JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Kundan Kumar Ambastha, counsel appearing for the petitioners. 2. Heard Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Senior counsel assisted by Ms. Pragati Prasad, counsel appearing for the private respondents. 3. Heard Mr. Ashish Kumar Thakur, counsel appearing for the respondent-State. 4. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs: “For issuance of an appropriate Writ/Rule/Order/Direction for quashing of the order dated 7.2.1986 passed by the D.C.L.R. Bermo in Restoration Case No. 16/85-86 contained in Annexure-4 to this writ petition by which order has been passed for restoration of 9.63 Acres of land out of Plot No. 33 of Khata No. 45 situated at village Gajhandih, P.S. Jaridih District Giridih in favour of the Respondent no. 5 under the provision contained in Section 46(4) of the C.N.T. Act and for quashing the Order dated 12.5.1988 passed by the Additional Collector, Giridih in Restoration Appeal No. 32/85-86 by which the Appeal filed by the petitioners has been dismissed (Annexure-5) and for quashing the order dated 25.11.2003 passed by the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh in Land Restoration Revision No. 84/99 dismissing the Revision filed by the petitioners contained in Annexure-8 to this writ petition and for such other relief or reliefs to which the petitioners are legally entitled to.” 5. Counsel for the petitioners submits as under: (a) Tial Manjhi, Babulal Manjhi and Thakur Manjhi were the recorded tenants of the property involved in this case. By a registered deed of surrender dated 20.04.1942, the recorded tenants surrendered the property in favour of the land lord who came in possession of the property and thereafter, the ex-landlord settled the entire property by way of another registered deed of Kabuliyat dated 20.04.1942 in favour of the father of the original writ petitioners. Thereafter, the petitioners were regularly making payment of rent to the land lord and after vesting in the State, the petitioners have been recognized as raiyats and they have been regularly making payment of rent to the State of Bihar. (b) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that after a lapse of more than 43 years from the date of registered-deed of surrender and registered deed of settlement both dated 20.04.1942, the respondent no. (b) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that after a lapse of more than 43 years from the date of registered-deed of surrender and registered deed of settlement both dated 20.04.1942, the respondent no. 5 (since deceased and substituted) filed an application before Land Reform Deputy Collector, Bermo at Tenughat on 30.07.1985 claiming restoration of land under Section 46(4) of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 alleging that the original respondent no. 5 was forcefully dispossessed only eight years back. On the basis of this application, Land Restoration Case No. 16 of 1985-86 was registered. Thereafter, a show-cause was filed by the petitioner stating that he is having title and possession over the land at least for last 43 years on the basis of the registered surrender by the recorded tenant and registered settlement by the ex-landlord as back as on 20.04.1942. Thereafter, they came in physical possession of the property and are in continuous possession. (c) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that as it is apparent from the original order passed by the Land Reform Deputy Collector dated 07.02.1986, a plea was also taken that the claim of the applicant was barred by limitation. (d) He submits that vide Annexure-4 to this writ petition, the application for restoration of land was allowed. The basis for allowing the application for restoration was that a proceeding was drawn against the father of the applicant by Sub-divisional Officer, Bermo being Proceeding No. 36 of 1973-74 under the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land Act), 1961 and draft statement detailing the land held by the father of the applicant was published under Section 11 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 which was never questioned or disputed by the petitioner herein and consequently, the said publication under Section 11 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 confirms beyond all doubt that the land in dispute was under the possession of the applicant on 30.09.1975 i.e. the day on which the draft statement under Section 11 of the said Act of 1961 was published. (e) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that the original authority while deciding the case, on the one hand, relied upon the publication of draft statement under Section 11 of the Act of 1961 holding this document to proof beyond doubt that the land in question was under the possession of the applicant on 30.09.1975 and the claim of the petitioners herein that they are in continuous possession of the land since 20.04.1942 i.e. the day they took the settlement was held to be not beyond all reasonable doubts. (f) Thereafter, the petitioners filed appeal before the appellate authority and the appellate authority refused to interfere with the finding given by the Land Reform Deputy Collector, Bermo and his finding was again based on the publication of draft statement under Section 11 of the Act of 1961. (g) Against this, the petitioner filed revision before the revisional authority and the revisional authority held that on the basis of the draft publication under Section 11 of the Act of 1961, it cannot be held that the applicants were in possession of the property and also held that the final publication was not available and accordingly, no such conclusive finding could be recorded and thereafter, the revisional authority allowed the revision vide order dated 02.04.1990. (h) Against this order, the applicant filed writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 1070 of 1990(R) which was disposed of vide order dated 10.07.1998 and the matter was remanded back to the revisional