Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1552 (GAU)

EX C/467 LALFELA v. STATE OF MIZORAM

2018-10-24

MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA

body2018
JUDGMENT : MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA, J. 1. Heard Mr. A.R Malhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. A.K Rokhum, learned Addl. Advocate General. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court for the second time as he is aggrieved with the Office Order dated 18.10.2016, issued by the Commandant, 3rd Bn MAP (respondent No. 6), by which he has been imposed with the penalty of "compulsory retirement", as per the provisio to Rule 1029 (1) (c) of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005, read with Section 91 (1) B of the Mizoram Police Act, 2011 and Rule 49 (1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 3. The facts of the case in brief is that the petitioner was serving as a Constable under 3rd Bn MAP and was one of the Guards detailed to guard the Aizawl District Court. 4. On 29.06.2016, a memorandum was issued by the respondent No. 6 to the petitioner, informing him that an enquiry was proposed to be held against him in respect of 3 Articles of charge framed against him under chapter 11 of the Mizoram Police Act, 2011, read with Rule 1038 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005, to which he was to submit his representation. The 3 (three) Articles of charge framed against the petitioner were as follows:- "STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGE FRMAED AGAINST C/467 LALFELA (U/S) OF 3RD BN. MAP Article-I That, on 29.05.2016 and 7.6.2016, C/467 Lalfela (u/s) of 3rd Bn. MAP was found unauthorisedly absent from duty without obtaining prior permission from the competent authority. Article-II That, on the night of 17.06.2016, C/467 Lalfela (u/s) left his duty place, i.e. District Court, Aizawl and physically assaulted Lalhruaitluangi, Bethlehem veng in front of Vanapa Hall, Aizawl, Mizoram. Article-III That, C/467 Lalfela of 3rd Bn. MAP was a very indisciplined constable who did not intend to reform himself after awarding 1 (one) minor punishment and 1(one) Major punishment as corrective measures during his short span of service. These acts of C/467 Lalfela (u/s) of 3rd Bn. MAP, amounts to gross misconduct, improper behavior and negligence of duty thereby unbecoming of a member of Police force and liable to be dealt with Chapter XI of the Mizoram Police Act, 2011 (Act No. 3 of 2012) read with Rule 1038 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005 for taking disciplinary action." 5. MAP, amounts to gross misconduct, improper behavior and negligence of duty thereby unbecoming of a member of Police force and liable to be dealt with Chapter XI of the Mizoram Police Act, 2011 (Act No. 3 of 2012) read with Rule 1038 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005 for taking disciplinary action." 5. The petitioner, vide Representation dated 12.07.2016, denied all the charges framed against him. Thereafter, the enquiry proceeding was started against the petitioner and the Enquiry Officer completed his enquiry report on 22.09.2016. The enquiry Report dated 22.09.2016 was thereafter submitted by the Enquiry Officer to the respondent No. 6 vide letter dated 22.09.2016. 6. The respondent No. 6, thereafter, furnished a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner vide Letter dated 27.09.2016 and also informed him that the major punishment of "removal from service" was being proposed to be imposed against the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner was asked to submit a representation with regard to the findings made in the Enquiry report and the proposed penalty of "removal from service", mentioned in the Letter dated 27.09.2016. 7. The petitioner, thereafter, submitted his Representation dated 06.10.2016 in reply to the Letter dated 27.09.2016, issued by the respondent No. 6 and prayed that he should not be removed from service and he should be reinstated. He also admitted to all the findings made by the Enquiry Officer in his Enquiry report and stated that he felt ashamed and that he was not worthy to be forgiven. 8. Consequent to the above, the respondent No. 6 issued the impugned Office Order dated 18.10.2016, by which the petitioner was imposed with the penalty of "compulsory retirement" with immediate effect as per the provisio to Rule 1029 (1) (c) of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005, read with section 91 (1) (b) of the Mizoram Police Act, 2011 and Rule 49 (1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 9. The petitioner being aggrieved by the impugned Office Order dated 18.10.2016, by which he has been compulsorily retired, challenged the same by way of WP(C) No. 83/2017. WP(C) No. 83/2017 was disposed off by this Court vide Order dated 09.08.2017, by holding that as the petitioner had approached this Court without filing any prior departmental appeal, the petitioner should file a departmental appeal against the impugned office Order dated 18.10.2016. 10. WP(C) No. 83/2017 was disposed off by this Court vide Order dated 09.08.2017, by holding that as the petitioner had approached this Court without filing any prior departmental appeal, the petitioner should file a departmental appeal against the impugned office Order dated 18.10.2016. 10. The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal under Rule 105 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005 on 21.08.2017, by addressing the same to the respondent No. 5. The respondent No. 5 rejected the petitioner's appeal vide Order dated 07.11.2017. Thus, the petitioner has approached this Court by challenging the impugned Office Order dated 18.10.2016 and the Order dated 07.11.2017, by which his appeal had been rejected. 11. The grounds of challenge made by the petitioner's counsel to the above 2 (two) impugned orders are to the effect that:- (1) The Letter dated 27.09.2016, issued by the respondent No. 6, by which he had been furnished a copy of the enquiry report and informed to make a representation, if any, against the findings of the Enquiry Officer in the enquiry report and to also submit a representation with regard to the proposed penalty of removal from service, proposed to be imposed upon the petitioner was not proper. He submits that the disciplinary authority could not have come to a conclusion and taken a decision on the penalty to be imposed, prior to the petitioner being given a copy of the Enquiry report. The petitioner's counsel thus submits that a disciplinary authority can come to a conclusion or take a decision on the Enquiry report, only after the petitioner was given an opportunity of submitting a representation against the same and if the representation was submitted by the petitioner, the disciplinary authority had to take the same into consideration, prior to coming to a conclusion on the Enquiry report. In this regard, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Foyezuddin Ahmed Laskar (MD) vs. Gauhati High Court & Ors, reported in, 2017 4 GauLT 969 . 12. The second ground of challenge, taken by the petitioner with respect to his alleged unauthorised absence from duty on 29.05.2016 & 07.06.2016 and misconduct on 17.06.2016 is that, as he had already been given punishment by the Guard Commander, he could not have been given a second punishment on the same set of facts. 12. 12. The second ground of challenge, taken by the petitioner with respect to his alleged unauthorised absence from duty on 29.05.2016 & 07.06.2016 and misconduct on 17.06.2016 is that, as he had already been given punishment by the Guard Commander, he could not have been given a second punishment on the same set of facts. 12. He further submits that as 25.05.2016 was the rest day for the petitioner, the petitioner had gone out of his duty station after doing his period of duty for the said day. As such, the petitioner's absence was not an unauthorised absence. 13. The third ground of challenge taken by the petitioner against the penalty order is that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the offence. 14. Mr. A.K Rokhum, learned Addl. Advocate General, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner had not taken the consent/prior permission of the Guard Commander, before leaving his duty post on 29.05.2016 and 07.06.2016. He also submits that no rest day was given to the petitioner on 29.05.2016 by the Guard Commander. He further submits that the petitioner is a very undisciplined Constable and as recorded in Article III of the charges framed against the petitioner, one minor punishment and one major punishment had been imposed earlier on the petitioner. He thus submits that there is no infirmity with the decision of the disciplinary and appellate authority in issuing the impugned orders. 15. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 16. With regard to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Foyezuddin Ahmed Laskar (MD) vs. Gauhati High Court & Ors , it would be profitable to reflect para 25 & 26 of the said judgment. "25. The question as to whether the enquiry report of the Enquiry Officer, who was appointed by the Disciplinary Authority to hold enquiry into the charges against the delinquent, was required to be furnished to the delinquent to enable him to make proper representation to the Disciplinary Authority before such authority arrives at its own final decision with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent and the consequent punishment proposed was referred to the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL . Reference was made in view of what was thought to be conflicting decisions in Ramzan Khan , and an earlier decision in the case of Kailash Chander Asthana Vs. Reference was made in view of what was thought to be conflicting decisions in Ramzan Khan , and an earlier decision in the case of Kailash Chander Asthana Vs. State of U.P. reported in, (1988) 3 SCC 600 . The question, which was referred, has since been authoritatively decided by the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL . It has been held that right to receive the Enquiry Officer's report and to show cause against the enquiry report was independent of the right to show cause against the penalty proposed. Acknowledging that there was some confusion between the two rights, the Apex Court clarified that the right to receive the enquiry report and to represent against the findings recorded in it was inexplicably connected with the decision of the Disciplinary Authority and the nature of penalty proposed. Since the 42nd amendment dispensed with the requirement of issuance of notice against the penalty proposed, the Apex Court observed that some Courts took the view that the delinquent was deprived of his right to represent against the finding of his guilt as well. The confusion was on account of the failure to distinguish the 2 (two) rights, which were independent of each other. The Apex Court explained the distinction between the two stages and held as under:- "25. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the forty-second Amendment. 26. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the forty-second Amendment. 26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer to constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it. 27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings." 26. Therefore, from a careful reading of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, it is clearly evident that before the Disciplinary Authority comes to its own conclusion whether to accept the enquiry report or not, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the Enquiry Officer's findings. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority is required to consider the evidence on record, the report of the Enquiry Officer and the representation of the employee against the report of the Enquiry Officer." 17. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority is required to consider the evidence on record, the report of the Enquiry Officer and the representation of the employee against the report of the Enquiry Officer." 17. A reading of the above quoted paragraphs clearly shows that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusion whether to accept the Enquiry report or not, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the Enquiry Officer's findings. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority is required to consider the evidence in the report of the Enquiry Officer and the representation made by the employee against the enquiry report. The above clearly shows that the disciplinary authority should not come to its own conclusion, prior to giving a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent employee. However, in the present case, the disciplinary authority has purportedly come to a conclusion in respect of the findings made by the Enquiry Officer in his enquiry report, prior to giving the petitioner an opportunity to give a representation on the same. The disciplinary authority has accepted the Enquiry report and proposed the penalty of "removal from service", which is reflected in the Letter dated 22.09.2019, issued by the respondent No. 3. 18. In this case, the petitioner has made a representation dated 06.10.2016 in respect of the Letter dated 22.09.2016 and admitted to the findings and conclusions made by the Enquiry Officer in his Enquiry report. It is settled law that a judgment is an authority only for the case it decides and not what logically follows from it. A little difference in facts changes the precedential value of a Judgment. Though the Disciplinary Authority should not have accepted the findings of the Enquiry Report before giving an opportunity to the petitioner to make a representation on the same, the admission of the findings and conclusions of the Enquiry Officer made in the Enquiry Report by the petitioner, vide his Representation dated 06.10.2016, does not cause any prejudice to the petitioner. The issue/matter would have been different, if the petitioner had not accepted the findings and conclusions of the Enquiry Report. The petitioner having accepted the Enquiry Report, there could not have been a different decision/conclusion made by the Disciplinary Authority, with regard to the facts and findings made by the Enquiry Officer/Report. The issue/matter would have been different, if the petitioner had not accepted the findings and conclusions of the Enquiry Report. The petitioner having accepted the Enquiry Report, there could not have been a different decision/conclusion made by the Disciplinary Authority, with regard to the facts and findings made by the Enquiry Officer/Report. Thus, assuming this Court sets aside the conclusion/decision of the Disciplinary Authority accepting the Enquiry Report is quashed, and the Letter dated 22.09.2016, by which the petitioner was asked to give his representation on the Enquiry Report, and the petitioner made to submit a fresh representation on the Enquiry Report, the same would only lead to a useless formality, as the petitioner cannot take a different stand subsequent as earlier Representation dated 06.10.2016. Further, the penalty of "removal from service", reflected in the Letter dated 22.09.2016 was only a proposal. The same being only a contemplated penalty, there was no finality to the penalty to be imposed. This is clearly evident from the actual penalty imposed, i.e., "compulsory retirement". Though the petitioner has taken a stand in para 8 of his writ petition that on the wrong advice of his colleagues, he had submitted the Representation dated 06.10.2016, in reply to the Letter dated 22.09.2016, requesting for forgiveness, there is nothing stated by the petitioner in his writ petition that what he has stated in his Representation dated 06.10.2016 are false. Though there is a change of stand taken by the petitioner in his Representation dated 06.10.2016 vis-a-vis the earlier representation made by him, vide written statement dated 12.07.2016, the petitioner not having denied the correctness of the statements made by him in his Representation