JUDGMENT : BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J. 1. This appeal has been filed in respect of the judgment dated 18.04.2017, delivered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in OWP No.572/2016 whereby the appellant’s writ petition was allowed by directing the respondents to pay a sum of rupees three lakhs with 6% interest from the date of filing of the petition till its final realization. 2. The appeal has been filed seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded in modification of the said judgment to the extent that, according to the appellant, the just compensation would be in the range of Rs 10-11 lacs and the rate of interest awarded would also be between 7% to 9%. Strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Joginder Singh v. State of J&K and others : AIR 2011 J&K 130 .We shall refer to the said decision at a later stage in this judgment. 3. Before we do that, it would be necessary to set out the factual background of the case. On 25.05.2001 when the appellant, who was 17 years of age at that time, while going to attend the call of nature at about 6 o’clock in the morning, came in contact with a live electric service wire, which was hanging down to the ground level and as a result of the severe electric shock, she suffered serious physical injuries on her thigh, chest and left arm. Her father managed to save her but, he, too, suffered some minor injuries in the process. The appellant was then taken to the Government District Hospital, Kathua on the same day. On examining her, the doctors were of the opinion that it was necessary to amputate her arm from the middle. The amputation surgery was performed on 14.06.2001 and she was discharged from the hospital on 26.06.2001. It is the case of the appellant and which has been accepted by the learned Single Judge, that due to the amputation of left arm of the appellant, her life had been badly affected and she was going through acute depression and suffered from an inferiority complex. Even in performing mundane day to day activities, she was greatly hampered because of the loss of her left arm. Even in performing mundane day to day activities, she was greatly hampered because of the loss of her left arm. For the purpose of her treatment, she had to be hospitalized and had incurred medical expenses for the same. The appellant, apart from suffering physical pain, has been left with the life-long psychological trauma of loss of a limb. 4. Realizing this, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the maintenance of electric supply is under the control of the respondents and they were bound to ensure that the lives of the citizens are not put in jeopardy. It was held that a duty is cast upon the State to take such steps as are required for the safety of the people and on the failure of such steps being taken, the respondents could not escape the obligation to compensate a victim. Several decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts were referred to which we need not refer to for establishing the point that the appellant was entitled to compensation. We need not refer to those decisions or devote further time on this aspect of the matter because the same has not been assailed before us. The present appeal is only one for enhancement of the compensation. 5. The learned Single Judge while considering the question of compensation, after examining the facts which were placed before him, computed the compensation amount of Rs.3.00 lacs as under:- i. 70% permanent disability 1,80,000/- ii. Pain and suffering 20,000/- iii. Loss of amenities 20,000/- iv. Medical & other related expenses 20,000/- v. Compensation on account of bleak Chances of getting a suitable match/life Partner in view of her 70% permanent Disability 50,000/- vi. Costs 10,000/- Total 3,00,000/- 6. As aforesaid, the writ petition was allowed by directing the respondents to pay the said sum of Rs.3.00 lakhs with 6% interest from the date of filing of the petition till its final realization. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that this amount of compensation cannot be considered as just compensation, particularly in view of the Division Bench decision in the case of Joginder Singh (supra). In that decision, several appeals were decided together. We are concerned with the decision in LPAOW No.34/2007 arising out of OWP No. 647/2002. That was the case of Joginder Singh. In that decision, several appeals were decided together. We are concerned with the decision in LPAOW No.34/2007 arising out of OWP No. 647/2002. That was the case of Joginder Singh. It was also a case of amputation of the right hand. In that decision, it was noted that Joginder Singh was 25 years of age and although there was no evidence of his earning, the Court considered his earning capacity at the level of a daily wager and, therefore, came to the conclusion that his income would, in the minimum, be Rs.3000/-per month. The Division Bench referred to the Supreme Court decision in case Yadava Kumar v. The Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd and another: AIR 2010 SC 3426 In that decision, the Supreme Court made a distinction between an award of compensation and an award of damages. The Supreme Court observed that in the matter of computation of compensation, the approach is more broad based than what is done in the matter of assessment of damages. It also observed that there could not be any rigid or mathematical precision in the matter of determination of compensation. 8. After examining the facts of the case, and applying the relevant multiplier in the Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Division Bench assessed the loss of future earning at Rs. 3,67,2000/-. The methodology for the same was that in that case, the income of Joginder Singh was assessed at the rate of Rs.3,000/- per month which came to Rs.36000/- per annum and since he was 25 years of age, the multiplier of 17 was used which resulted in the figure of Rs. 6,12,000/-. Since the percentage of disablement was 60%, the loss of future earnings was computed at Rs. 3,67,200/-. The same was rounded off to Rs. 3,70,000/-. Apart from this, the Court awarded a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- for pain and suffering, Rs.70,000/- for medical expenses, Rs.25,000/- for conveyance and attendant charges and Rs.75,000/- towards loss of amenities. 9. It has been held in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India(P) Ltd. (1995) 1SCC 551 that, broadly speaking, while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. 