JUDGMENT Sureshwar Thakur, J. - The landlord (respondent herein), instituted, A rent petition bearing Case No. 25-2 of 2009, cast under the provisions ,of, Section 14(3)(i) (iv) (d) (i)(ii), of, the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), before the Rent Controller, Rampur Bushehar, District Shimla, H.P., seeking eviction, of the tenant, from, the demised premises, on the ground (a) of his requiring the demised premises for his own use; (b) his bonafidely requiring the suit premises, for, commercial purpose; (c) the respondent/tenant falling, in, arrears of rent, in, respect of the demised premises, (d) whereon, the learned Rent Controller rendered affirmative findings, visa-vis the landlord, and, adversarial to the tenant, and concomitantly directed the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises. Uncontrovertedly, the tenant/ petitioner herein, has, within the prescribed statutory period, hence liquidated the entire apt arrears of rent, hence, the affirmative findings rendered, upon, the ground of his falling into arrears, of, rent, in, respect of the demised premises, is, hence extantly rather worthless. The tenant being aggrieved therefrom, preferred a statutory appeal, before, the learned Appellate Authority, and, the latter thereon, rendered a pronouncement hence bearing concurrence, with, the verdict recorded by the learned Rent Controller, upon, the apposite rent petition. The tenant is aggrieved therefrom, hence, has motioned this Court, through, the instant civil revision petition. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case, are, that the respondent herein, is, the landlord of House No.10/05, situated in Ward No.5, Rampur Bushahr, built on land denote by Khatoni No.159, Khasra No. 328 and 329, Mauza Kasba Bazar-II, Rampur Bushahr, to the exclusion of all other co-sharers. The said house, a shop measuring 30x10 feet was rented out to the tenant Jhompi Ram, for non residential purpose. In the said shop, the tenant started running the shop of Manyari, sports goods etc. Besides the tenant, there has been another tenant in the building/house, aforesaid, of the landlord. It is pleaded that the monthly rent of the shop, let out to the tenant Jhompi Ram, is Rs. 880/- per month including house tax. It has further been mentioned that as per the Municipal Committee records, the rateable value has been entered to be Rs. 800/-. Similar, building/shop having similar amenities is being rented out at Rs. 15,000/- per month in the locality. 880/- per month including house tax. It has further been mentioned that as per the Municipal Committee records, the rateable value has been entered to be Rs. 800/-. Similar, building/shop having similar amenities is being rented out at Rs. 15,000/- per month in the locality. A shop smaller to the demised premises, was rented out for Rs. 10,000/- per month. The eviction of the tenant was sought from the demised shop on the ground that the petitioner requires it for his own use because his two sons are unemployed, who require the sop, in question, for running business or office therein. In fact, the family of the landlord has quadrupled with two sons, their wives and children. For the sons being unemployed they require some commercial place in order to run their own business of any type or to start office. It was further maintained that his sons are not occupying any other building, for use as office, residence or consulting room in the urban area. Apart from this, they did not vacate any such building in the urban area of Rampur Bushahr before or after the commencement of the Act. It was further maintained that even the landlord is not occupying any other residential or commercial building in Rampur urban area. As far as tenant Jhompi Ram is concerned, he has acquired a three storeyed house bearing No.135 about five years ago which he rented out to different person, in order to run shops, on commercial rates. On the contrarily, the petitioner has no shop with him despite being the owner of the tenanted shop. ON the other hand, the respondent has the luxury to rent out his shops. If he so desires, the tenant can start business in his own commercial premises which is situated on National Highway-22 and is also a commercial industrial hub of the town for the last 15 years. 3. The petitioner herein/tenant, in his reply, filed to the eviction petition, has taken preliminary objections qua maintainability. On merits, It has been asserted that out of the demised premises/shop, the landlord has occupied area measuring 10 feet x 5 feet for his own use, as entrance to his residential house. The accommodation which has been in occupation of the landlord is very spacious and more than sufficient to accommodate his entire family. On merits, It has been asserted that out of the demised premises/shop, the landlord has occupied area measuring 10 feet x 5 feet for his own use, as entrance to his residential house. The accommodation which has been in occupation of the landlord is very spacious and more than sufficient to accommodate his entire family. In fact, he has been in possession of complete two floors of the building/house, to live in, including a spacious hall, being used