ORDER : C.T. Ravikumar, J. The petitioner herein seeks to file appeal against an order dated 11.07.2017 in SOP No.21 of 2008, passed by the Court of the Additional Sub Judge-I, Thrissur, dismissing the same. The said Original Petition was filed under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for brevity 'the Act' only). The Registry has noted a defect to the effect that in the light of the provision under Section 384 of the Act an appeal against an order of the Sub Court in an application filed under Section 372 of the Act would not lie before the High Court. The counsel for the appellant sought to cure the defect stating thus:- "Under Section 384, the appeal is provided only to the High Court, irrespective of valuation. Even if the valuation is considered it is above 2 lakhs and the petition is of 2008 and still the appeal lies to the High Court." The Registry, upon considering the endorsement made by the learned counsel, stuck to its earlier stand regarding the defect noted and further pointed that based on the proviso to Section 388 (2) of the Act an appeal from an order of such an inferior court would lie to the District Judge and not to High Court. In such circumstances, at the instance of the learned counsel for the appellant, the matter is posted before us. Based on our order, copy of the appeal was provided to Standing Counsel appearing for the Guruvayur Devaswaom Board. 2. We have heard the learned counsel on both sides on the defect noted by the Registry. The point to be resolved is whether an order in an application filed under Section 372 of the Act passed by a Court inferior in grade to the Court of a District Judge is appealable before the District Court or is it appealable only before this Court ? 3. Sri.N.M.Mdhu, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that in terms of the provisions under Section 384, an appeal against an order in an application filed under Section 372 of the Act will lie only to the High Court. The further submission is that going by the pecuniary jurisdiction as regards the case on hand also, an appeal will lie only to the High Court since the petition was instituted in the year 2008. 4. The further submission is that going by the pecuniary jurisdiction as regards the case on hand also, an appeal will lie only to the High Court since the petition was instituted in the year 2008. 4. Per contra, Sri.P.Gopal, the learned Standing Counsel for the Guruvayur Devaswom Board submits that the defect noted by the Registry is to be upheld in the light of the proviso to Section 388 (2) of the Act. However, a perusal of sub-section (2) of Section 388 of the Act may convey an impression that such jurisdiction thereunder is concurrent jurisdiction as regards the District Judge and if it is viewed and understood in that manner, one may tend to think doubtfully about the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge. In a bid to clarify the position the learned counsel drew our attention to sub-section (1) of Section 388, the proviso to sub-section (2) and sub-section (6) of Section 388, of the Act. 5. In the context of the contentions we are of the view that it is profitable to refer to Section 388(1), sub-section (2) thereof with its proviso as also its sub-section (6) and they read thus:- "388. Investiture of inferior courts with jurisdiction of District Court for purposes of this Act.-(1)the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, invest any Court inferior in grade to a District Judge with power to exercise the functions of a District Judge under this Part. (2) Any inferior Court so invested shall, within the local limits of its jurisdiction, have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge in the exercise of all the powers conferred by this Part upon the District Judge, and the provisions of this Part relating to the District Judge shall apply to such an inferior Court as if it were a District Judge. Provided that an appeal from any such order of an inferior Court as is mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 384 shall lie to the District Judge, and not to the High Court, and that the District Judge may, if he thinks fit, by his order on the appeal, make any such declaration and direction as that sub-section authorizes the High Court to make by its order on an appeal from an order of a District Judge. ............................ ............................ (6) Any Civil Court which for any of the purposes of any enactment is subordinate to or subject to the control of, a District Judge shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to be a Court inferior in grade to a District Judge." It is evident from the extracted provisions that sub-section (1) of Section 388 empowers the State Government to notify in the Official Gazette and to invest any Court which is inferior in grade to a District Judge with the power to exercise the functions of a District Judge under Part X of the Act. The fact that such a notification has already been issued is not in dispute. It is relevant to note that as per the proviso to Section 388(2) of the Act, in such circumstances, if the District Judge thinks fit, by his order on the appeal, he could make such declaration and direction which could be passed by the High Court in terms of the authorization under the said sub-section. Thus, the proviso to Section 388(2) of the Act is certainly indicative of the position that an appeal will lie to the District Judge in such