JUDGMENT : Rajesh Singh Chauhan, J. 1. Heard Sri R.C. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, Dr. L.P. Mishra and Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsels representing opposite party No.1, whereas learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 has sent out of station slip. 2. In view of the order proposed to be passed, we do not deem it necessary to issue notice to the opposite party No.3. 3. We have proceeded to hear the matter in the absence of opposite party No.2 as his interest is well protected in the directions issued by us. 4. By means of present writ petition i.e Public Interest Litigation (here-in-after referred to as the 'P.I.L.'), the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:- (a) Issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of certiorari quashing the nomination of opposite party No.3 as one of the members of Search Committee made by the opposite party No.2 for appointment on the post of Vice-Chancellor of Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam Technical University, Lucknow, opposite party No.1 after summoning the original record regard the same. (b) Issue a writ, director or order in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite party No.2 not to give effect to the recommendations made by the illegally constituted Search Committee in any manner what so ever and after re-nomination of some other member of Search Committee in place of opposite party No.3, the further process for appointment of Vice-Chancellor may be proceeded with. 5. The petitioner who happens to be an Advocate and so as to apprise his credentials, he has submitted that he is a practicing Advocate in Lucknow Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and is also a conscious citizen of the country and he is fully competent to file the present P.I.L. 6. The main submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the nomination of the opposite party No.3, Professor S.G. Dhandey as one of the members of Search Committee made by the opposite party No.2, Chancellor, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, Technical University, Lucknow (here-in-after referred to as the 'Technical University') for appointment on the post of Vice-Chancellor of the University is in violation of the guidelines so issued by the University Grants Commission vide notification dated 13.06.2013, which is contained as Annexure No.2 to the P.I.L. 7. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, Technical University, Lucknow (here-in-after referred to as the 'Technical University') for appointment on the post of Vice-Chancellor of the University is in violation of the guidelines so issued by the University Grants Commission vide notification dated 13.06.2013, which is contained as Annexure No.2 to the P.I.L. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Section 9 of U.P. Technical University Act, 2000 (here-in-after referred to as the Act, 2000) provides the necessary formalities for making appointment of Vice-Chancellor of the Technical University. Section 9 (2) provides about the committee for making selection/appointment on the post of Vice-Chancellor. Section 9 (2) of the Act, 2000 is being reproduced here-in-below:- (9) (2) The committee referred to in sub-section (1) shall consist of the following members, namely; (a) Principal Secretary or Secretary, as the case may be, to the State Government in the Technical Education Department who shall also be the convener of the Committee; (b) One person nominated by the All India Council for Technical Education; (c) One person nominated by the Chancellor. 8. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, the nomination of Professor S.G. Dhandey has been made by the Chancellor under Section 9 (2) (c) of the Act, 2000. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred para-4 of the University Grants Commission's notification dated 13.06.2013 wherein clause 7.3.0 of the Principal Regulations have been mentioned, in which, the qualification and formalities for making appointment of Vice-Chancellor has been given. Clause 7.3.0 of the notification is being reproduced here-in-below:- 7.3.0. VICE-CHANCELLOR: i. Persons of the higher level of competence, integrity, morals and institutional commitment are to be appointed as 'Vice-Chancellor'. The Vice-Chancellor to be appointed should be a distinguished academician, with a minimum of ten years of experience as Professor in a University system or ten years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research and/or academic administrative organization. ii. The selection of Vice-Chancellor should be through proper identification of a panel of 3-5 names by a Search Committee through a public notification or nomination or a latent search process or in combination. The members of the above Search Committee shall be persons of eminence in the sphere of higher education and shall not be connected in any manner with the University concerned or its colleges. The members of the above Search Committee shall be persons of eminence in the sphere of higher education and shall not be connected in any manner with the University concerned or its colleges. While preparing the panel, the Search Committee must give proper weightage to academic excellence, exposure to the higher education system in the country and abroad, and adequate experience in academic and administrative governance to be given in writing along with the panel to be submitted to the Visitor/Chancellor. The constitution of the Search Committee could be as per the Act/Statutes of the concerned University. iii. The Visitor/Chancellor shall appointment the Vice-Chancellor out of the Panel of names recommended by the Search Committee. iv. The conditions of services of the Vice-Chancellor shall be as prescribed in he Act/Statutes of the University concerned in conformity with the Principal Regulations. v. The term of office of the 'Vice-Chancellor' shall form part of the service period of the incumbent concerned making him/her eligible for all service related benefits. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards sub-clause (ii) of clause 7.3.0 submitting that the member of the committee for making selection of the Vice-Chancellor should not be connected in any manner with the University concerned or its colleges whereas Professor S.G. Dhandey is one of the members of the Executive Council of the Technical University as shown in the list of members of Executive Council, which is contained as Annexure No.3 to the P.I.L. wherein the name of Professor S.G. Dhandey find place at serial No.11. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn attention of this Court towards Annexure No.4 of the P.I.L., which is an 'Annual Report' of the Technical University, wherein it has been indicated in clause 8.2, under the heading of 'Centers of Advance Studies', that 'a High Level Committee under the Chairmanship of Professor S.G. Dhandey, U.G.C. member and Ex-Director I.I.T. Kanpur was constituted to prepare a D.P.R. for setting up 'Centres of Advance Studies'. An Advisory Board under the Chairmanship of Professor S.G. Dhandey is also constituted to advise the Vice-Chancellor to constitute Academic Advisory Council and Research Advisory with Council'. An Advisory Board under the Chairmanship of Professor S.G. Dhandey is also constituted to advise the Vice-Chancellor to constitute Academic Advisory Council and Research Advisory with Council'. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that nomination of Professor S.G. Dhandey as one of the members of the Search Committee for appointment on the post of Vice-Chancellor of the Technical University is incontravention of the U.G.C. guidelines, which are binding in nature. 12. Dr. L.P. Mishra and Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsels for opposite party No.1 have raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present Public Interest Litigation petition submitting that the present Public Interest Litigation has been filed without making mandatory compliance so indicated under sub-rule 3-A of Rule 1 of Chapter-XXII of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, (here-in-after referred to as the 'Rule, 1952'), therefore the instant Public Interest Litigation petition is liable to be dismissed. 13. Learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have submitted that sub-rule 3-A of Rule 1 of Chapter-XXII of the Rules, 1952 has been inserted after the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Re: State of Uttaranchal vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal & others reported in (2010) 3 SCC 402 . 14. We have noted the explanatory note appended under sub-rule 3A of Rule 1 of Chapter-XXII of the Rules, 1952, which categorically explains the reason as to why sub-rule 3-A of Rule 1 of Chapter-XXII of the Rules, 1952 has been inserted. The Sub-rule 3-A of Rule 1 of Chapter-XXII of Rules, 1952 is being reproduced here-in-below:- "3-A. In addition to satisfying the requirements of the other rules in his Chapter, the petitioner seeking to file a Public Interest Litigation, should precisely and specifically state, in the affidavit to be sworn by him giving his credentials, the public cause he is seeking to espouse; that he has no personal or private interest in the matter; that there is no authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court or High Court on the question raised; and that the result of the Litigation will not lead to any undue gain to himself or anyone associated with him, or any undue loss to any person, body of persons or the State." Explanatory Note: -The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its Judgment in C.A. Nos. 1134-1135/02, State of Uttaranchal vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal and others reported in 2010 AIR SCW 1029, has observed that the process of Court is frequently abused in the name of Public Interest Litigation and has directed all the High Courts to frame rules to prevent the same. The aforesaid amendment is intended to achieve the said objective. 15. Learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have submitted that the present Public Interest Litigation does not contain any credential of the petitioner except that he is a practicing Advocate of this Court. They have also submitted that the petitioner has not disclosed about any other public cause raised or any other effort in any field made by him either before the Hon'ble Supreme Court or before any other competent forum and it has also not been disclosed that the petitioner has ever filed any petition earlier. It has also been submitted by learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 that the present petition does not disclose the public cause which the petitioner is seeking to espouse and how the subject matter of the present petition affects the public interest. The learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have further submitted that the petitioner in a cursory and casual manner has just stated that there is no authoritative pronouncement by the Hon'ble Supreme Court or High Court on the question raised. It is a settled law that before filing a public interest litigation necessary homework has to be done. If the petitioner would have done the homework, no occasion would had arisen