dated 06.10.2016, this Court accordingly finds that there is no ground for the petitioner to challenge the findings made by the Enquiry Officer in his Enquiry report by way of the present writ petition. Further, there is no question of the petitioner being allowed to blow hot and cold on the same issue, when the petitioner has not denied the correctness of the statement made by him in his Representation dated 06.10.2016. Also, in the case of B.C Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, reported in, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Apex Court has held that the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Also, in the case of B.C Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, reported in, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Apex Court has held that the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Thus, this Court finds that the judgment of the Division Bench in Foyezuddin Ahmed Laskar (MD) vs. Gauhati High Court & Ors is not applicable to this case. Thus, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, on account of the Disciplinary Authority having arrived at a conclusion, before giving an opportunity to the petitioner to make a representation against the Enquiry Report. 19. With regard to the second issue, i.e., the petitioner's counsel's submission that the petitioner was punished twice on the same set of facts, this Court finds that paragraph 17 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the State respondents is to the effect that the petitioner was imposed 'guard stand' on 18.06.2016 from 9.00am to 6.00 pm for his misconduct by the Guard Commander. Paragraph 17 of the affidavit-in-opposition relates to the night of 17.06.2016. 20. Paragraph 16 of the affidavit-in-opposition states that the petitioner was given punishment by the Guard Commander on 8.06.2016 for his misconduct. The said paragraph speaks of the two dates mentioned in Article 1 of the charge framed against the petitioner, i.e. 29.05.2016 and 7.06.2016. 21. The question that is to be considered is whether "guard stand" and "punishment" given by the Guard Commander would come within the term "major penalty" or "minor penalty", as reflected under Rule 1029 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005. 22. It should be kept in mind that on the basis of the Disciplinary Proceeding, the petitioner has been imposed with the penalty of "compulsory retirement" as per the proviso to Rule 1029 (1)(c) of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005, read with Section 91 (1) B of the Mizoram Police Act, 2011 and Rule 49 (1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 23. Rule 1028, 1029 & 1033 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005 are reproduced below:- "1028. General Instruction: (1) The objective of awarding punishment is primarily corrective and secondarily a deterrent. In extreme cases it is a means to getting rid of unwanted elements in the Police force. 23. Rule 1028, 1029 & 1033 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005 are reproduced below:- "1028. General Instruction: (1) The objective of awarding punishment is primarily corrective and secondarily a deterrent. In extreme cases it is a means to getting rid of unwanted elements in the Police force. (2) Undue harshness in awarding punishment shall be avoided but there shall not be hesitation in awarding severe penalty in deserving cases and even awarding of the penalty of dismissal. The Disciplinary authority shall discriminate carefully between offence connoting moral turpitude, serious negligence of duty and offences which are of minor nature. Every effort shall be made to maintain discipline and to immediately correct minor faults of Police Officers by instructions and warnings before resorting to more severe punishment. A warning, if conveyed at a personal interview, is often more effective than if communicated only in writing. The errors and omissions of young and inexperienced hands must also be viewed differently. In no case the punishment should appear vindictive. (3) No major punishment shall be imposed on a Police Officer unless Departmental Enquiry have been conducted against him. (4) Transfer must not be resorted to as a form of punishment even thought the conduct of an officer renders a transfer necessary in the public interest. Transfer may be done when it becomes an administrative necessity, but in no case it must form a part of the order of punishment. 1029. Classification of Punishment: Penalties are divided into (1) Major and (2) Minor Penalties. (1) Major Penalties include:- (a) Dismissal from service (b) Removal from service (c) Compulsory retirement from service other than compulsory retirement in accordance with the provisions relating to the superannuation or retirement. (d) Reduction to a lower stage in the same time scale, or to a lower rank (e) Withholding increment with cumulative effect. (2) Minor Penalties includes:- (a) Reprimandation (b) Black Marks (c) Withholding increment without cumulative effect. (d) Censure (e) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders. (f) Confinement to Quarter-guard upto 15 days with or without punishment drill (g) Punishment drill (h) Extra-guard or fatigue duty" "1033. Minor Punishments: Normally minor punishments to a Police Officer are awarded without drawing up a disciplinary