CONTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF INDIA, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI v. UNNI. P. , S/O. P. KRISHNAN
2018-02-16
DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. Exordially, the central issue raised in this phalanx of cases is concise and confined to one, though collateral questions are impelled, but more as a method in support of the main issue than for independent resolution. 2. In singular focus in all these cases is whether a disciplinary authority, acting under the rigor of Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short, 'CCS (CCA) Rules'), which prescribes the procedure for imposing minor penalties, is obligated to hold an enquiry in the manner laid down in the case of imposition of major penalties in every case where the delinquent employee seeks such an enquiry. 3. We are considering all these cases together since the issues involved, the pleadings made and the materials produced on record are analogous to each other and are concatenated, thus enabling resolution of the issues raised therein by a single judgment. For ease of consideration we, however, treat OP(CAT) No. 381 of 2010 as the main case and all reference to parties and documents in this judgment will be as they are arrayed in the said original petition. 4. All the respondents in these original petitions are employees serving in the office of the Accountant General (A&E). Except four among the respondents, all the others are stated to be still serving. Smt. S.Girija, the respondent in OP(CAT) No.384 of 2010, Sri. C.Komalan, the respondent in OP(CAT) No.433 of 2011, Sri. T.N. Manoharan, the respondent in OP(CAT) No.518 of 2011 and Sri. C. Komalan, the respondent in OP(CAT) No.3059 of 2011 are stated to have retired subsequently. 5. Since we are considering all the above cases, numbering about 42 in total, jointly and since we are proposing to deliver a judgment in common, it is ineluctable that certain amounts of generalization in facts would become inevitable. Some of the factual circumstances that are undisputed can be easily stated first. 6. All the respondents in these original petitions are the applicants before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench in the various original applications filed respectively by them. The common case in all these applications was that the orders, issued by the Disciplinary Authority, imposing upon them a minor penalty as stipulated under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules have been issued without sanction of law since no enquiry was conducted preceding such action.
The common case in all these applications was that the orders, issued by the Disciplinary Authority, imposing upon them a minor penalty as stipulated under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules have been issued without sanction of law since no enquiry was conducted preceding such action. The punishment imposed against all the party respondents are either reduction of pay by one stage for three years or reduction of pay to a lower stage or withholding of increment without any cumulative effect. The various learned counsel appearing for the party respondents are ad idem in their submissions that the punishments imposed in these cases are minor penalties and not major. The nucleus of their assertions and contentions thereafter is that while imposing such a minor penalty, the disciplinary authority was enjoined and obligated in law to have conducted a detailed enquiry and only consequent to such enquiry to have concluded guilt against the respondents. 7. The bedrock of the powers of the Disciplinary Authority, while imposing minor penalties, is contained in Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. Since the underpinning of all the submissions in these cases before us are on this particular Rule, we deem it appropriate to extract the relevant portion of it as under: “16. Procedure for imposing minor penalties (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 15, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Clause (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 shall be made except after - (a) informing the Government servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal; (b) holding an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (23) of Rule 14, in every case in which the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is necessary; (c) taking the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant under Clause (a) and the record of inquiry, if any, held under Clause (b) into consideration; (d) recording a finding on each imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour; and (e) consulting the Commission where such consultation is necessary.” 8.
As is ineluctable from the Rules afore-extracted, the mandate of law is that no order, imposing any of the minor penalties which are specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 of the said Rules, shall be made except after holding an inquiry in every case in which the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is necessary. It is, therefore, inescapable that the discretion and the power to decide whether an inquiry is necessary is vested with the Disciplinary Authority and it is up to them to decide whether such an inquiry is to be ordered, taking into account the various factual factors as are presented in each case. 9. As we have already indicated above, the specific contention of the party respondents in all these cases is that if an employee requests for an inquiry, then notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 16(1)(b) above, it shall be obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to order such an inquiry. This, in effect, is the substratum of the submissions made before us by the various learned counsel appearing for the party respondents. 10. The facts, as are available from the pleadings on record, would show that all the party respondents were proceeded against under disciplinary proceedings on the allegation that they had participated in an illegal demonstration/strike held by them under the aegis of certain trade unions on 30.04.2008. The accusation against the various respondents is that they had participated in such an illegal event, notwithstanding the fact that they were legally obligated not to do so and that it contravened the specific provisions of the relevant Rules with respect to the conduct and behaviour of Government employees. The Disciplinary Authority, thereafter, invoked Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules in order to impose minor penalty on the respondents and recorded his view, which is articulated in the orders impugned before us, that no inquiry is required on account of the specific circumstances that he has indicted in the said orders. It is this part of the orders impugned before us that has been assailed by the respondents on the ground that even though they had denied the factual allegations against them, the Disciplinary Authority had decided not to conduct a detailed inquiry and had proceeded to impose punishment of minor penalty upon them even without such an inquiry.