as his office and for other multifarious purposes. At Bherakhad, on National highway 22, the sons of the landlord are running business of hardware in two storeyed building which is owned by the landlord. The tenant is not owner of any building, as alleged. As a matter of fact, the alleged building is in the rural area of village Chuhabagh which falls within the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat, Racholi and the same is owned by his sons and daughters. As far as that building is concerned, he has nothing to do with that. In order to earn his livelihood, he runs the business of Manyari, sports goods and stationery, in the main market at Rampur. There is no scope of such business in rural area like Chuhabagh. Thus, it was denied that he has acquired any building within the urban area of Rampur Town. Further denied that village Chuhabagh, on National highway, is a commercial and industrial hub of the town. Other allegations are also denied. 4. The landlord/respondent herein filed rejoinder to the reply of the tenant/petitioner herein, wherein, he denied the contents of the reply, and, re-affirmed and reasserted the averments, made in the petition. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck following issues inter-se the parties in contest:- 1. Whether the suit premises are required by the petitioner his own use?OPP. 2. Whether the petitioner bonafidely required the suit premises for commercial purpose?OPP. 3. Whether the respondent is defaulter in paying the rent regularly?OPP 4. Whether the petitioner is not occupying any residential accommodation in Rampur urban area?OPP. 5. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPR 6. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present petition? OPR 7. Relief. 6. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned Rent Controller, the learned Rent Controller, hence, allowed, the petition of the landlord/respondent herein. 5. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPR 6. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present petition? OPR 7. Relief. 6. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned Rent Controller, the learned Rent Controller, hence, allowed, the petition of the landlord/respondent herein. In an appeal, preferred therefrom, by, the tenant/petitioner herein, before, the learned Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order(s) recorded by the learned Rent Controller. 7. Now the tenant/petitioner herein has instituted the instant Civil Revision Petition, before this Court, for hence assailing the findings recorded, in its impugned order, by the learned Appellate Authority. 8. At the outset, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant has contended (i) that both the learned Courts below, rather, visibly falling into gross error, in, rendering disaffirmative findings, upon, the issue, appertaining, to the rent petition being not maintainable. However, before proceeding to fathom, the, tenacity of the afore espousal, the connected therewith factual, and, legal matrix requires meteings, of, allusion thereto. The apt factual scenario, is, comprised, (ii) in, the factum of the landlord, rearing, a ground in the apt eviction petition, serialized as sub para (3), of, Para 18 (a), of, the rent petition, sub para whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- "3. Two sons of the petitioner are unemployed and the petitioner require the shop for their use, for their own living, business or office. My sons are not occupying any other building for use as office, residence or consulting room in urban area. Nor have they vacated such a building in the urban area Rampur Bsr. Before or after commencement of the Act." 9. A perusal of the afore ground, unfolds, qua the landlord setting forth, therein, a ground bearing consonance, with, the mandate of Section 14(3) (d), of, the Act, the relevant provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- "(d). Nor have they vacated such a building in the urban area Rampur Bsr. Before or after commencement of the Act." 9. A perusal of the afore ground, unfolds, qua the landlord setting forth, therein, a ground bearing consonance, with, the mandate of Section 14(3) (d), of, the Act, the relevant provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- "(d). In case of any [residential and non residential building], if he requires it for use as an office, or consulting room by [his son or daughter] who intends to start practice as a lawyer, an architect, a dentist, an engineer, a veterinary surgeon or a medical practitioner, including a practitioner of Ayurvedic Unani or Homeopathic System of Medicine or for the residence of [his son or daughter] who is married, if (I) his [son or daughter] as aforesaid is not occupying in the urban area concerned any other building for use as office consulting room or residence, as the case may be; and (ii) his [son or daughter] as aforesaid has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause, after the commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned:" However, at the stage contemporaneous, to, the landlord rather projecting, the, aforesaid apt statutory ground, of eviction, rather conspicuously thereat, (i) the apt statutory ground stood not borne, on, the statute book, rather it uncontestedly acquired force, upon, the amending Act of 2009, vis-a-vis, the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, receiving on 28th February, 2012, the Presidential assent. Consequently, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant/petitioner herein, has, with great vehemence urged before this Court (ii) that when evidently at the apt stage, the afore statutory ground, was not existing on the statute book, nor when any express retrospectivity is foisted upon it, (iii) thereupon at the out set, the rearing of the afore ground, was, grossly impermissible, (iv) besides, hence, the apt cause of action, appertaining therewith, was neither enforceable nor any concurrent pronouncement(s), in affirmation thereto, can acquire any hue of validity, (v) rather he contends that the affirmative findings concurrently pronounced thereon, being stained with, a, vice of jurisdictional disempowerment. 10. 10. In making the aforesaid espousal, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant, has placed reliance, upon, a verdict rendered by the Hon''ble Apex Court in a case titled as Nand Kishore Marwah and others vs. Samundri Devi , (1987) 4 SCC 382 , the relevant paragraphs No. 11 and 12 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- "11. It is pertinent to note that this Section applies to those suits which were pending on the date of the commencement of this Act. Admittedly this Act came into force on 15th July, 1972 and therefore if the suit was pending on that date it is only then that the provisions of Section 39 will come to the assistance of the tenant- appellant. Admittedly this suit was not pending on the date on which this Act came into force. An attempt was made to contend that so far as the present property is concerned the Act will be deemed to have come into force on the expiry of 10 years i.e. 1.10.86 but this contention could not be accepted as it is very clear from the language of this Act that it applied I only to a suit pending on the date of the commencement of this Act and this is the view taken in the Om Prakash Gupta , (1982) 2 SCC 61 wherein it was observed: "Further, in order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of July, 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on 23rd of March, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act. There is yet another reason why section 39 will have no application to the present case. 12. It is therefore clear that so far as the present appeal is concerned, the provisions of Section 39 will be of no avail. Section 40 of the Act reads as under: "40. There is yet another reason why section 39 will have no application to the present case. 12. It is therefore clear that so far as the present appeal is concerned, the provisions of Section 39 will be of no avail. Section 40 of the Act reads as under: "40. Pending appeals or revisions in suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time-Where an appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply is pending on the date of commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 39, which shall mutatis mutandis apply." This Section talks of the pendency of a revision or an appeal arising out of a suit pending on the day on which this Act came into force. It is clear that provisions of Section 40 will come to the rescue of the appellant-tenant only if the suit from which revision or appeal arose was pending on the date of commencement of this Act i.e. 15.7.1972 and therefore it could not be contended that the present revision petition or the appeal either to the High Court or the appellate authority arose out of suit which was pending on the date on which this Act came into force. Admittedly the suit itself was filed much after the coming into force of this Act. In this view of the matter therefore, in our opinion, even this contention of learned counsel for the appellant could not be accepted." However, the factual scenario prevailing therein, and, also an incisive reading, of, the apt statutory provisions aforesaid, borne therein, and, as stand adjudicated therein, are, for reasons assigned hereinafter, in, stark disjunction, vis-a-vis, the extantly prevailing factual matrix/scenario. Consequently, also, the reliance, as placed by the learned counsel appearing, for the tenant/petitioner herein, upon, the aforesaid case, is misfounded besides, is, inapt. Consequently, also, the reliance, as placed by the learned counsel appearing, for the tenant/petitioner herein, upon, the aforesaid case, is misfounded besides, is, inapt. The reason for forming, the, aforesaid conclusion, stands aroused, by the factum qua therein, (i) the Hon''ble Apex Court dealing with apt exemption(s) or exclusion(s), of, apt statutory provisions, vis-a-vis, (a) Civil suits, for eviction, upon, theirs being imminently and evidently pending, before Civil Courts concerned, on coming into force, of, the apt provisions, and, appertaining to eviction, of, the tenant(s), from, the demised premises concerned, (b) rather begetting attraction, of, exclusion(s) of hence application(s), thereon, vis-a-vis, the