ORDER : D.N. PATEL, J. I.A. No. 9465 of 2017 1. The present Interlocutory Application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condoning the delay of 144 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the reasons stated in this Interlocutory Application especially in paragraph nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, there are reasonable reasons for condoning the delay in preferring this Appeal. We therefore, condone the delay in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. This Interlocutory Application is allowed and disposed of. L.P.A. No. 597 of 2017 1. By consent of the learned counsels for both the sides, this Letters Patent Appeal is taken up for hearing. 2. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original respondents-State authorities in W.P.(S) No. 575 of 2009 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 25th July, 2017 and hence, the original respondents-State have preferred this Letters Patent Appeal mainly for the reason that the learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the initiation of departmental proceedings against respondent no. 1 for misappropriation of total approximately Rs. 50 lakhs. 3. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there are several charges levelled against respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) including misappropriation of total approximately Rs.50 lakhs for which departmental proceeding were initiated. Confused mined Investigating Officer has given confused reasonings. 4. We have perused the report given by the Investigating Officer which is at Annexure-E to the counter affidavit filed by the original respondents in the writ petition. On one hand the Investigating Officer has stated that the misappropriation cannot be the misconduct of one man and on other hand he has stated that he is giving benefit of doubt. 5. It further appears from the facts of the case that whenever the disciplinary authority is not agreeing with the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, he has to give detailed reasoning for not agreeing with the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. This show cause notice was not given. In such eventualities, the matter should have been remanded to the disciplinary authority instead of quashing the departmental proceedings. This show cause notice was not given. In such eventualities, the matter should have been remanded to the disciplinary authority instead of quashing the departmental proceedings. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(S) No.575 of 2009 dated 25th July, 2017 and hence, same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. Looking to the nature of allegations levelled against respondent no.1 (original petitioner) sizeable amount has been misappropriated which is total approximately Rs.50 lakhs in two different charges. These charges are to be enquired into. Enquiry Officer has given a confused report which is prima facie evident. There is no clarity with the Enquiry Officer or there is brotherhood vested in the Enquiry Officer and none of the eventuality the disciplinary authority shall agree with the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, but, as stated hereinabove, the detailed notice was required to be given to respondent no.1-delinquent assigning reasons for not agreeing with the conclusions of the departmental Enquiry Officer. 7. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and others v. Kunj Behari Misra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 especially in paragraph nos. 17, 18 and 19 as under: “17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. 18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer’s report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” (Emphasis supplied). 8. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lav Nigam v. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd. and Another, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 440 especially in paragraph nos. 10 and 13 as under: “10. The conclusion of the High Court was contrary to the consistent view taken by this Court that in case the disciplinary authority differs with the view taken by the inquiry officer, he is bound to give a notice setting out his tentative conclusions to the appellant. It is only after hearing the appellant that the disciplinary authority would at all arrive at a final finding of guilt. Thereafter, the employee would again have to be served with a notice relating to the punishment proposed. 13. We have already quoted the extracts from the show-cause notice issued by the disciplinary authority. It is clear that no notice at all was given before the disciplinary authority recorded its final conclusions differing with the finding of fact of the inquiry officer. The notice to show cause was merely a show-cause against the proposed punishment. In view of the long line of authorities, the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside.” (Emphasis supplied). The notice to show cause was merely a show-cause against the proposed punishment. In view of the long line of authorities, the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside.” (Emphasis supplied). 9. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and others v. K.K. Verma, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 494 especially in paragraph nos. 23, 24, 25 and 30 as under: “23. Regulation 7 thus, speaks of four kinds of orders to be passed by the disciplinary authority after receiving the report of the inquiry: (1) Order once again remitting the case to the enquiry officer, (2) order recording disagreement with the enquiry officer, (3) order imposing a penalty, and (4) an order exonerating the employee. Regulation 7(2) makes it clear that where the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the enquiry officer on any article of charge, it must record its reasons for such disagreement. Regulation 9 provides that the orders made by the disciplinary authority under Article 7 have to be communicated to the officer/employee concerned. He is also to be supplied with a copy of the report of the inquiry, if any. The counsel for the respondent submitted with much force that both these Regulations when read together provide that when the disciplinary authority was differing with the enquiry officer, the report of the enquiry officer must be furnished to the employee before the decision on penalty was arrived at. 24. Regulation 7(2) requires the disciplinary authority to record its reasons for disagreement wherever it disagrees with the findings of the enquiry officer. Regulation 9 provides for communicating to the employee concerned, the orders passed under Regulation 7, apart from providing him with a copy of the enquiry report. These Regulations will have to be read as laid down only with a view to provide an opportunity to the employee to represent against the findings to the extent they are adverse to him. Then only will they become meaningful. 25. The Service Regulations of the appellant are concerning the discipline and conduct in a nationalised bank which is an instrumentality of the State. Then only will they become meaningful. 25. The Service Regulations of the appellant are concerning the discipline and conduct in a nationalised bank which is an instrumentality of the State. The instrumentalities of the State have always been expected to act in fairness, and following the principles of natural justice has always been considered as a minimum expectation in that behalf. The above Regulations will, therefore, have to be read as containing the requirement to furnish a copy of the enquiry report and the order of the disciplinary authority recording its disagreement therewith to the employee prior to any decision on the penalty being arrived at. That will secure to the delinquent employee an opportunity to make his submissions on the adverse findings and to prove his innocence. 30. This being the position, in the instant case it is clear that the appellant had not followed their own Regulations which clearly require the disciplinary authority to record the reasons where it differed from the enquiry officer. The Regulations also clearly lay down that a copy of the enquiry report and the order of disagreement are to be provided to the employee. In the present case, we are concerned with the stage where the disciplinary authority differs with the enquiry officer on his findings. This is prior to arriving at the guilt of the employee. His right to receive the report and defend at that stage before the guilt is established is very much recognised as seen above. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the Constitution Bench has held in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel that after the 42nd Amendment, the employees are not entitled in law to be heard in the matter of penalty.” (Emphasis supplied). 10. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CSHA University and Another v. B.D. Goyal, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 776 especially in paragraph no. 7 as under: “7. It is no doubt true that the punishing authority or any higher authority could have disagreed with the finding of the enquiring officer, but in such a case the authority concerned is duty-bound to record reasons in writing and not on ipse dixit can alter the finding of an enquiring officer. 7 as under: “7. It is no doubt true that the punishing authority or any higher authority could have disagreed with the finding of the enquiring officer, but in such a case the authority concerned is duty-bound to record reasons in writing and not on ipse dixit can alter the finding of an enquiring officer. The order of the Vice- Chancellor, which was produced before us does not satisfy the requirements of law in the matter of differing with the findings of an enquiring officer. In that view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity with the impugned judgment so as to be interfered with by this Court. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.” (Emphasis supplied). 11. In view of the aforesaid decisions, we hereby, quash and set aside the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 575 of 2009 dated 25th July, 2017 and the matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority. The point from which there is an illegality committed by the disciplinary authority, the said proceeding can be started by the disciplinary authority, by giving detail show cause notice assigning the reasons why disciplinary authority is not agreeing with the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. Thus, adequate opportunity of being heard will be given to respondent no.1-delinquent and thereafter further proceedings will be conducted by the disciplinary authority of this appellant in accordance with law. This exercise will be completed within a reasonable period and in no case later than six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 12. This Letters Patent Appeal is partly allowed and disposed of. In view of the final disposal of the instant Letters Patent Appeal, I.A. No. 9464 of 2017 also stands disposed of.