JUDGMENT : These intra court appeals are filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, challenging the correctness and legality of the order of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos. 104674-675/2016 dated 24.03.2017 whereby the writ petitions filed by the appellants are dismissed. 2. The writ petitions were filed by the appellants challenging the Notification dated 28.10.2015 issued by the 3rd respondent-Bank inviting applications for the posts of second division assistants. The Court framed the following question in the connected writ petition Nos.104721-25/2016: “Whether the procedure adopted for selection of candidates for appointment is transparent and in consonance with law or is vitiated by illegality?” 3. Considering the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and analyzing the material on record, the Notification impugned has been held to be valid and the writ petitions were rejected in the said batch of writ petitions (W.P. Nos.104721-25/2016). In the light of the said ruling, the arguments advanced at the hands of the learned counsel appearing for the parties was considered in the present petitions and the contentions of the petitioners has been negated by passing a detailed order. Aggrieved by the same, petitioners are in appeal. 4. Learned counsel Shri F.V. Patil, appearing for the appellants would contend that Rule 17(2)(B) of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Rules, 1960 (for short ‘the Rules 1960’) contemplates that the candidate must be a graduate from any recognized University established by law in India. The 3rd respondent has prescribed minimum of 60% marks for general category and 55% marks for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe in BA/B.Sc./B.Com degree obtained from the recognized University as the eligibility/qualification for appointment of second division assistants, which is contrary to the said Rules. 5. Nextly, it was contended that allotting 25% of marks for interview and 75% marks for written examination is against the Government Order dated 22.08.2013 which specifically prescribes, a minimum of 85% marks for written examination and 15% marks in oral examination for the appointments to be made by the Co-operative Societies in terms of Section 30-B of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (for short ‘the Act’). 6. 6. Thirdly, it was argued that the respondent No.3 has filed statement of objections in the writ proceedings that the 1st appellant has not filed the application itself, hence, he has no locus standi to question the selection process which is wholly unjustifiable. The eligibility conditions stipulated in the notification impugned, disqualified the appellant No.1 to submit the applications which otherwise he was duly qualified for the said post. Appellant No.1 is not espousing any public cause but being an aggrieved person has challenged the notification impugned. The second appellant applied for the post under Scheduled Caste category. The said appellant has secured 49.15% in the qualifying degree examination, minimum requirement to apply under the said category as per Notification being 55%, she was ineligible to be qualified for the written examination. The Notification issued by the 3rd respondent being contrary to the provisions of the Act and Rules as well as the Government Order dated 22.08.2013, the learned Single Judge ought to have allowed the writ petitions, quashing the impugned notification. 7. The learned Single Judge while calculating on the scale of 100% with the total marks of 200 relating to the viva-voce examination held that 12.5% would be the percentage stipulated which is below 15% as directed by the State and hence, it is not controverted. It was argued that mode of computation and the decision arrived at, in calculating the percentage inasmuch as viva-voce is erroneous. 8. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Jayakumar S.Patil, appearing for respondent No.3 has raised the preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the writ appeals. It was contended that 1st appellant is not an applicant to challenge the Notification impugned whereas the 2nd appellant having participated in the proceedings is estopped from challenging the notification. It was argued that the Notification at Annexure-A to the writ petition was issued on 28.10.2015, written examination was conducted on 29.05.2016 and writ petitions were filed on 13.06.2016. The factual foundation on which the writ petition was filed by the 1st appellant relates to the reservation governed under Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection or Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act 1995’). It was the main ground on which the 1st appellant challenged the Notification impugned raising a plea that he is a disabled person. The factual foundation on which the writ petition was filed by the 1st appellant relates to the reservation governed under Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection or Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act 1995’). It was the main ground on which the 1st appellant challenged the Notification impugned raising a plea that he is a disabled person. No reservation for disabled person being provided under the Notification, the same is bad being contrary to the 1995 Act. However, the said ground not being pursued or in other words given up by the 1st appellant in the writ appeal proceedings, the focal point is shifted to some other points not canvassed or addressed before the learned Single Judge. No petition can be filed as a public interest litigation in service matters. There being no factual foundation, appellant No.1 being not an aggrieved person, writ appeal deserves to be dismissed. Indeed, it was argued before the learned Single Judge that Section 32 of the 1995 Act provides for identification of posts which can be reserved for persons with disabilities. Appropriate Government shall identify posts, in the establishments, which can be reserved for the persons with disability. 9. Section 2 (k) of the 1995 Act defines “establishment” means a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a local authority or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act 1956 (1 of 1956) and includes Departments of a Government. 10. Respondent No.3-DCC Bank is a voluntary organization, a co-operative society registered under the provisions of the Act. Thus, provisions of the 1995 Act are not applicable to the 3rd respondent to reserve posts for persons with disabilities. This being the foundation on which the writ petition was filed and argued now a different ground urged by appellant No.1 is untenable, on this ground alone writ appeal has to be rejected. 11. The appellant No.2 applied for the post under the Scheduled Caste category. As per the information supplied, the 2nd appellant had secured 49.15% in the qualifying degree examination. Minimum requirement to apply under the said category as per the Notification being 55%, she was declared as ineligible to qualify for the written examination. 11. The appellant No.2 applied for the post under the Scheduled Caste category. As per the information supplied, the 2nd appellant had secured 49.15% in the qualifying degree examination. Minimum requirement to apply under the said category as per the Notification being 55%, she was declared as ineligible to qualify for the written examination. It was argued that the 2nd appellant has participated in selection process and being unsuccessful candidate, has challenged the Notification. Hence, the same is not maintainable. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar and another vs. State of Bihar and others [(2017} 4 SCC 357]). 12. Learned Senior Counsel placing reliance on the case of Mallaraddi H. Itagi and Others Vs. High Court of Karnataka reported in (2002 (3) L.L.N. 1012) contended that the qualification prescribed under Rule 17(2)(B) of the Rules 1960, denotes the minimum qualification fixing the qualification of 60% with respect to general category and 55% with respect to Scheduled Caste. It is to select the best available talented candidates, in the interest of the Bank, the impugned qualification was prescribed with 60% of marks with respect to General Category and 55% with respect to Scheduled Caste. 13. Reference was made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of VISVESWARAIAH TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY & ANOTHER VS. KRISHNENDU HALDER & OTHERS, (2011) 4 SCC 606 , to fortify the submission that fixing of the eligibility criteria is to maintain excellence and to ensure that there is good standard maintained in the performance of the employees to achieve the objects, for which they are employed. It was argued that fixation of the eligibility criteria is not contrary to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Keeping in mind the Rules and the circulars issued by the government as well as the judgments holding the field during the relevant period, the eligibility criteria is fixed. The learned single judge after considering these factors in extenso has rightly rejected the writ petition which do not warrant any interference by this Court. 14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar and perused the material on record. 15. At the first instance, it is apt to refer to the preliminary objections raised by the respondents in as much as the maintainability of the writ petitions/writ appeals. 16. 14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar and perused the material on record. 15. At the first instance, it is apt to refer to the preliminary objections raised by the respondents in as much as the maintainability of the writ petitions/writ appeals. 16. MAINTAINABILITY: The notification issued by respondent No.3 inviting applications for the posts of Second Division Assistant fixing the minimum marks of 60% to the general category and 55% of marks to the scheduled caste in B.A./B.Sc./B.Com from any recognized university is challenged by the appellants mainly on two grounds. Firstly, the eligibility criteria fixed, is contrary to the Rule 17(2)(B) of the Rules 1960 and secondly, the said notification is contrary to the government order dated 22.08.2013 issued under Section 30-B of the Act, 1959. 17. As regards appellant No.1, though the learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.3 submitted that there was no factual foundation laid down to challenge the notification impugned, it is manifest from the certificate placed on record at Annexure-C to the writ petition that the said appellant has passed BA PART- III (New) Examination in the first class. Thus, it is not in dispute that the said appellant was qualified to apply and participate in the selection for the post of SDA. However, it was the grouse of the said appellant that no reservation was made for disabled candidates in terms of the Act 1995. It is evident that in terms of Section 32 read with 2(k) of the Act 1995, respondent No.3-Bank is not an establishment. Hence, the reservation contemplated under the Act 1995 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In addition to this, in appeal proceedings, this argument is not seriously canvassed. However, the challenge is made on the other two grounds as narrated above. If appellant No.1 was qualified considering the marks of BA degree examination, he has no locus standi to challenge the notification on the ground now urged, since he is admittedly not an aggrieved person or disqualified person in terms of the eligibility fixed with respect to percentage of marks. On this ground, the petition/appeal filed by appellant No.1 deserves to be rejected. Further, it is trite law that no PIL is maintainable in service matters, moreover, this appeal is not filed or argued as PIL. On this ground, the petition/appeal filed by appellant No.1 deserves to be rejected. Further, it is trite law that no PIL is maintainable in service matters, moreover, this appeal is not filed or argued as PIL. Hence, the writ petition/writ appeal filed by appellant No.1 is not maintainable. 18. As regards appellant No.2, in order to appreciate the challenge made, it is beneficial to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar & Another (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that the appellant having participated in the fresh round of selection could not be permitted to assail the process, once they were declared unsuccessful, if the candidates were aggrieved by the decision to hold a fresh process, they did not espouse their remedy. Instead, they participated in the fresh process of selection and it was only upon being unsuccessful that they challenged the result in the writ petition, which was clearly not open to the appellants. The principle of estoppel would operate. This view is expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court considering the law crystallized in several decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 19. In the light of the said judgment, it can be held that appellant No.2, who participated in the selection process after being declared as unsuccessful is estopped from challenging the notification impugned. On this ground alone, the appeal/petition filed by appellant No.2 deserves to be rejected. The question of entertaining the petition/appeal challenging the