authority by holding as follows: “The findings of facts recorded by the two courts below have been set aside by the Respondent Commissioner without applying his mind and/or without meeting the reason assigned by the Courts below. Having regard to the order I propose to pass, it is not necessary to give positive findings on the submissions raised by the parties at this stage. Suffice it to say that the respondent Commissioner has set aside the order of the two courts below without any valid ground. Accordingly I quashed the order dated 12.5.88 passed by the Respondent Commissioner, copy of which is made Annexure-3 to this writ application and remit the case back to him with a direction to hear the parties, consider the evidence that may be produced before him and pass a fresh order in accordance with law without being prejudiced by the order of this Court. The order must be a reasoned order with reference to the submission as well as the materials, on the record. Let it be recorded that I have not expressed any opinion on the merit of the case. In the result the order dated 3.4.1990 is quashed and this writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above but without cost.” (i) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that pursuant to this order dated 10.07.1998, the Commissioner passed fresh order dated 25.11.2003 after hearing the parties, which is the impugned order before this Court. He further submits that from the perusal of the impugned order itself, it appears that no further evidence was produced in spite of the observation which was made by this Court in order dated 10.07.1998 in C.W.J.C. No. 1070 of 1990(R). (j) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that by the impugned order it has been recorded that there are parallel Jamabandi running so far as the petitioners and the private respondents are concerned and accordingly, the said authority has not given any value to the Jamabandi running in favour of the either party. However, he submits that in the impugned order it has been recorded that the surrender and settlement both dated 20.04.1942 have been held to be impermissible under the provisions of Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 on the ground that even if the Zamindar takes back the land, the same could have been settled only to a Scheduled Tribe and accordingly, the authority has held that the settlement itself is void. The said authority has further held that the private respondent herein had stated that the land ceiling case was instituted in the year, 1975 and thereafter, he was dispossessed from the property and after the land ceiling case, the property involved in this case was released in favour of the private respondent in view of the provisions of Act of 1961 and therefore, the date of dispossession cannot be more than eight years. (k) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that the registered deed of settlement dated 20.04.1942 has been declared to be void by the impugned order on the ground that the property could not be settled to a person belonging to non-Scheduled Tribe and from the perusal of the impugned order it further appears that the registered deed of surrender has not been declared as void. (l) Counsel for the petitioners also submits that the surrender as well as the settlement was by way of registered document and there is a presumption in favour of the registered document and accordingly, the same could not have been disbelieved or declared void by the impugned order. He also submits that the proceedings under the Act of 1961 and its declaration under Section 11 of the Act, even if the petitioner had not raised any objection to that, does not indicate that the private respondent was in possession of the property till 1975. (m) He further submits that the very fact that the property in dispute was surrendered by the recorded tenant in favour of the Zamindar as back as on 20.04.1942 by a registered document, the person claiming to be the descendants of the recorded tenant and persons claiming through the recorded tenant have no right to make such a claim. (n) He also submits that apart from this, there were no oral evidences led by any of the parties before the court below and no further evidence was led in spite of the order dated 10.07.1998 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1070 of 1990(R). (o) Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgments reported in (2000) 5 SCC 141 paragraph nos. 14, 15 and 16 and Situ Sahu vs. state of Jharkhand and Others, (2004) 4 JLJR 109 (SC) paragraph nos. 13 and 14; (2008) 2 JCR 1 (SC) paragraph no. 5 and 1988 BLT 185 relevant paragraph no. 5. (p) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that the surrender and settlement in this case relates to the year, 1942 and the restriction in connection with the requirement of taking the permission from the Deputy Commissioner was introduced only on 05.01.1948 and there was no restriction in connection with the transactions which have taken place in the year, 1942. Therefore, the genuineness of the transactions cannot be doubted. 6. Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the surrender and settlement having been done on the same day i.e. on 20.04.1942, the same has to be treated as a transaction of transfer and the same has to be treated as single transaction in view of the judgment passed by this Court reported in (1985) PLJR 732 (FB). 7. 7. The counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the petitioners have lost in all the three Courts and there being a finding of fact recorded that the private respondent was dispossessed from the property only eight years prior to filing the application, therefore such finding of fact cannot be disturbed in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the evidences cannot be re-appreciated. 