JUDGMENT : Nelson Sailo, J. 1. Heard Mr. Roshan Subedi, the learned counsel for the appellant and also Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, the learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. H. Lalmalsawmi for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. None appears for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 despite notice. 2. For the sake of convenience, both the appeal as well as the interlocutory applications are taken up together for disposal. The mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Smt. Nuhliri Varte, aged about 47 years met with a motor vehicular accident on 04.12.2015. One 407 truck bearing registration No. MZ01-G-7443, which was proceeding towards Durtlang from Bawngkawn could not climb the steep hill and therefore, moved backwards. As a result, the truck hit the two wheelers which were behind it and the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who was a pillion rider of one of the motor bikes bearing registration No. MZ01-D-2564 sustained injuries. She was then immediately evacuated to Durtlang hospital and was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the hospital. However, she succumbed to her injuries on 07.12.2015. Following the accident, an FIR was submitted at Bawngkawn Police Station, wherein Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 304/2015 dated 08.12.2015 under Sections 304-A/279/427 read with Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) was registered. Following the registration of a Police case, an enquiry was made. After the conclusion of the enquiry, a charge sheet was submitted. The enquiry revealed that the cause of the accident was due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the truck. The deceased was a Hindi teacher working in Little Flowers School, Khawzawl and she was earning a monthly salary of Rs. 43,682/-. The accident vehicle was validly insured with the appellant. 3. As a result of the accident, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed a claim application under Section 166 of the MV Act before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Aizawl (the Tribunal). The claim was registered as MACT Case No. 1/2016 by the Tribunal and notice was issued to the opposite parties i.e., the owner of the accident vehicle, the driver and the insurer, who is the appellant herein. On receipt of the notice, the appellant appeared before the Tribunal but did not file written statement. The claim was registered as MACT Case No. 1/2016 by the Tribunal and notice was issued to the opposite parties i.e., the owner of the accident vehicle, the driver and the insurer, who is the appellant herein. On receipt of the notice, the appellant appeared before the Tribunal but did not file written statement. As for the owner and the driver of the accident vehicle, who are arrayed as respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in the present appeal filed their written statement. 4. The learned Tribunal thereafter framed 3 (three) issues for adjudication, the same may be reproduced below for ready perusal:- "(i) Whether the claim application is maintainable in its present form and style? (ii) Whether there was fault on the part of the driver or owner of the accident vehicle? (iii) Whether the claimant is entitled to get compensation, if so, who is liable to pay and to what extent?" 5. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as claimants examined two witnesses i.e., Sh. Isaac Lalrochama, who represented the two minor claimants and Sh. Jerry L.D. Poonte, a Sub-Inspector of Police. The appellant did not examine any witnesses. After the closure of evidence, the learned Tribunal passed the impugned Judgment & Award dated 14.11.2017 and awarded the claimants a sum of Rs. 63,55,804/-, alongwith interest @7% per annum from the date of filing the claim i.e., 20.01.2016, which was directed to be paid by the appellant within 1 (one) month from the date of the Judgment & Award. Being highly aggrieved with the Judgment & Award, the appellant is before this Court through the present appeal. 6. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Roshan Subedi, the learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal in relying upon the Last Pay Certificate produced and exhibited by the claimants calculated the amount of compensation to be awarded to the claimants. However, the contends of the Last Pay Certificate was not proved by the claimants by examining the authority who had issued the same. Therefore, the Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained. 7. The learned counsel further submits that the learned Tribunal committed a mistake in granting compensation towards the conventional heads like funeral expenses, loss of love and affection of the minor children, loss of expectation of life etc. Therefore, the Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained. 7. The learned counsel further submits that the learned Tribunal committed a mistake in granting compensation towards the conventional heads like funeral expenses, loss of love and affection of the minor children, loss of expectation of life etc. He submits that the 2nd Schedule of the MV Act, which is a guide for awarding compensation provides for certain compensation which can be awarded under the heading "General Damages". Clause 3 of the 2nd Schedule relates to compensation for general damages in case of death, which includes funeral expenses, loss of consortium, if the beneficiary is a spouse, loss of estate and actual medical expenses incurred supported by bills/vouchers. He, therefore, submits that the learned Tribunal could not have awarded compensation under various conventional heads, besides what was provided under the 2nd Schedule of the MV Act. The learned counsel in this connection relies upon the decision of