apt special statutory mechanism, (c) besides the tenants,being entitled, to, save their apt evictions, reared on ground(s) of his/theirs, rather defaulting, in liquidating, the contractual rent, vis-a-vis, his/ their landlords, (d) upon, evident liquidation(s), of, the contractual rent and damages, along with interest, before the court concerned, rather evidently occurring, from, the date of acquisition of knowledge qua the pendency of the suit. Further more Section 40 of the Act , provisions whereof, stand, alluded, to, in the Nand Kishore''s case also bring to the fore, the, factum, of, the provisions borne, in Section 39, being applicable, to, the pending appeals, or revisions as arise, from the verdict rendered, upon, the apt suit for eviction, and, as relate to buildings, as brought under regulation, for the first time. A perusal of the afore referred provisions, borne in Nand Kishore''s case , make apt underlinings (ii) qua clear delineated, and, marked statutory prescriptions, standing embodied therein, vis-avis, the necessity, of, pendency of suits inter se the landlord, and, the tenant, and, anvilled upon, grounds analogus to the ones, as borne, in the apt legislative enactment, (iii) and, the apt statutory exclusion(s), of, the mandate of the relevant statutory provisions, and, also apt benefits against, eviction(s) as, statutorily embodied therein, rather being accruable or bestowable, upon, the tenant, upon, his evidently satiating, the, imperative condition(s) precedent, as, elucidated therein. The sequel thereof, is, qua unless, the aforesaid condition precedents, were, evidently satiated, and, reiteratedly when the apt civil suits, were, pending in contemporaneity, vis-a-vis, the coming into force, of, the statutory provisions, as, alluded therein, thereupon, alone the apt benefits, being visitable, upon, the tenant, AND, not thereafter. Further also the apt benefits, being visitable, vis-a-vis, appeal(s) or revision(s), arising from, verdicts pronounced, upon, the apt civil suits. Further also the apt benefits, being visitable, vis-a-vis, appeal(s) or revision(s), arising from, verdicts pronounced, upon, the apt civil suits. The trite nuance thereof, is , hence (i) with coming into force, of, apt statutory provisions, thereupon, the institution, of, civil suits by the landlord, against, the tenant, anvilled, upon, purported statutory purpose(s), and, theirs bearing alalogity, vis-a-vis, the grounds borne, in the apt statutory provisions, rather being barred, (ii) and, in case any civil suit, thereafter, rather coming to be instituted, by the landlord against the tenant, thereupon, the apt civil suit, when hence not carrying any legally enforceable cause of action, rather hence its facing dismissal or the court concerned, whereat, the plaint stood instituted, hence upon, an apt motion made therebefore, by tenant/defendant rather proceeding to reject the plaint. Contrarily, hereat, there is no analogus therewith factual scenario nor obviously, the landlord, had, instituted a civil suit before the Civil Court concerned, for hence seeking, the, eviction of the tenant, from, the demised premises, (iii) rather has cast, an, apt eviction petition, before the learned Rent Controller concerned, and, the purported legal fallacy, as, espoused to be committed, is, comprised in his rearing, the, afore ground, though, ground whereof, hence, in contemporaneity thereof, rather was not borne in the statute book, (iv) and, whereas obviously, the afore made discernings, as made, from a keen, and, incisive perusal, of, the afore reproduced paras, of, the Nand Kishore''s case , may not, hence to the fullest support, the, espousal of the learned counsel appearing, for the tenant, (v) imminently when the afore extracted paras, omit, to make any pronouncement, bearing trite consonance therewith, (vi) and when the apt afore espousal, was, neither dealt with nor stood answered, in, the Nand Kishore''s case , thereupon, the reliance placed, upon, the aforesaid judgment, is, inapt. Markedly, also the apt therein statutory provisions, visibly make trite prescriptions, both with exactitude and precision, vis-a-vis, the, parametrs, for hence applying the apt exclusionary provisions, and, also for applying the apt barring provisions, (vii), whereas, contrarily hereat, no, rigid statutory prescriptions, for treating hence oustable or not oustable, the, apt grounds, stand constituted in the apt amending provisions, (viii) rather when, for hereinafter, assigned reasoning, the afore espousal, is, rendered hence nugatory. 11. 