8. Counsel for the respondent further submits that in the case of Pandey Oraon reported in AIR 1992 SC 196 at paragraph no. 6 it has been stated that what is material is not the registered document which has been executed, but the date on which the original private respondent was physically dispossessed from the property and the period of limitation has to be counted from the date of physical dispossession from the property. 9. He further submits that under the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 a proceeding was initiated and returns were filed under Section 5 and enquiry was made and thereafter, the excess area was declared and a conclusive notification under Section 11 was issued under the said Act. Thereafter, the property involved in this case was released from land ceiling area. 10. Counsel for the respondent further submits that the petitioners never raised any objection to the declaration or Notification under Section 11 of the aforesaid Act and this particular notification is a conclusive proof of the fact that the original private respondent no. 5 herein was in physical possession of the property in the year, 1975 and accordingly, the date of dispossession in the instant case is of the year, 1975. However, the counsel admitted during the course of hearing that there is no oral evidence in the matter and the only evidence which the original private respondent no. 5 had and is relying upon is the Notification issued under Section 11 of the aforesaid Act of the year, 1961. 11. The counsel for the respondents has referred to Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 being Rules of 1963. 5 had and is relying upon is the Notification issued under Section 11 of the aforesaid Act of the year, 1961. 11. The counsel for the respondents has referred to Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 being Rules of 1963. In the said rules, there is a specific provision giving the procedure under Section 10(1) regarding checking of information given by or on behalf of the land holders under Section 6, 8 and 9 or information obtained by the Collector under Section 7. He submits that there is a provision for inspection by the Circle Officer, Block Development Officer or Anchal Adhikari and they are required to make a verification and the declaration made is required to be checked and accordingly, after being satisfied, the Notification under Section 11 is issued. 12. Counsel for the respondent submits that had the petitioners been in possession of this property, this property could not have formed a part of Notification under Section 11 of the aforesaid Act of 1961. He submits that the inclusion of the property in the Notification under Section 11 of the aforesaid Act by itself is a conclusive proof of the fact that the original private respondent herein was in physical possession of the property in the year 1975. He further submits that if the petitioners were aggrieved by this Notification, they ought to have raised objection to it. Having not done so, the petitioners at the relevant point of time had admitted that the private respondent herein was in physical possession of the property. 13. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court finds as follows: (a) In the year 1985, the application for restoration of land was filed under Section 46(4A) of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and the applicant alleged that the petitioner has forcefully dispossessed them only around 8 years back and in support of the contention that the original private respondent herein was in possession of the property till 1975, the only evidence which the private respondent had relied upon was the Notification issued under Section 11 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land Act), 1961. (b) Faced with the aforesaid, the petitioners herein filed their show-cause and asserted that they were in possession of the property by virtue of the aforesaid two registered deeds of the year 1942 and had also claimed that the application for restoration was barred by law of limitation. (c) The original Court while deciding the case rejected the contention of the petitioners on the ground that the contention of the petitioners was not beyond all reasonable doubt and relied upon the sole evidence adduced on behalf of the private respondent i.e. the Notification issued under Section 11 of the Act of 1961 in proceeding No. 36 dated 1973-74 and held that at least up to 30.09.1975, the private party herein were in possession of the property. The said authority allowed the petition for restoration as the period of dispossession was held to be only 8 years and the period of limitation is prescribed as 12 years. (d) The appellate court refused to interfere with the order of the original court and thereafter, the revisional court interfered with the order by holding that on the basis of draft publication it may not be said that the private respondent herein was in the possession of the property and there was no final publication. Thereafter, the revisional court allowed the revision. (e) Against this order of the revisional court, the original private respondent filed C.W.J.C. No. 1070 of 1990(R) and this Hon'ble Court held that the revisional court has not dealt with the materials on record and has not met with the reasons assigned by the court below and thereafter this Court remitted the matter before the revisional authority for fresh consideration with a liberty to adduce evidence before the revisional authority and also indicated that this Court had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. (f) This Court finds that in spite of the liberty having been granted by this Court in order dated 10.07.1998 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1070 of 1990(R), the private respondent did not produce any evidence in connection with the possession. They chose to rely upon the sole document i.e. the Notification under Section 11 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land Act), 1961. They chose to rely upon the sole document i.e. the Notification under Section 11 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land Act), 1961. (g) This Court further finds that the revisional court while