as the issue raised by the petitioner is no more res integra rather stands conclusively decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 16. On the strength of the aforesaid arguments, learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken a very strong exception vide paras-173 and 174 of the judgment of Balwant Singh Chaufal (supra) taking note that the Public Interest Litigation has been filed by the practicing lawyer without doing proper homework is nothing but the abuse of process of the Court, more particularly when the issue in question has already been settled by the superior Court. The relevant paras 173 and 174 of the judgment of Balwant Singh Chaufal (supra) are being reproduced here-in-below:- "173. The relevant paras 173 and 174 of the judgment of Balwant Singh Chaufal (supra) are being reproduced here-in-below:- "173. When we revert to the facts of the present case then the conclusion is obvious that this case is a classic case of the abuse of the process of the court. In the present case a practicing lawyer has deliberately abused the process of the court. In that process, he has made a serious attempt to demean an important constitutional office. The petitioner ought to have known that the controversy which he has been raising in the petition stands concluded half a century ago and by a Division Bench judgment of Nagpur High Court in the case of Karkare (supra) the said case was approved by a Constitution Bench of this court. The controversy involved in this case is no longer res integra. It is unfortunate that even after such a clear enunciation of the legal position, a large number of similar petitions have been filed from time to time in various High Courts. The petitioner ought to have refrained from filing such a frivolous petition. 174. A degree of precision and purity in presentation is a sine qua non for a petition filed by a member of the Bar under the label of public interest litigation. It is expected from a member of the Bar to at least carry out the basic research whether the point raised by him is res integra or not. The lawyer who files such a petition cannot plead ignorance." 17. Learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have also submitted that the present Public Interest Litigation in sum and substance seeks to challenge the appointment of an Officer of the University and thus is a service matter and it is settled proposition of law that in service matters Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable. 18. Learned counsel for the opposite party No.1 have also placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in re: (1998) 7 SCC 273 ; Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & others vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & others, (2005) 1 SCC 590 ; Datta Raj Nathuji Thaware vs. State of Maharashtra & others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 ; Ayub Khan Noor Khan Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra & others submitting that the Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in service matter. Duryodhan Sahu & others vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & others, (2005) 1 SCC 590 ; Datta Raj Nathuji Thaware vs. State of Maharashtra & others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 ; Ayub Khan Noor Khan Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra & others submitting that the Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in service matter. In all the aforesaid matters the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that a person who raises a grievance, must show how he has suffered legal injury. It has been further held that a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the affairs of others. 19. In the light of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court wherein it has been categorically held that such Public Interest Litigations are not maintainable, therefore, the learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have submitted that the present P.I.L. may be dismissed with costs. 20. So far as merits of the issue are concerned, learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have submitted that the present Public Interest Litigation petition has been filed mainly on the premise that the nomination made by the Hon'ble Chancellor is not in accordance with the regulation 7.3.0 (ii) of the U.G.C. Regulations, 2013. Learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have apprised the Court that the aforesaid Regulation, 2013 is the amendment/substitution of earlier Regulation, 2010. It has also been submitted that the question of applicability of U.G.C. Regulations has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kalyani Mathivanan vs. K. V. Jeyaraj and others reported in (2015) 6 SCC 363 . The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the Regulations 7.3.0 has held that the University Grants Commission regulation is not applicable to the Universities, Colleges, and other Higher Educational Institutions coming under the purview of the State Legislature unless the State Government wishes to adopt and implement the scheme subject to the terms and conditions therein. The relevant paras-18, 39 & 43 of the aforesaid judgment are being reproduced here-in-below:- "18. The relevant paras-18, 39 & 43 of the aforesaid judgment are being reproduced here-in-below:- "18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and the issues that arise for our consideration are: (i) Whether UGC Regulations, 2010 is mandatory in nature; and (ii) Whether in the event of conflict between the University Act, Regulations framed thereunder and the UGC Regulations, 2010, the provisions of the UGC Regulations, 2010 would prevail or not; and (iii) Whether the post of Vice-Chancellor of a University is to be considered as part of teaching staff. 