11. However, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant/petitioner herein, has, thereafter proceeded to place reliance, upon, a judgment of this Court rendered, in, case titled, as, Gauri Shankar versus Tilak Raj Sharma , (1988) 2 ShimLC 303 , and, rests his submission, upon, paragraph No.19 thereof, paragraph whereof, stand extracted hereinafter:- "19. The principles which have been recognised in the decision cited by Shri Gupta are unexceptionable. The question, however, is whether they are attracted in a case like the present where the Legislature mandates in imperative terms that the proceedings shall not be instituted for a period of five years from the date of acquisition of the property by transfer by the landlord. The prohibition is absolute and impinges upon the competence of the Rent Controller to entertain the proceedings. It touches his jurisdiction. It cannot be equated with a case where the cause of action may be said to have arisen later during the pendency of the proceedings. Nor can the expiry of a period of 5 years from the date of acquisition of the property by transfer be said to be an even taking place subsequent to the date of the institution o the proceedings which can be taken into account while recording a decision on the merits of the claim of the landlord. The applicability of the two principles canvassed by the learned Counsel for the landlord is ruled out by the language which the Legislature was used in sub-section (6) of Section 14 of the Act. This sub-section robs the Rent Controller of Jurisdiction entertain any application for a period of five years from the date of acquisition by the landlord of the property by transfer for being put in possession of that property on the ground of his personal need. This sub-section robs the Rent Controller of Jurisdiction entertain any application for a period of five years from the date of acquisition by the landlord of the property by transfer for being put in possession of that property on the ground of his personal need. Any application made before the expiry of the period prescribed by sub-section (6) of Section 14 is bound to be dismissed on this ground alone as has clearly been observed by the Supreme Curt in Anadilal Bhanwarlal and another v. Smt. Kasturi Devi Generiwala and another , (1985) AIR SC 376." He further submits qua, with, the apt amendment, to section 14(6) of the Act No. 25 of 1987, making a contemplation (i) qua the imperative enabling necessity, of, five years elapsing, from, the date of acquisition of property, by the landlord, thereupon, rendered imperative, adduction of proof, qua, the apt elapsing, of, a period of five years, hence, occurring, since, the amending apt provisions, legally commencing, and, upto the casting, of, any petition, under, the apt amended provisions, AND, the occurrences, if any, of, the aforesaid statutory elapses, during, pendency, of, apt proceeding(s), (i) rather, also infracting the statutory prohibition, and, also the Rent Controller concerned, being jurisdictionally disabled, to pronounce, any affirmative verdict, upon, the apt rent petition, (ii) reiteratedly nor any efflux, of, a period of five years, during, the pendency, of, the apt proceedings, rather reiteratedly, not rendering, the, apt amending provisions to be enforceable, given lack, of, legislative validation/vindication thereto. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein/tenant contends, that, in purported concurrence therewith, the, rigidity and absoluteness, of, the legal principle qua, (iii) unless, express retrospectivity, is, granted, to, the apt statutory provisions, it operating only prospectively, (iv) and, hence, he, contends, that, with no express retrospectivity, being assigned, vis-a-vis, the apt statutory grounds, nor when the apt grounds initially acquired validity, rather theirs even remaining continued to be incorporated, as apt grounds, in the apt petition, also not implanting, any sustenance thereto, (a) given the petition at its inception, being inchoate, and, (b) it not rearing any legally enforceable cause of action, thereupon, any affirmative concurrent pronouncement, of, verdicts by both the learned Courts below, being jurisdictionally disabled verdicts, rendering them, hence, stained with vice, of, voidness. 12. 12. Nonetheless, even the aforesaid reliance placed by the learned counsel appearing, for the tenant/petitioner herein, upon, Gauri Shankar''s case , (i) only appertains, to, an apt amendment, rather prescribing with specificity, the imperative necessity, of, completion, of, a particular tenure, or period time, (ii) and, also its prescribing, the statutory condition(s), and, also enjoining, the, apt mandatory strict compliance therewith, also being efficaciously proven, (iii) AND upon evident, proof, of, all absolute, and, dire statutory necessities, thereupon, alone the, landlord being equipped to hence make a valid reliance thereon. Thereat also there, was, an apt fixity of tenure, or, an apt time or period, and, also the apt implied non defeasance(s) clause, rather stood, judicially pronounced, to, hence rather render the apt petition, to be not maintainable, and, any exercise of jurisdiction, by the Rent Controller, despite, evident statutory breaches, also stood, pronounced to be both nonest and void. However, in the factual matrix, prevailing hereat, the aforesaid pronouncement, is, unattracted, (iv) given the afore apt dissimilarity, as, underlined therein, squarely appertaining, to, a ground contradistinct, vis-a-vis, the ground reared, in the instant petition, (v) and, with also, the, apt strictest disabling statutory legal interdiction(s), standing borne therein, and, also, with theirs rather with stark pointedness, hence, only appertaining to the apt factual scenario, as stands, elucidated