JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment dated May 18, 2017 passed in the writ application. By virtue of the impugned judgment, the learned single judge set aside the award impugned to the writ application as also directed the appellant Company to recalculate the amount payable by it to each of the respondents or their predecessors-in-interest, as the case may be, after adjusting the amount which had been paid to them at the time of taking voluntary retirement. 2. The above writ application was filed by the respondents challenging an award dated July 10, 2012 passed by the learned single Judge, Ninth Industrial Tribunal, Durgapur rejecting the proceeding under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947. A proceeding arose out of a reference to the Industrial Tribunal made by an order dated March 17, 2006 to adjudicate the following issues : (1) Whether the claim of the 152 workmen (as per list enclosed) that their apprenticeship period in the Company should be taken into account for calculation of their retirement benefits by the management for the total service period is justified? (2) What relief, if any, are the workmen entitled to? 3. It is submitted by Mr. Sudarananda Pal, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant Company that the learned single Judge traversed beyond its jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment in view of the provisions of subsection 4 of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is his further submissions that the terms of reference was to decide whether the claim of the respondents that their apprenticeship period in appellant Company should be taken in to account for calculation of their retirement benefits. Instead the learned single Judge ventured in to the issue of finding out as to whether the apprenticeship period of the respondents in the appellant Company was to be treated in service as regular employee in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 read with the provisions of sub-sections of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. According to Mr. Pal, the learned Tribunal being a creature of reference could not adjudicate the matter not within the purview of disputes actually referred to it by the order of reference. Therefore, according to him, there was a jurisdictional error on the part of the learned single Judge to pass the impugned judgment. 4. According to Mr. Pal, the learned Tribunal being a creature of reference could not adjudicate the matter not within the purview of disputes actually referred to it by the order of reference. Therefore, according to him, there was a jurisdictional error on the part of the learned single Judge to pass the impugned judgment. 4. Reliance is placed by Mr. Pal on the decisions of Mukund Limited Vs. Mukund Staff & Officers Association, reported in (2004) 10 SCC 460 and State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Om Prokash Sharma, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 123 . 5. In reply, it is submitted by Mr. Sujash Ghosh Dastidar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents that under the provisions of sub-section 4 of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was within the scope of terms of reference to decide any issue incidental to the terms of reference. According to him, the learned single Judge was right in arriving at a finding that the award of the learned Tribunal was based on perverse finding. According to him, in absence of contract under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 the respondents should not have been treated as apprenticeship for the period in question in view of the aforesaid provisions of law. 6. Reliance is placed by Mr. Ghosh Dastidar on the decisions of Hanuman Prosad Chowdhury & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan State Electricity Board & Ors., reported in 1985(2)WLN 219 and U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Shri Shiv Mohan Singh & Another, reported in AIR 2004 SC 5009 . 7. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties at length and we have considered the fact and circumstances of this case. In order to adjudicate the question involved in this appeal, the provisions of sub-section 4 of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is required to be quoted and the same is quoted as under : Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals 1…. 2… 3… 4. Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to {a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal} under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of disputes for adjudication, { the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be} shall confine its jurisdiction to those points and matters incidental thereto. 8. 8. In view of the above provisions, a Labour Court or National Tribunal should confine its adjudication to the specified points of disputes as referred to. As quoted hereinabove, the terms of reference was that the period of apprenticeship of the respondents under the appellant Company should be taken in to consideration while calculating their terminal benefits on the occasion of their voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme floated by the appellant Company. It was observed by the learned Tribunal in the award that no material was produced by the Company to show that there was any contract executed by and between the parties for the apprenticeship period in question though similar contracts which were executed with the workmen other than the respondents, had been produced before the learned Tribunal. 9. However, the learned Tribunal found from the evidences of one of the respondents (P.W.-I) that there was an admission with regard to the apprenticeship under the appellant Company. According to the learned Tribunal, once the workmen admitted their apprenticeship that there was no scope to disbelieve the same and decided the issue relying on the evidence on record. It was also not in dispute before the learned Tribunal that the workmen also failed to bring any material on record to show that they were not apprentices during the period in question and they were workmen in terms of sub-sections of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As a consequence thereof, the learned Tribunal passed the award rejecting the claim of the respondents to add the period of their apprenticeship for calculation of their terminal benefits. 10. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment, we find that the learned single Judge took into consideration the findings of the learned Tribunal that no material was produced by the appellant Company before the learned Tribunal in respect of the respondents to show that there were contracts in between the parties or the apprenticeship period. According to the learned single Judge, the onus was upon the employer to show whether they were apprentices or not. Taking recourse to the provisions of Section 18 of the Apprenticeship Act, 1961, the learned single Judge scrutinized whether they were apprentices or workmen under sub-sections of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. According to the learned single Judge, the onus was upon the employer to show whether they were apprentices or not. Taking recourse to the provisions of Section 18 of the Apprenticeship Act, 1961, the learned single Judge scrutinized whether they were apprentices or workmen under sub-sections of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In our opinion, it was not within the terms of reference for the learned Tribunal to venture to that aspect of the matter. When the period of apprenticeship was not in dispute on the basis of the materials on record as is evident from the evidences of one of the respondents that they were apprentices and whether they were to be treated as apprentices in the light of Section 18 of the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 read with sub sections of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was a jurisdictional error on the part of the learned single Judge. We find force in the submissions of Mr. Pal that in view of decisions of Mukund Limited (Supra) it was not permissible for the learned Tribunal to travel beyond the terms of reference, the learned Tribunal being a creature of reference and the relevant portion of the above decision is set out below : “We have already referred to the order of reference dated 17-2-1993 in paragraph supra. The dispute referred to by the order of reference is only in respect of workmen employed by the appellant Company. It is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal, being a creature of the reference, cannot adjudicate matters not within the purview of the disputes actually referred to it by the order of reference. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Tribunal could not have adjudicated the issue of salaries of the employees who are not workmen under the Acts nor could it have covered such employees by its award. Even assuming, without admitting, that the reference covered the non-workmen, the Tribunal, acting within its jurisdiction under the Act could not have adjudicated the disputes insofar as it related to the “non- workmen”. 11. We further find much force in the submissions of Mr. Pal with reference to the decision of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (Supra) to opine that the learned Tribunal was the last fact-finding forum. 11. We further find much force in the submissions of Mr. Pal with reference to the decision of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (Supra) to opine that the learned Tribunal was the last fact-finding forum. Unless any of these findings was perverse there was hardly any scope for a Court sitting in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the award passed by the learned Tribunal and the relevant portion the above decision is quoted below : “This specific issue which was, therefore, referred for determination by the Labour Court, related to the dispute as regards violation of Section 25-H of the Act. If the said provisions had not been found to be violated, the question of setting aside the order of termination by the Labour Court did not and could not arise. The learned Single Judge proceeded on the premise that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, cannot sit in appeal over the award of the Labour Court. The learned Single Judge was right, but then, only because the jurisdiction of the High Court, while exercising of its power of judicial review was limited, it would not mean that even a jurisdictional error could not have been corrected. The provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India w2ould be attracted if the inferior Tribunal has, inter alia, committed a jurisdictional error. What would be the ground for judicial review, in regard to the orders passed by an inferior Tribunal is no longer res integra.” 12. The decision of Rajasthan High Court in the matter of Hanuman Prosad Chowdhury & Ors. which has been upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court was relating to the settled principles of law as to whether serving the employer the period of apprenticeship could be treated as a period of apprenticeship in a case of calculating the compensation for retrenchment. We afraid that was not the issue before us. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment should not be applicable in this appeal. 13. In view of the above, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law and accordingly the same stands set aside. Since nothing remains to be decided in this appeal, the same is treated as on day’s list for hearing and the same together with the application for stay being C.A.N.7972 of 2017 are disposed of accordingly. 14. 13. In view of the above, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law and accordingly the same stands set aside. Since nothing remains to be decided in this appeal, the same is treated as on day’s list for hearing and the same together with the application for stay being C.A.N.7972 of 2017 are disposed of accordingly. 14. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 15. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis.