JUDGMENT : Munishwar Nath Bhandari, J. Heard on the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 2. There is a delay of 108 days in filing appeal. 3. The application would be considered after considering merit of the appeal in view of the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandramani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 : AIR 1998 SC 3222 . The judgments aforesaid rule the issue for consideration of application for condonation of delay. It is held that appeal should not be dismissed if the case has merit and otherwise delay is not such which may defeat merit of the case thus consideration on the application would be made after considering merit of this case. 4. It is a case where after passing an order of punishment of dismissal from service, the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short “the Corporation”) filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act of 1947”) to seek approval of the order of punishment due to pendency of a case before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (for short “the Tribunal”). The punishment of dismissal was inflicted on, charge of carrying passengers without tickets. 5. Learned Tribunal did not find a case for approval and, accordingly dismissed the application. It was challenged by the Corporation by maintaining a writ petition but it has also been dismissed. 6. The counsel for the appellant submits that learned Tribunal considered fairness of enquiry and finding no defect therein, held it to be fair and proper. After finding enquiry to be fair, the only jurisdiction available to the Tribunal was to see as to whether a prima facie case is made out or not Instead of exercising limited jurisdiction, it has reappreciated the evidence for proof of charge, as if the Tribunal is hearing an appeal or exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(a) of the Act of 1947. 7. The charge against the workman was for carrying passengers without tickets. The evidence led by the Corporation was discarded mainly in reference to the witnesses produced by the workman, namely, Shivji and Abdul Latif. It is on the ground that their statements have not been considered by the Enquiry Officer thus finding is perverse. In fact, the Enquiry Officer has considered the statements of two witnesses. The evidence led by the Corporation was discarded mainly in reference to the witnesses produced by the workman, namely, Shivji and Abdul Latif. It is on the ground that their statements have not been considered by the Enquiry Officer thus finding is perverse. In fact, the Enquiry Officer has considered the statements of two witnesses. They were not found reliable They had changed the place of inspection of bus. They said to have boarded the bus at “Ratadia” and, according to them, inspection was also made at that place. No passenger was without ticket. As per the Waybill and Bus Checking Report (BCR) prepared at the spot, the place of inspection of bus was “Badki arrival”. The Waybill and BCR give description of passengers without tickets and was signed by the non-appellant-workman. No protest or objection to it was ever made indicating place of inspection to be of “Ratadia arrival” or that every passenger was carrying ticket, in view of the above and taking into consideration the limited jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 after holding enquiry to be fair and proper, the interference made in Finding of facts is illegal. 8. The order passed by the Tribunal as well as learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. It is for the reason that even learned Single Judge did not appreciate the argument raised by the petitioner. Learned Single Judge even failed to consider that inspection of the bus was made at “Badki arrival” and not “Ratadia arrival”. The issue aforesaid has been touched but no Finding has been recorded, rather, diverted by referring that the delinquent is a physically disabled person. 9. Reference of the judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court has been given by learned counsel for the appellant to show limited jurisdiction of the Labour Court/Tribunal on an application u/Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947. 10. The appeal has been opposed by learned counsel appearing for the non-appellant-workman. It is stated that there was perversity in finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer thus has rightly been interfered by the Tribunal after holding enquiry to be fair. The statements of two witnesses were not considered by the Enquiry Officer so as the statement of the workman. In fact, inspection of bus was conducted at “Ratadia arrival” and not at “Badki arrival”. 11. The statements of two witnesses were not considered by the Enquiry Officer so as the statement of the workman. In fact, inspection of bus was conducted at “Ratadia arrival” and not at “Badki arrival”. 11. The non-appellant-workman had signed the Waybill and BCR giving description of the passengers travelling without tickets under the given circumstances thus aforesaid should not have been taken as a conclusive proof to prove the place of inspection so as the allegation of carrying passengers without tickets. In view of the above, interference in the order passed by the Tribunal dismissing the application u/Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 as well as in the order of learned Single Judge may not be made. 12. Learned counsel for the non-appellant-workman has given reference of following judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court to support the arguments: (i) Divisional Manager & Authorized Disciplinary Authority, RSRTC v. Rameshwar Lal, DB Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 730/2015, decided on 07th September, 2015 (ii) The Divisional Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Ajmer v. Shri Loomb Singh, DB Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 744/2001, decided on 24th July, 2013 (iii) Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain, AIR 1969 SC 983 . 13. It is stated that when Finding of the Enquiry Officer is perverse then the Tribunal and, for that, the High Court can cause interference while adjudicating the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947. 14. We have considered rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and scanned the matter carefully. 15. From the facts on record, it comes out that after Filing application u/Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947, learned Tribunal considered fairness of the enquiry. It was held to be fair vide order dated 11.08.2016. The Tribunal then proceeded with the matter and vide order dated 17.02.2017, dismissed the application finding enquiry report without consideration of the statements of witnesses produced by the non-appellant-workman apart from his own statement. According to the statements of Shivji and Abdul Latif, no passenger was travelling without ticket. It was also found that only on the basis of the statement of one Ram Avatar, the Enquiry Officer held charges as proved. The finding recorded by the Tribunal has been uphled by learned Single Judge. 16. According to the statements of Shivji and Abdul Latif, no passenger was travelling without ticket. It was also found that only on the basis of the statement of one Ram Avatar, the Enquiry Officer held charges as proved. The finding recorded by the Tribunal has been uphled by learned Single Judge. 16. Before going into the finding recorded by the Tribunal and learned Single Judge, we need to address the issue about jurisdiction of the Tribunal while exercising its power under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947. 17. It is settled law that after finding application in order, the first consideration has to be about fairness of enquiry. If the enquiry is held to be fair then to find out as to whether a prima facie case is made out or not. The word “prima facie” has been defined by the Apex Court in the case of Martin Burn Ltd. v. RN Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79 . It has been held that while considering the prima facie case, the Labour Court or Tribunal cannot reappreciate the evidence to draw its own conclusion. The charges need not to be proved to the hilt. If the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer is plausible based on the evidence then even if other conclusion is also possible the interference in the finding should not be made. The “prima facie” means that if evidence exists to draw conclusions given by the Enquiry Officer then ii cannot be interfered. Paras 23 and 28 of the judgment in the case of Martin Burn, (supra) are quoted hereunder for ready reference: “23. The nature and scope of the enquiry before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act has been the subject-matter of decisions of this Court in Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union : (1953) II LJ 321 SC, The Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala : (1955) I LLJ 346 SC and Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Limited v. Pt. Ram Sarup, (1957) I LLJ 17 SC. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union : (1953) II LJ 321 SC, The Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala : (1955) I LLJ 346 SC and Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Limited v. Pt. Ram Sarup, (1957) I LLJ 17 SC. In the last mentioned case this Court succinctly laid down the principles governing such enquiry and observed at p. 935: “The Tribunal before whom an application is made under that section has not to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute arising between the employer and the workman but has only got to consider whether the ban which is imposed on the employer in the matter of altering the conditions of employment to the prejudice of the workman or his discharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise during the pendency of the proceedings therein referred to should be lifted. A prima facie case has to made out by the employer for the lifting of such ban and the only jurisdiction which the Tribunal has is either to give such permission or to refuse it provided the employer is not acting mala fide or is not resorting to any unfair practice or victimization.” 28. The Labour Appellate Tribunal had to determine on these materials whether a prima facie case had been made out by the appellant for the termination of the respondent's service. A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal considering this question may itself have arrived at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record.” 18. Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 was earlier Section 22 of the Act of 1947. 19. The same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in case of The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Col. Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 was earlier Section 22 of the Act of 1947. 19. The same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in case of The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Col. Ltd. v. B. Dasappa, MT represented by the Binny Mills Labour Association, AIR 1960 SC 1352 . Paras 9, 10 and 13 of the said judgment are also quoted hereunder for ready reference: “9. The matter was again considered in Martin Bum Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, (1958) I LLJ 247 SC where this Court observed, after setting out the materials on the record in that case: “The Labour Appellate Tribunal had to determine on these materials whether a prima facie case had been made out by the applicant for the termination of the respondent's service. A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence.” 10. The settled position in law there fore is that permission should be refused if the Tribunal is satisfied that the Management's action is not bona fide or that the principles of natural justice have been violated or that the materials on the basis on which the Management came to a certain conclusion could not justify any reasonable person in coming to such a conclusion. In most cases it will happen where the materials are such that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion as regards the workman's misconduct that the Management has not acted bona fide. A finding that the Management has acted bona fide will ordinarily not be reached if the materials are such that a reasonable man could not have come to the conclusion which the Management has reached. A finding that the Management has acted bona fide will ordinarily not be reached if the materials are such that a reasonable man could not have come to the conclusion which the Management has reached. In every case therefore it would be proper for the Tribunal to address itself to the question, after ascertaining that the principles of natural justice have not been violated, whether the materials on which the Management has reached a conclusion adverse to the work man, a reasonable person could reach such a conclusion. 