, 7 and 8 as under: “6. There is no dispute that the eligibility of a candidate as to age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police should be determined according to Rule 5 of the A.P. Police Services Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to look first at that Rule. Rule 5 so far as is relevant provides: “5. Qualifications.— (A) No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Category 2 by direct recruitment unless he — (i) has completed the age of 21 years and had not completed the age of 26 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. 7. The rule prescribes the minimum as well as the maximum age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Minimum age is 21 years. The candidate must have completed 21 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. He should not have also completed 26 years as on that day. The Tribunal while construing this rule has observed: “According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in forwarding the list to the appointing authority. The essence of the process lies in the preparation of the list. A selection can be said to have been done only when the list is prepared. In this view the eligibility of the candidates as to age has to be determined at this stage.” If the word ‘selection’ is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment, then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps. When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to construe the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the rule making authority. 8. The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal.” (Emphasis Supplied) 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 212 , in paragraph nos. 7, 8 and 11, as under:- “7. In this context, it would also be useful to state that when a court is called upon to decide such a matter, mere errors are not subject to correction in exercise of power of judicial review; it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared to be void, as stated in Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago in which Justice McKenna observed as follows: “It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void ....” The aforesaid was noted by this Court in Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan in which case also reasonability of fixation of a date for a particular purpose had come up for examination. 8. Having known the legal parameters within which we have to function, let it be seen whether fixation of 1st August as cut-off date for determining the eligibility of applicants qua their age can be held to be arbitrary despite preliminary examination being conducted before that date. As to why the cut-off date has not been changed despite the decision to hold preliminary examination, has been explained in paragraph 3 of the special leave petition. The sum and substance of the explanation is that preliminary examination is only a screening test and marks obtained in this examination do not count for determining the order of merit, for which purpose the marks obtained in the main examination, which is still being held after 1st August, alone are material. In view of this, it cannot be held that continuation of treating 1st August as the cut-off date, despite the Union Public Service Commission having introduced the method of preliminary examination which is held before 1st August, can be said to be “very wide off any reasonable mark” or so capricious or whimsical as to permit judicial interference. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, equity does not demand any favour to be shown to the respondent. The result is that appeal is allowed with costs by setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal. Cost assessed as Rs 10,000. The respondent would not be treated or deemed to have passed the examination in question and whatever benefit of the same was given to him pursuant to Tribunal's directions shall stand cancelled.” (Emphasis Supplied) 7. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Cost assessed as Rs 10,000. The respondent would not be treated or deemed to have passed the examination in question and whatever benefit of the same was given to him pursuant to Tribunal's directions shall stand cancelled.” (Emphasis Supplied) 7. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. (Mrs.) Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & ors., as reported in A.I.R. 1985 SC 1367, in paragraph no.29, as under: “29. The object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing. So therefore experience and continuous employment were necessary ingredients. The Hindi version of the Ordinance used the expression “ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein” is capable of meaning “and are continuing” to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. Keeping the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper construction which is in consonance with the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object of the Act then in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should be construed to mean that only those would be eligible for screening who were appointed prior to 25-6-1975 and were continuing at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12-6-1978 i.e. approximately about three years. If that is the correct reading, then we are unable to accept the criticism that those who were for a short period appointed prior to 25-6-1975 then again with interruption were working only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12-6-1978 would also be eligible. In other words people with very short experience would be eligible for absorption. That cannot be the purpose of the Act. It cannot be so read reasonably. Therefore on a proper construction it means that all temporary lecturers who were appointed as such on or before 25-6-1975 and were continuing as such at the commencement of the Ordinance shall be considered by the University for screening for absorption. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. If a Legislature considers a particular period of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such a decision is not subject to judicial review. Keeping the aforesaid reasonable meaning of clause (3) of the Ordinance and section 3 of the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed for screening for absorption was not irrational criterion or a criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the criticism that a teacher who was working even for two or three months only before 25-6-1975 and then with long interruptions was in employment of the University at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance would be eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from 26-6-1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e. 25th June, 1975 for three years would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against long experience, cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language used in the provisions concerned. It is well-settled that if a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or for absorption, it is within the wisdom of the Legislature, and what period should be sufficient for a particular job or a particular employment is not subject to judicial review. We need not refer to a large number of decisions on this point.” (Emphasis Supplied) 8. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan & ors., as reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 11 and 17, as under: “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rulemaking authority or the employer as the case may be. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rulemaking authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cutoff date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, “when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age. xx xx xx 7. In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cutoff date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut-off date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. xx xx xx 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. xx xx xx 17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cut-off date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cut-off date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs.” (Emphasis Supplied) 9. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Public Service Commission & ors. v. Arvind Singh Chauhan & ors., as reported in (2009) 9 SCC 135 , in paragraph nos. 19, 20, 23 and 24, as under: “19. As far as the finding of the High Court is concerned, had the intention of the Commission been to consider 31-3-2003 as a cut-off date for eligibility, it would have been explicitly specified. The Division Bench has referred to the Circular dated 22-3-2002 issued by the Department of General Administration of the State Government. The relevant portion of the Circular reads: “Keeping in view the increasing problem of unemployed youths in the State and keeping the interest of the unemployed youths in mind, the Government has again considered and has taken a decision that a further relaxation of two years more needs to be given. Meanwhile, thereby now from March 2000 to March 2003, the maximum age-limit for appointment in government services will be thirty-five years.” 20. Rule 5(C) of the State Services Examination Rules on which reliance was placed by the appellant states: “5. (C)(a) A candidate must have attained the age of 21 years and must not have attained the age of 30 years on 1st January next following the date of commencement of the competitive examination.” xx xx xx 23. Rule 5(C) of the State Services Examination Rules on which reliance was placed by the appellant states: “5. (C)(a) A candidate must have attained the age of 21 years and must not have attained the age of 30 years on 1st January next following the date of commencement of the competitive examination.” xx xx xx 23. On account of no record of any concession made on the part of the appellants and considering all the circumstances of the case, it is clear that the respondents were over aged on the specified cutoff dates which makes their application liable for cancellation. 24. In view of the above discussion, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. (Emphasis Supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions, the cut-off date prescribed by the State of Jharkhand cannot be altered by this Court, so as to accommodate these two appellants. 10. Further, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that now result has already been published and selection process has already been completed for the post, in question. Even otherwise also, the appellants (original petitioners) were over aged. They belong to General category. The age limit of General category candidate for the post of Sub-Inspector was 26 years, whereas, these appellants (original petitioners) were of the age of above 26 years. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 4721 of 2017 vide order dated 20th November, 2017. 11. Thus, we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge and we are in full agreement with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge. Even otherwise also, this matter has become infructuous because result has already been published for the post of Sub-Inspector and selected candidates have also been appointed. Hence, this Letters Patent Appeal is, hereby, dismissed.