passing the fresh order has declared the registered settlement as void on the sole ground that after the surrender of the land, the same ought to have been settled by the Zamindar only in favour of the Scheduled Tribe. (h) A registered deed of surrender was executed by the recorded tenant in favour of the then landlord in the year, 1942 vide registered surrender deed No. 1551 dated 20.04.1942. At the relevant point of time surrender of land by the recorded tenant in favour of the landlord was not restricted by a pre-condition of previous sanction of the deputy commissioner. Such restriction was introduced only with effect from 05.01.1948 vide amendment Act of 1947. Accordingly this deed of surrender being a registered document has neither been declared void nor could have been declared void by the impugned order passed by the learned commissioner. (i) On the same day i.e. on 20.04.1942, another deed of settlement by way of registered document was executed by the then landlord in favour of the ancestor of the petitioners. It has been held as a void by the impugned order passed by the learned commissioner on the sole ground that the same was in violation of section 72 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 as there was a statutory provision that the landlord after surrender could either cultivate the land only with another schedule tribe raiyat. Section 72 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act,1908 as it stood in the year 1942 reads as under:- “72. Surrender of land by raiyat. (1) A raiyat not bound by a lease or other agreement for a fixed period may, at the end of any agricultural year surrender his holding. (2) But notwithstanding the surrender, the raiyat shall be liable to indemnify the landlord against any loss of the rent of the holding for the agricultural year next following the date of the surrender, unless he gives to his landlord, at lease four months before he surrenders notice of his intention to surrender. (2) But notwithstanding the surrender, the raiyat shall be liable to indemnify the landlord against any loss of the rent of the holding for the agricultural year next following the date of the surrender, unless he gives to his landlord, at lease four months before he surrenders notice of his intention to surrender. (3) The raiyat may, if he thinks fit, cause the notice to be served through the Court of the Deputy Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the holding or any portion of its is situate. (4) When a raiyat has surrendered his holding the landlord may enter on the holding or either let it to another tenant or take it into cultivation himself. (5) Nothing in this section shall affect any arrangement by which a raiyat and his landlord may arrange for a surrender of the whole or a part of the holding.” This section was amended in the year 1947 with effect from 05.01.1948 and certain restrictions introducing previous sanction of the deputy commissioner was introduced and accordingly the said section 72 read as under with effect from 05.01.1948 :- “72. Surrender of land by raiyat - (1) A raiyat not bound by a lease or other agreement for a fixed period may, at the end of any agricultural year surrender his holding with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing. (2) But notwithstanding the surrender, the raiyat shall be liable to indemnify the landlord against any loss of the rent of the holding for the agricultural year next following the date of the surrender, unless he gives to his landlord, at lease four months before he surrenders notice of his intention to surrender. (3) The raiyat may, if he thinks fit, cause the notice to be served through the Court of the Deputy Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the holding or any portion of its is situate. (4) When a raiyat has surrendered his holding the landlord may enter on the holding or either let it to another tenant or take it into cultivation himself. (4) When a raiyat has surrendered his holding the landlord may enter on the holding or either let it to another tenant or take it into cultivation himself. (5) Nothing in this section shall affect any arrangement by which a raiyat and his landlord may arrange for a surrender of the whole or a part of the holding with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing.” Tenant has been defined under the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 under section 3(xxvi) which reads as follows:- “Tenant means a person who holds land under another person and is, or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent for that land to that person.” The term raiyat has been defined in section 6 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, which reads as follows:- “6. Meaning of “raiyat” - (1) Raiyat means primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself, or by members of his family, or by hired sevants, or with the aid of partners and includes the successors-in-interest of persons who have acquired such a right, but does not include a Mundari-Khunt-Kattidar. (2) A person shall not be deemed to be a raiyat unless he holds land either immediately under a proprietor or immediately under a tenure-holder or immediately under a Mundari- Khunt-Kattidar. (3) In determining whether a tenant is a tenure holder or a raiyat, the Court shall have regard to:- (a) local custom. (b) the purpose for which the right of tenancy was originally acquired.” This court finds that the finding of the learned commissioner in the impugned order that the landlord after surrender could only settle the land with another schedule tribe raiyat is perverse as the section 72(4) clearly provides that the when a raiyat has surrendered his holding, the land lord may enter on the holding and either let it to another tenant or take it into cultivation himself. The power to settle the land by the land lord is not restricted to only schedule tribe raiyat, but the power is to settle it to another tenant or take it into cultivation himself. Thus this Court finds that the finding