It is this part of the orders impugned before us that has been assailed by the respondents on the ground that even though they had denied the factual allegations against them, the Disciplinary Authority had decided not to conduct a detailed inquiry and had proceeded to impose punishment of minor penalty upon them even without such an inquiry. The validity of such a course of action pursued by the disciplinary authority is under challenge in all these proceedings. 11. As we have already said above, the respondents initially challenged the actions and the orders of the Disciplinary and the Appellate Authority before the Tribunal by filing the original applications. The Tribunal, after an evaluation of all the facts and materials presented before it, entered a conclusion that since the respondents had contested the factual allegations leveled against them in the charge sheet, it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to have conducted an inquiry before imposing even a minor penalty and on such reasoning, set aside the orders imposing punishment as being illegal and unlawful. 12. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India and the other petitioners herein have approached this Court by filing the above original petitions challenging the view, holdings and conclusions of the Tribunal in the original applications. 13. We have heard Sri. V.V. Asokan, the learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri. Jaikrishna, appearing for the petitioners in all the above cases and Sri. T.A. Shaji, the learned senior counsel assisted by Sri. Vincent Didacose and Sri. T.C. Govindaswamy, appearing for the various respondents in the various cases. 14. The primary submission now urged by Sri. T.A. Shaji and the various learned counsel for the party respondents in these cases in support of the impugned orders issued by the Tribunal, is that everyone of them had contested and denied the factual allegations made against them in the charge sheet. According to them, in such a situation, it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to have ordered an inquiry before imposing any punishment against them. They say that once the factual allegations were denied, then there was no platform, standing on which the Disciplinary Authority could have imposed punishment because the factual allegations have not been found true.
According to them, in such a situation, it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to have ordered an inquiry before imposing any punishment against them. They say that once the factual allegations were denied, then there was no platform, standing on which the Disciplinary Authority could have imposed punishment because the factual allegations have not been found true. They say that the rigor of Rule 16(1)(b), afore extracted, is that whenever the disciplinary authority finds that the facts warrant an inquiry, it is incumbent upon him to order so. They rely on the Government of India's decision with respect to this Rule which is extracted as under: GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S DECISION Holding of an inquiry when requested by the delinquent: Instructions.- The Staff Side of the Committee of the National Council (JCM) set up to consider revision of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, had suggested that Rule 16(1) should be amended so as to provide for holding an inquiry even for imposition of minor penalty, if the accused employee requested for such an inquiry. 2. The above suggestion has been given a detailed consideration. Rule 16(1-A) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, provides for the holding of an inquiry even when a minor penalty is to be imposed in the circumstances indicated therein. In other cases, where a minor penalty is to be imposed, Rule 16(1) ibid leaves it to the discretion of Disciplinary Authority to decide whether an inquiry should be held or not. The implication of this rule is that, on receipt of representation of Government servant concerned on the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour communicated to him, the Disciplinary Authority should apply its mind to all facts and circumstances and the reasons urged in the representation for holding a detailed inquiry and form an opinion whether an inquiry is necessary or not. In a case where a delinquent Government servant has asked for inspection of certain documents and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, the Disciplinary Authority should naturally apply its mind more closely to the request and should not reject the request solely on the ground that an inquiry is not mandatory.