therein, (vi) besides, with the apt implied non defeasance clause, as arising, from evident breaches thereof, being judicially pronounced therein, to render the apt petition, to be not maintainable, before the Rent Controller concerned, (vii) thereupon, the apt implied non defeasance clause, as, judicially pronounced therein, obviously cannot be extended, to the factual scenario hereat, (viii) given hereat the apt statutory ground, not, initially creating any strict legal embargo, against, the rearing, of, pleadings in the apt petition, at the stage, when they were not available on the statute book, nor thereupon, per se, when, the apt amendment occurred, during, the pdnency of the rent petition, rather not rendering , the apt ground, the striking of issues, and, the adduction of evidence, for, all being, per se, construable, to be, rendered nugatory. 13. Furthermore, the effects thereof, are, (a) that with the tenant hence, at the out set, being empowered, to, recourse the appropriate provisions, borne, in the Code of Civil Procedure, for, his hence seeking rejection, of, the petition. 13. Furthermore, the effects thereof, are, (a) that with the tenant hence, at the out set, being empowered, to, recourse the appropriate provisions, borne, in the Code of Civil Procedure, for, his hence seeking rejection, of, the petition. (b) However, he omitted to do so, and, when the afore inferred, lack of any ill consequence, being spelt, in the apt amended provisions, vis-a-vis, the disablings, of, the landlord, to, initially rear them, whereupon, the apt willful abandonments or waivers, of, the aforesaid espousal(s), (b) now estops, the tenant to contend that even, when, the amendment came into force, and, the apt therewith ground subsisted, thereupon, the petition being initially jurisdictionally construable, to be, misconstituted, (c) nor he can contend, after his permitting the apt adduction(s), of, evidence, upon, the relevant ground, qua it being unreadable, especially when he without demur, permitted its adduction. Conspicuously also when, accepting the espousal of the counsel for the tenant, it would beget hardship and unjustness to the landlord. Rather, with the appellant without demur, ensuring the subsisting, of, apt ground, in the apt petition, is to stand concluded, qua hence the learned Rent Controller, rather also tacitly according apt leave, for, its retention, in the, Rent Petition. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the tenant/petitioner herein, has also placed reliance, upon, a judgment of this Court rendered in a case titled as Jasvinder Singh vs. Sh. Kedar Nath, along with other connected matters,2012 LatestHLJ 1452 (HP), the relevant paragraph No. 9 whereof, stand extracted hereinafter:- "9. The rule with respect to the retrospectivity is by now ell settled. In a catena of decision, the Supreme Court holds that it is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is specially or by necessary implementation made retrospective." (I) wherein deference is meted to the trite, echoing qua unless, an apt explicit retrospectivity, is, assigned by the Legislature, vis-a-vis, any provision, (ii) thereupon, it being construable, to be holding only prospective force, (iii) and, hence, when, in tandem therewith, the, apt amending provisions, are not, explicitly foisted retrospectivity, (iv) thereupon at the stage contemporaneous, to, the institution of the apt rent petition, the apt statutory grounds, as, reared therein, were unrearable, given theirs being not borne, in, the statute book, hence, rendering disabled the courts below, to pronounce, any affirmative verdict thereon. However, the entire force of the aforesaid submission made before, this Court by the learned counsel, appearing for the tenant/petitioner herein, is weakened by the factum, of, the verdict aforesaid also carrying paragraph No.22 therein, paragraph whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- "22. It would come into operation from the date of its publication in the Rajpatra, which is 16th March, 2012, and, would apply from that date. The landlord is not deprived of his right for seeking an order of eviction, but in execution of such an order under Section 14, ordering eviction of the tenant, he will be entitled to premises equivalent in area to the original premises on the conditions as provided in the proviso to clause (c) of sub-section 3 of Section 14. This would not be pre condition for passing an order of eviction, but a ground which can be taken up at the time of execution. I am fortified in taking this view from Section 14 which provides that no tenant can be evicted from the premises in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with provisions of this Act. The protection of tenancy by inheritance, as provided in Section 2(j), would be available to all those tenants within the ambit of amended provisions where cases are pending and same would be the position for determination of the standard rent as provided for under Sections 4 and 5. In other provisions, namely, Section 7, the substitution is only of the word "standard rent" in place of ''fair rent''. In this view of the matter, the point of law for interpretation urged is