JUDGMENT Inderjeet Singh, J. - This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 23-4-2009 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Kota whereby the appeal (no.12/2007) filed by the respondent (now deceased, hereinafter to be referred as landlady) was allowed and the judgment and decree dated 13-10-2006 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Kota in favour of the petitioner (hereinafter to be referred as tenant) was set aside. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the landlady Smt. Usha Sharma filed application under section 6 & 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act,2001 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act,2001) before the Rent Tribunal, Kota against the tenant on the ground of bona fide necessity & personal need of the property in dispute and also on the ground of alternative accommodation being available to the tenant. 3. The tenant filed reply to the eviction application and denied the averments made in the application. It was further pleaded in the reply that the landlady is a retired government servant and having other property vacant where she can start her business. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Tribunal, Kota framed as many as four issues for consideration. In support of her case, the landlady produced the evidence of herself as PW1 Usha Sharma & PW2 Shyam Sunder Sharma. The tenant in support of his case produced the evidence of himself as NAW1 Dr. Shishil William & NAW2 Usman. 5. The Rent Tribunal after hearing the parties & taking into consideration the material on record while allowing the application under section 6 of the Act,2001 for revision of rent dismissed the application filed by the landlady under section 9 of the Act,2001 for eviction of the tenant vide common order dated 13-10-2006. 6. Being aggrieved by the order dated 13-10-2006 passed by the Rent Tribunal dismissing the application filed by the landlady under section 9 of the Act,2001 for eviction of the tenant, the landlady preferred appeal (no.12/2007) before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, at the same time being aggrieved by the order dated 13-10-2006 passed by the Rent Tribunal allowing the application filed by the landlady for revision of rent, the tenant also preferred appeal (no.94/2006) before the Appellate Rent Tribunal. The parties, dispute and order of the Rent Tribunal under challenge in the appeals being the same, both the appeals were clubbed together and were decided by the Appellate Rent Tribunal by common order dated 23-4-2009. In the present writ petition preferred by the tenant, the order dated 23-4-2009 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal on the point of revision of rent is not subject matter of challenge and the tenant by way of present writ petition has assailed the order passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal in appeal no.12/2007 which was preferred by the landlady and was allowed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal thereby directing eviction of the tenant from the property in dispute. 7. During pendency of the present writ petition the original landlady expired and her LRS were taken on record by this Court vide order dated 6-7-2017. 8. Counsel for the tenant submitted that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has erred in reversing the finding given by the Rent Tribunal on the issue no.2. Counsel further submits that the Rent Tribunal has rightly held that the there is no bonafide & reasonable need of the landlady either to start business for herself or for her daughter. Counsel further submits that during pendency of the eviction application daughter of the landlord got remarried in the year 2004, therefore, need pleaded by the landlady for her daughter does not survive any more. Counsel further submits that the landlady is having other shops vacant from where the landlady or her daughter can start business. Counsel further submits that at the time of filing of the eviction application the landlady who was a retired government servant was not actually in the need of the shop in dispute and it was mere her wish to get the shop vacated and the counsel for the tenant lastly prayed for allowing the writ petition. 9. In support of the contentions, counsel for the tenant relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pratap Rai Tanwani & Anr. v. Uttam Chand & Anr., reported in 2004 (6) Supreme 658 where in para-9, 18 & 19 it has been held as under :- "9. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram (1992 (Suppl. v. Uttam Chand & Anr., reported in 2004 (6) Supreme 658 where in para-9, 18 & 19 it has been held as under :- "9. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram (1992 (Suppl. (2) SCC 623) a two judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachalia, J., as he then was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced and the only exception is that the court is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriate in consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. What the learned Chief Justice observed therein is this (SCC pp.626- 27, para 6). 6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief." 18. In the background of the factual position one thing which clearly emerges is that the High Court had considered the subsequent events which the appellants highlighted and tend to hold that the bona fide need continues to subsist. As observed in Hasmat Rai's case (supra) the appellate Court is required to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the subsequent events and their effect. This has been done in the instant case. That factual finding does not suffer from any infirmity. What the appellants have highlighted as subsequent events fall within the realm of possibility or probability of non-return and a certainty, which is necessary to be established to show that the need has been eclipsed. 