proceeding. However, the Disciplinary Authority should always provide opportunity to the concerned officer to explain his position or action. (f) Confinement to Quarter-guard upto 15 days with or without punishment drill (g) Punishment drill (h) Extra-guard or fatigue duty" "1033. Minor Punishments: Normally minor punishments to a Police Officer are awarded without drawing up a disciplinary proceeding. However, the Disciplinary Authority should always provide opportunity to the concerned officer to explain his position or action. This may be done in an orderly room or by asking a written explanation. In respect of censure, stoppage of increment or recovery from pay to make up a pecuniary loss to Government written explanation should be called from the officer proposed to be punished. He should be given a chance to represent his case before the Disciplinary Authority. In respect of other minor punishments an opportunity to represent his case is given to the officer proposed to be punished in an orderly room." 24. The punishment of "guard stand" and "punishment" per given by the Guard Commander to the petitioner, as mentioned in para 16 & 17 of the affidavit-in-opposition is not relatable to the Disciplinary Authority and as such, cannot be said to covered by the provisions of para 1029 of Mizoram Police Manual, 2005, as the punishment under para 1029 can only be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Thus, the petitioner's counsel's submission that the petitioner could not have been given a second penalty on the same set of facts is not applicable to the facts in hand, as the petitioner had been imposed "compulsory retirement" by the Disciplinary Authority on the basis of the Disciplinary Proceeding initiated against the petitioner. The punishment of "guard stand" and "punishment" was not given by the Disciplinary Authority, but given by the Guard Commander, who is in-charge of the duty post. As such, the punishment given by the Guard Commander could not be said to be a penalty/punishment given under para 1029 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005. As such, there is no infirmity with the Disciplinary Authority imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement against the petitioner. 25. With regard to the petitioner's counsel's submission that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the charge framed against the petitioner, this Court would have to see whether the punishment imposed is unconscionable and actuated by malice. As such, there is no infirmity with the Disciplinary Authority imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement against the petitioner. 25. With regard to the petitioner's counsel's submission that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the charge framed against the petitioner, this Court would have to see whether the punishment imposed is unconscionable and actuated by malice. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others-vs- J.P.Saraswat, reported in, (2011) 4 SCC 545 , the Apex Court has held that judicial review is permissible in very rare cases, where punishment is so disproportionate to the established charge that it would appear unconscionable and actuated by malice. In the case of Samar Bahadur Singh -vs- State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in, (2011) 9 SCC 94 , the Apex Court has held that punishment of dismissal from service for unauthorized absence from duty has not been held to be disproportionate where the delinquent belongs to a discipline force. 26. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the petitioner had been granted rest day on 29.05.2016. There is also nothing to show that the petitioner had been allowed to leave his duty post on 29.05.2016. Further, there is nothing to show that the petitioner had left his duty post on 07.06.2016 with the permission of the Guard Commander. Also, the finding of the Enquiry Officer in respect of Article I and II, has been accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and admitted by the petitioner in his representation dated 06.10.2016. Thus, the petitioner is guilty of the charge of unauthorized absence. 27. The representation dated 06.10.2016 submitted by the petitioner having admitted to all the evidences and findings made by the Enquiry Officer in his Enquiry report, there cannot be a subsequent challenge to the facts and findings made in the Enquiry report by the petitioner. As the petitioner belongs to Disciplinary Force and as the petitioner has not made any allegation that the Disciplinary Proceeding or the findings have been actuated by malice, this Court finds that there is no ground to have a judicial review of the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner. As the petitioner belongs to Disciplinary Force and as the petitioner has not made any allegation that the Disciplinary Proceeding or the findings have been actuated by malice, this Court finds that there is no ground to have a judicial review of the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner. Accordingly, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others-vs-J.P Saraswat and Samar Bahadur Singh-vs-State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the penalty/punishment imposed upon the petitioner as the same does not appear to be unconscionable. 28. In view of the reasons stated above, the writ petition stands dismissed.