JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. 1. Present Writ Petition has been preferred by the petitioners, who are the Public Information Officers, as appointed under the Right to Information Act. 2. The brief facts as put up by the petitioners and involved in the writ petition are that respondent No. 2 is said to have filed an application under Right to Information Act, 2005 on 23rd August, 2011, seeking certain information from the Public Information Officer, i.e. petitioner No. 1. It is the contention of the petitioners that in response to the application dated 23rd August, 2011, they had supplied the information on almost all the points as mentioned in the application of the respondent No. 2 by their reply dated 15th September, 2011. It is the case of the petitioners that despite of the fact that they had supplied all the information, still respondent No. 2 feeling himself to be dissatisfied by the information supplied, had preferred a Departmental Appeal before the Departmental Appellate Authority / Commissioner. 3. It is the case of the petitioners that despite of the fact that the departmental appellate Authority had fixed several dates, i.e. 13th October, 2011 and 18th October, 2011, the Appellate Authority has observed that respondent No. 2 was informed by registered letter dated 13.10.2011, asking him to appear on 18.10.2011 and to place his case before the Appellate Court. He remained absent. He was again informed by registered letter dated 18.10.2011 to appear on 31.10.2011, but the respondent No. 2 has voluntarily chosen not to participate in the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. Consequently, the Appellate Authority was constrained to dismiss the Departmental Appeal by the order dated 1st November, 2011. 4. The respondent No. 2, being aggrieved against the information supplied on 15th September, 2011 as well as against the appellate order dated 1st November, 2011, has preferred a Second Appeal under Section 19 (3) of the Act before the Second Appellate Authority, i.e. respondent No. 1, being Appeal (D)-6972:19 (3)/2011. The Second Appellate Authority by the impugned order dated 7th February, 2012 had allowed the second appeal and has directed the petitioner as Information Officer to supply the information as sought by the respondent No. 2 in his application submitted on 23rd August, 2011. 5. The Second Appellate Authority by judgment dated 07.02.2012, directed Information Officer to provide the information which Mr. 5. The Second Appellate Authority by judgment dated 07.02.2012, directed Information Officer to provide the information which Mr. Govind Singh Mehta has provided, the details of his movable and immovable properties and the manner in which he has got the renewal done of those details. Further directed to provide the details if any vehicle has been purchased by him during his service period. Further directed to refer the matter to appointing authority for providing ten years service records of Mr. Govind Singh Mehta, who would provide the same as third party information. 6. The petitioners, being aggrieved against the judgment dated 07.02.2012, have preferred this writ petition against the order as passed by Second Appellate Authority on 2nd February, 2012. The impugned order passed by the Second Appellate Authority has been put to challenge by the petitioners in personal capacity through an engagement of Standing Counsel. 7. This Court feels that Writ Petition by petitioner in personal capacity by engaging the Office of Chief Standing Counsel will not lie. 8. For a logical conclusion, certain provisions contained in the Manual are necessarily required to be considered. Under Chapter V of Legislative Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer Manual, in its clause 5.04 deals with the duties attached to the office of Chief Standing Counsel, it enumerates the area of duties of the Chief Standing Counsel, in the sub-clauses contained under clause 5.04. In the interpretation clauses of Chapter 1, the term “Authority” has not been defined. Though in sub-clause (8) of clause 1.02, it defines Chief Standing Counsel, which includes within its ambit the Standing Counsels of the High Courts. Meaning thereby, on the definition of a Chief Standing Counsel as provided under clause 1.02, it would include within its ambit the Additional Chief Standing Counsel also. Under the duties defined in clause 5.04 sub-clause (3) in particular for the purpose of present case, it reads as under :- “(3) to represent the State or any authority within the State in such other civil cases in which he might be directed or required to appear by the Government, the Legal Remembrancer or the High Court,” 9. Under the duties defined in clause 5.04 sub-clause (3) in particular for the purpose of present case, it reads as under :- “(3) to represent the State or any authority within the State in such other civil cases in which he might be directed or required to appear by the Government, the Legal Remembrancer or the High Court,” 9. The term “authority”, herein used would mean the ‘office’ and not the government officer personally, more particularly, when the office of Chief Standing Counsel is called to defend personal liability of an officer, who has been harnessed individually with a liability under law, it imposes a personal liability for dereliction of duty by an officer. The duties so far as defined and which fall within the ambit of the office of the Additional Chief Standing Counsel or the Chief Standing Counsel to be discharged under the LR Manual, is to represent the cause of the State or any authority within the State in such other civil cases by or on behalf of state, where it involves stakes of the state, and its states interest which is affected, in which Chief Standing Counsel might be directed or required to appear by the Govt. and for the Govt. So the form represent as contained under sub-clause (3) of clause 5.05, means representation for a cause taken against a State or its authority to defend the State and its interests before the court of law. In the absence of the term authority being defined under the Manual, its interpretation could be derived from the term authority as literally defined under the legal glossary, which defines the word “authority” as under:- A right, “An Official” or Judicial Command; also a legal power to do an act given by one man to another. 10. Meaning thereby, the authority is the power which has been vested with the office represented by an official of the State entitled to legally exercise authority i.e. power, it would include designation of an officer and not an individual or person himself. It is the office of State or any department of which any action if taken is required to be defended by Standing Counsel in the court of law. 11. In another dictionary, the word “authority”, means, a power is, which is vested with an office. That means that it always denotes an office and not officer himself. It is the office of State or any department of which any action if taken is required to be defended by Standing Counsel in the court of law. 11. In another dictionary, the word “authority”, means, a power is, which is vested with an office. That means that it always denotes an office and not officer himself. Term authority is an abstract power to an individual officer, who has to exercise the powers, within the ambit of the provisions of Act or the law which vests in it. In other words, it is not an individual or any persona, who can be termed as an authority within the definition of authority as defined under the legal glossary or under the L.R. Manual. 12. Thus, for the above reason, the writ petition is dismissed on this ground itself, leaving it open for the petitioner to engage a private advocate and to file writ petition. If he so chooses, to do so, it is expected that if any writ is filed, the Court concerned would consider the impact of pendency of this writ petition since 2012 with regards to latches. 13. Subject to above liberty, writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.