JUDGMENT : 1. One K.S.R.Sriranga Raja (plaintiff No.1) along with his two nephews, viz., K.J.Ravichandra Raja (plaintiff No.2) and K.J.Srirangaperumal Raja (plaintiff No.3) filed a suit in O.S.No.428 of 1995 on the file of Additional District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur on 11.10.1995 (hereinafter referred to as 'trial court' for the sake of convenience and clarity). 2. In the aforesaid suit in the trial court, Rajapalayam Municipality through its Commissioner was arrayed as defendant No.1. Two other individuals, namely, S.M.Ravi Raja and S.M.Regupathy Raja have been arrayed as defendants 2 and 3 respectively. To be noted, first defendant Rajapalayam Municipality alone contested the suit and carried the matter in appeal. Defendants 2 and 3, I am informed, remained ex parte throughout in the courts below. 3. Plaint schedule property is land admeasuring 1,44,062 square feet (3 acres and 30 cents) comprised in Town Survey Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 in Kadambangulam village in Rajapalayam Sub Registration, Kamarajar Registration District including a workshop situate thereon in door No.551. To be noted, T.S.Nos.2, 3 and 4 are situate in Block No.17 and T.S.No.5 is situate in Block No.18. Both sides before me agree that aforesaid property has been correctly described in the Advocate Commissioner's sketch, Ex.C.2. Also to be noted, there was no objection to the Commissioner's report and sketch in the courts below. Therefore, for better appreciation of this judgment, I deem it appropriate to scan and reproduce Advocate Commissioner's sketch (C2). I do so and the same is as follows: “IMAGE” 4. Both sides before me agree that plaint schedule property described above is what has been described as ABCD in the Advocate Commissioner's sketch supra. For the sake of convenience and clarity, this plaint schedule property spread over land extent of 3 acres and 30 cents (together with superstructure in the form of a workshop thereon) shall henceforth be referred to as 'suit property'. 5. Prayer in the aforesaid suit in the trial court was for a permanent injunction to restrain the first defendant Rajapalayam Municipality from interfering with plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit property. I have already mentioned that defendants 2 and 3 remained ex parte throughout in the courts below. Also to be noted, no relief was claimed against defendants 2 and 3. 6. However, there are errors in this regard in the trial court and first appellate court. I have already mentioned that defendants 2 and 3 remained ex parte throughout in the courts below. Also to be noted, no relief was claimed against defendants 2 and 3. 6. However, there are errors in this regard in the trial court and first appellate court. In trial court, defendant No.1 has been shown to have appeared through a counsel Mr.K.Kalidass and defendant No.1 has also been shown to have remained ex parte. This is obviously incorrect. In the first appellate court, the name has been mis-spelt. When this was pointed out, both counsel before me submitted that respondents 3 and 4 / defendants 2 and 3 remained ex parte throughout in the courts below and submitted on instructions that this is the correct position. 7. Aforesaid three plaintiffs laid above mentioned suit claiming that they are owners of the suit property, having purchased the same under four different sale deeds, which have been marked as Exs.A.1 to A.4 in the trial court. It is the further case of plaintiffs that first defendant Rajapalayam Municipality is interfering with their possession inter-alia by insisting that the compound wall in the suit property should be removed. It is also plaintiffs' say that notice for removal of compound wall was issued by Sivakasi Sub Collector. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that Rajapalayam Municipality proposed to form a scheme road across the suit property and that is the basis for the Municipality's interference with suit property and cause of action for plaintiffs to file the suit. 8. Municipality through its Commissioner entered appearance and filed a written statement clearly contending that the property shown as EFGH in the plaint plan and the road east of GH belongs to Municipality. It was also the specific case of the Municipality that it has been in possession and maintenance of the aforesaid EFGH and road east of GH. It was also contended by Municipality that it has been notified as Municipality public road. Such specific contention of municipality is contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the written statement and I deem it appropriate to extract the same, which read as follows: “5. The plaintiffs have no right, title or possession exclusively either over the property specifically as ABCD in the plaint plan. Such specific contention of municipality is contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the written statement and I deem it appropriate to extract the same, which read as follows: “5. The plaintiffs have no right, title or possession exclusively either over the property specifically as ABCD in the plaint plan. It is submitted that the Plaintiffs should prove that the suit properties are ancestral properties of the plaintiffs and they were actually having title and possession exclusively to the suit properties. The suit property is within Pudupalayam Town planning Scheme No.1 Rajapalayam. The said Town Planning Scheme was notified in Tamilnadu Government Gazette in part I Page 267 dated 10.6.81 after observing all the rules and regulations. In the said scheme the southern portion of the suit property is notified as C C 60 feet wide scheme road. The said Town Planning scheme has become final. As per the Tamilnadu Town and Country Planning Act, no person is entitled to put up any construction in the site that has been notified as Road in Town Planning Scheme. The plaintiff is fully aware that the suit site is notified as road in the above said scheme. 