the Apex Court rendered in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors., reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 . Referring to the case, the learned counsel submits that the Apex Court held that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. Besides the three heads, the Apex Court has not mentioned any other conventional heads. Therefore, the learned Tribunal not only in awarding compensation under nonexistence conventional heads awarded the claimants excessive compensation to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 1 lakh under the conventional heads of funeral expenses and loss of expectation of life. Besides these, the learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs towards loss of love and affection for minor children and Rs. 1 lakh towards loss of expectation of life. He, therefore, submits that the impugned Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal in view of the Apex Court decision cannot be sustained. 8. Mr. Roshan Subedi also submits that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MAC Appeal No. 19/2017 (The ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Lalliantluangi & Anr) relying upon the case of Pranay Sethi & Ors. (Supra) modified the impugned Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal. Therefore, this Court may also adopt the Apex Court decision. 9. Mr. Roshan Subedi also submits that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MAC Appeal No. 19/2017 (The ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Lalliantluangi & Anr) relying upon the case of Pranay Sethi & Ors. (Supra) modified the impugned Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal. Therefore, this Court may also adopt the Apex Court decision. 9. The learned counsel further submits that the impugned Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal also cannot be sustained for non-joinder of the necessary parties to the claim. He submits that there were two vehicles involved in the alleged accident i.e., the 407 truck bearing registration No. MZ01-G-7443 and one Karizma motor cycle bearing registration No. MZ01-D-2564. He submits that the possibility of negligence on the part of both the vehicles cannot be ruled out. However, the claimants while impleading the owner and driver of the 407 truck failed to implead the owner and driver of the motor cycle. Therefore, the learned Tribunal without discussing the aspect of contributory negligence on the part of the two vehicles involved could not have placed the entire liability of paying compensation to the claimants upon the appellant. Therefore, the impugned Judgment & Award for this reason as well cannot be sustained. 10. Mr. Roshan Subedi, the learned counsel further submits that from a perusal of the police report exhibited by the claimants as Exhibit C-4, it can be seen that following the accident, Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 304/2015 under Sections 304-A/279/427 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 185 of the MV Act was registered and thereafter, a charge sheet was also submitted against the driver of the offending 407 truck. Section 185 of the MV Act prescribes a penalty for drunken driving or by a person under the influence of drugs. Section 19 of the MV Act also empowers the licensing authority to disqualify a person from holding a driving license on the ground of intoxication amongst others and thereby, causing danger to the public. He submits that as per the terms and conditions of the Insurance policy, it was specifically mentioned that the person driving the insured vehicle should have an effective driving license at the time of the accident and should not be disqualified from holding or obtaining such a license. He submits that as per the terms and conditions of the Insurance policy, it was specifically mentioned that the person driving the insured vehicle should have an effective driving license at the time of the accident and should not be disqualified from holding or obtaining such a license. Therefore, as can be seen from the police report, the driver of the offending vehicle was under intoxication and thereby, causing danger to the public which may result in his disqualification from holding a driving license. Therefore, the nature of the offences committed by the driver being in violation of the policy condition of the insurance, the appellant cannot be held liable to indemnify the owner of the alleged offending vehicle. Besides this, there was substantial delay in lodging the FIR and therefore, there is also a presumption of collusion between the claimants and the owner of the driving vehicle. This aspect of the matter having not being considered by the learned Tribunal, the impugned Judgment & Award cannot be sustained. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that an ex-parte proceeding was drawn by the learned Tribunal since the appellant failed the file a written statement. However, the fact is that there was some mis-communication between the appellant and their counsel. He submits that the appellant was informed with the order drawing ex-parte proceeding had been set aside but however, the appellant received the impugned Judgment & Award, wherein it was indicated that the ex-parte order had not been set aside and that the appellant did not file written statement. On the other hand, the appellant had duly verified the written statement to be filed before the learned Tribunal and instructed their counsel to file the same before the learned Tribunal but however, the same was not filed. For this reason, the learned counsel submits that the matter be remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration by giving opportunity to the appellant to file their written statement after setting aside the impugned Judgment & Award. 