In a case where a delinquent Government servant has asked for inspection of certain documents and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, the Disciplinary Authority should naturally apply its mind more closely to the request and should not reject the request solely on the ground that an inquiry is not mandatory. If the records indicate that, notwithstanding the points urged by the Government servant, the Disciplinary Authority could, after due consideration, come to the conclusion that an inquiry is not necessary, it should say so in writing indicating its reasons, instead of rejecting the request for holding inquiry summarily without any indication that it has applied its mind to the request, as such an action could be construed as denial of natural justice. 15. Sri. T.A. Shaji, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of various party respondents say that the decision of the Government of India at supra makes the position absolutely clear. He says that Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 provides for the holding of an inquiry even when a minor penalty is imposed if the circumstances indicated therein warrant so. According to him, as has been stated in the Government of India's decision, the effect of this Rule is that on receipt of the representation of the Government servant denying the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour, the Disciplinary Authority is bound to apply its mind to all the relevant facts and circumstances and then to decide whether a detailed inquiry is required or otherwise. He urges that once the delinquent officer or the charge sheeted employee denies all the allegations against him, then it would be completely impermissible for the Disciplinary Authority to proceed to impose punishment without an inquiry. 16. Au contraire, Sri. V.V. Asokan, the learned standing counsel appearing for the petitioners asserts that the Tribunal has completely misdirected itself while concluding that in all cases where an employee requires an inquiry to be done, it shall be obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to do so. According to the learned senior counsel, the mandate of Rule 16(1)(b) is absolutely clear that it is the optional discretion of the Disciplinary Authority to order an inquiry, if he is of the opinion that such an inquiry is necessary.
According to the learned senior counsel, the mandate of Rule 16(1)(b) is absolutely clear that it is the optional discretion of the Disciplinary Authority to order an inquiry, if he is of the opinion that such an inquiry is necessary. According to him, the position of law is that the Disciplinary Authority is vested with the opportunity to first decide whether an enquiry is necessary and that once he feels no such inquiry is necessary, then to continue forward and to impose the punishment of minor penalty. The learned standing counsel for the petitioners reiterates that the decision of the Government of India afore extracted is also to this effect and no other. He points out that the said decision mandates that if the records indicate that notwithstanding the objections raised by the delinquent, the Disciplinary Authority enters a conclusion that no such inquiry is necessary, then he can, after recording his reasons in writing in concluding so, proceed to impose a minor penalty even without an inquiry. 17. The submissions of Sri. T.A. Shaji, the learned senior counsel was adopted and followed by Sri. Govindaswamy, the learned counsel appearing for some of the party respondents, but he adds that in a case of this nature where the sole allegation made against the respondents is that they have participated in a dharna/strike illegally, it would be incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to order an inquiry since the question whether there such an illegal strike/dharna ever took place is a question of fact. According to him, the Disciplinary Authority cannot be permitted to be the judge, jury and executioner by making an allegation and then affirming that the allegation is proved even without an inquiry, thus enabling him to impose penalty. 18. The consideration as to the validity of the orders issued by the Disciplinary Authority would hinge upon the interpretation to be acceded to Rule 16(1)(b). To aid this, it would be profitable to first refer to Rule 1-A of Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules which is inserted by notification dated 20th April, 1968.
18. The consideration as to the validity of the orders issued by the Disciplinary Authority would hinge upon the interpretation to be acceded to Rule 16(1)(b). To aid this, it would be profitable to first refer to Rule 1-A of Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules which is inserted by notification dated 20th April, 1968. For convenience of reference, we deem it appropriate to extract it as under: “(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (b) of sub-rule (1), if in a case it is proposed after considering the representation, if any, made by the Government servant under Clause (a) of that sub-rule, to withhold increments of pay and such withholding of increments is likely to affect adversely the amount of pension payable to the Government servant or to withhold increments of pay for a period exceeding three years or to withhold increments of pay with cumulative effect for any period, an inquiry shall be held in the manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (23) of Rule 14, before making any order imposing on the Government servant any such penalty.” 19. It is obvious from sub-rule 1-A afore extracted that even in the case of a minor penalty which is likely to affect adversely the amount of pension payable to the Government servant or when increments of pay are ordered to be withheld for a period exceeding three years or when increments of pay are ordered to be withheld with cumulative effect for any period, an inquiry shall be held in the manner laid down in Rule 14, before making any order imposing penalty on the Government Servant. The provisions of sub-rule 1-A is in contradistinction to the provisions in Rule 16(1)(b). This is because while under sub-rule 1-A, the Disciplinary Authority is obligated to conduct an inquiry, under Rule 16(1)(b) a discretion has been vested with him. The reason for this deviation in Rule 1-A is obvious because those types of minor penalties, which has an effect pecuniarily on the pension drawable by the delinquent officer, have been treated to be a separate class and has been ordained to be treated in a different manner. Therefore, in cases of imposition of minor penalties which come under sub-rule 1-A, while the Disciplinary Authority is obligated to conduct an inquiry, it is not so in the case of a minor penalty which does not have such repercussions. 20.
