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2018 DIGILAW 157 (ALL)

SURENDRA VERMA v. STATE

2018-01-18

PRABHAT CHANDRA TRIPATHI, SUNITA AGARWAL

body2018
JUDGMENT : Sunita Agarwal, J. 1. Heard Shri Samit Gopal, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant and Shri Ajit Ray, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. The present appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 21.4.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.11, Gorakhpur in Session Trial No.205 of 2006 (State of U.P. v. Surendra Verma) of conviction of appellant, Surendra Verma for life imprisonment found guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC and a fine of Rs.10,000/-. 3. The appellant, Surendra Verma is father of the deceased victim namely Ms. Radhna. The case of the prosecution is that on 15.10.2005 at about 5:30 am, a written report was given by Smt. Uma Verma, wife of Virendra Verma, resident of Mohalla Shivpur Sidhariya, Thana Cantt, District Gorakhpur, stating therein that her brother-in-law (Jeth) Surendra son of Bhabhuti Verma had inflicted serious injuries on the head of her daughter Ms. Radhna through "Gandasi". The victim also received serious injuries on other parts of the body and became unconscious and fell on the ground. The informant and other villagers took the victim to the Sadar Hospital, Gorakhpur for treatment. After admitting her in the hospital, the informant came to lodge the First Information Report. 4. The said report was registered as Case Crime No.1396 of 2005 under Sections 307 and 504 IPC. The investigation was conducted, a site plan of the place of occurrence was prepared, the statement of the witnesses were recorded. The medical examination of the injured victim namely Ms. Radhna was done. Upon death of Ms. Radhna, the case was converted for offences under Sections 302 and 504 IPC. Surendra Verma, the appellant was arrested from his house and on his pointing out, a blood-stained "Gandasi" was recovered, inquest of the dead body was prepared in the presence of the witnesses post-mortem was conducted. The appellant was charge-sheeted under Sections 302 and 504 IPC after completion of the investigation and committed to trial on 9.6.2006. The charges were framed by the Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur. The accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 5. The prosecution examined six witnesses. Among them, PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 were eye-witnesses. PW-3 is the scribe of the First Information Report. PW-5 and PW-6 are witnesses of arrest of the appellant and recovery of murder weapon. PW-7 is the witness of scribe of chik FIR. The accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 5. The prosecution examined six witnesses. Among them, PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 were eye-witnesses. PW-3 is the scribe of the First Information Report. PW-5 and PW-6 are witnesses of arrest of the appellant and recovery of murder weapon. PW-7 is the witness of scribe of chik FIR. PW-8 is the first Investigating Officer who arrested the appellant and prepared recovery memo of the plain earth and blood-stained earth taken from the site of occurrence; 'Nakashanajari' (site-plan); recovered the murder weapon (Gandasi) at the pointing of the accused and prepared recovery memo thereof. PW-9 is the doctor who conducted post-mortem of the dead body. PW-10 is the second Investigating Officer to whom investigation was transferred on administrative grounds. PW-11 proved the preparation of the inquest report. PW-12 was the Investigating Officer who conducted final investigation after 31.10.2005 when the case was converted into an offence under Section 302 IPC. PW-13 is the doctor of the District Hospital, Gorakhpur who prepared the injury report. The documentary evidences filed by the prosecution apart from the documents mentioned above, include the letter sent to Vidhi Vigyan Prayogshala for chemical examination of the blood-stained and plain earth as also the murder weapon "Gandasi". 6. In his statement, under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant denied having committed murder of his daughter and stated that he was implicated by the villagers on account of enmity relating to a land dispute. The injuries found on the person of the deceased in the post-mortem report are:- "(1) Multiple incised wound on occipital region of scalp. Size-6cm x 1cm upto bone deep -8cm x 1 cm upto bone deep -5 cm x 1 cm upto bone deep - 5 cm x 1 cm upto bone deep -4 cm x 1 cm upto bone deep Incised wound on below occipital region. On scalp fracture and hematoma present. (2) Incised wound at the back of neck Size 5cm x 1 cm upto muscle deep (3) Lacerted incised wound 5 cm x 1.5 cm upto bone deep on temporal bone left side of ear. (4) Left scapular region incised wound 4cm x 2 cm bone deep. (5) Left elbow-lacerated wound 2cm x 1 cm muscle deep. (6) Left ring finger nail crushed. (7) Left middle finger two stiches. (8) Right back of palm incised wound 3cm x 1 cm upto muscle deep." 7. (4) Left scapular region incised wound 4cm x 2 cm bone deep. (5) Left elbow-lacerated wound 2cm x 1 cm muscle deep. (6) Left ring finger nail crushed. (7) Left middle finger two stiches. (8) Right back of palm incised wound 3cm x 1 cm upto muscle deep." 7. The time of occurrence of death as per the report of the doctor posted in the emergency in B.R.D. Medical College (wherein the victim was shifted after been referred by the District Hospital) was about 11:25 pm on 15.10.2005. The cause of death mentioned in the post-mortem report is shock due to ante-mortem injuries. Apart from the formal witnesses, all other witnesses including eye witnesses and witnesses of recovery of murder weapon and arrest of appellant had turned hostile. They were cross-examined by the prosecution and defence after they were declared hostile by the prosecution counsel. 