12. Mr. For this reason, the learned counsel submits that the matter be remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration by giving opportunity to the appellant to file their written statement after setting aside the impugned Judgment & Award. 12. Mr. Roshan Subedi, the learned counsel submits that after the impugned Judgment & Award was passed by the learned Tribunal on 14.11.2017, the appellant was informed by the Directorate of Transport (Motor Vehicle Wing), Government of Mizoram on 13.07.2018 that the driving license held by the driver of the offending 407 truck was not found in the official records and therefore, the same may not be genuine and can be considered as duplicate or fake. He submits that if such was the case, the same will amount to breach of the insurance policy and the appellant will have no liability to indemnify the claim. He submits that in view of such discovery, the appellant has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC for producing additional evidence before this Court through Interlocutory Application (C) No. 83/2018. He submits that the information received by the appellant was in response to the information sought through an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005. The information was not in the knowledge of the appellant earlier and therefore, the same could not be brought to notice of the learned Tribunal. If the driver of the offending 407 truck was not in possession of a valid driving license at the time of the accident, the appellant cannot be held liable and therefore, the information acquired by the appellant being crucial and a substantive piece of evidence, the same may be admitted as the evidence of the appellant even at this stage. 13. Appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the learned senior counsel, Mr. L.H. Lianhrima submits that the accident occurred due to the gross negligence of the offending 407 truck which was validly insured with the appellant. As a result of the accident, the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 succumbed to her injuries on 07.12.2015. The two respondents being minors, they are represented by their uncle Sh. Isaac Lalrochama. L.H. Lianhrima submits that the accident occurred due to the gross negligence of the offending 407 truck which was validly insured with the appellant. As a result of the accident, the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 succumbed to her injuries on 07.12.2015. The two respondents being minors, they are represented by their uncle Sh. Isaac Lalrochama. The appellant not only fail to contest the claim by filing their written statement but also failed to obtain the permission of the Tribunal to contest the claim on all, or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made in terms of the provision of Section 170 of the MV Act. Therefore, the appellant has no locus standi to file the present appeal, much less, the right to dispute the amount awarded by the learned Tribunal. He submits that the appellant has no right to file the instant appeal on any other grounds besides the grounds they can take under Section 149(2) of the MV Act. By referring to the case of Josphine James vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., reported in 2013 (4) TAC 22 (SC), he submits that the Apex Court held that in the absence of permission obtained by the Insurance Company from the Tribunal to avail the defence of the insured, it was not permissible for them to contest the case on merits and that limited defence will only be available under Section 149 (2) of the MV Act. The learned senior counsel submits that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Sangzuali & Anr., reported in 2001 (2) T.A.C. 136 (Gau.) also held that as the Insurance Company having failed to invoke Section 170 of the MV Act, they were not entitled to file an appeal on merits of the claim which was awarded by the Tribunal. Consequently, the appeal of the Insurance Company was dismissed. 14. The learned senior counsel submits that the deceased was working as a Hindi teacher in Little Flower School at Khawzawl earning a monthly salary of Rs. 43,682/- per month, that in support of her monthly income, the claimants produced and exhibited her Last Pay Certificate issued by the Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Khawzawl, Mizoram and exhibited the same as Exhibit C-16. The learned senior counsel submits that the deceased was working as a Hindi teacher in Little Flower School at Khawzawl earning a monthly salary of Rs. 43,682/- per month, that in support of her monthly income, the claimants produced and exhibited her Last Pay Certificate issued by the Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Khawzawl, Mizoram and exhibited the same as Exhibit C-16. The Last Pay Certificate was exhibited by the claimants and no objection, whatsoever, was raised by the appellants before the Tribunal and therefore, objection on the same cannot be raised at this stage. Thus, the calculation made by the learned Tribunal on the basis of the Last Pay Certificate suffers from no infirmity and the same may be up-held. 15. The learned senior counsel also submits that the Apex Court in the case of Pranay Sethi & Ors. (Supra), while fixing the amount of compensation that can be awarded under the conventional heads such as, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses did not advert to the other heads such as, loss of love and affection and loss of expectation of life and therefore, the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal to the claimants under the two heads may not be disturbed. By referring to the Apex Court decision in Jiju Kuruvila & Ors. Vs. Kunjujamma Mohan & Ors., reported in 2013 (3) TAC 369 (SC), the learned senior counsel submits that a sum of Rs. 1 lakh which was awarded by the Apex Court to the two children of the deceased and a sum of Rs. 1 lakh was awarded towards loss of consortium to the wife of the deceased. The learned Tribunal by taking reliance of the aforesaid decision awarded similar amount to the two minor children of the deceased. Likewise, insofar as, loss of expectation of life, the learned Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Apex Court decision rendered in Kalpanaraj & Ors. vs. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, reported in 2015 (2) SCC 764 awarded a sum of Rs. 1 lakh towards loss of expectation of life. Therefore, the amount awarded under this head by the learned Tribunal may also not be disturbed. 16. Mr. vs. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, reported in 2015 (2) SCC 764 awarded a sum of Rs. 1 lakh towards loss of expectation of life. Therefore, the amount awarded under this head by the learned Tribunal may also not be disturbed. 16. Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, the learned senior counsel submits that since the appellant fail to contest the claim before the learned Tribunal, the appellant cannot raised the plea that the driving license of the driver who drove the offending vehicle was a fake license by seeking to invoke Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC at this stage. He submits that such a plea is only available to the appellant before the learned Tribunal under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the MV Act. By invoking the said provision, the insurer can take a defence that the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was not duly licensed. However, once a defence is taken, the onus of proof lies on the insurer. As far as the owner of the vehicle is concerned, when he hires a driver, he has to check whether the driver has a valid driving license. Thereafter, he has to satisfy himself as to the competence of the driver. If satisfied in that regard also, it can be said that the owner had taken reasonable care in employing a person who is qualified and competent to drive the vehicle. However, the situation will be different if at the time of insuring of the vehicle, the insurer requires the owner of the vehicle to have the license duly verified from the licensing authority. In the instant case, the learned senior counsel submits that there was apparently no such requirement and the appellant also failed to contest the case before the learned Tribunal and as such, the grounds raised by the appellant should be rejected and the Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal be up-held. 17. I have heard the learned counsels for the rival parties and I have perused the materials available on record, including the record of the learned Tribunal. What can be noticed is that the appellant failed to contest the claim before the Tribunal by filing a written statement and also adduce evidence. The ground taken for having failed to contest the claim is that there was miscommunication between the appellant and the counsel engaged by them. What can be noticed is that the appellant failed to contest the claim before the Tribunal by filing a written statement and also adduce evidence. The ground taken for having failed to contest the claim is that there was miscommunication between the appellant and the counsel engaged by them. However, a perusal of the memorandum of appeal shows that the miscommunication, as claimed has not been substantiated. The name of the counsel with whom the miscommunication took place has also not been disclosed. In absence of any specific allegation against the counsel, who has not even been named, the stand taken by the appellant therefore is not persuasive and cannot be accepted. 18. Before proceeding further with the rival contentions of the parties, let us examine as to whether an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC can be accepted. In order to appreciate the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, the same may be abstracted below for ready perusal:- "27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.--The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if-- (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or [(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or] (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." 19. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." 19. From the above abstract, it can be seen that the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary before the Appellate Court unless the Court below had refused to admit such evidence or the parties seeking production of such additional evidence is able to establish that despite due diligence, the evidence which was not even in his knowledge could be produced or such evidence is required by the Appellate Court to pronounce its judgment or for any other substantial cause. 20. Coming to the present case, it may be noticed that the appellant not only failed to file their written statement but also failed to adduce any evidence before the Tribunal. The document sought to be produced through I.A(C) No. 83/2018 is an information procured by the appellant only on 13.07.2018 from the Directorate of Transport, Aizawl whereas, the claim which was filed on 20.1.2016 stood disposed of on 14.11.2017. On perusal of the said document, what can be noticed is that the information was given to the appellant by the Directorate, pursuant to a query made under an RTI application submitted on 23.03.2018. Therefore, it can be seen that the information received by the information applied and received by the appellant is much after the passing of the Judgment & Award by the learned Tribunal. When the appellant failed to contest the claim in the above manner, the same cannot be accepted as an exercise of due diligence which otherwise is a condition precedent