6. Further the suit site is within the Rajapalayam Municipality. As per the Tamilnadu District Municipalities Act, no construction should be put without obtaining sanction from the Municipal Executive Authorities. The suit property marked as EFGH in the plaint plan and the road east of GH point belongs to this defendant and its survey No. is Town Survey No.4. This defendant has been in possession and maintenance of the plaint schedule property and east of GH point and the same has been notified as Municipal Public Road. The Town Survey was conducted after due publication and also after due notice to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have not filed any objections to the classification of the suit property as public road. The Rajapalayam Town Survey has been notified in Ramanathapuram District Gazette dated 29.1.1985 and the abovesaid notification has become final and therefore if any person has any objections, he ought to have filed objections within 1 year or to have filed civil suit within 3 years to modify the entries with survey records. The plaintiffs have not filed any suit within the prescribed limitation and the present suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed.” 9. The plaintiffs have not filed any suit within the prescribed limitation and the present suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed.” 9. For appreciating the aforesaid stand of the Municipality, it is necessary to give the plaint plan. Therefore, the plan annexed to the plaint (forming part to the plaint) is scanned and reproduced below: “IMAGE” 10. When parties went to trial on the aforesaid rival pleadings, three sets of documents became pivotal and can even be described as fulcrum of trial in the trial court. 11. One set of documents is Ex.B.1 and Ex.B.6. Ex.B.6 is a notification dated 13.5.1981 made and published in the Gazette of Government of Tamil Nadu under Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 ('T and P Act' for brevity) declaring the land mentioned therein to be forming part of Pudupalayam scheme road. The sketch relatable to this notification is Ex.B.4. There is no dispute or disagreement that Exs.B.4 and B.6 pertain to Town S.No.5 which forms part of the suit property. 12. The second is one document, i.e., Ex.B.5. Ex.B.5 is again a notification which was published in the gazette. By notification dated 29.1.1985, certain areas were declared as public municipal road. This notification was made under Section 13 of the Tamil Nadu Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'S and B Act' for brevity). There is no dispute or disagreement before me that Ex.B.5 pertains to T.S.No.4 which also forms part of suit property. 13. The third set of documents are Exs.A.1 to A.4, which according to plaintiffs are title deeds under which plaintiffs acquired suit property. 14. Trial court after full contest / trial decreed the suit in and by judgment and decree dated 30.11.1999. The judgment of trial court turns heavily on its interpretation of the aforesaid Ex.B.5 and Ex.B.6. I shall refer to this in the later part of this judgment infra. 15. Municipality carried the matter in appeal by way of regular first appeal being A.S.No.8 of 2001 on the file of Subordinate Judges Court, Srivilluputhur (hereinafter referred to as 'first appellate court' for the sake of clarity and convenience). I shall refer to this in the later part of this judgment infra. 15. Municipality carried the matter in appeal by way of regular first appeal being A.S.No.8 of 2001 on the file of Subordinate Judges Court, Srivilluputhur (hereinafter referred to as 'first appellate court' for the sake of clarity and convenience). After full contest, first appellate court dismissed the regular first appeal under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC' for brevity), confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. The judgment of the first appellate court also turns on interpretation of aforesaid two sets of documents. As mentioned supra, I shall refer to the same in greater detail in the later part of this judgment. 16. Aggrieved, Municipality filed the instant second appeal in this court on 4.6.2007. 17. This second appeal was admitted by this court on 11.3.2008 on two substantial questions of law. I deem it appropriate to extract the entire order of this court dated 11.3.2008. The same reads as follows: “Heard the learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The Second Appeal is admitted on the following substantial questions of law. 1. “Whether the judgment and decree of the Court below is perverse on account of the mis-construction of the documents in Exs.B.4 & B6” 2. Whether the judgment and decree of the Court below is erroneous on account of its failure to consider the fact that the disputed property has already been declared as public pathway and the said declaration has not been challenged by the respondent in the manner known to law.?” Notice returnable by four weeks.” 