13. We are not concerned in this case with the question whether the view taken by the Tribunal was a better view than the view taken by the Manager. It appears clear that the Tribunal placed the wrong standard before it in addressing to itself the question whether the evidence conclusively proved the guilt of Dasappa. In our opinion, of the correct approach as directed in the decisions of this Court had been applied the Tribunal was bound to come to the conclusion on the materials on the record that a reasonable man could come to the conclusion that Dasappa was guilty of theft and that the Management had acted bona fide. 20. Same is the position in the case of Cholan Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasarnbandam, (2005) 3 SCC 241 . Para 18 of the said judgment reaffirms the view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Martin Burn, (supra). Paras 18 to 20 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder for ready reference: “18. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal while considering an application for grant of approval has succinctly been stated by this Court in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee : (1958) I LLJ 247 SC. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard the validity or otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the delinquent; keeping in view the fact that if the permission or approval is granted, the order of discharge or dismissal which may be passed against the delinquent employee would be liable to be challenged in an appropriate proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. In Martin Burn's case, (supra) this court stated: “A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal considering this question may itself have arrived at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record. (See Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. The Workers of the Company, (1952) LAC 490(F).” 19. It is further trite that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry vis-a-vis a criminal trial is absolutely different. Whereas in the former ‘preponderance of probability’ would suffice; in the latter, ‘proof beyond all reasonable doubt’ is imperative. 20. The tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was required to bear in mind the aforementioned legal principles. Furthermore, in a case of this nature the probative value of the evidence showing the extensive damages caused to the entire left side of the bus; the fact that the bus first hit the branches of a tamarind tree and then stopped at a distance of 81 ft there from even after colliding with another bus coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the hands of the tribunal. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently.” 21. In line of the judgments, referred to above, the Apex Court in the case of The Management of TNSTC (Coimbatore) Ltd. v. M. Chandrasekaran, (2016) 16 SCC 16 : 2017 (1) RLW 249 (SC) also took the view, as was taken in the case of Martin Bum (supra) and Cholan Roadways Limited, (supra). Paras 10 and 12 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder for ready reference: “10. Paras 10 and 12 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder for ready reference: “10. In the present case, the sole reason which weighed with the Commissioner was that no independent witness was produced-not even a single passenger of the bus was examined by the Department. The decision relied by the Appellant squarely deals even with this reasoning. It has been held that, in the case of State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 the Court held that mere non-examination of passenger does not render the finding of guilt and punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority invalid. Similar view has been taken in the case of Divisional Controller KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane, (2005) 3 SCC 254 . Both these decisions have been noticed in the reported decision relied by the Appellant. The burden to prove that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence, is on the employee, as expounded in the case of Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208 referred to in the reported decision. In the reported case relied by the Appellant, it has been noted as under: 34……… In the instant case the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court misdirected themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose unto themselves correct questions. It is now well-settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In this case, furthermore, the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did riot apply the principle of Res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into consideration a relevant factor and furthermore took into consideration an irrelevant fact not germane for determining the issue, namely, the passengers of the bus were mandatority required to be examined. The Industrial Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic enquiry, which in “preponderance of probability” and applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review was, thus, clearly made out.” 12. The Industrial Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic enquiry, which in “preponderance of probability” and applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review was, thus, clearly made out.” 12. In our opinion, the Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer and in substituting his own judgment to that of the Disciplinary Authority. It was not a case of no legal evidence produced during the enquiry by the Department, in relation to the charges framed against the Respondent. Whether the decision of the Disciplinary Authority of dismissing the Respondent is just and proper, could be assailed by the Respondent in appropriate proceedings. Considering the fact that there was adequate material produced in the Departmental enquiry evidencing that fatal accident was caused by the Respondent while driving the vehicle on duty, the burden to prove that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence was on the Respondent. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur squarely applies to the fact situation in the present case.” 22. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court or Tribunal to cause interference in the finding of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer is very limited. It cannot be interfered even if second view is plausible based on the evidence. 23. The judgment cited by learned counsel for the non-appellant are not mainly in reference to the Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947. 