19. At this juncture it would be appropriate to take note of Section 17 of the Act. Same deals with consequences which statutorily follow if there is deviation from the purposes for which possession has been recovered. 19. At this juncture it would be appropriate to take note of Section 17 of the Act. Same deals with consequences which statutorily follow if there is deviation from the purposes for which possession has been recovered. If in the instant case such contingency arises, the respondents shall re-deliver possession to the appellants-tenants on such terms as the Rent Controlling Authority shall fix." Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Gaiv Dinshaw Irani and Ors. v. Tehmtan Irani and Ors., reported in AIR 2014 SC 2326 , where in para-34 it has been held as under :- "34. Considering the aforementioned changed circumstances, the High Court taking note of the subsequent events moulded the relief in the appeal Under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same has been challenged by the Appellants before us. In ordinary course of litigation, the rights of parties are crystallized on the date the suit is instituted and only the same set of facts must be considered. However, in the interest of justice, a court including a court of appeal Under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not precluded from taking note of developments subsequent to the commencement of the litigation, when such events have a direct bearing on the relief claimed by a party or on the entire purpose of the suit the Courts taking note of the same should mould the relief accordingly. This rule is one of ancient vintage adopted by the Supreme Court of America in Patterson v. State of Alabama followed in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Choudhury AIR 1941 Federal Court 5. The aforementioned cases were recognized by this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 AIR 1975 SC 1409 wherein he stated that: ...If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmade and not the mistress of the judicial process. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmade and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair-play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. The abovementioned principle has been recognized in a catena of decisions. This Court by placing reliance on the Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Case AIR 1970 SC 1409 (supra), held in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram AIR 1992 SC 700 that: 6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. This was further followed in Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal and Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 762 . This Court in Sheshambal (dead) through L.Rs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and Ors. This was further followed in Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal and Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 762 . This Court in Sheshambal (dead) through L.Rs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 470 while discussing the issue of taking cognizance of subsequent events held that: 19. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta case where the Court declared that although the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit yet the court has power to mould the relief in case the following three conditions are satisfied: (SCC p. 263, para 11) 11.... (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. This Court in Rajesh D. Darbar and Ors. v. Narasinghro Krishnaji Kulkarni and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 219 , a matter regarding the elections in a registered society, held that the courts can mould relief accordingly taking note of subsequent events. Furthermore, in Beg Raj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 726 while deciding on the issue of renewal of a mining lease held that: ....A Petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the Petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the Petitioner any relief over the Respondents because of the balance tilting against the Petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. Even this Court while exercising its powers under Article 136 can take note of subsequent events (See: Bihar State Financial Corporation and Ors. v. Chemicot India (P) Ltd. and Ors. Even this Court while exercising its powers under Article 136 can take note of subsequent events (See: Bihar State Financial Corporation and Ors. v. Chemicot India (P) Ltd. and Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 293 , Parents Association of Students v. M.A. Khan and Anr. (2009) 2 SCC 641 , State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. (2011) 13 SCC 77 ) Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sheshambal (D) Thr. L.Rs. v. M/s. Chelur Corporation Chelur Buildings & Ors., reported in 2010 SAR (Civil) 283 where in para-13 & 19 it has been held as under :- "13. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Baba Kashinath Bhinge's case (supra) where relying upon the decision in Hasmat Rai's case (supra) this Court held that in a case of bona fide requirement it is necessary to establish that the landlord needs the premises and the need subsists till a decree is passed in his favour. In a case where such need is available at the time of the filing of the petition but becomes extinct by the time the matter attains finality in appeal for revision no decree will be justified. For that purpose the Court should take all the subsequent events into consideration and mould the relief accordingly. Following passage provides a complete answer to the question raised before us "Equally it is settled by this Court in series of judgments and a reference in this behalf would be sufficient by citing Hasmat Rai v. Raghu Nath Prasad that in a case of bona fide requirement, it is always necessary, till the decree of eviction is passed that the landlord should satisfy that the need is bona fide and the need subsists. In a case where the need is available at the time of filing the petition, but at the time of granting decree