JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. The unsuccessful plaintiff who was the appellant in the learned lower appellate court has filed this appeal under section 100 of the code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Gumla in Title Appeal No.20 of 2002 dated 04.09.2009 by which the learned lower appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court by which the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 3. The brief facts of the case of the plaintiff is that the suit property was earlier owned and possessed by the T.D.L.A. company who was the recorded tenant of the suit property as per the revisional survey records of rights through its local agent and it was agreed to sale the suit property to the original plaintiff for a sum of Rs.20,000/-. The original plaintiff paid Rs.20,000/- gradually to late Ram Narayan Agrawal who was managing the affairs on behalf of T.D.L.A. company but the registered sale deed could not be executed because of the death of Ram Narayan Agarwal. As per the terms of the said agreement for sale, the original plaintiff was put in possession of the suit property since the year 1950. After coming in possession of the suit property, the plaintiff constructed a house by investing Rs.40,000/- and also planted some trees over the suit land and continued to live there with all his family members. The son of the plaintiff namely Binod Kumar Sharma died in the said house because of snake bite in the year 1996. The only source of income of the original plaintiff was of selling milk and the original plaintiff was a landless person. The son of Ram Narayan Agarwal namely Tej Narayan Agarwal executed a sale deed on 27.10.1987 in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit land. The suit land is not a public land rather it is a raiyati land of the plaintiff after vesting of Zamindari as per the provision of Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act. In the present survey, the possession of the plaintiff has been noted and the khata of the suit land has been made in the name of T.D.L.A. Company. The plaintiff perfected his title by way of adverse possession as he has been in possession over the suit land since 1950. In the present survey, the possession of the plaintiff has been noted and the khata of the suit land has been made in the name of T.D.L.A. Company. The plaintiff perfected his title by way of adverse possession as he has been in possession over the suit land since 1950. The defendants were fairly trying to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land and the defendant no.2 started an encroachment proceeding in the year 1985 which has been quashed by the Hon’ble High Court in C.W.J.C. No.967 of 1985 (R) and possession of the suit land was restored to the plaintiff. It was also averred that the order of the defendant no.2 in a proceeding under Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act directing the plaintiff to vacate the suit land within 15 days from the date of the order dated 05.05.1987, was illegal. Though the plaintiff filed an appeal against the said order before the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla but the same was dismissed and the Revenue Revision No.139 of 1987 filed by the plaintiff against the order of the Deputy Commissioner was also dismissed. C.W.J.C. No.1229 of 1987 (R) filed by the plaintiff against the order of the revenue revision has been dismissed by this Court but the plaintiff asserts that the said order passed by this Court is illegal and without jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed the suit with a prayer to declare the order dated 05.05.1987 passed by the Circle Officer, Gumla in the case filed under Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, the order dated 14.05.1987 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla in Encroachment Appeal No. 3 R 15 of 1987-88, the order dated 09.06.1987 passed by the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi in Gumla Revenue Revision No.139 of 1987 and the order dated 5/8.12.1987 passed by the Hon’ble High Court, Ranchi Bench confirming the order of the Circle Officer, Gumla as illegal, void and contrary to law and without jurisdiction and also prayed for restraining the defendants from permanently dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit property. In their written statement, the defendants besides their usual defence averred that the suit land was not owned by the T.D.L.A. Company during the revisional survey nor it was managed by its local agents. It was also averred by the defendant-State that after vesting the estate to the government, no return with respect to the suit land was filed by the ex-landlord. It was also averred by the defendant-State that after vesting the estate to the government, no return with respect to the suit land was filed by the ex-landlord. Since, the T.D.L.A. Association vanished, the land left was parti and it vested in the State and became a part of the State thus, the character of the suit land became public land and as the land was transferred to the defendant no.3-Food Corporation of India for constructing godown, the land leased to the T.D.L.A. association, which after vanishing of T.D.L.A. company, was vested in the State Government. The defendant-State denied the agreement of sale for consideration of Rs.20,000/- by the agent of T.D.L.A. company with the plaintiff. The defendant-State also denied all other averments made by the plaintiff in the plaint and pleaded that the registered deed dated 27.10.1987 was illegal, void and without any consideration and hence, not binding upon the defendant as the executant of the said sale deed namely Tej Narayan Agarwal was not having any title nor possession over the suit land at any point of time. In its separate written statement, the defendant no.3 took the same defence as the defendant-State. The defendant no.3 further pleaded that the plaintiff himself admitted the possession of the State and prayed for settlement on a portion of the land. 4. In view of the rival pleadings, learned trial court altogether framed six issues out of which the main was the issue no.3 which is as under :- (iii) Whether the order dated 05.05.1987 passed by the Circle Officer, Gumla and order dated 09.06.1987 of the Commissioner, Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi in Revenue Revision No.139 of 1987 and order dated 5/8.12.1987 passed by the Hon’ble High Court, Ranchi bench confirming the order of the Circle Officer, Gumla are illegal, void and without jurisdiction? 