39. We find that post of Vice-Chancellor under the University Act, 1965 is a post of an Officer. The UGC Act 1956 is silent about this aspect. The UGC Regulations, 2000 are also silent in regard to post of Vice-Chancellor. Provisions regarding Vice-Chancellor have been made for the first time under UGC Regulations, 2010. We have noticed and held that UGC Regulations, 2010 is not applicable to the Universities, Colleges and other higher educational institutions coming under the purview of the State Legislature unless State Government wish to adopt and implement the Scheme subject to the terms and conditions therein. In this connection, one may refer paragraph 8(p)(v) of Appendix-I dated 31st December, 2008 and Regulation 7.4.0 of UGC Regulations, 2010. 43. We do not agree with the finding of the Bombay High Court that Regulation 7.3.0 of the UGC Regulations, 2010 is not traceable to clause (e) or (g) of Section 26(1) of UGC Act, 1956. We also refuse to agree that Regulation 7.3.0 of the UGC Regulations, 2010 being a sub-ordinate legislation under the Act of Parliament cannot override the preliminary legislation enacted by the State Legislature. However, the finding of the Bombay High Court that Regulation 7.3.0 has to be treated as recommendatory in nature is upheld in so far as it relates to Universities and Colleges under the State Legislation." 21. However, the finding of the Bombay High Court that Regulation 7.3.0 has to be treated as recommendatory in nature is upheld in so far as it relates to Universities and Colleges under the State Legislation." 21. Learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have cited the judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported in 2016 (4) ALJ 194; Syed Abrar Ahmad vs. University Grants Commission and others submitting that this Hon'ble Court while considering the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Kalyani Mathivanan (supra) has held that in absence of any adoption by the University at clause 7.3.0 of the U.G.C. Regulations and in the absence of any amendment having been made in the University Act, Ordinance or Statute to give any effect to the provisions of clause 7.3.0 of the U.G.C. Regulations, the qualification as prescribed under clause 7.3.0 of the U.G.C. Regulations in relation to the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of the University would not be applicable to the University. The relevant paras-33, 34, 35 & 40 of the aforesaid judgment are being reproduced here-in-below:- "33. The University Act and the UGC Act are referable to Entries 63 and 66 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The UGC Regulations dated 30 June 2010 on minimum qualifications for appointment of teachers and other academic staffs in the Universities and measures for the maintenance of standards in higher education have been framed under clauses (e) and (g) of sub-section (1) of section 26 of the UGC Act. The UGC was conscious of the fact that the Act and the Statutes of Universities would be governing the appointment of Vice-Chancellors of the Universities and, therefore, the necessity to first adopt and then amend the Act/Statutes of the Universities was made an essential requirement. It, therefore, in clause 7.4.0 provided that the Universities/State Governments shall modify or amend the relevant Act or Statutes of the University concerned within six months of the adoption of these Regulations. 34. The coming into force of the UGC Regulations with immediate effect as provided for in clause 1.3 of the UGC Regulations would not mean that they would automatically apply to Universities dehors the provisions of clause 7.4.0 of the UGC Regulations. Clause 7.4.0 clearly requires that the Universities should first adopt the Regulations and then modify or amend the relevant Act/Statutes of the University within six months of the adoption. Clause 7.4.0 clearly requires that the Universities should first adopt the Regulations and then modify or amend the relevant Act/Statutes of the University within six months of the adoption. Thus, the UGC Regulations would not automatically apply to Universities. The consequences of failure of the Universities to comply with the recommendations of the University Grants Commission have also been provided in clause 3. It provides that if any University contravenes the provisions of any Regulations made under clause (e) or clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 26, the Commission after taking into consideration the cause, if any, shown by the University for such failure or contravention, may withhold from the University the grants proposed to be made out of the funds of the Commission. 35. Insofar as the adoption of the UGC Regulations by the University is concerned, it is seen that an office memo dated 6 December 2010 was issued by the Registrar of the University. The office memo mentions that the Vice-Chancellor, in exercise of the powers vested in him under section 19(3) of the University Act has on behalf of the Academic Council/Executive Council approved the adoption/implementation of certain letters including that containing the UGC Regulations. However, an office memo dated 26/30 November 2011 was subsequently issued by the Registrar of the University in continuation of the earlier office memo dated 6 December 2010 that the Vice-Chancellor had ordered to keep the adoption of clause 7.3.0 of the UGC Regulations regarding the selection of the Vice-Chancellor of the University in abeyance till the matter was examined and deliberated in detail by the Executive Council and the University Court. Thus, the adoption of clause 7.3.0 relating to the selection of the Vice-Chancellor of the University was kept in abeyance by the University. The meeting of the Executive Council of the University was held on 12 April 2012 after the issuance of the office memo dated 26/30 November 2011. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the University subsequently adopted clause 7.3.0 of the UGC Regulations or that the Act/Statutes of the University had been amended to give effect to the provisions of clause 7.3.0 of the UGC Regulations. The Act and the Statutes of the University were necessarily required to be amended as is also contemplated in clause 7.4.0 of the UGC Regulations. 40. The Act and the Statutes of the University were necessarily required to be amended as is also contemplated in clause 7.4.0 of the UGC Regulations. 40. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kalyani Mathivanan. In the said case the High Court had set aside the appointment of the appellant Kalyani Mathivanan as Vice-Chancellor of the University on account of non-fulfillment of eligibility criteria contained in clause 7.3.0 of the UGC Regulations and rejected the plea that they were not mandatory. The Supreme Court found that the UGC Regulations had not been adopted or implemented by the State Government nor the University Act had been amended in terms of the UGC Regulations nor any action was taken by the University Grants Commission under section 14 of the UGC Act as a consequence of failure of the University to comply with the recommendation of the University Grants Commission. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court upheld the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor and set aside the order of the High Court." 22. Learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in re: Amrit Prasad vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2016 (1) A.L.J. 533 has followed the view of Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Kalyani Mathivanan (supra). The relevant paras-22 & 25 of the aforesaid judgment are being reproduced here-in-below:- "22. Bare perusal of the Government Order dated 31st December, 2010 would go to show that as far as teachers and other non-teaching staff are concerned, qua them the UGC Regulations 2010 has to be adhered to and similar is the language that has been so used in the letter dated 3rd December, 2013. The said letter in question, at no point of time, has ever taken within its fold the selection and appointment of Vice-Chancellor, rather it confines itself only in reference to selection and appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff and nothing beyond the same. There is logical reason behind the same, as under U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, Vice-Chancellor holds the post of principal Executive Officer and has not at all been taken with the fold of teacher. There is logical reason behind the same, as under U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, Vice-Chancellor holds the post of principal Executive Officer and has not at all been taken with the fold of teacher. "Teacher" has been defined under Section 2(18) of the Act as a person employed [for imparting instructions or guiding or conducting research in the University or in an institute or in a constituent, affiliated or associated college] and includes Principal or Director. Under Section 9(c) Vice-Chancellor has been described as Officer of the University. Vice-Chancellor and Teacher stand on all-together different footing under U.P. State Universities Act, 1973. Scheme as contained under UGC Regulation, 2010 had been adopted in part by the State Government only in reference of teaching/non-teaching staff. Post of Pro-Vice Chancellor and Vice Chancellor has been deliberately and intentionally left out and as such, UGC Regulation, 2010 ipso-facto would not at all apply in the matter of selection and appointment of Pro-Vice Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor. 25. Even otherwise facts of present case are identical to the facts of Kalyani Mathivanan (Supra) for the reason that the provisions of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 as well as The Madurai Kamraj University Act, 1965 are more or less identical as under both the statutory provisions "Teacher" has been separately defined and "Officer" of the University has been separately defined, and in the backdrop of statutory provisions of The Madurai Kamraj Univesity Act, 1965, finding has been returned that post of Vice-Chancellor under University Act, 1965 and the Statutes made thereunder is not a teaching post but an officer of the University. Under the provision of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 also Vice-Chancellor is not a teacher but an officer of the University. Once such is the similarity and State has not at all adopted UGC Regulations, 2010 in reference of Vice-Chancellor, then appointment of Vice-Chancellor being akin to the appointment of Dr. Kalyani Mathivanan, has to be upheld in all eventuality." 23. Learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have also submitted that neither Regulations, 2013 has been adopted either by the State of U.P. or the Technical University and as such the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Regulation 7.3.0 (ii) is mandatory in nature, is incorrect and not tenable in the eyes of law. Learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have also submitted that neither Regulations, 2013 has been adopted either by the State of U.P. or the Technical University and as such the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Regulation 7.3.0 (ii) is mandatory in nature, is incorrect and not tenable in the eyes of law. Further, learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 have submitted that the U.G.C. Regulations are only directory. It has also been submitted that the opposite party No.1 does not receive any fund from the U.G.C. or maintenance grant for the Technical University. 