8. Learned Amicus Curiae, vehemently, contended that all six prosecution witnesses who were produced as direct evidence of the crime allegedly committed by the appellant had turned hostile. There was no direct evidence. The recovery memo is defective as the place of recovery of the alleged murder weapon is conspicuously missing therefrom. There is no report of the chemical analyst connecting the murder weapon from the crime. As mentioned in the recovery memo, blood stains were found on the murder weapon which were not connected with the blood stained soil allegedly recovered from the scene of occurrence. 9. The laxity in investigation is evident on the face of the record inasmuch as, the Investigating Officer did not care to record the statement of the victim though he was well aware of the fact that she was admitted in the hospital which was only at a distance of six kilometers from the police station where the First Information Report was lodged. The Investigating Officer, PW-8 admitted that he did not visit the hospital to record statement of the injured and a lame excuse had been taken during the course of cross-examination that he did not visit the hospital as he was busy in his official duties of maintaining the law and order situation. He admitted having known the fact of deceased being injured at the time of receipt of investigation as the said fact was mentioned in chick report. He admitted having known the fact of deceased being injured at the time of receipt of investigation as the said fact was mentioned in chick report. The arrest of the appellant are in suspicious circumstances inasmuch as, the appellant was arrested from his house at about 5:35 am in the early morning of 16.10.2005. The story of recovery of murder weapon at the pointing of the accused from the house itself makes it evident that the prosecution case is a concocted story. The murder weapon was not sealed at the place of recovery. Sanctity of the recovery goes with this fact. Entire investigation is sham and fictitious. Nothing turns on the statement of the witnesses who were declared hostile. 10. It is further contended that the police had concocted the story in a hurry to solve the case. There was complete absence of evidence. The Trial Court went in-tangent to treat it as a case of circumstantial evidence. In absence of any corroborative evidence to complete the chain of circumstances, the appellant cannot be held guilty of the alleged offence of murder of his daughter. The laxity in investigation, manipulations and casual and careless attitude of the Investigating Officers will not lean in favour of the prosecution rather it demolishes the entire prosecution case. It cannot be comprehended by a man of ordinary prudence that a person after committing murder of his daughter, would stay calm and conveniently remain in his house when he was arrested by the police in the early hours of the day following the incident. The appellant was not arrested on the same day and he did not make any effort to run away from the place of occurrence of the crime. The appellant was living in a joint family, there were other brothers and sisters, the prosecution had withheld other witnesses. All the above noted facts coupled with the fact that the statement of the injured was not recorded proves that the appellant was falsely implicated in the alleged offence of murder of his daughter. 11. Learned A.G.A, on the other hand, submits that all witnesses turned hostile being close relatives and neighbours of the appellant, however, the portion of statement of hostile witnesses which point towards the guilt of the appellant cannot be ignored. 11. Learned A.G.A, on the other hand, submits that all witnesses turned hostile being close relatives and neighbours of the appellant, however, the portion of statement of hostile witnesses which point towards the guilt of the appellant cannot be ignored. PW-1, the informant in first part of her statement had admitted of she being present in the house at the time of incident and having taken the victim to the hospital with the help of the villagers. However, in the later part of her statement, she denied the said fact. Emphasis was laid on the recovery of weapon of assault from the house and that the injuries on the person of the victim being relatable to the murder weapon namely "Gandasi"; the presence of the accused-appellant in the house at the time of incident; the First Information Report having been lodged by sister-in-law of the appellant; scribe of First Information Report having admitted writing the same at the dictate of the informant, Smt. Uma Verma. 