18. This being a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, I commence the discussion from the substantial questions of law. 19. From a bare reading, it would be clear that substantial question of law No.1 turns on construction of Exs.B.4 and B.6 by courts below. As already alluded to supra, Ex.B.6 is a notification under Section 29 of T and P Act. Ex.B.6 is dated 13.5.1981. This is the notification by which certain lands have been notified as scheme road. Ex.B.4 is the official sketch which shows the areas which have been declared as scheme road. In search of an answer to substantial question of law No.1, one has to first look at the manner in which trial court has dealt with Exs.B.4 and B.6. This is the notification by which certain lands have been notified as scheme road. Ex.B.4 is the official sketch which shows the areas which have been declared as scheme road. In search of an answer to substantial question of law No.1, one has to first look at the manner in which trial court has dealt with Exs.B.4 and B.6. A reading of trial court judgment brings to light that trial court has referred to Ex.B.6 alone and there is no reference to Ex.B.4. That part of the judgment of trial court which dealt with Ex.B.6 is paragraph 43 and the relevant portion of paragraph 43 reads as follows: “IMAGE” 20. As mentioned supra, a bare perusal of the relevant portion of paragraph 43 of trial court judgment (extracted supra) would reveal that there is reference only to Ex.B.6 without any reference to Ex.B.4. Trial court has proceeded on the basis that survey numbers or town survey numbers have not been mentioned in Ex.B.6. Ex.B.6 is a notification under Section 29 of T and P Act. Section 29 of T and P Act reads as follows: “29. Approval by the Director.-- As soon as may be, after the submission of the detailed development plan, but not later than such time as may be prescribed, the Director may, either approve the said plan or may approve it with such modifications, as he may consider necessary, or may return the said plan to the local planning authority to modify the plan or to prepare a fresh plan in accordance with such directions as the Director may issue in this behalf and resubmit it to him for approval.” 21. Therefore, it would be untenable to expect Ex.B.6 contain the survey number and town survey number. One has to necessarily look at Ex.B.4 to ascertain which are the survey numbers and lands that have been declared as scheme road. A perusal of Ex.B.4 clearly reveals that it pertains to T.S.No.5 which even according to respondents / plaintiffs is admittedly part of suit property. Therefore, trial court has clearly erred in its construction of Ex.B.6, more so by looking at Ex.B.6 and holding that it does not contain survey number without even making reference to Ex.B.4. In other words, trial court has misread Ex.B.6 by reading it in isolation, whereas Ex.B6 ought to have necessarily been read along with Ex.B.4. 22. Therefore, trial court has clearly erred in its construction of Ex.B.6, more so by looking at Ex.B.6 and holding that it does not contain survey number without even making reference to Ex.B.4. In other words, trial court has misread Ex.B.6 by reading it in isolation, whereas Ex.B6 ought to have necessarily been read along with Ex.B.4. 22. This takes me to the judgment of first appellate court with regard to Ex.B.4 and Ex.B.6 which is contained in paragraph 14 of judgment of first appellate court. I deem it appropriate to refer to that portion of paragraph 14, which reads as follows: “TAMIL” 23. First appellate court again has not made any reference to Ex.B.4. Therefore, I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that both courts below have made an error in the construction of Ex.B.4 and Ex.B.6. The misconstruction is clearly perverse as both courts below have looked into Ex.B.6 in isolation ignoring Ex.B.4. Both courts below have also erred in holding that Ex.B.6 does not contain town survey numbers and therefore, does not relate to suit property, without looking into Ex.B.4 and by looking at Ex.B.6 in isolation, while the two (Ex.B.6 and Ex.B.4) ought to have been correlated and read together. This itself gives a straight forward answer to substantial question of law No.1. 24. However, as some arguments were advanced before me regarding lands comprised under Ex.B.6 being released owing to a statutory provision, I deem it appropriate to refer to those arguments also for the purpose of capturing the nature of hearing before me as comprehensively as possible. 25. It was contended on behalf of respondents (plaintiffs in trial court) that Ex.B.6 and Ex.B.4 are of no significance as lands notified as scheme road under said exhibits stood released by operation of Section 38 of T and P Act. I deem it appropriate to extract Section 38 of T and P Act which reads as follows: "38. 25. It was contended on behalf of respondents (plaintiffs in trial court) that Ex.B.6 and Ex.B.4 are of no significance as lands notified as scheme road under said exhibits stood released by operation of Section 38 of T and P Act. I deem it appropriate to extract Section 38 of T and P Act which reads as follows: "38. Release of land.