disposed of. Each individual petition shall be disposed of on what I hold on the interpretation of the provisions. The cases of tenants/landlords which have already been decided cannot invoke the provisions of the Act of 2012." (p.1477) (v) and with the underlined apt portions thereof, clearly making, apt underscorings qua the benefit, of, the apt amending provisions, being bestowable, even, vis-a-vis, the tenant concerned, who further rears proceedings, in appeals or revision, before the statutorily enshrined forums. The cases of tenants/landlords which have already been decided cannot invoke the provisions of the Act of 2012." (p.1477) (v) and with the underlined apt portions thereof, clearly making, apt underscorings qua the benefit, of, the apt amending provisions, being bestowable, even, vis-a-vis, the tenant concerned, who further rears proceedings, in appeals or revision, before the statutorily enshrined forums. Corollary thereto being, when, the benefits of apt beneficial provisions, stand, therein expostulated, to be, bestowed even, vis-a-vis, the afore tenants, who rear appeals or revisions, vis-a-vis, the apt verdict, hence, upon, making an analogical consonance therewith connectivity, (vi) rather hence engenders, an inference, qua when the apt grounds, whereon, the concurrent verdicts, were rendered by both the learned Courts below, though were initially unrearable, by the landlord, at the initial stage, yet, when they without demur, continued to be retained in the apt petition, and, their retention has continued, upto the stage,of, this Court being seized, with, the extant petition, it would be unjust to nowat construe it, to be unrearable, (c) and, also it would be grossly unjust, qua, the tenant, permissibly making, given, for, theirs, merely at the outset, being rather unrearable, an espousal, qua hence this Court proceeding to render a concomitant decision, qua its apt disabling effect, upon, the concurrently pronounced verdicts, by the learned Courts below. Predominantly, with the apt protection being visited, upon, appeal, and, revisions, it being antithetical to logical, to render, them unworthwhile. 15. Having rested the aforesaid conundrum, the apt evidence which has been adduced in respect, of, the apt ground, is comprised in the testification, of, the landlord, and, the corroborative therewith testifications, rendered by other Pws. Testifications, in, repudiation thereto, rendered by the tenant, are rested, upon, the factum of the landlord, rather extantly holding commodious accommodation, at a place contradistinct, vis-a-vis, the building, in part whereof, the demised premises is located, rather a huge commercial premises, and, thereupon the ground of his bonafidely requiring, the, demised premises, being ingrained, with, a vice of malafides. However, the afore made repudiatory testification, by the tenant, is, also enjoined to beget satiation, vis-a-vis, the landlord, not, within, the urban area concerned holding any premises, residential or commercial. However, the afore made repudiatory testification, by the tenant, is, also enjoined to beget satiation, vis-a-vis, the landlord, not, within, the urban area concerned holding any premises, residential or commercial. However, upon, the premises other than, the building, in part whereof, the, demised premises rather being evidently located outside, the, urban area concerned, hence, the apt premises, would be construed to be neither suitable for the relevant purpose, for meteing the necessity(ies), of, landlord nor it would be construed of hence his rearing, a ground ingrained with evident malafides. Moreso, when it stands propounded in a judgment rendered, by the Hon''ble Apex Court in a case titled as Uday Shankar Upadhyay vs. Naveen Maheshwari , (2010) 1 SCC 503 qua th landlord being the best adjudicatory person, vis-a-vis, his bonafides, and, it being not amenable, for the tenant to dictate him, vis-a-vis, the necessity, of, his requiring the demised premises, nor his being enabled to dictate qua the other purported alternative accommodations, being more suitable for the relevant purpose, thereupon also renders worthless, the, apt repudiation of the tenant. 16. Furthermore, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant has contended, that, the findings appertaining to issue of the tenant/petitioner, herein owning a premises, within, the urban area, being erroneous as the apt building of the petitioner herein/tenant, evidently not occurring within the urban area, rather it occurring outside it. However, the aforesaid espousal is rendered rudderless in the face of Ex.PW1/A, making, a, vivid disclosure qua the building owned by the petitioner/tenant, rather being located within the apt urban area. 17. The above discussion unfolds qua the conclusions arrived by both the learned Courts below are based upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the apposite findings, both the learned Courts below have not excluded germane and apposite material from consideration. 18. In view of above discussion, the present petition is dismissed and the verdicts impugned hereat are affirmed and maintained. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.