12. Learned A.G.A. has submitted that the burden was upon the appellant to explain as to who had caused the injuries upon the person of her daughter leading to her death. The burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence Act') laid upon the appellant had not been discharged. His statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., especially answers to question Nos.2, 5 and 13 is an additional link in the chain of circumstances completing it to establish the guilt of the appellant. 13. Since all the eye witnesses had turned hostile, the Trial Court cannot be said to have erred in examining it from another angle, putting together all the circumstantial evidences brought by the prosecution before it. It cannot be said that any error has been committed by the Trial Court in treating it as a case of circumstantial evidence as direct evidence were not coming in. Moreover, there are variance in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, who are husband and wife, regarding their presence in the house at the time of incident. This fact also supports the prosecution case. Putting together all the circumstances, the chain is complete. There cannot be any other conclusion but of the guilt of the appellant. The conviction of the appellant is liable to be affirmed by this Court. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. This fact also supports the prosecution case. Putting together all the circumstances, the chain is complete. There cannot be any other conclusion but of the guilt of the appellant. The conviction of the appellant is liable to be affirmed by this Court. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The correctness of the documentary evidences submitted by the prosecution has been admitted by the learned Amicus Curiae except for the assertion that the recovery memo was defective inasmuch as it does not disclose the place of recovery of the murder weapon. However, in his statement, the Investigating Officer had proved the place of recovery of the murder weapon. The murder weapon as per the case of prosecution is "Gandasi" which was recovered at the pointing of the appellant from his house i.e. the accommodation wherein the incident had occurred. 15. It is now well settled that the recovery of an object is not recovery of the fact as envisaged in the Section 27 of the Evidence Act. See State of Maharashtra v. Damu S/o Gopinath Shinde & Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 269 ). The basic idea embedded in the Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by the subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if the fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a person who has been taken into police custody, such a discovery is the guarantee that the information supplied by him is true. The information may be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of fact, it becomes a reliable information. However, the information before being admitted in evidence is confined to that portion of the information which "distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered" but the information to get admissibility need not to be so truncated as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of admission committed should be consisted with understandability. Mere statement that the accused led the police and the witnesses to the place where he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the information given under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. (See Bodhraj @ Bodha & Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2002) 8 SCC 45 ). 16. Mere statement that the accused led the police and the witnesses to the place where he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the information given under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. (See Bodhraj @ Bodha & Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2002) 8 SCC 45 ). 16. The recovery of murder weapon at the pointing of the accused, therefore, cannot be said to be the fact which would prove the prosecution case. Thus, the discovery of weapon of assault on the basis of the information given by the accused while in custody cannot be a circumstance which can be said to prove the prosecution case. 17. Coming to the evidence brought on record to substantiate the accusations, the prosecution had examined six witnesses, among whom three (PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4) are stated to be the eye witnesses of the crime. PW-3 is the scribe of the first information report. PW-5 and PW-6 are witnesses of arrest of the appellant from his house and the recovery memos. Of three eye witnesses, PW-1, the informant is sister-in-law and PW-2, brother of the appellant (husband of the informant). PW-4 is a neighbour who is stated to have reached at the time of commission of crime having listened to the cries of the victim. 18. All these eye witnesses and witnesses of recovery and arrest of the accused had been declared hostile and were cross-examined. The Trial Court having examined the evidence of these witnesses and the admitted fact that the accused was present in the house at the time of occurrence of the incident, laid burden of disclosure of special circumstances on the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 19. Before analysing the factual aspects of the matter, as has been laid down in Bodhraj (supra), it may be stated that for a crime to be proved, it is not necessary that the crime must be seen to have been committed and must, in all circumstances be proved by direct ocular evidence by examining before the Court those persons who had seen its commission. The offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The principal fact i.e. factum probandum may be proved indirectly by means of certain inferences drawn from the evidentiary facts i.e. factum probans. 