5. Learned trial court after considering the issue no.3 in record held that the trial court has no jurisdiction to decide and declare the said orders to be void, illegal and without jurisdiction and dismissed the suit. 6. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 25.11.2002, passed by the Sub-Judge-III, Gumla in Title Suit No.20 of 1988, the plaintiff-appellants preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Gumla which was numbered as Title Appeal No.20 of 2002 and by the impugned judgment and decree dated 04.09.2009, the same was ultimately heard and disposed of. 7. 6. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 25.11.2002, passed by the Sub-Judge-III, Gumla in Title Suit No.20 of 1988, the plaintiff-appellants preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Gumla which was numbered as Title Appeal No.20 of 2002 and by the impugned judgment and decree dated 04.09.2009, the same was ultimately heard and disposed of. 7. Learned lower appellate court after considering the materials and submissions made before him, framed the following two issues :- (i) Whether Tej Narayan Agarwal had any right to execute the Sale Deed and his father Ram Narayan Agarwal was authorized to sale the land and he put plaintiff in possession over the land in part performance of agreement and plaintiff constructed a house thereon? (ii) Whether the suit land after vesting of the estate became public land and State is entitled to transfer and manage the same? Learned lower appellate court after making a threadbare discussion of the materials, both oral and documentary, available in record found that Tej Narayan Agarwal was not authorized to execute the sale deed and he has not conferred any right to the plaintiff and his father Ram Narayan Agarwal has also not put the plaintiff in possession over the suit land and also considered that since the T.D.L.A. company vanished and the suit was vested in the State and the same has rightly being transferred to the defendant no.3 and the defendant-State was entitled to do so and further considered that since the suit land was a public land, the Circle Officer who was authorized by the notification of the State Government to discharge the function of the Collector under the Act has validly, legally passed the order dated 05.05.1987. Learned lower appellate court also considered that as the plaintiff has neither pleaded nor could prove that his possession over the suit land was continuous, exclusive and undisturbed to the knowledge of real owner of the land, thus the plaintiff failed to make out a case of adverse possession. 8. Mr. Indrajit Sinha the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned lower appellate court has failed to appreciate the evidence in record in its right perspective and passed the impugned judgment and decree against the weight of evidence in record without considering the material evidence in record. 8. Mr. Indrajit Sinha the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned lower appellate court has failed to appreciate the evidence in record in its right perspective and passed the impugned judgment and decree against the weight of evidence in record without considering the material evidence in record. It is further submitted that the learned court below erred in holding that Tej Narayan Agarwal did not have the authority to execute the sale deed dated 27.10.1987. 9. Mr. V.K. Prasad and Mr. Nipun Bakshi the Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand defended the impugned judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court and submitted that the learned lower appellate court has considered the evidence in its proper perspective and there is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. 10. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after perusal of the record and also after having a threadbare discussion, I find that the learned lower appellate court has considered the evidences both, oral and documentary in record in its proper perspective and has arrived at the finding of fact on the basis thereof that Tej Narayan Agarwal was not authorized to execute the sale deed and he has not conferred any right to the plaintiff and the plaintiff has neither pleaded nor could prove that his possession over the suit land was continuous, exclusive and undisturbed to the knowledge of real owner of the land. It is a settled principle of law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse, as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme of India, in paragraph-10 of the case of Gurvachan Kaur and Others vs. Salikram (dead) through LRS., reported in (2010) 15 SCC 530 as under:- "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." (Emphasis Supplied). Learned Counsel for the appellants could not point out any specific instance of any particular evidence being not considered. The learned Counsel for the appellants also could not point out any illegality or error in the impugned judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court giving rise to any substantial question of law to be framed and decided by this Court in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. 11. Accordingly, this appeal being without any merit is dismissed but in the circumstances without any costs.