-- If within three years from the date of the publication of the notice in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette under section 26 or section 27--- (a) no declaration as provided in sub-section (2) of section 37 is published in respect of any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in a regional plan, master plan, detailed development plan or new town development plan covered by such notice; or (b) such land is not acquired by agreement such land shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment or designation." 26. Referring to Section 38 of T and P Act, learned counsel for respondents Mr.M.Thirunavukkarasu submitted that lands contained in Exs.B.4 and B.6 have not been acquired by agreement within three years from the date of publication of Ex.B.6 and therefore, it automatically stood released. 27. With regard to section 38 of T and P Act, learned counsel for respondents pressed into service three judgments of this court. They are: (1) V.Nagamani Vs. The Director of Town & Country Planning, Chennai and others reported in 2010 (2) CTC 510 ; (2) S.Kanagam Achi Vs. The Director, Town & Country Planning, 807, Anna Salai, Chennai and others reported in 2014 (6) CTC 60 and (3) S.Anand Vs. The Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 015 and others reported in 2017 (1) CTC 175 . 28. This argument of learned counsel for respondents though appeared attractive in first blush, is not tenable for more than one reason. This is not a case where the validity of the notification is assailed. Exs.B.6 and B.4 were never assailed. At least, there is nothing on record to show that Exs.B.6 and B.4 were assailed. In this case, it is a question of construction of Exs.B.6 and B.4 qua suit property. 29. Ex.B.6 is dated 13.5.1981. Nothing prevented the respondents herein from assailing Ex.B.6 after expiry of three years, if no action had been taken. Respondents have not done so. This suit was filed on 11.10.1995. In this case, it is a question of construction of Exs.B.6 and B.4 qua suit property. 29. Ex.B.6 is dated 13.5.1981. Nothing prevented the respondents herein from assailing Ex.B.6 after expiry of three years, if no action had been taken. Respondents have not done so. This suit was filed on 11.10.1995. According to respondents herein (plaintiffs in trial court), cause of action arose immediately before that. At least when the cause of action arose, plaintiffs could have challenged Ex.B.6 in an appropriate forum. Assuming for a moment, plaintiffs were not aware of Ex.B.6 until written statement was filed in the suit, respondents herein / plaintiffs could have assailed Ex.B.6 in an appropriate forum at the latest after the written statement was filed. To be noted, written statement is dated 29.03.1996. Not having done so in any one of these three distinct occasions, respondents cannot assail the validity of Ex.B.6 or contend that land contained under Ex.B.6 gets released by operation of Section 38 of T and P Act in a bare injunction suit. There can be no two opinions that the scope of a suit for bare injunction qua immovable property is very limited. In such a suit, trial court and first appellate court could not have decided the validity of Ex.B.6 or the question as to whether land contained in Ex.B.6 stood released even if the plea had been raised in the courts below. In any event, to be noted, such a plea was never raised in the courts below. 30. Further more, the instant appeal before me, is a second appeal under Section 100 CPC which turns only on substantial question/s of law and such substantial question/s of law should necessarily arise from the proceedings in the court below. In other words, such substantial question/s of law should be those for which the foundation has been laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the findings of the courts below. This has been clearly laid down and elucidatively articulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 . The relevant paragraph is 14 and the same reads as follows: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. Purushottam Tiwari reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 . The relevant paragraph is 14 and the same reads as follows: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be “substantial” a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law “involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." (Underlining made by me to supply emphasise and highlight) 31. To be noted, aforesaid Santosh Hazari case continues to be good law and it has been extensively quoted, restated and relied on by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as late as 03.10.2016 in Malan Bi's case (Syeda Rahimunnisa Vs. Malan Bi [ (2016) 10 SCC 315 ]. 32. Neither a substantial question of law in this regard has been raised nor is there any scope for me to formulate this as substantial question of law now, as it would certainly not arise out of the proceedings in the courts below. Malan Bi [ (2016) 10 SCC 315 ]. 