24. Replying to the aforesaid contentions of learned counsel for the opposite party No.1, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in re: State of Bihar and others vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another reported in (2000) SCC (L & S) 845 submitting that the writ petition may not be dismissed on technicalities and it should have been decided on merits as it is a first and foremost obligation of the Court to decide the disputes between the parties in the ends of justice. He placed reliance upon paras-11 & 13 of the aforesaid judgment, which are being reproduced here-in-below: "11. Power to condone the delay in approaching the court has been conferred upon the courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. This Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. [ 1987 (2) SCR 387 ] held that the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice -that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: '1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so'." 13. In Nand Kishore vs. State of Punjab [ 1995 (6) SCC 614 ] this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years. In N. Balakrishnan v M. Krishnamurthy [ 1998 (7) SCC 123 ] this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack malafides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed: '9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. If the explanation given does not smack malafides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed: '9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court'." 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner in his rejoinder arguments has cited the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan reported in AIR 2016 SC 3506 reiterating his earlier submission and also submitted that the writ petition should be decided on merits only and no writ petition should be dismissed on account of technical issues for example maintainability etc. inasmuch as the paramount consideration of the Court should be to decide the issue on merits only. He has placed reliance upon para-28 of the aforesaid judgment, which is being reproduced here-in-below. "28. inasmuch as the paramount consideration of the Court should be to decide the issue on merits only. He has placed reliance upon para-28 of the aforesaid judgment, which is being reproduced here-in-below. "28. Given the fact that pronouncements mentioned above have interpreted and understood the word “life” appearing in Article 21 of the Constitution on a broad spectrum of rights considered incidental and/or integral to the right to life, there is no real reason why access to justice should be considered to be falling outside the class and category of the said rights, which already stands recognised as being a part and parcel of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If “life” implies not only life in the physical sense but a bundle of rights that makes life worth living, there is no juristic or other basis for holding that denial of “access to justice” will not affect the quality of human life so as to take access to justice out of the purview of right to life guaranteed under Article 21. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that access to justice is indeed a facet of right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. We need only add that access to justice may as well be the facet of the right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws to not only citizens but non-citizens also. We say so because equality before law and equal protection of laws is not limited in its application to the realm of executive action that enforces the law. It is as much available in relation to proceedings before Courts and tribunal and adjudicatory fora where law is applied and justice administered. The Citizen’s inability to access courts or any other adjudicatory mechanism provided for determination of rights and obligations is bound to result in denial of the guarantee contained in Article 14 both in relation to equality before law as well as equal protection of laws. Absence of any adjudicatory mechanism or the inadequacy of such mechanism, needless to say, is bound to prevent those looking for enforcement of their right to equality before laws and equal protection of the laws from seeking redress and thereby negate the guarantee of equality before laws or equal protection of laws and reduce it to a mere teasing illusion. Absence of any adjudicatory mechanism or the inadequacy of such mechanism, needless to say, is bound to prevent those looking for enforcement of their right to equality before laws and equal protection of the laws from seeking redress and thereby negate the guarantee of equality before laws or equal protection of laws and reduce it to a mere teasing illusion. Article 21 of the Constitution apart, access to justice can be said to be part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 as well." 