JUDGMENT : DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J. Introduction: 1. A portion of his property acquired and compensation paid, the owner enjoys the remaining property. Later, his younger son gets the property. Almost 40 years after the acquisition and after his father’s death, the son claims that the Government, then, occupied more property than it had acquired and that the Government allowed his father to occupy its property to the extent his father had lost. 2. The son, as the successor, first sues for an injunction and loses it. Later, he petitions the Tahsildar to have that piece of government land in his occupation assigned but has his request turned down. Without assailing the decree in the civil suit or the Tahsildar’s rejection order, once again he approaches the revenue authorities. This time he succeeds. The Government decides to allot him the land. A third-party, a Society, questions the Government’s belated benevolence. The Issue: Can the Government, after its initial rejection, assign or “reconvey” a separate piece of land—particularly canal puramboke—to a person whose land the Government occupied without compensating him? Viewed alternatively, is the claim for compensation the only remedy available to the landowner whose land the Government occupied, especially, with his consent? Facts: (a) Father’s Title & Possession: 3. It all happened long back—as far back as in the 1950s. Then the Government proposed to construct an irrigation canal: Chalakudy-Idathukara Canal. So it acquired lands, among other places, in Parakkadavu Village, Aluva Taluk. A part of the land acquired in that village belonged to one Mr. Varkey, the Appellant’s father. The acquisition completed, Varkey received the compensation and continued to enjoy whatever property remained. (b) Sons’ Succession: 4. In 1984 Varkey settled his property on Jose, his elder son. Later, in 1992, Jose exchanged the property with George, his younger brother, for another piece. George, the owner, first approached the revenue authorities with a grievance and, later, filed a civil suit in OS No. 698 of 1996 before the Munsiff court, Aluva. We will set out his grievance. 5. Initially, when the Government acquired some properties for constructing the canal, it slightly altered the canal course. As a result, the Government took an additional 10 cents of land from Varkey, George’s father. Instead of compensating Varkey, the Government allowed him to occupy 10 cents of its land, adjacent to Varkey’s land, near the canal. 5. Initially, when the Government acquired some properties for constructing the canal, it slightly altered the canal course. As a result, the Government took an additional 10 cents of land from Varkey, George’s father. Instead of compensating Varkey, the Government allowed him to occupy 10 cents of its land, adjacent to Varkey’s land, near the canal. All this was said to be on an oral understanding between Varkey and the Government. Despite this understanding, the revenue officials continued to reflect in the revenue records the 10 cents of land as puramboke. (c) Claim & Rejection: 6. In December 1996 George filed OS No. 698 of 1996 before the Munsiff’s court, Aluva, claiming that the officials trespassed upon the property, destroyed the boundaries, and cut away the trees. He sought a permanent prohibitory injunction against the Government and its officials. Ext.P4 is the plaint. Through Ext.P10, dated 28.11.2003, the Munsiff court dismissed the suit. 7. In 2000, George applied to the Tahsildar to have the land allegedly in his possession assigned to him. He cited the same reasons as he did before the civil court. After considering George’s claim, the Tahsildar passed Ext.P5 order, dated 10.08.2001, rejecting his claim for assignment. (d) Revival of Fortune: 8. Undaunted by Tahsildar’s rejection, George, this time, petitioned the Hon’ble Revenue Minister, who called for a report from the officials to find out the truth of George’s claim. The Deputy Director (Survey) reported, supporting George’s version. So, when the Government was again considering George’s claim, Desiya Poura Samithi, a society supposedly championing the public cause, filed WP (C) No. 40909 of 2003, questioning the Government’s proposal. This Court, through Ext.P11 judgment, directed the Government to hear the Society as well as George before its taking a decision. On 05.04.2005, the Government eventually passed Ext.P12 order: “the acquired unutilised land which is in the possession of the complainant should be reconveyed to him for the unacquired utilised land and to settle the complaint.” The Judicial Proceedings: 9. Aggrieved, the Society filed WP (C) No. 13677 of 2005, questioning Ext.P12 order. A learned single Judge, through judgment dated 06.03.2015, allowed the writ petition: quashed Ext.P12. Now George filed this intra-court appeal. Submissions: Appellant’s: 10. Sri P. Ramakrishnan, the learned counsel for the Appellant, has submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from serious legal infirmities. Aggrieved, the Society filed WP (C) No. 13677 of 2005, questioning Ext.P12 order. A learned single Judge, through judgment dated 06.03.2015, allowed the writ petition: quashed Ext.P12. Now George filed this intra-court appeal. Submissions: Appellant’s: 10. Sri P. Ramakrishnan, the learned counsel for the Appellant, has submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from serious legal infirmities. To elaborate, he has contended that until the Society raised the issue, the Government knowingly allowed, first, George’s father and, later, George himself to enjoy the property, which they occupied in lieu of the land they had lost. According to Sri Ramakrishnan, George, initially, questioned the Tahsildar’s Ext.P5 order before the Hon’ble Revenue Minister. And, only as a corollary, Ext.P9 survey report emerged. 