32. Neither a substantial question of law in this regard has been raised nor is there any scope for me to formulate this as substantial question of law now, as it would certainly not arise out of the proceedings in the courts below. My understanding of the scope of Section 100 CPC in the light of the aforesaid Santosh Hazari case, Malan Bi case and other authoritative pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court is that, it would be impermissible for this court to go into this aspect as neither substantial question/s of law has/have been framed nor is there scope for formulating such substantial question/s of law in the instant proceedings, i.e., substantial question/s of law touching upon section 38 of T and P Act. Therefore, the above plea predicated on Section 38 of T and P Act and three judgments pressed into service do not help respondents in the instant case in the present proceedings under Section 100 CPC. On an extreme demurrer, as set out supra, obtaining position that respondents have not chosen to challenge Ex.B.6 in an appropriate forum earlier, particularly when three distinct occasions arose to do so also militates against the respondents in this regard. 33. Therefore, I have no hesitation in answering substantial question of law No.1 in favour of appellant and holding that judgment and decree of courts below are certainly perverse on account of misconstruction of Exs.B.4 and B.6. 34. This takes us to substantial question of law No.2. 35. A bare reading of substantial question of law No.2 reveals that it turns completely on Ex.B.5. Ex.B.5 is a gazette publication of a declaration under Section 13 of S and B Act. Vide Ex.B.5, there is declaration that certain lands are public municipal streets. This Ex.B.5 is dated 29.01.1985. Ex.B.5 notification has been made under Section 13 of S and B Act. Before proceeding further on this aspect of the matter, it is necessary to see how the trial court and first appellate court have dealt with Ex.B.5. As to how trial court dealt with Ex.B.5 is articulated in paragraph 41 of the trial court judgment and I deem it appropriate to extract the same, which reads as follows: “TAMIL” 36. Before proceeding further on this aspect of the matter, it is necessary to see how the trial court and first appellate court have dealt with Ex.B.5. As to how trial court dealt with Ex.B.5 is articulated in paragraph 41 of the trial court judgment and I deem it appropriate to extract the same, which reads as follows: “TAMIL” 36. A perusal of paragraph 41 would show that trial court has gone on the basis that date of commencement of measurement and the date of completion have not been given in Ex.B.5. This according to me, is completely unacceptable. With regard to D.W.2 (Velusamy), he was examined only for the purpose of marking Ex.B.5 and he is a Superintendent in the Government Press. Statement of D.W.2 that government press got instruction from the District Collector's office for printing Ex.B.5 is absolutely acceptable, but the trial court has construed the same to be a statement that forms the basis for Ex.B.5 and said that original documents received from Collector's office should also have been filed. To be noted, Ex.B.5 was not under challenge before trial court. Therefore, it is not for the trial court to say that documents which are basis for Ex.B.5 have not been filed and on that basis, decree the bare injunction suit. 37. As far as first appellate court is concerned, there is absolutely no mention about Ex.B.5 in the entire judgment. If anybody has grievance regarding the notification under Section 13 of S and B Act, the same has to be challenged within three years from the notice. This is contained in Section 14 of S and B Act. It is mandated in Section 14 of S and B Act. I deem it appropriate to extract Section 14 of S and B Act and the same reads as follows: "14. This is contained in Section 14 of S and B Act. It is mandated in Section 14 of S and B Act. I deem it appropriate to extract Section 14 of S and B Act and the same reads as follows: "14. Institution of a suit in Civil Court within three years to establish rights claimed in respect of the boundary of the property surveyed.-- Any person deeming himself aggrieved by the determination of any boundary under Section 9, 10, 11, 12-A or 12-B may, subject to the provisions of Parts II and III of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963) institute a suit within three years from the date of the notification under Section 13 to set aside or modify the said determination and the survey shall, if necessary, be altered in accordance with the final decree in the suit and the alteration, if any, shall be noted in the record. The plaintiff in such suit shall join as parties to it all persons whom he has reason to believe to be interested in the boundary which is the subject of the suit." 38. There is nothing on record to show that respondents before me have have assailed Ex.B.5. On the contrary, it is not disputed that respondents have not assailed Ex.B.5 much less as per Section 14 of S and B Act within the time stipulated therein. To make it very clear, it is nobody's case before me that Ex.B.5 was ever put to challenge. Notwithstanding this position, going back to discussion of trial court on Ex.B.5, it is erroneous for one more reason. That reason is, Ex.B.5 has not been correlated with Exs.B1 and B.2. Ex.B.1 is the extract from the records of measurement for town survey produced by Rajapalayam municipality. Ex.B.2 is the town survey register. I deem it appropriate to scan and reproduce Ex.B1, which is as follows: “IMAGE” To be noted, there are some colors in Ex.B.1, placed before me, but Ex.B.1 has been scanned and reproduced in black and white. 39. Both these documents clearly show that T.S.No.4 is a public road. It has been described as Alagar Raja Street in Ex.B.2. Ex.B.1 shows T.S.No.4 as Government poramboke. 