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also cited the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Olga Tellis and others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others etc. reported in (1985) 3 SCC 545 reiterating his aforesaid submissions. He has placed reliance upon paras-28 & 29 of the aforesaid judgment, which are being reproduced here-in-below:- "28. . . .There can be no estoppel against the Constitution. The Constitution is not only the paramount law of the land but, it is the source and sustenance of all laws. Its provisions are conceived in public interest and are intended to serve a public purpose. The doctrine of estoppel is based on the principle that consistency in word and action imparts certainty and honesty to human affairs. If a person makes representation to another, on the faith of which the latter acts to is prejudice, the former cannot resile from the representation made by him. He must make it good. This principle can have no application to representations made regarding the assertion or enforcement of fundamental rights. . . . Fundamental rights are undoubtedly conferred by the Constitution upon individuals which have to be asserted and en forced by them, if those rights are violated. But, the high purpose which the Constitution seeks to achieve by conferment of fundamental rights is not only to benefit individuals but to secure the larger interests of the community. The Preamable of the Constitution says that India is a democratic Republic. It is in order to fulfil the promise of the Preamble that fundamental rights are conferred by the Constitution, some on citizens like those guaranteed by Articles 15, 16, 19, 21 and 29 and, some on citizens and non-citizens alike, like those guaranteed by Articles 14, 21, 22 and 25 of the Constitution. No individual can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the Constitution. No individual can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the Constitution. A concession made by him in a proceedings, whether under a mistake of law or otherwise, that he does not possess or will not enforce any particular fundamental right, cannot create an estoppel against him in that or any subsequent proceedings. Such a concession, if enforced, would defeat the purpose of the Constitution. . . . Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners had conceded in the Bombay High Court that they have no fundamental right to construct hutments on pavements and that they will not object to their demolition after October 15, 1981, they are entitled to assert that any such action on the part of public authorities will be in violation of their fundamental rights. How far the argument regarding the existence and scope of the right claimed by the petitioners is well-founded is another matter. But, the argument has to be examined despite the concession." 29. . . . The plea of estoppel is closely connected with the plea of waiver, the object of both being to ensure bona fides in day-to day transactions. . .." 27. The bare perusal of the judgments so cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reveals that those are not addressing the points of maintainability of the instant Public Interest Litigation so raised by the learned counsels for the opposite party No.1 as well as the points regarding the applicability of the provisions of U.G.C. Regulations so raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party No.1 with the support of the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and of this Court. 28. The petitioner being a member of legal profession should not indulge himself in a litigation which can't be said to be a Public Interest Litigation inasmuch as neither he has disclosed that he had filed any Public Interest Litigation ever nor could he substantiate that there is any public cause in this Public Interest Litigation. Further, Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in service matter as the petitioner has sought relief challenging the order of appointment if so made pursuant to the recommendation of the Committee. Further, Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in service matter as the petitioner has sought relief challenging the order of appointment if so made pursuant to the recommendation of the Committee. If effect, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not substantiate either by way of his arguments or by way of citing the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court that the present Public Interest Litigation is maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Balwant Singh Chaufal and others (supra), Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & others (supra), Datta Raj Nathuji Thaware (supra) and Ayub Khan Noor Khan Pathan (supra). 29. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are convinced that this Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable as the same has not been filed in conformity with the provisions of sub-rule 3-A of Rule-1 of Chapter-XXII of Rules, 1952. 30. So far as the merits of the case is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that since in veiw of the judgment of Kalyani Mathivanan (supra), Syed Abrar Ahmad (supra) and Amrit Prasad (supra), the University Grants Commission Regulations, 2013 is not applicable on the Technical University as it has neither been adopted by the Technical University nor the Technical University receives any fund or maintenance grant from U.G.C, therefore, nomination of Dr. S.G. Dhandey as one of the members of the Search Committee made by the Chancellor for appointment of Vice-Chancellor of the Technical University would not be violative of any of the regulation of U.G.C. Regulations, 2013. 31. Consequently, the instant Public Interest Litigation petition is dismissed on both the counts, firstly, it is not maintainable and secondly, it is devoid of merits, as discussed above. 32. No order as to costs.