Therefore, in cases of imposition of minor penalties which come under sub-rule 1-A, while the Disciplinary Authority is obligated to conduct an inquiry, it is not so in the case of a minor penalty which does not have such repercussions. 20. Litera scriptra, there cannot be a doubt, by the way in which Rule 16(1)(b) is phrased, that except when an opinion is arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority, after looking into the various aspects involved, that such an inquiry is required, he would be enabled to impose a minor penalty, save those referred to in sub-rule 1-A afore, without causing any enquiry at all. The question is, as has been impelled before us by the various learned counsel for the respondents, whether in spite of the way Rule 16(1)(b) is worded, it will have to be a read-in that in every case where an employee requires or requests for an inquiry, such a course will have to be conceded. 21. It is relevant in the consideration of this issue that even as per the Government of India's decision supra, the request of the employees made before it, which led to the said decision, was that an inquiry be ordered to be held even in the case of a minor penalty if the accused employee requested for such an inquiry. It is pertinent that the Government of India did not accept this in toto but only granted such a course to the employee, subject to the discretion to be exercised by the Disciplinary Authority in certain specified circumstances. The specified circumstances that we have mentioned above are also mentioned in the decision of the Government. It is clearly stated therein that in a case where a delinquent Government servant requests for inspection of documents or cross examination of witnesses, the Disciplinary Authority should apply its mind more closely to such request and shall not reject it solely on the ground that an inquiry is not mandatory. The view of the Government of India, voiced in this opinion, is absolutely without ambiguity. The discretion to order an inquiry is certainly with the Disciplinary Authority and it is for him to take a decision, after proper application of mind, as to whether such an inquiry is to be called for.
The view of the Government of India, voiced in this opinion, is absolutely without ambiguity. The discretion to order an inquiry is certainly with the Disciplinary Authority and it is for him to take a decision, after proper application of mind, as to whether such an inquiry is to be called for. It is only in cases where the delinquent employee completely denies the allegations and then seeks inspection of documents or cross examination of witnesses and if the Disciplinary Authority feels that these requests are bona fide and not intended merely to delay, that he need to pass an order allowing such an inquiry. In all other cases, it is certainly available, going by the literal interpretation of the Rule itself, that he shall proceed to pass an order justifying his decision not to hold an inquiry and then proceed to propose and impose punishment. 22. When we expressed our view above across the Bar, Sri. T.A. Shaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the party respondents and Sri. Govindaswamy cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in O.K. Bharadwaj v. Union of India [ (2001) 9 SCC 180 ] to add strength to the contention that even in the case of a minor penalty, an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say or to file his explanation and that if the charges are factual and if they are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be called for. The learned senior counsel says that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically said in the said judgment that this is the minimum requirement of the principles of natural justice and that the said requirement cannot be dispensed with. Even though in paragraph 3 of the said judgment, this is the manner in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed its mind, a reading of paragraph 4 of the said judgment makes it clear the circumstances under which their Lordships had said so.
Even though in paragraph 3 of the said judgment, this is the manner in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed its mind, a reading of paragraph 4 of the said judgment makes it clear the circumstances under which their Lordships had said so. In the said paragraph, their Lordships, after considering the facts pithily, held that since the High Court did not consider the matter from the aforesaid angle, it is better to remit it to consider whether an opportunity was given to the appellant therein to put forward his case and whether in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, an enquiry was called for and if called for, was it held according to law and the principles of natural justice. It, therefore, becomes luculent that the circumstances under which their Lordships delivered the said judgment was that there was no confirmation as to whether the delinquent was given an opportunity to deny the charges and whether upon such denial, any decision had been taken by the Disciplinary Authority in entering into a conclusion that an enquiry was warranted or otherwise. 23. In fact, the very same issue was dealt with in greater detail by the Hon'ble Supreme Court later in the year 2000 and our path is illuminated by its judgment in Food Corporation of India, Hyderabad and others v. A.Prahalada Rao and another [ (2001) 1 SCC 165 ]. The opinion of the Hon'ble Court is clearly recorded in paragraph 5 of the said judgment, which, in our view, requires to be read in full and for such purpose, we deem it appropriate to extract it as under: “5. In our view, on the basis of the allegation that Food Corporation of India is misusing its power of imposing minor penalties, the Regulation cannot be interpreted contrary to its language. Regulation 60(1) (b) mandates the disciplinary authority to form its opinion whether it is necessary to hold inquiry in a particular case or not. But that would not mean that in all cases where an employee disputes his liability, a full-fledged inquiry should be held. Otherwise, the entire purpose of incorporating summary procedure for imposing minor penalties would be frustrated. If the discretion given under Regulation 60(1)(b) is misused or is exercised in an arbitrary manner, it is open to the employee to challenge the same before the appropriate forum.