40. Before I answer substantial question of law No.2, I deem it appropriate to deal with one submission made before me on behalf of respondents. 39. Both these documents clearly show that T.S.No.4 is a public road. It has been described as Alagar Raja Street in Ex.B.2. Ex.B.1 shows T.S.No.4 as Government poramboke. 40. Before I answer substantial question of law No.2, I deem it appropriate to deal with one submission made before me on behalf of respondents. Learned counsel for respondent Mr.Thirunavukkarasu pointed out that respondents (plaintiffs in trial court) have not been put on notice about the survey under the S and B Act. For this purpose, learned counsel drew my attention to sub section (2) of Section 9 of S and B Act. I deem it appropriate to extract the entire Section 9 of S and B Act, which reads as follows: "9. Power of survey officer to determine and record an undisputed boundary.-- (1) The survey officer shall have power to determine and record as undisputed any boundary in respect of which no dispute is brought to his notice. (2) Notice to registered holders of lands affected.-- Notice of every decision of the survey officer under Section 9(1) shall be given in the prescribed manner to the registered holders of the lands the boundaries of which may be affected by the decision." 41. In response to this submission, Mr.Parekhkumar, learned counsel appearing for appellant Municipality submitted that sub section (2) of section 9 of S and B Act will apply only when a decision of Survey Officer under sub section (1) is made. With regard to lands held by private entities, learned counsel pointed out that a perusal of Exs.B.1 and B.2 read in juxtaposition with Ex.B.5 would reveal that T.S.No.4 is government poramboke. Therefore, question of giving notice under sub section (2) of Section 9 of S and B Act to respondents herein did not arise. 42. Exs.A.1 to A.4 are the basis on which respondents before me (plaintiffs in trial court) have laid their claim to be registered holders / owners of suit property. 43. In this regard, Mr.Parekhkumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant Municipality contended that plaintiffs in the trial court (respondents before me) have not been able to establish that they have title for the entire suit property. Learned counsel Mr.Parekhkumar points out that according to plaintiffs, they acquired title to suit property under Exs.A.1 to A.4. 43. In this regard, Mr.Parekhkumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant Municipality contended that plaintiffs in the trial court (respondents before me) have not been able to establish that they have title for the entire suit property. Learned counsel Mr.Parekhkumar points out that according to plaintiffs, they acquired title to suit property under Exs.A.1 to A.4. It was pointed out that the extent of land in Ex.A.1 is 88 cents, Ex.A.2 is 11 cents, Ex.A.3 is 4 cents and Ex.A.4 is 1 acre and 20 cents. It was submitted that if all four add up, it would be only 2 acres and 22 cents, whereas suit property is 3 acres and 30 cents. In respect to this, learned counsel for respondents submitted that this plea has not been raised in the pleadings in the trial court. I am unable to agree. Municipality would have had an opportunity in this regard only if plaintiffs had raised this plea qua Ex.B.5 in the courts below. Plaintiffs have laid the suit by saying that they own suit property only on the basis of Exs.A.1 to A.4. It was a definite stand of the Municipality that a part of it is a public road. In this scenario, unless plaintiffs have shown that they have title for the entire 3 acres and 30 cents, plaintiffs cannot be heard to contend that there is no plea in this regard. 44. For this reason also, plaintiffs / respondents before me cannot be heard to contend that notice under sub section (2) of section 9 of S and B Act has not been given. In any event, this question if at all could have been raised only if Ex.B.5 had been assailed or challenged in any manner known to law. However, for making this discussion comprehensive, I have discussed this aspect of the matter also. 45. I answer substantial question of law No.2 by holding that judgment and decree of courts below are clearly erroneous on account of and owing to the failure to consider the obtaining position that suit property has already been declared as public road and said declaration has not been challenged by respondents in the manner known to law. Therefore, I have no difficulty whatsoever in answering substantial question of Law No.2 also in favour of appellant and against respondents. 46. Therefore, I have no difficulty whatsoever in answering substantial question of Law No.2 also in favour of appellant and against respondents. 46. As I have answered both substantial questions of law in favour of appellant Municipality and against respondents, this second appeal is allowed. In the result, the judgment and decree of both courts below, i.e., judgment and decree dated 24.1.2006 made in A.S.No.8 of 2001 on the file of Subordinate Judges Court, Srivilluputhur and judgment and decree dated 30.11.1999 made in O.S.No.428 of 1995 on the file of Additional District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur are set aside. Considering the trajectory of the litigation, I leave the parties to bear their respective costs.