notification would not arise, where a candidate has applied, participated and declared unsuccessful. He cannot contend that the notification is having some lacuna much against the Rules, Circulars, Instructions and the judicial pronouncements. Hence, the challenge made by appellant No.2 also has to be rejected as not maintainable. APPLICABILITY OF RULE 17(2)(B) OF THE RULES 1960 20. Rule 17(2)(B) of the Rules 1960 reads thus: 17. Officers and employees of Co-operative societies-qualifications etc. He cannot contend that the notification is having some lacuna much against the Rules, Circulars, Instructions and the judicial pronouncements. Hence, the challenge made by appellant No.2 also has to be rejected as not maintainable. APPLICABILITY OF RULE 17(2)(B) OF THE RULES 1960 20. Rule 17(2)(B) of the Rules 1960 reads thus: 17. Officers and employees of Co-operative societies-qualifications etc. (2) No person shall be eligible for appointment to the posts mentioned below unless he possesses the qualification specified against them.[the designation and qualification of the Chief Executive Officer of Agriculture Credit Structure, Karnataka Milk Federation and District Milk Union, Urban Banks shall be as specified in the Annexure and in respect of other societies, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies shall specify such guidelines]: (B) Accountants, Clerks, Ledger-keepers, Sales Clerks and Shroffs.- (i) A degree or post-graduate degree in co-operation or any other degree of a University established by Law in India. 21. A reading of this Rule contemplates that the candidate must be a graduate from any recognized University established by law in India. This qualification prescribed under the Rules is minimum qualification. It cannot be held that the employer has no power to fix the eligibility criteria over and above the minimum qualification prescribed under the Rules. To analyse the arguments advanced at the hands of the learned counsel appearing for the parties on this point, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Mallaraddi H. Itagi and Others (supra). The questions that arose for consideration before the co-ordinate bench of this Court is extracted at para-9 which reads thus: (i) Whether the petitioners 1 to 9 were practicing advocates on the date of the submission of their applications to the first respondent and as such were eligible to be considered for appointment as District Judges in terms of the qualification prescribed under schedule given to rule 2 of the Rules? (ii) Whether the qualification prescribed in schedule given to Rule 2 of the Rules that an applicant “must be practising on the last date fixed for submission of application, as an advocate and must have so practised for not less than seven years as on such date” is liable to be struck down either on the ground that it runs counter to the provisions contained in Sub-cl.(2) of Art. 233 or Art.14 of the Constitution of India? 22. While answering question No.2, which is relevant for our case, it was observed that the Rules cannot be struck down either on the ground that it is not permissible for the rule-making authority to prescribe a higher qualification than the one prescribed under Subcl. (2) of Art.233 of the Constitution of India or on the ground that the qualification prescribed is violative of the rights guaranteed to the petitioners therein and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was categorically held that Sub-cl.2 of Article 233 of the Constitution of India only prescribes the minimum qualification. In other words no one who has not put in 7 years of practice as an advocate is eligible for appointment as a District Judge. Neither the High Court nor the rule-making authority can relax the said minimum qualification prescribed under Sub.cl.(2) of Article 233 of the Constitution of India. However, that does not mean that the appointing authority keeping in mind the large public interest and efficiency and excellence in administration of justice cannot prescribe a higher qualification for appointment to the post of District Judge than the prescribed in Sub.cl(2) of the Article 233 of the Constitution of India. The words “not less than 7 years as an advocate” employed in Article 233 of the Constitution clearly indicates that what is prescribed is the minimum qualification and it does not prevent the rule-making authority from prescribing higher qualification. 23. We have no reasons to differ from the said judgment. Thus, it is apparent that respondent No.3-Bank in order to ensure better, qualified and talented candidates to get into employment as SDA has prescribed 60% of marks in respect of general category and 55% in respect of scheduled caste. This eligibility criteria fixed cannot be said to be unreasonable or irrational. Rule 17(2)(B) of the Rules 1960, merely prescribes minimum qualification for being appointed as SDA. This eligibility criteria fixed cannot be said to be unreasonable or irrational. Rule 17(2)(B) of the Rules 1960, merely prescribes minimum qualification for being appointed as SDA. There is no legal impediment for respondent No.3-Bank to stipulate higher percentage of marks than the minimum prescribed, keeping in mind the interest of Bank as well as the public at large. APPLICABILITY OF GOVERNMENT ORDER DATED 22.08.2013 24. This government order is issued by the Government of Karnataka in terms of Section 30-B of the Act 1959 (Amendment 2012) and the Rules 1960. The learned Senior Counsel argued that this G.O. is not applicable to respondent No.3-Bank. Be that as it may, even assuming that the said government order prescribing the conditions for the appointment of staff to various co-operative societies is applicable to the facts of the present case, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted. The said order stipulates the qualification of not exceeding 85% with respect to written examination and 15% with respect to oral examination. The notification impugned provides 25 marks for interview and 75 marks for written examination for the total marks of 200; if the same is computed on percentage basis, the same would work out to 12.5% for every 100 marks. We cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that this calculation arrived at by the learned single judge is wrong. The notification is clear on this point. The percentage has to be calculated only on considering the total marks vis-à-vis scale of 100. 25. Viewed from any angle, the impugned notification has to be upheld confirming the order of the learned Single Judge. In the result, writ appeals are dismissed. In view of dismissal of the main appeals, all pending IAs are consigned to file.