Otherwise, the entire purpose of incorporating summary procedure for imposing minor penalties would be frustrated. If the discretion given under Regulation 60(1)(b) is misused or is exercised in an arbitrary manner, it is open to the employee to challenge the same before the appropriate forum. It is for the disciplinary authority to decide whether regular departmental enquiry as contemplated under Regulation 58 for imposing major penalty should be followed or not. This discretion cannot be curtailed by interpretation which is contrary to the language used. Further, Regulation 60(2) itself provides that in a case if it is proposed to withhold increments of pay and such withholding of increments is likely to affect adversely the amount of retirement benefits payable to an employee and in such other cases as mentioned therein, the disciplinary authority shall hold inquiry in the manner laid down in Regulation 58 before making any order imposing any such penalty. Hence, it is apparent that the High Court erroneously interpreted the Regulation by holding that once the employee denies the charge, it is incumbent upon the authority to conduct inquiry contemplated for imposing major penalty. It also erred in holding that where an employee denies that loss is caused to the Corporation either by his negligence or breach of order, such inquiry should be held. It is settled law that court's power of judicial review in such cases is limited and court can interfere where the authority held the inquiry proceedings in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry and imposing punishment or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence or is such that no reasonable persons would have ever reached. As per the Regulation, holding of regular departmental enquiry is a discretionary power of the disciplinary authority which is to be exercised by considering the facts of each case and if it is misused or used arbitrarily, it would be subject to judicial review.” 24. The position of law is, therefore, very clear. The rigor of the Rule is that the Disciplinary Authority shall order an inquiry, if in his view, such a course is warranted.
The position of law is, therefore, very clear. The rigor of the Rule is that the Disciplinary Authority shall order an inquiry, if in his view, such a course is warranted. That discretion of the Disciplinary Authority has to be guided, to a large extent, by the opinion of the Government of India afore extracted and in cases where the delinquent employee denies the allegations and seeks that witnesses be allowed to be examined or documents be allowed to be scrutinized, then the Disciplinary Authority, though not enjoined to order an inquiry automatically, is but obligated to consider it more closely and decide whether such an inquiry is required. 25. Interestingly, even going by the decision of the Government of India afore, it is not obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to order an inquiry every time an employee seeks the assessment of materials or cross examination of the witnesses, but it is still open to the Disciplinary Authority to consider the issue as to whether an inquiry has to be ordered and if he thinks otherwise, he is still vested with the authority to reject that request and go on with the imposition of the punishment. 26. The submissions of the learned senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that whenever a delinquent employee requests for an inquiry or makes an application for cross examination of witnesses or examination of documents, it shall be obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to order an inquiry is, in our view, completely misdirected. This is because, as we have already said above, litera scriptra Rules 16(1)(b) does not say so. It vests the Disciplinary Authority with the discretion to decide on the requirement of an inquiry one way or the other. The opinion of the Government of India is also not different. It only cautions the Disciplinary Authority to be more circumspect while making that assessment, as to whether an inquiry is required or otherwise, in cases where an employee seeks cross examination of witnesses or scrutiny of documents. Even the opinion of the Government of India makes it ineluctable that it is not automatically enjoined or obligatory on the Disciplinary Authority to order an inquiry every time that a delinquent calls for.
Even the opinion of the Government of India makes it ineluctable that it is not automatically enjoined or obligatory on the Disciplinary Authority to order an inquiry every time that a delinquent calls for. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India (supra) would also leave no room for doubt that it is up to the Disciplinary Authority to take a decision on the requirement of an inquiry and there cannot be a one-fit-all solution or mandate in such cases; It will vary from case to case and would depend on the individual situations that are presented before the Disciplinary Authority. 27. That being said, the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority, of course, has to be exercised by him judicially. It is up to him to decide not to order an inquiry on relevant factors, but to place it on record in the form of a written order. Once the said Authority passes an order concluding that no inquiry is required, it certainly becomes available to the delinquent employee to challenge it by filing an appropriate proceeding and it would be up to the Courts or the Tribunal to decide whether the Disciplinary Authority had exercised its discretion correctly and eruditely. If the discretion is found to be exercised without reason or without proper application of mind, it will be certainly be open to the Tribunals and the Courts, while exercising judicial review, to interfere with the same and decide whether that decision was right or wrong. This, in our view, is the only option that is available to the delinquent employee once an inquiry is ordered to be dispensed with by the Disciplinary Authority and a minor penalty is imposed. 28. That being the position, all which is available to a Court or a Tribunal is whether the order impugned, wherein the Disciplinary Authority finds that no such inquiry is required, is valid in law and whether it is supported by cogent and credible reasons. The reasons that are recorded by the Authority in the impugned order will surely attract judicial attention in the assessment as to whether it is valid and whether sustainable in law. 29.
The reasons that are recorded by the Authority in the impugned order will surely attract judicial attention in the assessment as to whether it is valid and whether sustainable in law. 29. It is in the backdrop of the above observations and the position of law that we will now go forward to consider the merits of each of these cases on the basis of the materials that are produced before us. 30. The facts in this case, as we have already cursorily said above, are that the party respondents are alleged to have participated in an illegal dharna/strike on 30.04.2008. The orders that are impugned in these proceedings are those which were issued by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority imposing minor penalties on them. They are marked separately in these cases, but all of them virtually are on the same lines. Since we are deciding all these cases together, it will be inevitable that we generalize some of the facts, as are applicable in common in all these cases, since none of the learned counsel appearing for the party respondents have a case that the individual respondents have separate contentions or separate circumstances coming to their aid or otherwise. On the allegation that the respondents had participated in the illegal dharna/strike, an order imposing minor penalty was issued by the Disciplinary Authority, namely the Senior Deputy Accountant General (Administration). Annexure A1 in O.P(CAT) No. 381 of 2010 is one such order issued to a certain Sri. P.Unni, the respondent therein. We are told that similar, if not identical, orders have been issued to all the other party respondents, which have been impugned in the various original applications and original petitions. 31. In the order in contest, namely Annexure A1, the Disciplinary Authority records that the respondent has made his objections to the charge sheet denying the same, but that there is no reason to order an inquiry because the evidence is “irrefutable, complete and categorically establishes his misconduct”.
31. In the order in contest, namely Annexure A1, the Disciplinary Authority records that the respondent has made his objections to the charge sheet denying the same, but that there is no reason to order an inquiry because the evidence is “irrefutable, complete and categorically establishes his misconduct”. The allegation against the various party respondents was that they were, along with a group of around 40 other persons, marching through the corridors of the buildings, housing the offices of the Principal Accountant General (Audit) and the Accountant General (A&E), shouting slogans, thus disturbing the peace of the office and preventing free movement of officials and visitors in violation of clause 6(b) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1993 and Rules 3(1)(iii) and 7(ii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The order further records that the respondents were given ten days time to furnish their reply. The respondents in all the cases had filed their objections denying all the charges, though some of them did so after the time initially granted to them to do so. The evidence, as has been recorded in Annexure A1, comprises of the video recordings on the dates of the incident and the reports of the incident obtained by the Disciplinary Authority from the various other sources in the office. The Disciplinary Authority has clearly opined in the order that he is fully satisfied that the incidents mentioned in the charge sheet did indeed take place and that the respondent can be seen clearly in the video participating in the unauthorized demonstration. The decision of the Disciplinary Authority in the case of the other respondents are also on similar lines. 32. The records would further reveal that after Annexure A1 order was issued, the delinquent officers requested for an opportunity to go through the video recording and other materials so as to personally make an assessment of the validity of the same and to voice their objections to it, if any. It is clearly available on record and it is not disputed by any of the learned counsel for the respondents, that their clients were given such an opportunity and that some of them had viewed the video recording while others choose not to do so. 33.
It is clearly available on record and it is not disputed by any of the learned counsel for the respondents, that their clients were given such an opportunity and that some of them had viewed the video recording while others choose not to do so. 33. It is also discernible from the records that the respondents who saw the video recording took a uniform contest against the same by saying that it is not credible, because they seem to have been edited and tampered with. When such an allegation was made by some of the party respondents, the Disciplinary Authority issued notices to them to establish their allegations or to face further action because, according to it, such allegations would also have to be seen as being in contravention of the discipline required to be maintained by a Government servant. When such a memo was received by some of the party respondents, they filed their reply resiling from the said allegation that the video recordings were edited or tampered with but explained that, as per their understanding, the video recording should have been continuous from starting till its end and in its natural sequence but that the clippings of the video shown to them were not so, the incidents appearing to be overlapping at difference places at different time slots. They also added that even the time slots were seen not continuous in the video and it was thus that they had expressed their apprehension earlier that the video recording may be tampered with or edited. 34. These objections were also considered by the Disciplinary Authority, who passed a subsequent order stating that the video clippings were recorded from the closed circuit cameras that were installed around the office premises and that each such cameras had recorded the incident at the same time frame but that when they are seen together it would only appear that one time frame overlaps the other. The Disciplinary Authority also found that the objections raised by the party respondents to the video clipping was only on account of a misunderstanding especially because it is only on account of their misunderstanding of the technology especially because subsequently they had chosen to withdraw the allegation of the video having been tampered with or edited. 35.
The Disciplinary Authority also found that the objections raised by the party respondents to the video clipping was only on account of a misunderstanding especially because it is only on account of their misunderstanding of the technology especially because subsequently they had chosen to withdraw the allegation of the video having been tampered with or edited. 35. Similarly, with respect to the documents and other reports that were relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority, some of the party respondents requested that they be given an opportunity to go through the same, which request was also granted. It was after affording all such opportunities that the Disciplinary Authority passed the final order imposing the punishment of minor penalty, holding that there was no factual circumstance that was really disputed by the respondents and that they have irrevocably conceded that they took part in the demonstration/strike but with a defensive caveat that they do not do so during the office hours or time. However, the fact that they participated in the said event during the office hours and in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant, according to the Disciplinary Authority, was amply clear from the video recording itself, which at the moment stands unimpeached. These are the reasons, as is clear from the orders impugned, that weighed with the Disciplinary Authority in not ordering an enquiry. These orders were, thereafter, approved by the Appellate Authority also holding that there was nothing else to be proved and that there was no requirement to conduct an enquiry, especially because under Rule 16(1)(b) it was the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority to decide either way. 36. We are thus called upon, in the fasciculus of the above facts, whether the discretion exercised by the Disciplinary Authority and recorded in the orders impugned, are legally tenable and sound. 37. As we have already noticed above, Rule 16(1)(b) gives the option to the Disciplinary Authority to decide whether an enquiry is necessary, taking into account the various relevant aspects. The opinion of Government of India, afore extracted, is also to the same effect that the said authority shall decide this option with great amount of circumspection when a request is made for cross-examination of witness or scrutiny of documents. 38.
The opinion of Government of India, afore extracted, is also to the same effect that the said authority shall decide this option with great amount of circumspection when a request is made for cross-examination of witness or scrutiny of documents. 38. In the case at hand, the evidence relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority to prove the allegations against the respondents are the video recording and some of the statements recorded by the other persons in the office. None of the respondents have a case that the video recording is tampered with or manipulated, contrary to their assertions earlier and none of them have a case that they were not allowed to scrutinise the documents. Most of the respondents have filed their objections to the order issued by the Disciplinary Authority seeking that they be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by holding an enquiry, but without specifying the reason or cause for making such a request. It is not sufficient, in our view, that the delinquent employee makes a request for an enquiry, but it is also incumbent upon him to state as to why he requires such an enquiry to be conducted. None of the respondents, as is clear from the pleadings on record, have any definite case as to why such enquiry has to be called for except by vaguely averring that they have denied the allegations against them, thus entitling them to an enquiry, without stating why it is warranted. 39. The Disciplinary Authority, on the other hand, considered all these factors and found that since the video recording is true and credible and since the documents remain uncontested, the factum of the respondents having participated in the demonstration/ dharna is proved and therefore, does not require an enquiry to establish it. The only remaining question before the Disciplinary Authority was whether even when such misconduct was found proved by him, whether it would construe to be an act deserving of a disciplinary action under the applicable Rules. 40. Sri. V.V. Asokan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners draw our attention to Rule 7 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, which reads as under: 7.
40. Sri. V.V. Asokan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners draw our attention to Rule 7 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, which reads as under: 7. Demonstration and Strikes No Government servant shall- (i) engage himself or participate in any demonstration which is prejudicial to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or which involves contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence, or (ii) resort to or in any way abet any form of strike or coercion or physical duress in connection with any matter pertaining to his service or the service of any other Government servant. According to him, the dharna/demonstration was engaged in by the respondents to protest against the suspension of an employee by name Sri. Santhoshkumar and that it, therefore, becomes a case of misconduct under Rule 7(2) above. Sri. T.A. Shaji, the learned Senior Counsel, on the contrary, asserts that the demonstration/strike was not on account of the suspension of Sri. Santhoshkumar per se but because of a decision taken by the Accountant General to privatise and outsource certain functions of the said office. He adds that it is true that Sri. Santhoshkumar was suspended in connection with that movement but that the particular demonstration/strike, alleged against the respondents, was not in connection with such suspension but to protest the larger cause against the illegal outsourcing of the work of the office. He says that such a demonstration/strike, even if admitted, would not in any manner be a misconduct coming under Rule 7 of the Rules aforementioned. 41. We have taken into consideration the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel as above. While considering the questions of discipline and integrity of Government servants, we cannot lose track of the manner in which the duties ascribed to a public servant is enumerated in the Conduct Rules. Rule 3 makes it incumbent upon every official of the Government at all time to maintain absolute integrity, maintain devotion to duty and do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant. The facts, as are presented before us, would indubitably show that the dharna/demonstration was conducted by the respondents along with others in the premises of the office during the working time.
The facts, as are presented before us, would indubitably show that the dharna/demonstration was conducted by the respondents along with others in the premises of the office during the working time. This has been established and proved through the video recording which, as we have already said above, is presently unimpeached even by the respondents. The moot issue is whether a Government servant can validly hold a demonstration/strike, even assuming such action to otherwise not unlawful, in the precincts and premises of the offices and can engage in shouting of slogans, thereby disturbing peace and thus cause distress to the citizens who are in the office for availing services due to them. We are certain in our mind that this can never be so and, therefore, Disciplinary Authority has correctly found this to be in violation of the applicable Conduct Rules. We cannot find any reason to differ from that view because the fact that such a demonstration/dharna was conducted during the office hours within the office premises would, in our view, be simplicitor reason to warrant action against the Government servants who indulge in such activities. This factum having been proved, it was certainly available to the Disciplinary Authority to initiate action and to conclude it in terms of law. 42. Sri. T.A. Shaji, the learned Senior Counsel, at this time urges that even assuming that these facts are treated to have been proved, it would not be sufficient to impose any penalty because the Disciplinary Authority was additionally bound to record that such action of the respondents had interfered with the functioning of the office. We are afraid that we cannot accede to this submission either because the factum of the respondents having conducted a dharna/demonstration during working hours in the premises of the office which was recorded by the CCTV cameras would by itself is sufficient to hold and judicially infer that the working of the office was impaired and that gross inconvenience had been caused to the public at large. 43. Our opinion and observations being as above, we are persuaded to allow these original petitions but we must record that among the above, O.P.(CAT)Nos.384/2011 and 392/2011 will have to be dismissed as having become abated since the party respondents therein have died pending proceedings before this Court and no legal heirs have been brought on record by the petitioners.
43. Our opinion and observations being as above, we are persuaded to allow these original petitions but we must record that among the above, O.P.(CAT)Nos.384/2011 and 392/2011 will have to be dismissed as having become abated since the party respondents therein have died pending proceedings before this Court and no legal heirs have been brought on record by the petitioners. These two original petitions would thus stand dismissed as having become abated. 44. In such circumstances, we are not in a position to grant approval to the orders of the learned Tribunal in the various original applications, which are impugned in these original petitions and we are constrained, being without any other option, to vacate all of them. Consequently, the original petitions except the two mentioned above stand allowed vacating the orders of the learned Tribunal in the various original applications involved herein and granting imprimatur to the impugned orders of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities. Taking into account the very peculiar circumstances that we have noticed herein, we deem it appropriate not to make any order as to costs but to leave the parties to suffer their respective costs.