under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. Therefore, the belated attempt on the part of the appellant to adduce evidence or additional evidence cannot be permitted. Moreover, in view of the Apex Court decision rendered in PEPSU Road Transport Corporation vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2013) 10 SCC 217 , the onus of proving the license to be a fake one will still have to be discharged by the appellant under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the MV Act, Furthermore, the claimants have exhibited the driving license of the driver who drove the offending vehicle as Exhibit C-6. A perusal of Exhibit C-6 would go to show that the driving license has been issued to one Mr. Mickey Zonunsanga S/o. Mr. A perusal of Exhibit C-6 would go to show that the driving license has been issued to one Mr. Mickey Zonunsanga S/o. Mr. Lalvula with the address as Lawngtlai, Chandmari, Mizoram by the District Transport Officer of Lawngtlai District, Mizoram, whereas the information sought by the appellant was from the Directorate of Transport (Motor Vehicle Wing) at Aizawl. It is therefore not surprising to see that the record of the license issued by the District Transport Officer at Lawngtlai District was said to be unavailable with the Directorate of Transport (Motor Vehicle Wing) at Aizawl. In that view of the matter, I am not inclined to allow the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. 21. As regards the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal, the same may be abstracted below for ready perusal:- “(1) Annual income Rs. 43682x12=524184 (2) Addition of 30% of future prospect Rs. 524184x30=157255 100 (3) Loss of income Rs. 524184+157255x13x2=5905804 3 (4) Love and affection for minor children Rs. 2,00,000 (5) Funeral Expenses Rs. 50,000 (6) Loss of Estste Rs. 1,00,000 (7) Loss of expectation of life Rs. 1,00,000 Total Compensation Awarded Rs. 63,55,804/- (Repees sixty three lakhs fifty five thousand eight hundred four) only.” 22. From the above abstract, it can be seen that an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs was awarded towards loss of love and affection of the minor children, Rs. 50,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs. 1 lakh towards loss of estate and Rs. 1 lakh towards loss of expectation of life. The decision rendered by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi & Ors. (Supra) was by a five judges bench, wherein apart from compensation payable under the conventional heads i.e., loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses, no other conventional heads such as loss of love and affection for minor children and loss of expectation of life has been provided. Although the Apex Court in Kunjujamma Mohan & Ors. (Supra) awarded compensation towards loss of love and affection of the children of the deceased and also in Kalpanaraj (Supra) awarded an amount of Rs. 1 lakh towards loss of expectation of life, the decisions were rendered by a two judges bench and therefore, the decision by the five judges bench in Pranay Sethi & Ors. (Supra) will have to prevail. 1 lakh towards loss of expectation of life, the decisions were rendered by a two judges bench and therefore, the decision by the five judges bench in Pranay Sethi & Ors. (Supra) will have to prevail. The larger bench of the Apex Court in its own wisdom considered an award of Rs, 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs, 15,000/- to be reasonable under the conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses respectively. Besides the three heads, no other conventional heads were accounted. Therefore, it must be held that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as claimants will be entitled to compensation as per the decision of Pranay Sethi & Ors. (Supra). It is a well stated law that the insurer having failed to obtain permission under Section 170 of the MV Act will not have the liberty to challenge the award of the Tribunal on merits but nevertheless the appeal of the Insurance Company has been examined in view of the fact that the appeal was admitted by this Court on 08.05.2018 and permission to grant to the appellant for filing an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. 23. In the result, I do not find any merit in the appeal as well as in the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. However, in view of the Apex Court decision in Pranay Sethi & Ors. (Supra), the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal shall be modified as below:- “(1) Annual income Rs. 43682x12=524184 (2) Addition of 30% of future prospect Rs. 524184x30=157255 100 (3) Loss of income Rs. 524184+157255x13x2=5905804 3 (4) Funeral Expenses Rs. 15,000 (5) Loss of Estate Rs. 15,000 Total Compensation Awarded Rs. 59,35,804/- (Repees sixty three lakhs fifty five thousand eight hundred four) only.” 24. Besides the above modification, the rate of interest payable as awarded by the Tribunal shall remain the same. In the result, the appellant is directed to deposit Rs. 59,35,804/- alongwith interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing i.e., 20.01.2016 within a period of 8 (eight) weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order before the Tribunal for onward disbursement to the claimants. 25. The impugned Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal stands modified to the extent indicated above. Liberty is granted to the appellant to withdraw the statutory deposit of Rs. 25. The impugned Judgment & Award of the learned Tribunal stands modified to the extent indicated above. Liberty is granted to the appellant to withdraw the statutory deposit of Rs. 25,000/- alongwith interest by observing usual formalities. 26. The appeal as well as Interlocutory Application No. 83/2018 stands disposed of. Registry to send back the LCR immediately.