11. About George’s losing the civil suit, Sri Ramakrishnan maintains that it is only a suit for mere injunction, and the court rejecting George’s claim of possession does not operate as res judicata. He has also submitted that Ext.P12 proceedings are unassailable. To elaborate, he has submitted that the Government followed the due procedure, consulted all the officials concerned, and eventually issued those proceedings. 12. To sum up, Sri Ramakrishnan submitted that the Government, on physical verification, found that George has had the property which his father secured from the Government more than five decades ago. That securing was only as a measure of compensation for their land the Government had wrongfully occupied. So he urges this Court to set aside the impugned judgment and dismiss the writ petition. Respondents: First Respondent Society: 13. Sri C.S. Dias, the learned counsel for the respondent Society, has, with equal vehemence, submitted that the impugned judgment is unassailable. According to him, once the civil court decree and the Tahsildar’s rejection order attained finality, George had his legal options closed to reagitate the issue. 14. Sri Dias has submitted that the Government, strangely, has shown unwarranted haste and unexplainable indulgence in accepting George’s claim, though it had earlier rejected the very same claim on valid, sustainable grounds. To conclude, Sri Dias has submitted that the property the Government sought to assign to George is admittedly canal puramboke, which cannot, in the first place, be assigned. So he urges us not to interfere with the impugned judgment. The Official Respondents’: 15. The learned Government Pleader has submitted in tune with what the Appellant’s counsel did. To conclude, Sri Dias has submitted that the property the Government sought to assign to George is admittedly canal puramboke, which cannot, in the first place, be assigned. So he urges us not to interfere with the impugned judgment. The Official Respondents’: 15. The learned Government Pleader has submitted in tune with what the Appellant’s counsel did. According to him, Ext.P9 Survey Report clinches the issue: on the survey, the Government found that it took ten cents more land from George’s father than it had acquired. According to him, Ext.P12 attempts to legitimize George’s right over an equal extent of land—10 cents—only as a recompense. Discussion: 16. To begin with, the acquisition took place in the 1950s. There exists no conclusive proof—to be relied on, especially, in a summary proceeding as this one—that the Government occupied more land than it had acquired from George’s father. Nor has there been any record to conclude that, first, Varkey occupied Government land, be it under an oral understanding, and, later, his sons continued to occupy the Government land, as a matter of reparation. Now, we will examine the records, including the previous judicial proceedings. 17. At least, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s, neither Varkey, the original owner, nor George, his son, tried to legitimise their alleged possession of the Government property— even in the name of compensation for the land they had lost. The defence that the Government never objected until the Society raised the issue is no excuse for George to occupy Government property under whatever pretext. The alleged oral understanding between Varkey and the Government lacks credence and deserves to be disbelieved, which we do. The Civil Suit: 18. In OS No. 698 of 1996, the trial court framed, among others, two vital issues: (1) What is the correct identity of the plaint schedule property? (2) Does the plaintiff have title and possession over the suit property? On merits, the trial court answered both the issues against George. 19. True, the suit was for mere prohibitory injunction. It is equally true, as a matter of legal proposition, that in a suit for mere injunction, the title can be gone into—incidentally, though. The parties to the litigation knew that both title and possession were at issue; they led evidence to establish both aspects. 19. True, the suit was for mere prohibitory injunction. It is equally true, as a matter of legal proposition, that in a suit for mere injunction, the title can be gone into—incidentally, though. The parties to the litigation knew that both title and possession were at issue; they led evidence to establish both aspects. So the civil court’s findings on George’s legitimacy to occupy or to possess Government land cannot be brushed aside, on the mere premise that the civil court’s findings on the title in a suit for an injunction do not attract the principle of res judicata. The Tahsildar’s Rejection: 20. Indeed, in 2000 George approached the Tahsildar, when the Government tried to evict him alleging that he had encroached on the government land. Through Ext.P5 order, the Tahsildar discussed the issue threadbare: first, he had found that George owned more than one-acre land. So he ruled that the Government cannot consider George’s case for assigning its land. Second, the Tahsildar stressed that “the law does not in any manner provide for the assignment of the land for which he has filed the petition because the land is canal puramboke which cannot be assigned.” 