it may not continue to subsist, in that event, the decree for eviction could not be made. Similarly pending appeal or revision or writ petition, the need may become more acute. The court should take into account all the subsequent events to mould the relief. Similarly pending appeal or revision or writ petition, the need may become more acute. The court should take into account all the subsequent events to mould the relief. The High Court may not be justified in omitting to consider this aspect of the matter but that does not render the judgment illegal for the subsequent discussion we are going to make." 19. In the light of what we have stated above, we have no hesitation in holding that on the death of the petitioners in the original eviction petition their right to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement for the demised premises became extinct and no order could on the basis of any such requirement be passed at this point of time. Counsel further relied upon the judgment in the matter of Heera Lal v. Mandir Shri Thakurji Sangria & Anr., reported in 2005(1) DNJ (Raj.) 480, where in para-18 & 19 it has been held as under :- "18. It is well to remember that under Section 13(1) (h) of the Act, whether the landlord claims requirement for use and occupation of himself or his family, or for the use and occupation of any person for whose benefits the premises are held, or for public purpose, or philanthropic use; such requirement has to be reasonable and bonafide. The term 'requirement' is not akin to a 'desire'. As explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta : (1999) 6 SCC 222 , the degree of intensity contemplated by the word "required" is much higher than in mere desire. The Hon'ble Supreme Court explained,- "Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The decree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "requirement bona fide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is an outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court." The Apex Court cautioned,- "In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against." The test to be employed by the courts as laid down in the case of Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander : (1988) 3 SCC 131 and as reiterated in Shiv Sarup Gupta's case (supra) remains thus:- "The need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith; and that, further, the court must also consider it reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element in it and that, that desire, to become a 'requirement' in law must have the objective element of a 'need'. It must also be such that the court considers it reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing so, the court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded by law to the tenant is not rendered merely illusory or whittled down." 19. When seen in the light of the principles for judging the reasonable and bonafide requirement, it is apparent in the present case that the plaintiff-landlord has made cursory and vague pleading suggesting that since the accommodation for institution was insufficient, therefore, the suit premises were required. In the deposition before the court, the plaintiff has only stated that as they were to establish Sanskrit College, therefore, getting the shops vacated and that the main reason for seeking eviction was that the plaintiff has established a Sanskrit college and that tenant was not making payment of the rent. In the deposition before the court, the plaintiff has only stated that as they were to establish Sanskrit College, therefore, getting the shops vacated and that the main reason for seeking eviction was that the plaintiff has established a Sanskrit college and that tenant was not making payment of the rent. Nothing else has been placed before the court so as to enable it to come to conclusion that the need put forward by the landlord was a "requirement" in law and that the requirement was reasonable as well as bonafide. It is of course true that the landlord was not to explain as to why they want to set up the college or to extend it, but then, the relevance of the suit premises vis-a-vis the alleged requirement was definitely required to be shown. The landlord-plaintiff has chosen not to state if the suit premises were of any obstruction or interference in establishment of such college nor the extent of available premises and the extent of further requirement has been placed so as to satisfy the court of the presence of objective element in the professed need so as to become a requirement in law. While judging reasonable and bonafide requirement, the court could not have proceeded on assumptions regarding the state of facts. No material whatsoever has been placed on record by which the court could have been satisfied that the alleged need was natural, real, sincere and honest. Merely because the defendant did not lead any evidence, the plaintiff was not relieved of the burden of proving the alleged need to be a reasonable and bona fide requirement. Both the courts below have not even addressed to the requirement of law for a positive finding on this ground of eviction under Section 13 (1)(h) of the Act and merely the want of evidence on the part of defendant has been taken to be a final answer to the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement. The findings on the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement by both the courts below are perfunctory, are based on no evidence and are perverse. Such findings cannot be sustained. Question No.2 is answered in the affirmative. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed in the matter of Chainmal v. Rani Bai, reported in 2005 (1) RCR 416 where in para-14 & 16 it has been held as under :- "14. Such findings cannot be sustained. Question No.2 is answered in the affirmative. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed in the matter of Chainmal v. Rani Bai, reported in 2005 (1) RCR 416 where in para-14 & 16 it has been held as under :- "14. I have discussed the important piece of evidence hereinabove because the Rent Controlling Authority had ignored them. In Para 14 it has been held by the Rent Controlling Authority that two shops were sold to Golchha, earlier to filing of the present proceedings. But it has come in the evidence of Dr. K.L. Kakkad that the need accrued to him 5-6 years ago prior to the filing of the application of eviction and if the evidence of landlady and Dr. Kakkad is read conjointly and in proper perspective, it is revealed that after the need accrued, two shops were sold to Golchha. On going through the evidence, it is perceivable that 3-4 times different type of agreement was settled with Golchha for the sale of the entire building including the suit shop and, therefore, it can not be said that the need is bona fide. The landlady has to prove the bona fide need objectively. The bona fide requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and should not be a mere desire or wish. In the present case, it has been established that the landlady is engaged in selling activity of suit premises and therefore the need can not be said to be a bona fide need. The important feature of the case is that the application of eviction was filed on 9-1-2001 and according to the landlady as well as her son Dr. Kakkad, the entire building (including the suit shop) was agreed to be sold to Golchha earlier to the filing of the application of the eviction. Thus, the need can not be said to be a bona fide need. It has also come in the evidence of Dr. Kakkad that the need accrued to him 4-5 years ago then why proceeding of eviction was not initiated and why the entire building, including the suit shop was agreed to be sold. There is nothing on record to show nor there is any evidence of plaintiff or her son that they asked petitioner to vacate the suit accommodation and when he denied the eviction proceedings were initiated. There is nothing on record to show nor there is any evidence of plaintiff or her son that they asked petitioner to vacate the suit accommodation and when he denied the eviction proceedings were initiated. If the need is really bona fide and accrued in plaintiff 4-5 years earlier, there is no reason why the eviction proceedings were not filed earlier. This important fact can not be marginalized and blinked away that, in between, plaintiff entered with an agreement with one Golchha to transfer the entire building including the suit shop and therefore she sold two shops to him. The landlady also executed registered power of attorney in favour of Golchha which was never cancelled. There is nothing on record, in order to show that the agreement was cancelled. Even if it is assumed that the agreement was cancelled, this fact would not be diluted that the plaintiff and her son are keen to get the entire building sold and therefore the need can not be said in any manner to be a bona fide need. 16. In the case of Ranjit Narayan Haksar v. Surendra Verma 2000 (1) MPHT 106 , while considering the scope of Section 23-E it was held that if the finding of Rent Controlling Authority was contrary to law and evidence, this Court was justified in revision under Section 23-E to interfere with the said findings. This Court further held that the bona fide requirement of landlord must be decided by applying objective tests to find out whether the need of landlord is bona fide and reasonable or not. In the present case, the need can not be said to be bona fide. Another meaning of objective test is to take out the grain from the chaff. Looking to the conduct of the plaintiff as she had entered for several time with Golchha to alienate the entire building including the suit shop how and in what manner her need can be said to be bona fide. The expression "bona fide" used in Section 23A (b) has not been defined under the Act. But, it can be said that the thing which is not malafide can be said to be a bona fide." 10. Counsel for respondent submits that the present writ petition has been filed by the tenant under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. But, it can be said that the thing which is not malafide can be said to be a bona fide." 10. Counsel for respondent submits that the present writ petition has been filed by the tenant under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Counsel further submits that the scope of this Court is very limited to disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. Counsel further submits that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has recorded finding of fact on the issue of bona fide need & personal necessity of the landlady and the legislature has provided only one remedy of appeal therefore the finding arrived at by the Appellate Rent Tribunal is not liable to be disturbed by this Court under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Counsel further submits that the subsequent events regarding remarriage of daughter of the original applicant/landlady was not pleaded in the eviction application for the reason that the eviction application was filed in the year 2003 and the landlady specifically stated in her evidence before the Rent Tribunal that after remarriage there was a dispute between her daughter & her husband and in this regard a matrimonial dispute was pending before the learned Family Court, Kota. Counsel further submits that even after death of the original applicant/landlady, her LRS were taken on record and therefore need of the landlady being bonafide may be considered at the time of filing of the eviction application and such need still survives for daughter of the original landlady. 11. In support of the contentions, counsel relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Sait Nagjee Purushottam & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors., reported in 2005 (8) SCC page 252, where in para-4 reads it has been held as under :- "4. First of all we shall take up the question of bona fide need of the landlords. So far as the partition of the property and the present premises coming to the share of the landlords are concerned, there is no dispute that the portion of the building has come to the share of the landlords and they are the owners as a result of the partition of the family properties. So far as the partition of the property and the present premises coming to the share of the landlords are concerned, there is no dispute that the portion of the building has come to the share of the landlords and they are the owners as a result of the partition of the family properties. But the question is whether the landlords who are the owners of the portion of the building have substantiated the allegation with regard to the bona fide need or not. We have gone through the findings of the trial court as well as that of the appellate authority and the High Court and after closely scrutinizing the same, we do not think that the finding recorded by appellate court and the High Court can be interfered with by this Court on the ground of being perverse or without any basis. The landlords have led evidence to show that one of their sons who had requisite qualification for starting a computer institute wants to establish the same at Calicut and others for extension of their business. The trial court as well as the first appellate court and the High Court examined the statements of P.Ws.2 & 3 and after considering their evidence, the appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need of the respondent-landlords to start business at Calicut, is bona fide & genuine. It was held that it cannot be said that a person who is already having business at one place cannot expand his business at any other place in the country. It is true that the landlords have their business spreading over Chennai and Hyderabad and if they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it cannot be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of the tenant from the premises in question. It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlords and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlords and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. However, the trial court held in favour of tenant-appellant. But the appellate court as well as the High Court after scrutinizing the evidence on record, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need of establishing the business at Calicut by the landlords cannot be said to be lacking in bona fides. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shakuntala Bai and Ors. v. Narayan Das and Ors. reported in 2004 (5) SCC 772 , where in paras-3, 4, 5 & 15, it has been held as under :- "3. Girdhari Lal Gattani (husband of appellant no.1 and father of appellants no.2 to 4) filed a suit on 31.3.1962 for eviction of Magan Lal (father of respondents) from a non-residential premises. The suit was filed on the ground that he required the premises for carrying on his own business. The suit was decreed by the trial Court against which an appeal was preferred by Magan Lal. During the pendency of the appeal, Girdhari Lal died and the appellants herein were substituted as his heirs and legal representatives. The appellants sought an amendment of the plaint and pleaded that they bona fidely require the premises for carrying on business. The tenant Magan Lal sought an amendment in the written statement to the effect that after the death of Girdhari Lal, the bona fide requirement of the premises for carrying on business pleaded in the suit came to an end. The lower appellate Court allowed the amendments and remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh consideration. During the pendency of the suit, the plaint was further amended and it was pleaded that the appellants no.2, 3 and 4 had also attained majority and they wanted to start a cloth business in the premises in dispute. The trial Court, after affording the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence, dismissed the suit. The appellants then preferred an appeal and during the pendency thereof the original tenant Magan Lal died and his sons, respondents no.1 and 2 were substituted in the plaint. The trial Court, after affording the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence, dismissed the suit. The appellants then preferred an appeal and during the pendency thereof the original tenant Magan Lal died and his sons, respondents no.1 and 2 were substituted in the plaint. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for eviction. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of eviction, the respondents preferred second appeal which has been allowed by the High Court by the impugned judgment/decree dated 3.9.1997 and the suit has been dismissed. 4. The main ground on which the appeal has been allowed by the High Court is that in a suit filed by the landlord for eviction of a tenant, the requirement or need set up by him must subsist till the appeal filed by the tenant is finally decided and that a tenant can always take advantage of subsequent event like death of the landlord at a later stage during the pendency of the appeal etc. to urge that the requirement or need of the landlord has come to an end. Accordingly, it has been held that on the death of Girdhari Lal Gattani, the Civil Suit filed by him ought to have been dismissed as his legal heirs, the appellants herein, could not have continued the suit which was based on personal bona fide need. 5. The question which requires consideration is whether on account of death of a landlord during the pendency of the appeal, a suit validly instituted by him for eviction of a tenant on the ground of his personal need, is liable to be dismissed. 15. As the preamble shows the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will be no end to litigation. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. The same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs and it may become an unending process. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to come. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by LR's, reported in AIR 1997 SC 2399 where in para-3 it has been held as under :- "3. Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant in this Court urged that the person for whose bonafide requirement the order of eviction has been passed by the appellate authority having died during the pendency of the writ petition, the said bonafide requirement no longer subsists and consequently the High Court should have taken that fact into consideration and should have interfered with the order passed by the appellate authority for the eviction of the tenant. The learned Counsel further urged that no doubt the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a continuation of the eviction proceedings under the Act, but all the same the High Court while exercising its power of supervision under Article 226 of the Constitution is not denuded of its power to take into consideration the subsequent event that had happened which is necessary to be taken into consideration in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the High Court committed serious error in not taking into account the facts of the death of the landlord for whose bona fide requirement the order of eviction had been passed by the appellate authority, and therefore, this Court should interfere with the said order of the High Court. Accordingly, the High Court committed serious error in not taking into account the facts of the death of the landlord for whose bona fide requirement the order of eviction had been passed by the appellate authority, and therefore, this Court should interfere with the said order of the High Court. Having given an anxious consideration to the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant and under the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the considered opinion that this case does not warrant interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Under the Act the order of the appellate authority is final and the said order is a decree of the civil court and decree of a competent Court having become final cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by taking into account any subsequent event which might have happened. That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises in question for starting a business which fact has been found by the appellate authority, in eye of law, it must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the bonafide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any elder son. In this view of the matter, we find no force in the contention of Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and we do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court warranting interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 13. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 13. The first argument raised by the counsel for the tenant regarding perverse finding recorded by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal on the issue of bonafide need and personal necessity is not accepted as the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal considering the evidence produced by the parties came to the conclusion that the need was bonafide and reasonable and in my considered view the finding of fact arrived at with regard to reasonable and bonafide need by the Appellate Rent Tribunal is based on sound appreciation of the evidence & doesn't deserve to be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. The second argument raised by the counsel for the tenant regarding availability of other vacant shops to the applicant/landlady or to her LRS on record, from where daughter of the original applicant/landlady can start her business is also not accepted for the reason that it is for the landlord to decide and choose the place of business and not for the tenant to dictate that from what place the landlady should start her business in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Bhupinder Singh Bawa v. Asha Devi, reported in 2016(10) SCC 209 where in para-12 it has been held as under :- "12. In light of the above, Additional Rent Controller and the High Court rightly concluded that no alternative premises were lying vacant for running business of respondent's son. The High Court rightly relied on the ratio of Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja to hold that it is perfectly open to the landlord to choose a more suitable premises for carrying on the business by her son and that the respondent cannot be dictated by the appellant as to which shop her son should start the business from." 15. The High Court rightly relied on the ratio of Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja to hold that it is perfectly open to the landlord to choose a more suitable premises for carrying on the business by her son and that the respondent cannot be dictated by the appellant as to which shop her son should start the business from." 15. The next argument raised by the counsel for the tenant that the need pleaded by the landlady at the time of filing of the eviction application does not survive on account of remarriage of her daughter, is also not accepted for the reason that the landlady in her evidence has specifically stated that after remarriage there is a matrimonial dispute pending between her daughter & her husband before the Family Court and the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal considering the evidence recorded a finding that the need still survives. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has also considered the evidence regarding availability of alternative place to the wife of the tenant from where the tenant can start/run his clinic. On being asked by the Court, counsel for the tenant informed that wife of the tenant is running a clinic in her own building measuring 1600 sq.ft and considering all the facts & circumstances of the case in my considered view the Appellate Rent Tribunal has rightly passed the decree of eviction in favour of the landlady. 16. In view of the entire discussion made hereinabove, the writ petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.