of the learned Commissioner that the landlord after surrender could either cultivate the land only with another schedule tribe raiyat is not backed by any provision under Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. Thus this Court finds that the finding of the learned Commissioner that the landlord after surrender could either cultivate the land only with another schedule tribe raiyat is not backed by any provision under Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. (j) During the course of argument, the counsel for the parties could not indicate any provision of law which casts such restriction on the powers of the Zamindar. So far as the deed of surrender is concerned, it has not been declared to be a void document. There is no finding in the impugned order that the surrender and settlement was a single transaction. (k) In view of the aforesaid findings this Court finds that the recorded tenant of the property was dispossessed from the property as back as on 20.04.1942 itself by virtue of registered deed of surrender in favour of the then landlord. (l) This Court further finds that the property was settled in favour of the ancestor of the petitioners on 20.04.1942 itself by virtue of registered deed of settlement by the then landlord. (m) This Court further finds that the judgment which has been relied upon by the respondent reported in (1985) PLJR 732 (FB) and it has been submitted that in that case it has been held that the surrender and settlement on the same date even if it is by registered documents has to be treated as a single transaction. This Court finds that in the said case the surrender and settlement were treated as single transaction and the surrender and settlement were affected vide registered deed of surrender dated 29.03.1954 and 30.03.1954 respectively which were admittedly after 05.01.1948 and were held to be transfer attracting restoration of land under section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 on account of absence of previous sanction from the Deputy Commissioner in writing. This was due to the reason that after 05.01.1948 restriction was introduced and permission was required from the Deputy Commissioner in writing prior to surrender of land by the raiyat to the landlord. In the instant case the surrender and settlement is of the year 1942 although on the same date when there was no such restriction in the year 1942. In the instant case there is no such finding in the impugned order that the surrender and settlement involved in this case was one and the same transaction. In the instant case the surrender and settlement is of the year 1942 although on the same date when there was no such restriction in the year 1942. In the instant case there is no such finding in the impugned order that the surrender and settlement involved in this case was one and the same transaction. The deed of surrender having not been questioned by the revisional authority, being a registered document, is a valid document of surrender of the property by the recorded tenant in favour of the landlord by which the recorded tenant loses all right over the property and accordingly, the private respondents who claim to be the descendants of the recorded tenant cannot assert any right over the same. (n) In the judgment passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court reported in (2000) 5 SCC 141 , at para 13, 14 and 15, the aforesaid introduction of restriction in the year 1948 with effect from 05.01.1948 has been considered and it has been held that surrenders prior to 05.01.1948 and after 05.01.1948 stand on different footings. The said paragraphs are quoted as follows:- “13. We are concerned in these appeals only with an admitted case and the class of transfer by way of surrender envisaged under Section 72 and not even any other category or class of transfer envisaged under Section 46, as it stood prior to the Amendment Act of 1947. This Court was also not at all concerned in the earlier decisions reported in Pandey Oraon and Brisa Munda specifically with any issue relating to the law applicable to a case of surrender effected prior to 1943 but on the other hand mainly dealt with the scope of Section 71-A and thereby the purport and content of the word “transfer” used therein. Even in the subsequent decision, the purport and meaning of the word “transfer” occurring in Section 46(4)(a) and that too in the context of dealing with a case of surrender effected in 1976 was the subject of consideration and not the applicability of Section 71-A. 14. Even in the subsequent decision, the purport and meaning of the word “transfer” occurring in Section 46(4)(a) and that too in the context of dealing with a case of surrender effected in 1976 was the subject of consideration and not the applicability of Section 71-A. 14. A perusal of the decision reported in Pandey Oraon would show that it did not deal with a case of surrender prior to 1947, as in this case and during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in this case there was no statutory provision in the CNT Act which envisaged the obtaining of prior permission of the Deputy Commissioner before surrender of the tenancy rights. Though no factual details are available in the judgment this is obvious from the fact that what was considered therein was only the scope of Section 71-A added by the amendment in the year 1969. So far as the decision reported in Brisa Munda is concerned also the date of surrender in that case is not stated specifically. Even otherwise, in para 9 of the judgment it is stated, thus: “In this case an application under Section 46(4)(a) has been made. It is, therefore, not at all necessary whether Section 71-A incorporated by amendment is applicable in respect of the land in question.” Section 46(4)(a) considered in this decision which envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting transfer in any of the modes stated therein was introduced only in the year 1947 with effect from 5-1-1948 and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time