9. It has been held in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India(P) Ltd. (1995) 1SCC 551 that, broadly speaking, while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. It was further observed that the pecuniary damages may include the expenses incurred by the claimants such as (i) medical attendance, (ii) loss of earning/profit, (iii) other material loss. As regards the non-pecuniary damages, the Court observed that they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future, (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters such as on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit, (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, for example, on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned may be shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life. In the said decision itself there was a reference to an English decision in the case of Ward v. James: (1965) 1 All ER 563 with regard to non-pecuniary damages. It was observed in the decision that when judges are confronted with computing the same, they are actually been asked to calculate the incalculable. In this backdrop, it was observed that the figure is bound to be, for the most part, a ‘conventional sum’. The judges, it was observed, have worked out a pattern, and they keep it in line with the changes in the value of money. 10. What was meant by the expression ‘conventional sum’ was that the courts have evolved a figure for such non pecuniary compensation and the same has more or less become conventional subject to revision based upon the changes in the value of money so that the nominal value of the conventional sum does not go out of sync with the real value which is to be maintained. It is obvious that the conventional sum would differ from case to case and particularly in death cases and in injury cases. It is also clear that the conventional sum, if it does not keep pace with inflation might become contemptible as noted in the Supreme Court decision Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh: (2003) 2 SCC 274 . It is obvious that the conventional sum would differ from case to case and particularly in death cases and in injury cases. It is also clear that the conventional sum, if it does not keep pace with inflation might become contemptible as noted in the Supreme Court decision Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh: (2003) 2 SCC 274 . It is, therefore, clear that while calculating the conventional sum there has to be an element of guess work but, once the sum is established by convention, the courts should not depart from that convention except for reassessing the same by factoring in the erosion of the value of money caused through inflation. In a death case in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar: (2001) 8 SCC 197 , the conventional sum in 1989 was taken to be Rs. 50,000/-. Various factors can be taken to upgrade that figure. But, as we pointed out above, the conventional sum in the case of injury or impairment, as in the present case where there is a permanent disability of 70%, would be different from that of a death case. Now, let us come to the crux of the matter and that is to compute the quantum of compensation. Since there is no appeal by the respondents challenging quantification done by the learned Single Judge, and the appeal is only one seeking enhancement, the amount arrived at under each head by the learned Single Judge ought not, in our view, to be revised, except if the revision is an upward revision. 11. We note that going by the methodology adopted in Joginder Singh’s case (supra), the loss of earning in the present case could be calculated by taking the minimum wages that the appellant who was then a girl of 17 years of age could have expected. We find that the daily wages of daily rated workers in all the Government Departments and Municipalities and local bodies was Rs. 60/- per day in terms of the Government Order No. 69-F of 2001, dated 19.03.2001. If we consider a month to comprise of 25 working days, the monthly income of such a daily rated worker would come to Rs. 1500/- per month which would mean that the annual income would be Rs. 18,000/-. Since the appellant had suffered 70% permanent disability, this figure of Rs. If we consider a month to comprise of 25 working days, the monthly income of such a daily rated worker would come to Rs. 1500/- per month which would mean that the annual income would be Rs. 18,000/-. Since the appellant had suffered 70% permanent disability, this figure of Rs. 18,000/- would have to be multiplied by 0.70 to arrive at the annual figure of Rs. 12,600/-. This would form the multiplicand. From the second schedule of the said act, the multiplier in respect of the appellant, since she was 17 years of age, would be 16. Thus, if the figure of Rs. 12,600/- is multiplied by 16, we come to the figure of Rs. 2,01,600/-. 12. The conventional amounts for pain and suffering, and loss of amenities have to be enhanced in terms of the Division Bench judgment in Joginder Singh (supra). The quantum given for pain and suffering was Rs. 1 lakh and for loss of amenity the amount was Rs. 75,000/-. We see no reason as to why the appellant should not be awarded the same compensation as it is a part of the ‘convention’ in the State. All other amounts apart from the costs would, in our view, remain the same. Therefore, the compensation which, in our view, would be just and fair, insofar as the appellant is concerned is re-worked as under:- i. 70% permanent disability 2,01,600/- ii. Pain and suffering 1,00,000/- iii. Loss of amenities 75,000/- iv. Medical and other relates expenses 20,000/- v. Compensation on account of bleak chances of getting a suitable match/life partner in view of her 70% permanent disability 50,000/- Total 4,46,600/- 13. The above sum of Rs. 4,46,600/- was to be the just and fair compensation on the date when the appellant suffered the injuries in May, 2001. Since almost 17 years have gone by, the value of money has obviously eroded due to inflation during these years. If we take the rate of interest @ 7% per annum simple interest, that would adequately, in our view, reflect the average rate of inflation throughout this period. Therefore, the interest component computed in these 17 years @ 7% simple interest per annum would come to Rs. 5,31,454/-, thereby, taking the total amount to Rs. 9,78,054/- (4,46,600+5,31,454). If we take the rate of interest @ 7% per annum simple interest, that would adequately, in our view, reflect the average rate of inflation throughout this period. Therefore, the interest component computed in these 17 years @ 7% simple interest per annum would come to Rs. 5,31,454/-, thereby, taking the total amount to Rs. 9,78,054/- (4,46,600+5,31,454). In addition to this, since the appellant has been litigating all these years for her rights and for receiving a just and fair compensation, we award costs of Rs. 50,000/-. 14. Thus, the total sum payable by the respondents to the appellant comes to Rs. 10,28,054/-.The same shall be paid to the appellant within a period of six weeks from today. Any amount paid to the appellant pursuant to the decision of the learned Single Judge, would of course, be adjusted to arrive at the net amount payable. In case, the said amount is not paid within the said period of six weeks, it shall continue to carry simple interest @ 7% per annum till the date of actual payment. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.