21. The Tahsildar’s order also records a vital fact: in 1994 the revenue and irrigation officials, after putting George on notice, measured the acquired land and re-fixed the boundaries. Then they found that George had encroached on Irrigation Department’s land. In April 1996, the District Collector found the re-fixed boundary markings removed; so he directed George’s eviction. Again, in November 1996, after following due procedure, the authorities evicted George and assigned a new survey number to the puramboke land. The Tahsildar issued Ext.P8 proceedings confirming the new survey number to that land. George challenged neither the civil court’s decree nor the Tahsildar’s order of rejection. Ext.P8, too, remains unchallenged. The Second Attempt: 22. As we have earlier observed, first-time unsuccessful, George did not lose heart. Second time, he petitioned the Hon’ble Minister. George defends his action as an appeal against Ext.P5 Tahsildar’s order. Regrettably, his defence fails. Under the extant statutory scheme—the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964 —the Tahsildar is the competent authority to assign any piece of land. Rule 4 prescribes the purpose for which the land may be assigned. Under Rule 11, the authorities have to prepare a list of assignable lands. Regrettably, his defence fails. Under the extant statutory scheme—the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964 —the Tahsildar is the competent authority to assign any piece of land. Rule 4 prescribes the purpose for which the land may be assigned. Under Rule 11, the authorities have to prepare a list of assignable lands. The very rule also enlists the lands to be reserved for Government or public purposes. Prominently found among the exempted categories is the land abutting or adjacent to irrigation canals. Rule 21 provides for the remedial mechanism, i.e. for appeals and revisions. Against an order passed by the Tahsildar, an appeal lies to the Revenue Divisional Officer. 23. Ext.P9 survey report discloses that George questioned the survey done earlier, contrary to George’s claim that he challenged the Tahsildar’s order. But the report endorses George’s claim. We may note Ext.P12 ignores the fact that earlier George had been evicted. In fact, it ignores all previous proceedings; it treats George’s claim as if he had approached the Government just the other day—for the first time. Impermissibility: 24. King Bruce of Scotland may have been inspired by the ever-trying spider that picked itself up from every tumble it took to reach the ceiling-dome. Indeed, as the fable goes, King Bruce “tried once more as he tried before; and that time did not fail.” (From Eliza Cook’s poem (1849) “King Bruce and the Spider” a pleasing parable to teach the children the moral: to keep on trying and never to be discouraged.) Parables may edify repeated attempts to attain the desirable, but law frowns at it, for certainty and finality are its essential attributes. 25. For a moment we will buy George’s story: the Government occupied more property than it had acquired. George’s father, as reparation, occupied government property. The Government used the excess extent, too, for constructing the canal. But it still has vacant land between the canal and George’s property. 26. If we proceed from the above assertions—without even doubting their veracity—we cannot still forget that in 1996 the authorities evicted George. Not only that, George suffered an adverse verdict from a competent civil court and an order of rejection from a competent revenue official. Neither was assailed. The land that remained with the Government was categorised as canal puramboke; even a new survey number was assigned. Conclusion: 27. It needs no cogitation that canal puramboke is unassignable. Not only that, George suffered an adverse verdict from a competent civil court and an order of rejection from a competent revenue official. Neither was assailed. The land that remained with the Government was categorised as canal puramboke; even a new survey number was assigned. Conclusion: 27. It needs no cogitation that canal puramboke is unassignable. A plethora of precedents stresses this proposition. So, if at all, George had lost any land to Government—which allegedly took it with no justification—his remedy is not far to seek. He ought to sue the Government for compensation; but, beginning from the mid-1950s, neither George’s father nor George himself attempted to move in that direction. If George can still establish his claim for compensation, he may do so, subject to the laws of limitation. 28. Viewed from any angle, the impugned judgment suffers from no legal infirmities; therefore, we affirm it. The appeal is dismissed. No order on costs.