20. The offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The principal fact i.e. factum probandum may be proved indirectly by means of certain inferences drawn from the evidentiary facts i.e. factum probans. 20. The circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together they form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed. 21. It has been consistently held by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions that the inference of guilt can be justified in a case which squarely rests on circumstantial evidence only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have been shown to be clearly connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by the Court from time and again. 22. The conditions precedent, as has been held by Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:- "(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 23. In the instant case, the prosecution had produced direct evidences. After the witnesses turned hostile, the prosecution tried to prove the case from the circumstances coupled with the portion of the statement of hostile witnesses which would support the case of the prosecution. 24. It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated to be effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent, his version is found to be dependable on the careful scrutiny thereof and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence may be accepted. (See Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450 and State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Mishra, (1996) 10 SCC 360 ). (See also Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1976) 1 SCC 389 , Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, (1976) 4 SCC 233 , Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, (1980) 1 SCC 30 and Khujji v. State of M.P., (1991) 3 SCC 627 ). 25. One clinching circumstance, viz., the statement of PW-1 the informant, who is the aunt of the deceased, that she had admitted the victim (deceased) in the Sadar Hospital; the deceased received serious injuries on her person i.e. head, neck, chin and hands; the victim had died in the hospital at about 12:00pm. She had denied having lodged any report in writing to the police and that she knew the scribe of the report namely Pradeep. In the later part of her statement, she had denied having witnessed the crime and took a plea of alibi stating that she and her husband (PW-2) were not present in the house (where the incident occurred), at the time of the incident. She got to know that the villagers took the victim to the hospital, then she reached the hospital and got her admitted. PW-2 who is husband of the informant and is real brother of the appellant had stated that he and his entire family was not present in the house on the date of the incident and went to his in-law's house. PW-2 who is husband of the informant and is real brother of the appellant had stated that he and his entire family was not present in the house on the date of the incident and went to his in-law's house. They came back a day after and his wife i.e. informant was not present in the house at the time of the incident. PW-3, the scribe of the written First Information Report, however, had admitted his writing and signature on the written report when it was shown to him during the course of his deposition. He stated that the report was written by him on the dictation of Uma Verma, (PW-1 the informant) and after writing the same he put his signature thereon. During his cross-examination, he again admitted his writing and signature on the written First Information Report. Thus, the contradictions in the statements of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 are apparent. 26. PW-1 and PW-2 are husband and wife. They were residing in the same house in adjacent to the rooms wherein the incident had occurred. The prosecution had established the injuries on the person of the deceased which had also been admitted by PW-1, the informant who was the first to witness the crime having reached the scene of incident; the report had been lodged by her in writing of PW-3 is also proved from the deposition of the prosecution witnesses. The fact that the injured was admitted in the Sadar Hospital, Gorakhpur by the informant, PW-1 is admitted. The injured having died on the same day i.e. on 15.10.2015 at about 12:00 pm is also admitted. Thus, the prosecution case of the incident coming to light on the written report lodged by PW-1 after the victim was admitted in the hospital is proved. 27. There is clear contradiction and variance in the statements of PW-1 and PW-3 of being present in the house at the time of the incident. The question would be whether the plea of alibi taken by them is "true, likely or probable." PW-1 and PW-2 were admittedly living in the same house. They both had admitted the incident having occurred in their presence and the appellant having assaulted the victim in their statements made to the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded on the same day i.e. on 15.10.2005. They both had admitted the incident having occurred in their presence and the appellant having assaulted the victim in their statements made to the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded on the same day i.e. on 15.10.2005. No explanation has been offered by these witnesses as to why their statements were recorded by the police contrary to what they had stated in their oral depositions. Being closely related to the appellant, their conduct of having resiled from their previous statements can be understandable as an effort to save the appellant. 