24. In the case of Divisional Manager & Authorised Disciplinary Authority, RSRTC, (supra), consideration of the issue was in reference to the judgment of the Apex Court but it was not on the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947. The judgment of the Apex Court otherwise exits directly on the issue which were not cited thus the judgment of the Division Bench in the case supra cannot be applied contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases, referred to above. 25. Another judgment is in the case of Shri Loomb Singh, (supra). Therein, para 11 deals with the issue and it has been held that only prima facie case can be considered for grant or rejection of the application. 25. Another judgment is in the case of Shri Loomb Singh, (supra). Therein, para 11 deals with the issue and it has been held that only prima facie case can be considered for grant or rejection of the application. Unfortunately, therein the law laid down by the Apex Court to define the meaning of “prima facie” case and extent of jurisdiction while exercising powers u/Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 was not discussed to the extent required. There was reappreciation of the evidence by the Tribunal yet not interfered. The reappreciation of the evidence is not permissible. If a common person can come to the same conclusion as drawn by the Enquiry Officer, interference in the finding cannot be made. The facts of this case are otherwise distinguishable to the facts in the case Shri Loomb Singh, (supra). 26. The last judgment on the issue is in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd., (supra). The interference in the finding has been permitted if there exists perversity. The extent of perversity has been defined and it means that finding has been recorded without support of any legal evidence. In view of the above, the judgment in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd., (supra) does not enlarge the scope of interference in the finding of the Enquiry Officer, rather, it can be only when there is a perversity, that too, the extent of unavailability of evidence to draw conclusions. It is not the case herein. 27. In view of the above, none of the judgments, cited by learned counsel for the non-appellant, applies to the facts of this case. 28. Now, the present matter is to be considered in the light of the judgments of the Apex Court, referred to above. 29. In the instant case, the non-appellant-workman was carrying 24 passengers without tickets. The inspection was caused at “Badki arrival”. The inspecting party prepared Waybill and BCR on the spot. It was recorded that out of 73 passengers, 24 passengers were not carrying tickets. The fare from them has been collected by the workman. The Waybill and BCR indicate even place of inspection. It was signed by the non-appellant-workman in token of acceptance of the report. There is nothing on record to show any objection or protest against the remarks immediately or subsequently. 30. The non-appellant-workman was served with the charge sheet followed by an enquiry. The Waybill and BCR indicate even place of inspection. It was signed by the non-appellant-workman in token of acceptance of the report. There is nothing on record to show any objection or protest against the remarks immediately or subsequently. 30. The non-appellant-workman was served with the charge sheet followed by an enquiry. He produced two witnesses, namely, Shivji and Abdul Latif, who said to have boarded the bus at “Ratadia arrival” and it is stated that inspection was also caused at “Ratadia arrival” when bus was stationary. The Waybill and BCR on record indicate inspection at “Badki arrival”, therefore, the Enquiry Officer did not find their statements to be reliable. The finding to this effect has been recorded yet ignored by the Tribunal as well as learned Single Judge. The non-appellant-workman had produced two witnesses but no proof was given that they were travelling in the bus. It may be in the form of tickets otherwise anyone can be planted as witness, said to be travelling in the bus. The non-appellant could not otherwise explain as to why he signed the Waybill and BCR showing 24 passengers without tickets. The passengers cannot always certify that everyone was having ticket specifically when it was carrying 73 passengers. 31. It cannot be said to be a case of perverse finding, rather, if the enquiry report is taken into consideration, the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer is plausible one thus could not have been discarded while finding out a prima facie case. The Tribunal has reappreciated the evidence as if it is exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(a) of the Act of 1947 on a reference under Section 10 of the Act of 1947 and not under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947. 32. Learned Single Judge and the Tribunal could not supply reasons to ignore the Waybill and BCR, which have been considered by the Enquiry Officer to be in token of acceptance of allegation by none-else but the workman himself. No protest or objection was made at any point of time about correctness of Waybill and BCR. The evidence available on record is enough to show that conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer is plausible one. 33. In view of the above, we find reasons to cause interference in the order passed by the Tribunal so as learned Single Judge. Accordingly, both the orders are set aside. 34. The evidence available on record is enough to show that conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer is plausible one. 33. In view of the above, we find reasons to cause interference in the order passed by the Tribunal so as learned Single Judge. Accordingly, both the orders are set aside. 34. With the aforesaid, this appeal is allowed with the approval of application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947. 35. This order would, however, not preclude the non-appellant to take remedies under Sec. 10 of the Act of 1947 in regard to quantum of punishment and for recording detail finding of fact in regard to proof of the charges. 36. In the light of the consideration of merit of the case, we have considered the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by applying criteria given by the Apex Court in the cases of Chandramani, (supra) and N. Balakrishnan, (supra). 37. Finding merit in the appeal, we have expressed our view favourable to the appellant and taking into consideration the aforesaid, we find reason to accept the application for condonation of delay. It is moreso when, then exits explanation and otherwise delay is only of 108 days. 38. Accordingly, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed. The delay in filing appeal is condoned.