circumstances. We will now, refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Anitha V. Ashok Kumar [ 2012 (3) KLT 880 ] relied on by the learned Standing Counsel. In that case, it was also an unnumbered matter sent before the Bench on being noted as defective, at the instance of the counsel concerned. It was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and what was sought to be challenged was an order passed in an Original Petition filed before the Munsiff's Court under Section 372 of the Act. The Division Bench found that the application from which the said appeal arose could have been filed before the Munsiff's Court only by recourse to Section 388 of the Act and then further held thus:- "2.The application from which this appeal arises could have been filed before the Munsiff's Court only by recourse to S.388 of the Indian Succession Act, in terms of which, the State Government has invested other courts with power to exercise the functions of a District Judge. Appeal against an order on such an application would lie only under the proviso to sub-s. (2) of S.388 of that Act. Appeal against an order on such an application would lie only under the proviso to sub-s. (2) of S.388 of that Act. An appeal under that proviso, against an order passed by a court inferior to the court of a District Judge but invested with the power by the State Government by notification, would lie only to the District Judge. The jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal is not to considered on the basis of any pecuniary limit. 3. For the aforesaid reasons, this matter filed as an RFA under S.96 before the High Court is not maintainable. 4. In the result, this unnumbered RFA is rejected without prejudice to the right of the appellant to move the appropriate court by an appeal under the proviso to S.388(2), if aggrieved by the impugned order." A Single Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Mosamatt Parmeshwari Devi and another v. Geeta Devi and others [AIR 2001 Patna 107] relied on by the Standing Counsel is also noteworthy in the contextual situation. Evidently, the said decision was also rendered under similar circumstances and the Court was also considering the question whether an appeal against an order passed by an inferior court would lie before a District Judge in view of the proviso to Section 388(2) of the Act. It was answered in the affirmative. Further, it was held therein that there would be no bar as to pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge while considering such an appeal. We do not find any reason to disagree with the exposition of law in that decision especially in view of the decision in Anitha's case (supra). Thus, the decisions referred (supra) would answer the question as to whether an appeal against an order passed by a court inferior in grade to the court of a District Judge, on an application filed under Section 372 of the Act would lie before the Court of a District Judge in the affirmative. In such circumstances, it should be taken only as an order passed on an application filed by recourse to Section 388(1) of the Act by that court exercising the power invested on it by the State Government by notification as sans such a notification the said inferior court would not have obtained jurisdiction to entertain such an application. In such circumstances, it should be taken only as an order passed on an application filed by recourse to Section 388(1) of the Act by that court exercising the power invested on it by the State Government by notification as sans such a notification the said inferior court would not have obtained jurisdiction to entertain such an application. Such an order could be assailed only by way of an appeal in terms of the proviso to Section 388(2) of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, going by the said provision against such an order by a court inferior in grade to the court of a District Judge an appeal will lie only before the Court of a District Judge. In the decisions in Anitha's case as also Parmeshwari Devi's case (supra) it was held that there would be no bar as to the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge, in such circumstances. We do not find any reason to disagree with the said view of the matter. In the circumstances, we upheld the defect noted by the Registry. Hence, the unnumbered appeal is liable to be returned to the appellant to present it before the appropriate court. In the light of a Single Bench decision of this Court in Chandrasekharan Pillai v. Kesava Pillai [ 2009 (2) KLT 193 ], to which we respectfully concur, we are of the considered view that absence of a specific provision shall not be a reason for declining to return Memorandum of Appeal to the appellant for presenting it before the proper court. In that decision it was held that even in the absence of a specific provision for returning the Memorandum of Appeal by the Appellate Court, the same provisions as are applicable for the return of Plaint would apply to return the Memorandum of Appeal presented to the Appellate Court, which has no jurisdiction to entertain it. Hence, the Registry is directed to return the Memorandum of Appeal to the appellant. It is made clear that it would be open to the appellant to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the appropriate court in view of the above circumstances. The Registry shall comply with the procedure under Order VII Rule 10 while returning the Memorandum of Appeal.