28. There is yet another important aspect of the matter. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded. Most formidable incrimating circumstances were put to the appellant but he did not give any explanation whatsoever and instead choose to deny the existence thereof. In his reply to question No.2, of him having attacked her daughter inflicting serious injuries on her person, he had replied that his mental condition was not fit at that time. In reply to question No.5 relating to evidence of PW-1 that the victim was present in the house with her father i.e. the appellant, he had admitted his presence in the house and stated that at that point of time his shop used to remain closed and, as such, he remained in his house. In reply to question No.13, regarding his arrest from his house and recovery of murder weapon (Gandasi) at his pointing out, he had admitted of having been arrested from his house but for recovery of "Gandasi", he choose to deny by answering that he was not aware of the said fact. In reply to question No.21, he did not offer any explanation to the circumstances capable of inculpating him and only answer given by him that he was falsely implicated by the villagers because of enmity and they had deposed against him as he refused to sell his land at their instance. 29. The medical evidence relating to the injuries on the person of the deceased at the time of her admission in the hospital i.e. the injury report and after her death, the post-mortem report are proved by the doctors who had prepared the said reports. 29. The medical evidence relating to the injuries on the person of the deceased at the time of her admission in the hospital i.e. the injury report and after her death, the post-mortem report are proved by the doctors who had prepared the said reports. There are some variance in the description of injuries in the injury report and the post-mortem report which are bound to occur and are acceptable in view of the fact that the details of injuries has been explained in the post-mortem report which is proved and admitted. The nature of injuries as mentioned in the post-mortem report also tally from the portion of the statement of PW-1 as noted in the preceding part of this judgment. There were multiple incised wounds on the occipital region of the scalp along with some lacerated wounds on the elbow and palm. The injuries were fatal. The cause of death has been given due to shock as a result of ante-mortem injuries. The victim was unconscious when she was admitted in the Sadar hospital immediately i.e. in the evening and was referred to B.R.D. Medical College, Gorakhpur in view of the seriousness of her injuries. She had succumbed to those injuries and had died in the medical college in the night at about 12:00 pm. The injuries can be related to having been caused by a sharp object which can be "Gandasi" i.e. murder weapon recovered from the house i.e. the place of incident. The doctor who had prepared the injury report had deposed that the injuries were possible from the "Gandasi". 30. In a situation like this, where the appellant had admitted his presence in the house, the burden to explain the facts as to how the victim got injured, who took her to the hospital and who had committed the crime and why he did not reach the site of crime being present in the house is laid upon him as these facts would have been "especially" within his knowledge. 31. The most disturbing circumstance is that the appellant did not explain as to why he himself did not go to the hospital and choose to remain in the house when his daughter had died in the hospital at about 12:00 pm. 32. 31. The most disturbing circumstance is that the appellant did not explain as to why he himself did not go to the hospital and choose to remain in the house when his daughter had died in the hospital at about 12:00 pm. 32. The appellant got the opportunity to explain all the circumstances when the incriminating circumstances were put to him during his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. When the evidence of his implication in the crime was put to him, it was his turn to speak and explain. Section 106 of the Evidence Act comes into play, at this stage. This Section provides, interalia, that when a fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. As general rule, in a criminal case, the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. However, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or at rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The scope of Section 106 of the Evidence Act has been explained in Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 . 33. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 , it has been held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete (see paragraph-21). 34. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife inside his house. 34. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant was a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. See also Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1972) 3 SCC 80, State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, (1992) 3 SCC 300 . 34. In Munna Kumar Upadhyay v. State of Andhra Pradesh through Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 174 , the purpose of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has been considered. It has been observed therein that the said provision serves a dual purpose, firstly, to afford to the accused an opportunity to explain his conduct and secondly to use denial of established facts as incriminating evidence against him. In Manu Sao v. State of Bihar, (2010) 12 SCC 310 , it has been held that primary purpose of Section 313 Cr.P.C. is to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the accused and put to the accused every important incriminating piece of evidence and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such a statement is recorded, it can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in the case. The Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 35. Considering the circumstances and evidence, which is available on record as noted above, it was expected of the appellant to render proper explanation for the injuries of his daughter and his conduct. 35. Considering the circumstances and evidence, which is available on record as noted above, it was expected of the appellant to render proper explanation for the injuries of his daughter and his conduct. However, he had opted to deny the same and gave evasive replies to the questions posed to him. The statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. of the accused specifically the answers to the questions noted in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, coupled with the fact that the burden to explain the existing facts 'especially' in his knowledge under Section 106 of the Evidence Act was upon him as he was present in the house at the time of incident, is an additional link in the chain of circumstances which unerringly point to the guilt of the accused and are inconsistent with his innocence. 36. Looking from all angles, on a careful consideration of the facts of the case, the incriminating circumstances which form an unbroken chain pointing to the guilt of the accused are:- (i) The victim was injured in her house where the appellant was present at the time of the commission of crime; (ii) The injuries were fatal which lead to her death within a period of five hours after the victim was referred to the medical college by the doctor of the hospital wherein she was admitted; (iii) The injured was taken to the hospital by the family members with the help of villagers and was admitted first and then a written report was lodged narrating the crime committed by the appellant; (iv) The appellant did not accompany his daughter to the hospital though she was seriously injured. No explanation was offered as to how and who caused the injuries; (v) The victim cried when she was attacked and became unconscious, thereafter. The appellant did not explain his conduct. It cannot be comprehended that a father would not react upon hearing cries of his daughter. (vi) Lastly, all the incriminating circumstances were put to him but he did not offer any explanation rather chose to deny and gave evasive replies. 37. Taking into consideration of the above facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Trial Court has committed no error in adopting the approach in considering the burden laid upon the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 37. Taking into consideration of the above facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Trial Court has committed no error in adopting the approach in considering the burden laid upon the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. This aspect of the matter cannot be overlooked by this Court on the plea of the learned Amicus Curiae that the present case was a case of direct evidence and the Trial Court had erred in treating it as a case of circumstantial evidence. The submission of learned Amicus Curiae that the statement of victim girl was not recorded lacks merit considering the statement of the Investigating Officer and the facts proved from the medical report that the victim was unconscious when she was brought to the hospital. The said fact is also narrated in the written report lodged by the informant. The laxity in the investigation, as pointed out by the learned Amicus Curiae that the chemical examination report of the lab was not produced to connect the murder weapon with the crime is not such a circumstance which would break the chain of circumstances which is complete from the facts noted above. 38. We are of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to explain his conduct in the manner in which every person of normal prudence would be excepted to explain but gave evasive answers. Of the said fact, as such, we not only draw an adverse inference rather reach at an inescapable conclusion that such conduct of the accused would also tilt the case in favour of the prosecution. 39. On a consideration as given above, we see no infirmity in the judgment under appeal. There is no merit in the submissions raised on behalf of the appellant. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed.