JUDGMENT : Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State of Himachal Pradesh, laying challenge to judgment, dated 20.11.2007, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kandaghat, District Solan, H.P., in Criminal Case No. 115/2 of 2004, whereby the accused/respondent (hereinafter referred to as “the accused”) was acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. Succinctly, the facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the prosecution, are that on 10.09.2004, A.S.I. Parwal Singh received telephonic information that an accident has taken place at Waknaghat, upon which, A.S.I, Parwal Singh alongwith other Police officials visited the spot and recorded the statement of the complainant. The complainant in his statement stated that he is working as driver in truck (swaraj mazda) bearing registration No. HP-11B-0655 for the last ten years and on 09.09.2004, he alongwith Manmohan Singh (Second driver of the truck) was going from Baghi Tikkar towards Delhi, carrying 250 boxes of apples and at about 12.45 a.m. (midnight), when they reached at Waknaghat, a mahindra max pick-up, coming from Solan side in rash and negligent manner and in wrong side, struck with their truck. Due to which, both the vehicles were got damaged and Manmohan Singh, who was driving the truck at that time, sustained injuries on his person. The vehicle was being driven by Pradeep Kumar and one person was also sitting in the vehicle and after the accident the accused ran away from the spot. On the basis of statement of the complainant case, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act was registered against the accused. Spot map was prepared and photographs were obtained. Both the vehicles were taken into possession alongwith its documents and memos were prepared. Accused Pradeep Kumar and injured Manmohan Singh alongwith Suman Kumar were medically examined and their MLCs were procured. After completion of investigation, challan was presented in the Court. 3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as ten witnesses. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the prosecution case and claimed innocence. The accused did not lead any defence in his favour. 4. After completion of investigation, challan was presented in the Court. 3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as ten witnesses. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the prosecution case and claimed innocence. The accused did not lead any defence in his favour. 4. The learned trial below, vide impugned judgment dated 20.11.2007, acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, hence the present appeal. 5. Mr. Rajat Chauhan, learned Law Officer, has argued that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based upon the surmises and conjectures and learned trial Court without appreciating the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 correctly, acquitted the accused. He has further argued that as the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt, after re-appreciating the evidence, the accused be convicted for the offences, he was charged with. On the other hand, Ms. Rajvinder Sandhu, learned Legal Aid Counsel, has argued that PW-2 and PW-3 are the interested witnesses, as they were driver and co-driver of the vehicle, which met with an accident. She has further argued that the person sitting in the offending vehicle alongwith the accused-respondent, was the only independent witness, however he has not been examined by the prosecution. She has argued that the Investigation Officer of the case has not associated any person from the nearby shops and liquor vendor, which are otherwise shown in the spot map. She has further argued that there is nothing on record to suggest that accused-respondent was driving his vehicle in rash and negligent manner, as it has come on record that offending vehicle was on ascend and complainant’s vehicle was on descend and thus it cannot be said that the ascending vehicle was on fast speed. Lastly she has argued that there are material contradictions in the statements of PW-2 and PW-3 with regard to time they left Shoghi, as such, their statements cannot be relied upon and as the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused-respondent beyond the shadow of reasonable doubts, the judgment of acquittal, passed by the learned trial Court needs no interference. 6. 6. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, we have gone through the record carefully and in detail. 7. PW-1, Raj Mohan, conducted the medical examination of the vehicles and presented report, Ext. PW-1/A. PW-2, Manmohan Singh, who was driving the swaraj mazda truck at the time of accident deposed that though on the date of accident when he saw max pick-up coming in rash and negligent manner, he drove his vehicle on Kacha Road, however despite that max pickup hit his vehicle, due to which he sustained injuries and vehicle was also got damaged. In his cross-examination he deposed that at the time of accident, his vehicle was in 3rd gear. He further deposed that at the time of accident wine shops were open and there was traffic jam for about three hours. He denied that he was driving his vehicle without indicator and the accident has taken place due to his mistake. He further denied that the accused was driving his vehicle in his own side. 8. PW-3, Satish Kumar, who was sitting with PW-2 at the time of accident in his cross-examination has deposed that their vehicle was on low ascent and in 3rd gear. He denied that there were 3-4 shops near the place of accident. PW-4, Prem Lal, is the owner of the truck. PW-5, HHC Ramji Dass, proved on record rapat, Ext. PW-5/A. PW-6, Rakesh Singh, registered FIR and admitted his signature on the same. PW-7, Avtar Chand, presented the challan in the Court. 9. PW-9, ASI, Parwal Singh, Investigating Officer of the case deposed that he prepared spot map, Ext. PW-9/A and memos, vide which the vehicles alongwith its documents were taken into possession. In his cross-examination he deposed that he reached at the spot at 2.00 p.m. (midnight) and there are three shops near the place of accident. He further deposed that when he reached at the spot, there was no traffic jam. He denied that despite there being some shops open at the place of accident, he has recorded the statements of the witnesses on his own will and not recorded the statement of independent witnesses. PW-10, Dr. Poonam Sharma, examined the injured persons and issued MLCs, Ext. PW-10/A to Ext. PW-10/D. 10. He denied that despite there being some shops open at the place of accident, he has recorded the statements of the witnesses on his own will and not recorded the statement of independent witnesses. PW-10, Dr. Poonam Sharma, examined the injured persons and issued MLCs, Ext. PW-10/A to Ext. PW-10/D. 10. At the very outset, if the statements of PW-2 and PW-3, who are the drivers of swaraj mazda truck, are to be seen, there are complete dis-agreement in their statement with regard to the time, when they left Shoghi after taking dinner. Further the prosecution has not examined the person, sitting in the offending vehicle with the accused, neither any independent person was associated in the proceedings, though it has come on record that there were 3-4 shops open at the time of accident and many vehicles keep on passing through the road and traffic remained obstructed for three hours. From the site map it is clear that the vehicle of the complainant was also towards right side of the road, but there is no explanation from the prosecution, why he has not taken his vehicle to the left side of the road to prevent the accident, when the driver of swaraj mazda truck has seen the other vehicle from the distance of 300 meter, why he has not applied the brakes, as there was no sign of the brakes of the truck too at the place of accident. In these circumstance, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt and the well reasoned judgment of acquittal, passed by the learned trial Court, needs no interference. 11. It has been held in K. Prakashan vs. P.K. Surenderan, (2008) 1 SCC 258 , that when two views are possible, appellate Court should not reverse the judgment of acquittal merely because the other view was possible. When judgment of trial Court was neither perverse, nor suffered from any legal infirmity or non consideration/misappreciation of evidence on record, reversal thereof by High Court was not justified. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in T. Subramanian vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 1 SCC 401 , has held that where two views are reasonably possible from the very same evidence, prosecution cannot be said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in T. Subramanian vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 1 SCC 401 , has held that where two views are reasonably possible from the very same evidence, prosecution cannot be said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. In Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has culled out the following principles qua powers of the appellate Courts while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal : “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1873 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 14. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the discussion made hereinabove, the present appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 14. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the discussion made hereinabove, the present appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.