of the surrender made in this case on 15-1-1942. For all these reasons, we are of the view that the two decisions relied upon for the appellant do not either apply to the present cases or support the contentions raised before us. 15. No doubt, the understanding of the High Court about the scope of Section 71-A as interpreted by the earlier decisions of that Court noticed therein may not be good or correct in view of the later declaration of law by this Court but, the High Court did not proceed to rest its conclusion to uphold the claims of the contesting respondents who were writ petitioners before the High Court, only on that ground. The High Court has considered, at length, the further question as to whether Section 71-A, introduced in 1969, was attracted to this case of surrender effected by a registered deed, on 15-1-1942, in the light of the then existing statutory provisions contained in Sections 46 and 72 of the CNT Act. The nature of consideration and the other reasons assigned in support of the order made in CWJC No. 118 of 1986 (R) makes it clear that the statutory provisions as they stood in force on 15-1-1942 neither envisaged the obtaining of prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before a surrender by a tenant could be made of his interest in favour of the landlord nor could such surrender be held bad merely because it was not at the end of the agricultural year but immediately before. Those issues seem to have been considered and decided, even dehors the controversy raised with reference to the character of the land, proceeding on an assumption of the basis that it involved a surrender of raiyati interest. We find nothing illegal or wrong in the said reasoning and the conclusions arrived at by the learned Judges in the High Court appear to be well merited and quite in accordance with the statutory provisions in force, at the relevant point. Therefore, in our view, no interference is called for with the orders of the High Court, in this regard.” (o) This Court further finds that under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land Act), 1961, although local inspection and local enquiry are to be conducted but the same does not embark upon the authorities to verify the physical possession of the property. (p) This Court further finds that for the purposes of fixation of ceiling area, there is no requirement for the person to be in physical possession of the property. Moreover, apart from the Notification issued under Section 11 of the Act of 1961, no enquiry report of the Circle Officer or any other officer was ever produced at any stage who is said to have conducted the enquiry under the provisions of the Act of 1961. Moreover, apart from the Notification issued under Section 11 of the Act of 1961, no enquiry report of the Circle Officer or any other officer was ever produced at any stage who is said to have conducted the enquiry under the provisions of the Act of 1961. (q) Accordingly, this Court finds that merely because the property involved in this case was included in the Notification issued under Section 11 of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land Act), 1961, that does not lead to the conclusion that the private respondent herein was in physical possession of the property till the year 1975. Accordingly, the finding of the authority that the respondents were in physical possession of the property till 1975 on the basis of Notification issued under Section 11 of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land Act), 1961 is perverse. The judgment relied upon by the respondent reported in AIR 1992 SC 196 wherein it has been held that the period of limitation has to be counted from the date of physical dispossession from the property, does not help the petitioner in any manner as this court finds that the claim of the respondent that they were physically disposed after 1975 is itself not sustainable as the said claim is solely based on Notification issued under Section 11 of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land Act), 1961. (r) In the instant case, at least on the basis of the aforesaid registered deed of surrender of the year 1942, which was not in contravention to any of the provisions of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, this Court finds that the authorities below have failed to consider that on the basis of this registered document, the recorded raiyat was dispossessed from the property since 1942. These aspects of the matter has not at all been considered by any of the authorities. Any of the authorities has not even considered that there was no illegality in connection with the deed of surrender and deed of settlement in view of the law as it stood in the year 1942. (s) The property having been surrendered by the recorded tenant to the landlord as back as in the year 1942, the descendants of the recorded tenant cannot claim any right over the property. 14. (s) The property having been surrendered by the recorded tenant to the landlord as back as in the year 1942, the descendants of the recorded tenant cannot claim any right over the property. 14. This Court is also of the considered view that merely because all the three courts have given finding against the writ petitioners, the same does not debar this Court from exercising power under Section 226 of the Constitution of India as the impugned orders suffer from perversity and suffer from errors while appreciating the relevant provisions of law as per the aforesaid findings. 15. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, the orders passed by the authorities being the order dated 07.02.1986 passed by the D.C.L. R. Bermo in Restoration Case No. 16/85-86, Order dated 12.05.1988 passed by the Additional Collector, Giridih in Restoration Appeal No. 32/85-86 and order dated 25.11.2003 passed by the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh in Land Restoration Revision No. 84/99 are perverse and the same are hereby set-aside. 16. This writ petition is allowed.